RT @Etr1sHashemi: Damit machen sie uns erneut zum Spielball ihrer politischen Spiele. Dieser Ausschuss hatte in den Augen der CDU und der Grünen offensichtlich nur ein einziges Ziel: Die Landesregierung und die Polizei und Justiz vor kritischen Nachfragen zu schützen. Daran sind sie gescheitert.
Initiative 19. Februar Hanau
Never Forger Hanau - 🙅♂️Brevik-mania 🙅♂️☪️fobia by @HanauTerror
A @grttme project - Other backups: @Hallotme
Initiative 19. Februar Hanau
Never Forger Hanau - 🙅♂️Brevik-mania 🙅♂️☪️fobia by @HanauTerror
A @grttme project - Other backups: @Hallotme
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Zwei Monate nach den rassistischen Anschlägen in Hanau
Backup by @HanauTerror
A @grttme project - Other backups: https://swiy.co/tgme
Backup by @HanauTerror
A @grttme project - Other backups: https://swiy.co/tgme
Wie viele Notrufe wurden bei der Polizei in Hanau über den Tatzeitraum hinweg insgesamt angenommen?
In der Tatnacht sind in Hanau zwischen 21:55 Uhr und 03:10 Uhr insgesamt 81 Notrufe bei der Notrufnummer „110“ und 55 Notrufe bei Notrufnummer „112“ eingegangen. Hierbei handelte es sich nicht ausschließlich um im Tatzusammenhang stehende Notrufe.
Die Frage nach der Erreichbarkeit der Notrufnummer der Polizei und der Besetzung des Notruftelefons ist Gegenstand eines laufenden Prüfvorgangs der Staatsanwaltschaft Hanau. Wegen der Kompetenzverteilung des Grundgesetzes äußert sich die Bundesregierung grundsätzlich NICHT zu Vorgängen der Staatsanwaltschaften der Länder🤦♂️
Ist nach Kenntnis der Bunderegierung bei der Polizei in Hanau mittlerweile ein Überleitungssystem für Notrufe eingerichtet worden, und wenn nein, warum nicht?
Hierzu liegen der Bundesregierung keine Erkenntnisse vor 🤦♂️
————
@NorwayErrors
Distriktet kan ved full bemanning motta inntil 60 samtidige nødanrop.
At full staffing, the district can receive up to 60 simultaneous emergency calls.
Den 22. juli mottok politidistriktet langt flere nødsamtaler enn det hadde kapasitet til a besvare.
On July 22, the police district received far more emergency calls than it had the capacity to answer.
Det er teknisk mulig a viderekoble nødanrop til andre politidistrikter, men det forutsetter at det bista ende distriktet har kapasitet til a ta imot nødanrop, og at det har nødvendig informasjon til støtte og oppfølging av involverte/pa rørende. En ordning for slik viderekobling ma være etablert i forkant av en hendelse, og ble ikke iverksatt 22. juli.
It is technically possible to forward emergency calls to other police districts, but this requires that the assisting district has the capacity to receive emergency calls, and that it has the necessary information to support and follow up those involved/next of kin. An arrangement for such forwarding must be established in advance of an incident, and was not implemented on 22 July.
In der Tatnacht sind in Hanau zwischen 21:55 Uhr und 03:10 Uhr insgesamt 81 Notrufe bei der Notrufnummer „110“ und 55 Notrufe bei Notrufnummer „112“ eingegangen. Hierbei handelte es sich nicht ausschließlich um im Tatzusammenhang stehende Notrufe.
Die Frage nach der Erreichbarkeit der Notrufnummer der Polizei und der Besetzung des Notruftelefons ist Gegenstand eines laufenden Prüfvorgangs der Staatsanwaltschaft Hanau. Wegen der Kompetenzverteilung des Grundgesetzes äußert sich die Bundesregierung grundsätzlich NICHT zu Vorgängen der Staatsanwaltschaften der Länder🤦♂️
Ist nach Kenntnis der Bunderegierung bei der Polizei in Hanau mittlerweile ein Überleitungssystem für Notrufe eingerichtet worden, und wenn nein, warum nicht?
Hierzu liegen der Bundesregierung keine Erkenntnisse vor 🤦♂️
————
@NorwayErrors
Distriktet kan ved full bemanning motta inntil 60 samtidige nødanrop.
At full staffing, the district can receive up to 60 simultaneous emergency calls.
Den 22. juli mottok politidistriktet langt flere nødsamtaler enn det hadde kapasitet til a besvare.
On July 22, the police district received far more emergency calls than it had the capacity to answer.
Det er teknisk mulig a viderekoble nødanrop til andre politidistrikter, men det forutsetter at det bista ende distriktet har kapasitet til a ta imot nødanrop, og at det har nødvendig informasjon til støtte og oppfølging av involverte/pa rørende. En ordning for slik viderekobling ma være etablert i forkant av en hendelse, og ble ikke iverksatt 22. juli.
It is technically possible to forward emergency calls to other police districts, but this requires that the assisting district has the capacity to receive emergency calls, and that it has the necessary information to support and follow up those involved/next of kin. An arrangement for such forwarding must be established in advance of an incident, and was not implemented on 22 July.
Norway - an organisational disaster Part 5
Mange av datasystemene politiet bruker er gått ut på dato og fungerer dårlig. Flere av politiets datasystemer «snakker ikke med hverandre».
Many of the computer systems used by the police are out of date and work poorly. Several of the police's computer systems "don't talk to each other".
Det er begrenset antall nødlinjer inn til politiets operasjonssentraler. I Hønefoss kunne politiet bare svare på to samtaler til nødnummeret samtidig.
There is a limited number of emergency lines to the police operation centres. In Hønefoss, the police could only answer two calls to the emergency number at the same time.
Regjeringen varslet ønsket om felles nødnummer 112 og felles nødsentraler allerede i 2008, men har fortsatt ikke vedtatt. dette formelt.
The government announced its desire for a joint emergency number 112 and joint emergency centers already in 2008, but has still not adopted it. this formally https://perma.cc/6EJC-UCBA
Ogsa Asker og Bærum politidistrikt mottok et økt antall 112-anrop 22/7. Sju anrop ble besvart mellom 17 og 18, mens sju forble ubesvart i samme tidsrom. 78 prosent av de i alt 46 anrop distriktet mottok etter kl. 13.00, ble besvart.
Asker and Bærum police district also received an increased number of 112 calls on 22/7. Seven calls were answered between 17 and 18, while seven remained unanswered during the same period. 78 percent of the total of 46 calls the district received after 13.00, was answered.
I alt ble det registrert 780 anrop til 112 mellom kl. 13.00 og 23.00, hvorav 554 ble besvart (71 prosent).
Selv om tallet er høyt, er det lavt sammenlignet med det man har sett ved terrorhendelser i andre større byer. I Madrid registrerte man om lag 22 000 innkommende nødanrop de første 16 timene etter bombeeksplosjonen i 2004.
A total of 780 calls to 112 were registered between 13.00 and 23.00, of which 554 were answered (71 per cent).
Although the number is high, it is low compared to what has been seen in other major terrorist incidents
Mange av datasystemene politiet bruker er gått ut på dato og fungerer dårlig. Flere av politiets datasystemer «snakker ikke med hverandre».
Many of the computer systems used by the police are out of date and work poorly. Several of the police's computer systems "don't talk to each other".
Det er begrenset antall nødlinjer inn til politiets operasjonssentraler. I Hønefoss kunne politiet bare svare på to samtaler til nødnummeret samtidig.
There is a limited number of emergency lines to the police operation centres. In Hønefoss, the police could only answer two calls to the emergency number at the same time.
Regjeringen varslet ønsket om felles nødnummer 112 og felles nødsentraler allerede i 2008, men har fortsatt ikke vedtatt. dette formelt.
The government announced its desire for a joint emergency number 112 and joint emergency centers already in 2008, but has still not adopted it. this formally https://perma.cc/6EJC-UCBA
Ogsa Asker og Bærum politidistrikt mottok et økt antall 112-anrop 22/7. Sju anrop ble besvart mellom 17 og 18, mens sju forble ubesvart i samme tidsrom. 78 prosent av de i alt 46 anrop distriktet mottok etter kl. 13.00, ble besvart.
Asker and Bærum police district also received an increased number of 112 calls on 22/7. Seven calls were answered between 17 and 18, while seven remained unanswered during the same period. 78 percent of the total of 46 calls the district received after 13.00, was answered.
I alt ble det registrert 780 anrop til 112 mellom kl. 13.00 og 23.00, hvorav 554 ble besvart (71 prosent).
Selv om tallet er høyt, er det lavt sammenlignet med det man har sett ved terrorhendelser i andre større byer. I Madrid registrerte man om lag 22 000 innkommende nødanrop de første 16 timene etter bombeeksplosjonen i 2004.
A total of 780 calls to 112 were registered between 13.00 and 23.00, of which 554 were answered (71 per cent).
Although the number is high, it is low compared to what has been seen in other major terrorist incidents
Norway - an organisational disaster Part 6
Part 1 https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598
OPD har kapasitet til a ha ndtere 60 samtidige nødanrop i en felles kø, og det er derfor i hoved- sak antall operatører ved operasjonssentralen som er begrensende for om den nødstilte fa r svar eller ikke.
The OPD has the capacity to handle 60 simultaneous emergency calls in a common queue, and it is therefore mainly the number of operators at the operations center that is limiting as to whether the person in emergency receives an answer or not.
Komiteen vil påpeke at det har kommet frem at politiet sviktet på mange områder den 22. juli 2011 https://perma.cc/398H-BTW2
The committee would like to point out that it has emerged that the police failed in many areas on 22 July 2011.
Komiteens flertall, medlemmene fra Fremskrittspartiet, Høyre, Kristelig Folkeparti og Venstre, viser til atinformasjonen som regjeringen ga i noen sentrale tilfeller var divergerende med 22. juli-kommisjonens funn
The majority of the committee, the members from the Progressive Party, the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Liberal Party, point to the fact that the information that the government gave in some key cases was divergent with the 22 July commission's findings
Det gjelder avgjørende spørsmål om myndighetenes håndtering av angrepet, som tilgangen på båter ved Utøya, politihelikopteret, riksalarm og innkalling av ekstra mannskaper, der det gjennomgående ble skapt et inntrykk av at justissektoren hadde gjort en bedre innsats enn det kommisjonen fant var tilfellet.
It concerns crucial questions about the authorities' handling of the attack, such as the access to boats at Utøya, the police helicopter, the national alarm and the calling in of extra crews, where the impression was consistently created that the justice sector had made a better effort than what the commission found to be the case.
Part 1 https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598
OPD har kapasitet til a ha ndtere 60 samtidige nødanrop i en felles kø, og det er derfor i hoved- sak antall operatører ved operasjonssentralen som er begrensende for om den nødstilte fa r svar eller ikke.
The OPD has the capacity to handle 60 simultaneous emergency calls in a common queue, and it is therefore mainly the number of operators at the operations center that is limiting as to whether the person in emergency receives an answer or not.
Komiteen vil påpeke at det har kommet frem at politiet sviktet på mange områder den 22. juli 2011 https://perma.cc/398H-BTW2
The committee would like to point out that it has emerged that the police failed in many areas on 22 July 2011.
Komiteens flertall, medlemmene fra Fremskrittspartiet, Høyre, Kristelig Folkeparti og Venstre, viser til atinformasjonen som regjeringen ga i noen sentrale tilfeller var divergerende med 22. juli-kommisjonens funn
The majority of the committee, the members from the Progressive Party, the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Liberal Party, point to the fact that the information that the government gave in some key cases was divergent with the 22 July commission's findings
Det gjelder avgjørende spørsmål om myndighetenes håndtering av angrepet, som tilgangen på båter ved Utøya, politihelikopteret, riksalarm og innkalling av ekstra mannskaper, der det gjennomgående ble skapt et inntrykk av at justissektoren hadde gjort en bedre innsats enn det kommisjonen fant var tilfellet.
It concerns crucial questions about the authorities' handling of the attack, such as the access to boats at Utøya, the police helicopter, the national alarm and the calling in of extra crews, where the impression was consistently created that the justice sector had made a better effort than what the commission found to be the case.
Norway - an organisational disaster Part 7
Part 1 https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598
Breivik forklarer at han får opptattsignaler 2-3 ganger hos politiet når han ringer for å overgi seg. Massemorderen ringte to ganger fra Utøya: Først klokken 18, så klokken 18.26.
Breivik explains that he gets busy signals 2-3 times from the police when he calls to surrender. The mass murderer called twice from Utøya: First at 6pm, then at 6.26pm https://perma.cc/3WD6-V79E
Politiet bekrefter dermed deler av forklaringen til Breivik, som har sagt i avhør at han ringte nødnummeret 112 til politiet ti ganger under massakren på Utøya for å si at han ville overgi seg.
The police thus confirm parts of Breivik's explanation, who has said in questioning that he called the emergency number 112 to the police ten times during the massacre on Utøya to say he wanted to surrender https://perma.cc/V5MK-BLF5
Lydloggene viser at Breivik to ganger kom fram til nødtelefonen for å varsle at han hadde «utført oppdraget» og var villig til å overgi seg.
The audio logs show that Breivik came to the emergency phone twice to announce that he had "accomplished the mission" and was willing to surrender.
🥷 Breivik: Kan du, kan du overføre meg til operasjonsleder for Delta?
🚔 Politiet: Ja, du du snakker for så vidt meg en som, med en som på en måte har overordnet ansva
Breivik: Ok, bare finn ut det du skal, og så ringer du på denne telefonen her, ikke sant.
Politiet: Hm, men hvilket telefonnummer..?
Breivik: Kjempefint, hei.
Politiet: Jeg har ikke det telefonnummeret! Hallo!
🥷 Breivik: Can you, can you transfer me to operations manager for Delta? 👍
🚔 The police: Yes, as far as I'm concerned, you're talking to someone who, in a way, has overall responsibility
Breivik: Okay, just figure out what you're going to do, and then you call this phone here, right. 🧠💡
Police: Hm, but which phone number..? 🤦♂️ ... WTF ... Police not able to see the number ...
Breivik: Great, hello.
Police: I don't have that phone number! Hello!
Part 1 https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598
Breivik forklarer at han får opptattsignaler 2-3 ganger hos politiet når han ringer for å overgi seg. Massemorderen ringte to ganger fra Utøya: Først klokken 18, så klokken 18.26.
Breivik explains that he gets busy signals 2-3 times from the police when he calls to surrender. The mass murderer called twice from Utøya: First at 6pm, then at 6.26pm https://perma.cc/3WD6-V79E
Politiet bekrefter dermed deler av forklaringen til Breivik, som har sagt i avhør at han ringte nødnummeret 112 til politiet ti ganger under massakren på Utøya for å si at han ville overgi seg.
The police thus confirm parts of Breivik's explanation, who has said in questioning that he called the emergency number 112 to the police ten times during the massacre on Utøya to say he wanted to surrender https://perma.cc/V5MK-BLF5
Lydloggene viser at Breivik to ganger kom fram til nødtelefonen for å varsle at han hadde «utført oppdraget» og var villig til å overgi seg.
The audio logs show that Breivik came to the emergency phone twice to announce that he had "accomplished the mission" and was willing to surrender.
🥷 Breivik: Kan du, kan du overføre meg til operasjonsleder for Delta?
🚔 Politiet: Ja, du du snakker for så vidt meg en som, med en som på en måte har overordnet ansva
Breivik: Ok, bare finn ut det du skal, og så ringer du på denne telefonen her, ikke sant.
Politiet: Hm, men hvilket telefonnummer..?
Breivik: Kjempefint, hei.
Politiet: Jeg har ikke det telefonnummeret! Hallo!
🥷 Breivik: Can you, can you transfer me to operations manager for Delta? 👍
🚔 The police: Yes, as far as I'm concerned, you're talking to someone who, in a way, has overall responsibility
Breivik: Okay, just figure out what you're going to do, and then you call this phone here, right. 🧠💡
Police: Hm, but which phone number..? 🤦♂️ ... WTF ... Police not able to see the number ...
Breivik: Great, hello.
Police: I don't have that phone number! Hello!
Norway - an organisational disaster Part 8
Part 1 https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598
Dette er en følge av at utbyggingsomra dene i første byggetrinn følger politidistrikt og ikke AMK- omra der. Utøya ligger i nordre Buskerud, der Nødnett ikke er utbygd. I dette omra det benyt
ter hjemmehørende ressurser fra helsetjenesten og de andre nødetatene egne etatsvise analoge sambandsnett. Ambulansetjenesten som opererer i grenseomra det, har utstyr og kompetanse til a kommunisere over begge radionettene. Mange av ressursene som kom for a bista i hendelsen, benyt tet Nødnett som hovedsamband, mens andre var i det analoge helseradionettet. Nødnett hadde bare
This is a consequence of the fact that the development areas in the first construction stage follow police districts and not AMK areas. Utøya is located in northern Buskerud, where Nødnett has not been developed. In this area use
ter resident resources from the health service and the other emergency services own agency-wise analogue communication networks. The ambulance service that operates in the border area has the equipment and expertise to communicate over both radio networks. Many of the resources that came to assist in the incident used Nødnett as the main connection, while others were in the analogue health radio network.
Så la meg derfor redegjøre for den aktiviteten som er registrert forut for dette: Allerede kl. 16.20 varslet Forsvarets operative hovedkvarter luftvingen på Rygge om å skaffe oversikt over tilgjengelige helikoptre og mannskap. Fra kl. 16.36 ble innkalling av mannskaper iverksatt. Forsvaret har loggført at Politiets beredskapstropp tok kontakt med Bell-skvadronen på Rygge ca. kl. 16.50 for å få tilbakemelding på hva som kunne forventes av luftstøttekapasitet. På dette tidspunkt var ingen helikoptre klargjort, men det ble opplyst at de ville bli gjort tilgjengelige for politiet så raskt som mulig. Bell-helikoptre tok av fra Rygge kl. 18.57, 19.18 og 19.37.
Part 1 https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598
Dette er en følge av at utbyggingsomra dene i første byggetrinn følger politidistrikt og ikke AMK- omra der. Utøya ligger i nordre Buskerud, der Nødnett ikke er utbygd. I dette omra det benyt
ter hjemmehørende ressurser fra helsetjenesten og de andre nødetatene egne etatsvise analoge sambandsnett. Ambulansetjenesten som opererer i grenseomra det, har utstyr og kompetanse til a kommunisere over begge radionettene. Mange av ressursene som kom for a bista i hendelsen, benyt tet Nødnett som hovedsamband, mens andre var i det analoge helseradionettet. Nødnett hadde bare
This is a consequence of the fact that the development areas in the first construction stage follow police districts and not AMK areas. Utøya is located in northern Buskerud, where Nødnett has not been developed. In this area use
ter resident resources from the health service and the other emergency services own agency-wise analogue communication networks. The ambulance service that operates in the border area has the equipment and expertise to communicate over both radio networks. Many of the resources that came to assist in the incident used Nødnett as the main connection, while others were in the analogue health radio network.
Så la meg derfor redegjøre for den aktiviteten som er registrert forut for dette: Allerede kl. 16.20 varslet Forsvarets operative hovedkvarter luftvingen på Rygge om å skaffe oversikt over tilgjengelige helikoptre og mannskap. Fra kl. 16.36 ble innkalling av mannskaper iverksatt. Forsvaret har loggført at Politiets beredskapstropp tok kontakt med Bell-skvadronen på Rygge ca. kl. 16.50 for å få tilbakemelding på hva som kunne forventes av luftstøttekapasitet. På dette tidspunkt var ingen helikoptre klargjort, men det ble opplyst at de ville bli gjort tilgjengelige for politiet så raskt som mulig. Bell-helikoptre tok av fra Rygge kl. 18.57, 19.18 og 19.37.
Norway - an organisational disaster Part 9
So let me explain the activity that was registered before this: Already at At 16.20, the Norwegian Armed Forces' operational headquarters notified the air wing at Rygge to obtain an overview of available helicopters and crew. Starting at. At 16.36, crews were called in. The Norwegian Defense Forces have logged that the Police's emergency response team contacted the Bell squadron at Rygge approx. at 16.50 to get feedback on what could be expected from air support capacity. At this time, no helicopters were ready, but it was stated that they would be made available to the police as soon as possible. Bell helicopters took off from Rygge at 18.57, 19.18 and 19.37.
Det ble presisert i brev til Justisdepartementet i september 2009 at beredskapen på Rygge ville bli avviklet, og at Forsvaret ikke lenger hadde helikoptre som til enhver tid ville være klare innenfor en gitt beredskapstid. Det ble samtidig understreket at enhver anmodning om helikopterstøtte vil bli behandlet på vanlig måte, men vil være avhengig av den til enhver tids- og stedsmessige tilgjengelige kapasitet https://perma.cc/NLS6-Y8AS
It was specified in a letter to the Ministry of Justice in September 2009 that the readiness at Rygge would be discontinued, and that the Norwegian Armed Forces no longer had helicopters that would be ready at all times within a given readiness time. It was also emphasized that any request for helicopter support will be dealt with in the usual way, but will be dependent on the available capacity at any given time and place.
Komiteen viser til at de første meldingene om ugjerningene på Utøya kom til politiet kl. 17.24 den 22. juli. Skipperen på MS Thorbjørn ringte AMK-sentralen i Buskerud rett etter at han hadde vært vitne til de første drapene, og ble derfra koblet opp mot politiets operasjonssentral i Hønefoss. Ett minutt senere mottok operasjonssentralen de første telefonene fra ungdommer på Utøya.
So let me explain the activity that was registered before this: Already at At 16.20, the Norwegian Armed Forces' operational headquarters notified the air wing at Rygge to obtain an overview of available helicopters and crew. Starting at. At 16.36, crews were called in. The Norwegian Defense Forces have logged that the Police's emergency response team contacted the Bell squadron at Rygge approx. at 16.50 to get feedback on what could be expected from air support capacity. At this time, no helicopters were ready, but it was stated that they would be made available to the police as soon as possible. Bell helicopters took off from Rygge at 18.57, 19.18 and 19.37.
Det ble presisert i brev til Justisdepartementet i september 2009 at beredskapen på Rygge ville bli avviklet, og at Forsvaret ikke lenger hadde helikoptre som til enhver tid ville være klare innenfor en gitt beredskapstid. Det ble samtidig understreket at enhver anmodning om helikopterstøtte vil bli behandlet på vanlig måte, men vil være avhengig av den til enhver tids- og stedsmessige tilgjengelige kapasitet https://perma.cc/NLS6-Y8AS
It was specified in a letter to the Ministry of Justice in September 2009 that the readiness at Rygge would be discontinued, and that the Norwegian Armed Forces no longer had helicopters that would be ready at all times within a given readiness time. It was also emphasized that any request for helicopter support will be dealt with in the usual way, but will be dependent on the available capacity at any given time and place.
Komiteen viser til at de første meldingene om ugjerningene på Utøya kom til politiet kl. 17.24 den 22. juli. Skipperen på MS Thorbjørn ringte AMK-sentralen i Buskerud rett etter at han hadde vært vitne til de første drapene, og ble derfra koblet opp mot politiets operasjonssentral i Hønefoss. Ett minutt senere mottok operasjonssentralen de første telefonene fra ungdommer på Utøya.
Norway - an organisational disaster Part 10 Final
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598
De fleste innringerne fortalte at en mann i politiuniform gikk omkring på øya og skjøt og at det var mange skadde og drepte.
The committee points out that the first reports about the misdeeds on Utøya came to the police at 17.24 on 22 July. The skipper of MS Thorbjørn called the AMK central in Buskerud right after he had witnessed the first murders, and was connected from there to the police operations center in Hønefoss. One minute later, the operations center received the first calls from young people on Utøya. Most of the callers said that a man in a police uniform was walking around the island shooting and that there were many injured and killed.
Komiteen har merket seg at 22. juli-kommisjonen konkluderte med at politiet kunne ha ankommet Utøya raskere, og dermed trolig spart liv https://perma.cc/4E3K-4KVV
The committee has noted that the 22 July commission concluded that the police could have arrived on Utøya sooner, and thus probably saved lives.
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/589
På grunn av stor pågang ved operasjonssentralen i Nordre Buskerud politidistrikt fikk ikke Beredskapstroppen kontakt med operasjonssentralen på telefon.
Due to heavy traffic at the operations center in the Nordre Buskerud police district, the emergency response team was unable to contact the operations center by telephone.
The committee points out that the lack of clarity between the Emergency Squad and Nordre Buskerud police district officials was not solely due to the fact that the emergency network had not been developed in Nordre Buskerud.
Our final comment about these 10 posts in the next post https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/608
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598
De fleste innringerne fortalte at en mann i politiuniform gikk omkring på øya og skjøt og at det var mange skadde og drepte.
The committee points out that the first reports about the misdeeds on Utøya came to the police at 17.24 on 22 July. The skipper of MS Thorbjørn called the AMK central in Buskerud right after he had witnessed the first murders, and was connected from there to the police operations center in Hønefoss. One minute later, the operations center received the first calls from young people on Utøya. Most of the callers said that a man in a police uniform was walking around the island shooting and that there were many injured and killed.
Komiteen har merket seg at 22. juli-kommisjonen konkluderte med at politiet kunne ha ankommet Utøya raskere, og dermed trolig spart liv https://perma.cc/4E3K-4KVV
The committee has noted that the 22 July commission concluded that the police could have arrived on Utøya sooner, and thus probably saved lives.
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/589
På grunn av stor pågang ved operasjonssentralen i Nordre Buskerud politidistrikt fikk ikke Beredskapstroppen kontakt med operasjonssentralen på telefon.
Due to heavy traffic at the operations center in the Nordre Buskerud police district, the emergency response team was unable to contact the operations center by telephone.
The committee points out that the lack of clarity between the Emergency Squad and Nordre Buskerud police district officials was not solely due to the fact that the emergency network had not been developed in Nordre Buskerud.
Our final comment about these 10 posts in the next post https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/608
Most of the reason to why Jeffrey Dahmer spent a long time committing these crimes without anyone ever finding out about it was because they didn’t investigate him enough
Sorry Norway, do you feel involved now?
Sorry Germany, do you feel involved too?
What, about all other countries, THAT STILL IGNORE AND IGNORE AND IGNORE!
IGNORING IS NOT A SOLUTION! Fix such shit in your heads! even if you don't want to fix that in your heads and you will probably never do that too ...
The shame of our planet. The shame of our politicians. The shame of how people acts!
Sorry Norway, do you feel involved now?
Sorry Germany, do you feel involved too?
What, about all other countries, THAT STILL IGNORE AND IGNORE AND IGNORE!
IGNORING IS NOT A SOLUTION! Fix such shit in your heads! even if you don't want to fix that in your heads and you will probably never do that too ...
The shame of our planet. The shame of our politicians. The shame of how people acts!
What we should learn from "Norway - an organisational disaster"
Go to post 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598
So in conclusion, like we always say, we should focus always on POSITIVE THINGS! and there are tons of positive things in such massacre!
We already said the rescue "was shitty"
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/491
and now you see why ... Well, we can understand that too, since the situation is not so easy and it's the fault of many people ...
So again the goal is not to say "it was shit", but to make clear for other countries, that they don't need to do such shit error again!
We continue to see disorganisation even in 2023! where important government videos are private / not accessible, webpages not available, communication is bad, etc.
This is a reason why even our projects are limited in the effectivity ... if already the government doesn't offer such things. Yes, there are apps ... but ...
So again we really hope that
a) our governments don't repeat same errors! and this is just part of what Norway wrote ... there are tons of pages ...
b) people should take responsibility! and not take excuses
c) better communication and checking that all things really work, even on your webpages!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/DefenceTelegram/445
https://news.1rj.ru/str/WarningAlertTelegram/11
etc.
d) implementing laws that every people need to be controlled
https://news.1rj.ru/str/LawsTelegram/38
e) don't be so open, trusting everyone! Like we said in post 1. This behaviour is just a 🔪
f) don't act just with money in mind or "well, nothing happened until now, so we don't need such things!"
Even in Switzerland there is this shitty believe ...
Initiative against F-35A fighter jets gathers enough support https://perma.cc/77DK-2KHX
Swiss parliament approves purchase of F-35 jets from US https://perma.cc/6SFC-4Q99
Where people don't understand that such things are huge important! and Utøya showed why too!
Ok to not waste money a go go with military, but basic things are needed!
Go to post 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598
So in conclusion, like we always say, we should focus always on POSITIVE THINGS! and there are tons of positive things in such massacre!
We already said the rescue "was shitty"
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/491
and now you see why ... Well, we can understand that too, since the situation is not so easy and it's the fault of many people ...
So again the goal is not to say "it was shit", but to make clear for other countries, that they don't need to do such shit error again!
We continue to see disorganisation even in 2023! where important government videos are private / not accessible, webpages not available, communication is bad, etc.
This is a reason why even our projects are limited in the effectivity ... if already the government doesn't offer such things. Yes, there are apps ... but ...
So again we really hope that
a) our governments don't repeat same errors! and this is just part of what Norway wrote ... there are tons of pages ...
b) people should take responsibility! and not take excuses
c) better communication and checking that all things really work, even on your webpages!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/DefenceTelegram/445
https://news.1rj.ru/str/WarningAlertTelegram/11
etc.
d) implementing laws that every people need to be controlled
https://news.1rj.ru/str/LawsTelegram/38
e) don't be so open, trusting everyone! Like we said in post 1. This behaviour is just a 🔪
f) don't act just with money in mind or "well, nothing happened until now, so we don't need such things!"
Even in Switzerland there is this shitty believe ...
Initiative against F-35A fighter jets gathers enough support https://perma.cc/77DK-2KHX
Swiss parliament approves purchase of F-35 jets from US https://perma.cc/6SFC-4Q99
Where people don't understand that such things are huge important! and Utøya showed why too!
Ok to not waste money a go go with military, but basic things are needed!
Operasjonssentralen varslet interne og eksterne styrker via telefon. Politidistriktet har ikke noe system for massevarsling av egne styrker eller samvirkeaktører.
The operations center notified internal and external forces by telephone. The police district has no system for mass notification of its own forces or cooperative actors.
Mange tjenestepersoner ringte selv inn og tilbød sine tjenester og mobiliserte pa egenha nd, da de ikke lyktes i a oppna kontakt med operasjonssentralen i eget distrikt.
Many service personnel called in themselves and offered their services and mobilized on their own, as they did not succeed in establishing contact with the operations center in their own district.
Oslo har en løsning for massevarsling av stabsmedarbeiderne, men løsningen ble ikke benyttet da den ligger pa samme skjerm som alarmregistrering og nasjonal varsling.
Oslo has a solution for mass notification of the staff, but the solution was not used as it is on the same screen as alarm registration and national notification.
Det ble ikke benyttet massevarslingssystem for varsling av egne mannskaper verken i Oslo eller Nordre Buskerud.
No mass notification system was used to notify own crews either in Oslo or Nordre Buskerud.
Politiet hadde ikke kapasitet til a ha ndtere alle innkomne telefoner pa 112 selv om operasjonssentraler og sentralbord ble bemannet opp.
The police did not have the capacity to handle all incoming 112 calls, even though operation centers and switchboards were staffed.
Ved varsling av personell via ICCS (operasjonssentralen med det nye nødnettet) ma tte man grunnet en teknisk feil ringe alle mobiltelefoner to ganger. Dette førte til at varslingen tok lang tid.
When notifying personnel via ICCS (the operations center with the new emergency network), all mobile phones had to be called twice due to a technical error. This meant that the notification took a long time.
The operations center notified internal and external forces by telephone. The police district has no system for mass notification of its own forces or cooperative actors.
Mange tjenestepersoner ringte selv inn og tilbød sine tjenester og mobiliserte pa egenha nd, da de ikke lyktes i a oppna kontakt med operasjonssentralen i eget distrikt.
Many service personnel called in themselves and offered their services and mobilized on their own, as they did not succeed in establishing contact with the operations center in their own district.
Oslo har en løsning for massevarsling av stabsmedarbeiderne, men løsningen ble ikke benyttet da den ligger pa samme skjerm som alarmregistrering og nasjonal varsling.
Oslo has a solution for mass notification of the staff, but the solution was not used as it is on the same screen as alarm registration and national notification.
Det ble ikke benyttet massevarslingssystem for varsling av egne mannskaper verken i Oslo eller Nordre Buskerud.
No mass notification system was used to notify own crews either in Oslo or Nordre Buskerud.
Politiet hadde ikke kapasitet til a ha ndtere alle innkomne telefoner pa 112 selv om operasjonssentraler og sentralbord ble bemannet opp.
The police did not have the capacity to handle all incoming 112 calls, even though operation centers and switchboards were staffed.
Ved varsling av personell via ICCS (operasjonssentralen med det nye nødnettet) ma tte man grunnet en teknisk feil ringe alle mobiltelefoner to ganger. Dette førte til at varslingen tok lang tid.
When notifying personnel via ICCS (the operations center with the new emergency network), all mobile phones had to be called twice due to a technical error. This meant that the notification took a long time.
Vidnet Andreas Olsen kontakter politiet og fortæller, at han så en nordisk udseende mand iført politiuniform og bevæbnet med pistol. At manden fem minutter inden eksplosionen forlod området i en bil med nummerpladen VH 24605. Der bliver ikke meldt noget ud om observationerne - hverken til det lokale politi eller offentligheden.
The witness Andreas Olsen contacts the police and says that he saw a Nordic-looking man wearing a police uniform and armed with a gun. That the man left the area five minutes before the explosion in a car with the number plate VH 24605. Nothing is reported about the observations - neither to the local police nor to the public https://perma.cc/SC9X-LFEM
Andreas Olsens observationer bliver dog ikke videregivet – den vagthavende skriver hans oplysninger ned på en gul seddel og går hen for at aflevere sedlen til en operationsleder – men vedkommende er optaget, så den gule seddel bliver i stedet lagt på et bord https://perma.cc/S29S-RCCQ
However, Andreas Olsen's observations are not passed on – the duty officer writes his information down on a yellow note and goes to hand the note to an operations manager – but the person is busy, so the yellow note is instead placed on a table.
15.34: Meldingen ble ikke loggført i PO.
The message was not logged in PO.
20 minutes later: Vitnet som ringte inn om kjøretøy kl. 15.34, ringes opp. Han bekrefter meldingen og gir mer informasjon.
The witness who called in about vehicles at 15.34, call up. He confirms the message and provides more information.
30 MINUTES LATER: Operasjonslederen ber Kripos sende ut ”riksalarm” om kjøretøy VH 24605.
The operations manager asks Kripos to send out a "national alert" about vehicle VH 24605.
På det tidspunktet hadde Breivik akkurat kommet seg ut av Oslo. Han passerte Lysaker på vei ut av Oslo klokken 15.56, 22 minutter etter at tipseren først hadde meldt fra om den mulige gjerningsmannen.
At that time, Breivik had just got out of Oslo. He passed Lysaker on his way out of Oslo at 15.56, 22 minutes after
The witness Andreas Olsen contacts the police and says that he saw a Nordic-looking man wearing a police uniform and armed with a gun. That the man left the area five minutes before the explosion in a car with the number plate VH 24605. Nothing is reported about the observations - neither to the local police nor to the public https://perma.cc/SC9X-LFEM
Andreas Olsens observationer bliver dog ikke videregivet – den vagthavende skriver hans oplysninger ned på en gul seddel og går hen for at aflevere sedlen til en operationsleder – men vedkommende er optaget, så den gule seddel bliver i stedet lagt på et bord https://perma.cc/S29S-RCCQ
However, Andreas Olsen's observations are not passed on – the duty officer writes his information down on a yellow note and goes to hand the note to an operations manager – but the person is busy, so the yellow note is instead placed on a table.
15.34: Meldingen ble ikke loggført i PO.
The message was not logged in PO.
20 minutes later: Vitnet som ringte inn om kjøretøy kl. 15.34, ringes opp. Han bekrefter meldingen og gir mer informasjon.
The witness who called in about vehicles at 15.34, call up. He confirms the message and provides more information.
30 MINUTES LATER: Operasjonslederen ber Kripos sende ut ”riksalarm” om kjøretøy VH 24605.
The operations manager asks Kripos to send out a "national alert" about vehicle VH 24605.
På det tidspunktet hadde Breivik akkurat kommet seg ut av Oslo. Han passerte Lysaker på vei ut av Oslo klokken 15.56, 22 minutter etter at tipseren først hadde meldt fra om den mulige gjerningsmannen.
At that time, Breivik had just got out of Oslo. He passed Lysaker on his way out of Oslo at 15.56, 22 minutes after
Norway and Germany - an organisational disaster Part 4
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
At that time, Breivik had just got out of Oslo. He passed Lysaker on his way out of Oslo at 15.56, 22 minutes after the tipster had first reported the possible perpetrator https://perma.cc/S84U-MZWY
Etter at en operatør var blitt ledig og hadde fått snakket med tipseren, som altså kunne oppgi registreringsnummeret på den mistenkelige «politimannens» bil, var operasjonslederen i kontakt med Kripos og ba dem sende ut riksalarm på det aktuelle registreringsnummeret.
Da var klokken 16.04, en halvtime etter at tipseren først ringte politiets nødtelefon med opplysninger om det som skulle vise seg å være Anders Behring Breivik.
After an operator had become available and had been able to speak to the tipster, who could therefore provide the registration number of the suspicious "policeman's" car, the operations manager was in contact with Kripos and asked them to send out a national alert on the registration number in question.
It was then 16:04, half an hour after the tipster first called the police emergency number with information about what turned out to be Anders Behring Breivik.
Det var først da jeg så en enslig politimann med noe jeg oppfattet som et våpen, som deretter satte seg inn i en sivil bil og kjørte i feil kjøreretning, at jeg tenkte at her må det være noe galt, og at det var viktig å observere mer detaljert, sier Olsen https://perma.cc/Q4PD-VTAC
It was only when I saw a lone policeman with what I perceived to be a weapon, who then got into a civilian car and drove in the wrong direction, that I thought that there must be something wrong here, and that it was important to observe in more detail, says Olsen.
Færgen MS Thorbjørn sejler fra Utøya. Om bord er seks deltagere fra sommerlejren – blandt dem AUF-leder Eskil Pedersen. Desuden er skibets kaptajn og en besætning på to personer ombord på færgen.
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
At that time, Breivik had just got out of Oslo. He passed Lysaker on his way out of Oslo at 15.56, 22 minutes after the tipster had first reported the possible perpetrator https://perma.cc/S84U-MZWY
Etter at en operatør var blitt ledig og hadde fått snakket med tipseren, som altså kunne oppgi registreringsnummeret på den mistenkelige «politimannens» bil, var operasjonslederen i kontakt med Kripos og ba dem sende ut riksalarm på det aktuelle registreringsnummeret.
Da var klokken 16.04, en halvtime etter at tipseren først ringte politiets nødtelefon med opplysninger om det som skulle vise seg å være Anders Behring Breivik.
After an operator had become available and had been able to speak to the tipster, who could therefore provide the registration number of the suspicious "policeman's" car, the operations manager was in contact with Kripos and asked them to send out a national alert on the registration number in question.
It was then 16:04, half an hour after the tipster first called the police emergency number with information about what turned out to be Anders Behring Breivik.
Det var først da jeg så en enslig politimann med noe jeg oppfattet som et våpen, som deretter satte seg inn i en sivil bil og kjørte i feil kjøreretning, at jeg tenkte at her må det være noe galt, og at det var viktig å observere mer detaljert, sier Olsen https://perma.cc/Q4PD-VTAC
It was only when I saw a lone policeman with what I perceived to be a weapon, who then got into a civilian car and drove in the wrong direction, that I thought that there must be something wrong here, and that it was important to observe in more detail, says Olsen.
Færgen MS Thorbjørn sejler fra Utøya. Om bord er seks deltagere fra sommerlejren – blandt dem AUF-leder Eskil Pedersen. Desuden er skibets kaptajn og en besætning på to personer ombord på færgen.
Norway and Germany - an organisational disaster Part 10
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
Eskil Pedersen is a former politician for the Labor Party who was LEADER of Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AUF) from 2010 to 2014 https://perma.cc/SXR4-L8NC
It is impossible to go back ... DIMISSIONS? Taking responsibility? Obviously nope! Like no one in Norway took responsibility for the disaster they did before, during and after the attack!
WHICH IS A SHAME!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/HumanRightsChecklist/128
Because yes, from one side we need to learn ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/LearnWithNorway
but we need to take responsibility, not just "i'm sorry" ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/SoSorryTelegram/23
Otherwise every criminal could just say "sorry" and we fixed issues! Let we remember that Norway failed in so many things ... some things we still need to write ....
Let we remember even the topic abortion ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/HumanRightAbuse/40
https://news.1rj.ru/str/BreivikSex/6
Ok, let we go back to Germany ...
As you can see, both Germany and Norway had an EPIC fail about phone support, where Germany learned anything from Norway.
Ist nach Kenntnis der Bunderegierung bei der Polizei in Hanau mittler- weile ein Überleitungssystem für Notrufe eingerichtet worden, und wenn nein, warum nicht?
Hierzu liegen der Bundesregierung keine Erkenntnisse vor.
Welche Erkenntnisse hat die Bundesregierung bezüglich des Umstandes, dass der Täter nach Beginn seines Anschlags sehr lange Zeit, scheinbar unbehelligt, durch die Stadt laufen und fahren und weitere Taten ausüben konnte, ohne dass die Polizei ihn daran hinderte, und das, obwohl die Polizeiwache nur wenige hundert Meter vom ersten Tatort entfernt lag?
Die Bundesregierung nimmt keine Bewertung landespolizeilicher Einsatzmaßnahmen vor (wie die meisten Antworten)
Bundesregierung macht also einfach nichts ...
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
Eskil Pedersen is a former politician for the Labor Party who was LEADER of Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AUF) from 2010 to 2014 https://perma.cc/SXR4-L8NC
It is impossible to go back ... DIMISSIONS? Taking responsibility? Obviously nope! Like no one in Norway took responsibility for the disaster they did before, during and after the attack!
WHICH IS A SHAME!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/HumanRightsChecklist/128
Because yes, from one side we need to learn ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/LearnWithNorway
but we need to take responsibility, not just "i'm sorry" ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/SoSorryTelegram/23
Otherwise every criminal could just say "sorry" and we fixed issues! Let we remember that Norway failed in so many things ... some things we still need to write ....
Let we remember even the topic abortion ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/HumanRightAbuse/40
https://news.1rj.ru/str/BreivikSex/6
Ok, let we go back to Germany ...
As you can see, both Germany and Norway had an EPIC fail about phone support, where Germany learned anything from Norway.
Ist nach Kenntnis der Bunderegierung bei der Polizei in Hanau mittler- weile ein Überleitungssystem für Notrufe eingerichtet worden, und wenn nein, warum nicht?
Hierzu liegen der Bundesregierung keine Erkenntnisse vor.
Welche Erkenntnisse hat die Bundesregierung bezüglich des Umstandes, dass der Täter nach Beginn seines Anschlags sehr lange Zeit, scheinbar unbehelligt, durch die Stadt laufen und fahren und weitere Taten ausüben konnte, ohne dass die Polizei ihn daran hinderte, und das, obwohl die Polizeiwache nur wenige hundert Meter vom ersten Tatort entfernt lag?
Die Bundesregierung nimmt keine Bewertung landespolizeilicher Einsatzmaßnahmen vor (wie die meisten Antworten)
Bundesregierung macht also einfach nichts ...
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2 Jahre - Hanau ist nicht vorbei!
Backup by @HanauTerror
A @grttme project - Other backups: https://swiy.co/tgme
Backup by @HanauTerror
A @grttme project - Other backups: https://swiy.co/tgme
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Hanau: Familien und Angehörige von Ferhat Unvar und Gökhan Gültekin
Backup by @HanauTerror
A @grttme project - Other backups: https://swiy.co/tgme
Backup by @HanauTerror
A @grttme project - Other backups: https://swiy.co/tgme