NEW BOT Телеграм, страница

The Ukrainian army is facing the multiplication of small salients all along the eastern front. The Russian army pushes into a targeted area for several weeks, then threatens encirclement and forces a Ukrainian withdrawal.

Moreover, the Russian army is using fewer and fewer armored vehicles. We see a dominance of modern light cavalry (motorbikes, quads, civilian vehicles) and infantry for assaulting positions. This strategy is a direct response to the ultra-dronization of the war: it has become nearly impossible to move armored vehicles within the last five kilometers before the front line. As a result, the Russian army now leads assaults mostly on foot — which creates more targets for drones, and therefore more casualties.

But is this a problem? Not really — Moscow recruits between 30,000 and 40,000 men each month.
@AndrewPerpetua tracks the daily number of Russian soldiers killed on video.

He has counted 34,943 in the last 289 days based only on visually confirmed losses. Including the wounded who later die, he estimates around 80,000 deaths over the same period. On a yearly basis, that's approximately 102,000 Russian soldiers killed.

The lack of armored vehicle use is also explained by the “killzone,” which spans 5 to 10, or even 15 kilometers, where any vehicle can be targeted by a fiber-optic drone.

The Ukrainian army is now producing versions with ranges of 40 or 50 kilometers — enough to change the dynamics of strike warfare.

But by avoiding the use of armored vehicles, the Russian army can also rebuild its reserves — possibly preparing for exploiting a local breakthrough, which could be disastrous for the already overstretched Ukrainian forces.

On the Ukrainian side, a major issue is becoming increasingly apparent: desertions. 90,000 legal proceedings have been opened since the start of this year.

January 2025: 18,145
February 2025: 17,809
March 2025: 16,349
April 2025: 18,331
May 2025: 19,956

Since the beginning of 2022, a total of 213,722 desertion cases have been recorded. This adds to the many killed, wounded, or captured soldiers who are not being replaced, due to a suffocating mobilization system.

The Ukrainian army lacks manpower to hold positions, leading to a tacit form of front-line control — especially through drones.

To contain the Russian army, Ukraine is relying on two strengths: its drone force, which it hopes will keep Russian logistics at a distance of 5 to 10 kilometers or more, and its defensive fortifications.

Kyiv has finally grasped the stakes and adopted a new strategy: frontline brigades now fortify their own positions; in the rear, the army's engineering corps takes charge, while the new Donbas defense line is being built by private companies.

This line includes three anti-tank ditches, dragon's teeth, barbed wire, and camouflaged positions behind hedgerows. It’s meant to serve as the main fallback line if the last cities in the Donbas fall.

Previously, armored vehicle losses were key indicators — but these have drastically decreased in recent months. For instance, only one MRAP was lost at Kursk, and few armored vehicles were destroyed in the Pokrovsk sector.

This leads to two opposite hypotheses:

The Russian army is not as strong as it seems. It's pulling armored vehicles from the front due to drones, trying to advance at all costs with infantry, and cannot hope for a real breakthrough — only to push the front back slowly.

The Russian army is reserving its armored vehicles in anticipation of a return to maneuver warfare. It's advancing faster, wearing down the Ukrainian army, and getting closer to a breaking point.

Both theories seem plausible — and, as often, the truth likely lies somewhere in between.

❤1

37 views17:44