Ukrainian Air Force claim:

6 out of 9 Kh-101s shot down
6 out of 8 Kalibrs shot down
1 out of 6 Iskanders shot down

...

Map for reference

A couple of hours later, the Israeli Air Force conducted an airstrike on the reported rocket launchers in Deir Al-Balah, central Gaza.

Evacuation orders were issued for parts of the city.

3 U.S. airstrikes targeted the Sana'a governorate of Yemen.

Well, one of the businesses in Sumy that was destroyed last night 100% was not a military target because I know the owner and I visited his factory regularly to buy some fish.
The irony is that he is Russian speaking, and refused to speak Ukrainian, and also employed over 50 people. Millions of $$$$$ destroyed.

At about 8:17pm, 1 Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile was launched from Kursk Oblast. From what I've gathered, it struck the outskirts of Sumy City, but I will wait on more reliable information from a local from Sumy (Masno).

Ukraine launching MLRS (Likely HIMARS) from/near residential neighbourhoods of Sumy City.

Al-Jazeera correspondent in Gaza: "A journalist was killed and others were injured after a journalists' tent was bombed near the Nasser Medical Complex in Khan Yunis, Southern Gaza."

At least one U.S. airstrike targeted the vicinity of the town of Bani Hassan in the Hajjah governorate of Yemen, approximately 16km from the border with Saudi Arabia.

Russian forces advanced for nearly 3.5 km and have reached the large lithium deposit east of Shevchenko, Komar direction, Donetsk Oblast.

From my twitter:

"What we see in this war is one side being reckless in the attacks (most of the time), and the other being careful in their attacks (most of the time). This is - of course - for a number of reasons, many of which are unavoidable for Ukraine. I will get into those a little further down in this post.

Ukraine conducts these ridiculously planned, doomed-to-fail, operations such as what we've seen in Toretsk, Kursk, Belgorod, Solone, Kotlyne, etc, however there have been more careful counterattacks, like what we saw in Udachne and Uspenivka.

Russia does much more well-planned, careful, and more-likely-to-succeed operations, such as what we've seen in the final stages of Avdiivka, the offensive southwest of Pokrovsk, the Ocheretyne breakthrough, etc, however there have been more reckless attacks such as the initial Terny and Avdiivka offensives, as well as the new mechanised assault west of Andriivka.

There are other issues of course, such as the whole structure of the two militaries, with Ukraine lacking Division-level staff with experienced brigade commanders and staff officers. Also, Ukraine has only just recently started transitioning from a largely brigade-level system to an Army corps system. Army corps systems allow commanders to better focus on their troops and distributes the management load more efficiently. Of course, there are numerous other benefits (which I won't get into), but the main point I'm making is that Ukraine didn't enjoy these benefits during these reckless operations.

There is also the fact that Ukraine detaches and patches units together which results in a lack of adequate coordination, further undermining these operations and making them even more unsuccessful and costly.

And of course, the lack of training and motivated soldiers is a major drawback. With Ukraine lacking manpower, they feel the need to conduct training as fast as possible, which leads to missed knowledge by the new troops and many other issues which are sure to arise later on in terrible forms for the AFU.

The way in which mobilisation is conducted also plays a major role, as it is forced, and men are often beaten up by TCC (mobilisation) officers before being sent to training centres. Its self-explanatory why this is in no way adequate for motivated troops who fight well.

The above point on manpower also means that the Ukrainian command doesn't have the time for long periods of breaks for worn out and exhausted brigades where replenishment, reconstitution, regrouping and mobilisation to patch up said brigade should take place on a widespread and properly conducted way. Brigades should have one year allocated for this process, although this can be shortened to six months during wartime if necessary. This has not been happening in Ukraine, once again - because of the lack of manpower on the frontlines and in the rear.

Russia on the other hand has the manpower, firepower, airpower and overall time advantages against Ukraine. They can keep up the war of attrition for a long time, meaning that they have the time to plan operations and offensives, conduct them thoroughly and successfully, and have the necessary military structure and leadership qualities to ensure eventual success, even if it does take some time (which many incorrectly associate with a lack of success).

Of course, Russia has their reckless commanders who are stuck in the past and believe that it is somehow a great idea to send 18 tanks and other armoured vehicles down a 4km stretch of open road with no cover, little to no electronic warfare and with the expectation that they will somehow reach the next village without being chewed down by swarms of Ukrainian FPV drones. But overall, their commanders and higher-up command are largely smarter and correctly view this war as a war of attrition, know that they have the theatre-wide advantage, and don't get impatient with slow, or even no progress."