🇵🇸 🇮🇱 🇮🇷 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝘂𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗚𝗮𝘇𝗮 | Gaza war unit tracking

🔶️ After 2 weeks since the start of the Rafah invasion, 3/4 of the population have already evacuated to Al-Mawasi and the Safe Zone, much faster than expected.

🔶️ Despite the relatively fast progress of Rafah (quicker than my model from before the invasion had predicted), the IDF assesses that the war will likely continue into 2026 (as is consistent with my own prediction of a long attritional war), and says an invasion of Lebanon will start September this year at the latest. My previous own assessment for Lebanon was also around August or September.

📖 What then is the long-term plan for Gaza, until 2026 and later?

🔶️ The IDF plans, rather than to territorially occupy the entire strip (which they do not have the forces for, and would lead to an impossible, bleeding and lengthy counter-insurgency anyway), to only seize slim military corridors bisecting Gaza at various points and splitting it into multiple West-Bank-like pockets. 2 of these corridors have already been made policy, more may be established later on.

🔶️ From these corridors the IDF will then over the course of years perform heavy raids into the Hamas controlled urban areas, slowly attritioning them until Hamas (so the IDF hopes) ceases to exist as a fighting force.

🔶️ The IDF thus intends to eventually "West-Bankify" the Gaza Strip: Multiple Palestinian controlled pockets cut off from each other through IDF military corridors, pacified through regular raids.

🔶️ This "Corridor & Raid" strategy ("Clear-Withdraw-Clear-Withdraw..."), has already been in place for a few months now, culminating in the current raid on Jabaliya, which in my opinion is the most ambitious attempt so far. It's one thing to raid peripheral regions like Zeiytoun, Shati, and Nuseirat, but what will set expectations for the years to come is whether the IDF can also target the heart of Hamas in Jabaliya or Radwan.

🔶️ The main issue with this plan of course is time. The longer the war continues the more international pressure on Israel mounts. Hamas believes that eventually it will be too much to bear, and that Israel will accept a deal that sees them withdrawing from Gaza in exchange for all remaining hostages.

🔶️ This is also why the negotiations are not producing a ceasefire: Why would Sinwar trade hostages for very temporary benefits (1 month of ceasefire, return of civilians to the North) in a years long war, if he intends to trade them all for victory down the road? It would lose him the war. The only ceasefire he should ever be interested in is a permanent one, and I have reiterated this every time Hamas pretended to be interested in a ceasefire only to then return to their demand for an end of the war again (which in all honesty is the only thing that wouldn't be a loss for them).

🔶️ What then is the Israeli day-after for Gaza? Essentially, a second West Bank. Without a Palestinian Authority.

🔶️ Perhaps they will eventually settle on clans or some other group, or maybe they will keep Hamas in charge (just incapable of military activity after total arms blockade through Philadelphi and years of attritional warfare). The war may have gone quite differently had Israel decided on an alternative to replace Hamas rule on day 1, had it attempted the difficult path of winning hearts and minds - but this is not the strategy Israel would ever accept, and in Israel's case would probably not have worked anyway.

🔶️ There will probably be more offensives in Gaza: The Safe Zone will have to be revoked for a final assault on Deir al-Balah and Nuseirat, and there will be another war in Lebanon. But I think eventually the Gaza War will simply fizzle out.

🔶️ This years-long campaign will probably end with a few signatures under a piece of paper noscriptd "Oslo III accords", unless future elections give Hamas the all-hostages-for-end-of-war deal.