🇮🇷🇮🇱 Strike Arsenals of Iran’s IRGC vs. Israeli Air Force – Technical Breakdown

As IRGC missile divisions prepare potential strikes on IDF targets and U.S. Navy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, here’s a detailed look at both sides’ offensive capabilities:

🇮🇷 IRGC Ballistic and Cruise Missile Arsenal:
Estimated reserves: 10,000–20,000+ missiles
Likely systems to be deployed:

▪️ Shahab-3A/B MRBMs (range: 1300/2500 km)
– MIRV configuration with 5 warheads
– INS + GPS guidance; CEP (Circular Error Probable): 200/30 m
– Terminal speed: 1500–1700 m/s

▪️ Emad MRBM
– Based on Shahab-3, with enhanced CEP: 25–35 m
– Boost phase speed: ~12,000 km/h
– Terminal velocity: Mach 5–6

▪️ Ghadr-1 MRBM (range: ~1950 km)
– Boost phase: Mach 14
– Terminal phase: Mach 5–6

▪️ Soumar cruise missiles
– Range: 1900–2300 km
– Low-altitude flight (30–100 m)
– Speed: Mach 0.75–0.9
– Equipped with radar altimeter, INS, GPS-based correction

▪️ Khorramshahr-4 MRBM (next-gen)
– Range: 2000+ km
– Exo-atmospheric speed: Mach 15
– Stratospheric: Mach 8
– Terminal phase: ~Mach 6–7

▪️ Dezful MRBM w/ hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)
– Speed (at 70–20 km alt): Mach 7–5.5
– Speed (at 15–5 km alt): Mach 4.5–3
– Range: 1000–1500 km

⚠️ Limitations:
– High circular error probable (CEP) due to inaccuracies and lower quality in inertial sensors
– Lack of aerodynamic or gas-dynamic control on many warheads. Resulting in the need for 7–15 missiles in many high-value targets, but they have massive stockpiles.

🇮🇱 Israeli Air Force (IAF) Strike Capabilities:

▪️ 175× F-16I Sufa & F-16C Barak
– Weapons: GBU-31/B (2000-lb JDAMs), Delilah-AL IR-guided cruise missiles

▪️ 25× F-15I Ra’am + 75× F-15A/B/C/D
– Weapons: ROCKS, Rampage, Blue/Silver Sparrow, Air LORA (range: 300–1500 km)

▪️ 80–100× F-16A/B/D
– Fully integrated with precision-guided munition systems
🛩 All aircraft can be equipped with SPICE-250/500/1000 glide bombs
→ Stock: hundreds to possibly 1000+ units

The CEP of most Israel Air Force Weapons is of: 0.5–3 m
→ 1–2 bombs often sufficient to neutralize soft ground targets

🔥 Strategic Disparity
💬 Israel’s precision-guided arsenal allows for highly efficient munition usage a stark contrast to IRGC’s quantity-based approach relying on saturation fire.

At the same time, the MIC and the doctrine of the countries are adapted to these limitations.
Israeli aircraft have a small window of opportunity to fly over the launch area (they can be hunted down by Iranian systems + fuel limitations), so every attack must count.
Iran's massive missiles also serve to saturate Israeli defences, so the focus is on quantity with reasonable quality but without focusing on this in most of their systems. This also creates resilience if launchers or missile bases are hit.

⚠️ Moreover, Israel possesses dozens to hundreds of Jericho ballistic missiles and an estimated 50–90 nuclear warheads a capability Iran is not confirmed to possess.

There is talk in Israeli military circles of abandoning the air doctrine and focusing on missiles.
The country's lack of strategic depth means that if its air bases suffer even minor damage to their runways, Israel loses a huge part of its offensive and defensive capabilities.
Many Israeli analysts have expressed admiration for Russian missile systems.
If Israel were to lose the support of the American MIC at very low prices, the Israeli MIC would begin mass production of cost-effective systems with its ballistic missiles, adapting a doctrine more similar to that of Russia, which is superior to NATO in real war conditions where the absolute survival of air bases cannot be guaranteed.

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