Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
ough to power the equivalent of 16 million homes, according to the government. It also makes AR7 the single-largest auction round by far, at more than 50% larger than the previous record set by AR6 in 2024. This means that the two auction rounds held since…
efore, new sources of electricity generation will be needed, whether from renewables, gas-fired power stations or from other sources.
In his statement, quoted above, Miliband said that the prices for onshore wind and solar were less than half the £147/MWh cost of electricity from new gas-fired power stations.
(This is based on recently published government estimates and assumes that gas plants would only be operating during 30% of hours each year, in line with the current UK fleet.)
Trade association RenewableUK also pointed to the cost of new gas, as well as the £124/MWh cost of the Hinkley C new nuclear plant, in its response to the auction results.
In a statement, Dr Doug Parr, policy director for Greenpeace UK, said:
“These new onshore wind and solar projects will supply energy at less than half the cost of new gas plants. Together with the new offshore wind contracts agreed last month, these cheaper renewables will lower energy bills as they come online.”
Strike prices for solar dropped by 6% compared to last year and while onshore wind prices rose, this was by less than 2% despite a “difficult environment for wind generation”, according to Bertalan Gyenes, consultant at LCP Delta.
In a post on LinkedIn, he noted that “extending the contract length [for onshore wind projects] by five years seems to have helped keep this increase low”.
The January offshore wind round secured 8.4 GW at £91/MWh, as such, the onshore and solar projects are 25% cheaper per unit of generation.
(The offshore wind projects secured in January are nevertheless expected to cut consumer bills relative to the alternative, or at worst to be cost neutral.)
Parr added that while the AR7a auction results “show we’re getting up to speed” ahead of the clean power 2030 target (see below), “an even faster way for the government to make a really big dent in bills would be to change the system that allows gas to set the overall energy price in this country”. He adds:
“That would allow us to unshackle our bills from unreliable petrostates and get off the rollercoaster of volatile gas markets once and for all.”
Back to top
What does it mean for energy security, jobs and investment?
The onshore wind and solar projects secured in the latest auction round will generate an estimated 9 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
This is equivalent to roughly 3% of current UK electricity demand.
Combined with the estimated 37TWh from offshore wind secured during the first part of the auction, AR7 projects will be able to generate 46TWh[...]
In his statement, quoted above, Miliband said that the prices for onshore wind and solar were less than half the £147/MWh cost of electricity from new gas-fired power stations.
(This is based on recently published government estimates and assumes that gas plants would only be operating during 30% of hours each year, in line with the current UK fleet.)
Trade association RenewableUK also pointed to the cost of new gas, as well as the £124/MWh cost of the Hinkley C new nuclear plant, in its response to the auction results.
In a statement, Dr Doug Parr, policy director for Greenpeace UK, said:
“These new onshore wind and solar projects will supply energy at less than half the cost of new gas plants. Together with the new offshore wind contracts agreed last month, these cheaper renewables will lower energy bills as they come online.”
Strike prices for solar dropped by 6% compared to last year and while onshore wind prices rose, this was by less than 2% despite a “difficult environment for wind generation”, according to Bertalan Gyenes, consultant at LCP Delta.
In a post on LinkedIn, he noted that “extending the contract length [for onshore wind projects] by five years seems to have helped keep this increase low”.
The January offshore wind round secured 8.4 GW at £91/MWh, as such, the onshore and solar projects are 25% cheaper per unit of generation.
(The offshore wind projects secured in January are nevertheless expected to cut consumer bills relative to the alternative, or at worst to be cost neutral.)
Parr added that while the AR7a auction results “show we’re getting up to speed” ahead of the clean power 2030 target (see below), “an even faster way for the government to make a really big dent in bills would be to change the system that allows gas to set the overall energy price in this country”. He adds:
“That would allow us to unshackle our bills from unreliable petrostates and get off the rollercoaster of volatile gas markets once and for all.”
Back to top
What does it mean for energy security, jobs and investment?
The onshore wind and solar projects secured in the latest auction round will generate an estimated 9 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
This is equivalent to roughly 3% of current UK electricity demand.
Combined with the estimated 37TWh from offshore wind secured during the first part of the auction, AR7 projects will be able to generate 46TWh[...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
efore, new sources of electricity generation will be needed, whether from renewables, gas-fired power stations or from other sources. In his statement, quoted above, Miliband said that the prices for onshore wind and solar were less than half the £147/MWh…
of electricity, 14% of current demand.
If this electricity were to be generated by gas-fired power plants, then it would require around 90TWh of fuel, because much of the energy in the gas is lost during combustion.
This is several times more than the 25TWh of extra gas that could be produced in 2030 if new drilling licenses are issued, according to thinktank the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU). As such, AR7 will significantly cut UK gas imports, ECIU says, reducing exposure to volatile international gas markets.
Furthermore, ECIU says that the impact of renewables in driving down gas demand – and subsequently electricity prices – is already being seen in the UK.
Five years ago, gas was setting the wholesale price of power in the UK 98% of the time due to the way the electricity market operates.
This price-setting dominance is being eroded by renewables, with recent analysis from the UK Energy Research Centre showing that gas set power prices 90% of the time in 2025.
A further effect of new renewables is that they push the most expensive gas-fired power plants out of the system, reducing prices. This is known as the “merit-order effect”.
Recent analysis from ECIU found that large windfarms cut wholesale electricity prices by a third in 2025.
Lucy Dolton, renewable generation lead at Cornwall Insight, said in a statement that the AR7a results will provide a “surge in momentum as [the UK] pushes toward secure, homegrown energy”, adding:
“These investments ultimately strengthen the UK’s position against volatile gas markets. If the past few years have shown us anything, it’s that remaining tied to international energy markets comes with consequences.”
The projects that secured CfDs will help the UK avoid burning significant quantities of gas, “the bulk of which would have been imported at a cost which the UK cannot control”, said RenewableUK in its statement.
Together with previous CfD auction rounds, the latest new renewable projects are expected to generate some 155TWh of electricity once they are all operating, according to Carbon Brief analysis. This is around half of current UK demand.
Generating the same electricity from gas would require some 316TWh of fuel, which is similar to the 339TWh of gas produced by the UK’s North Sea operations in the most recent 12-month period for which data is available. This figure can also be compared with the 130TWh of gas that was imported by ship as liquified natural gas (LNG) in the same period.
The government added that the AR7a projects will support up to 10,000 jobs and bring £5bn in private investment to the UK.
(In total, the new projects secured via AR7 are expected to bring investments worth around £20-23bn to the UK, <a href='https://www.linkedin.com/posts/nicholas-civetta_ar7a-renewables-cp30-ugcpost-7426925115025846272-wg_-?utm_s[...]
If this electricity were to be generated by gas-fired power plants, then it would require around 90TWh of fuel, because much of the energy in the gas is lost during combustion.
This is several times more than the 25TWh of extra gas that could be produced in 2030 if new drilling licenses are issued, according to thinktank the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU). As such, AR7 will significantly cut UK gas imports, ECIU says, reducing exposure to volatile international gas markets.
Furthermore, ECIU says that the impact of renewables in driving down gas demand – and subsequently electricity prices – is already being seen in the UK.
Five years ago, gas was setting the wholesale price of power in the UK 98% of the time due to the way the electricity market operates.
This price-setting dominance is being eroded by renewables, with recent analysis from the UK Energy Research Centre showing that gas set power prices 90% of the time in 2025.
A further effect of new renewables is that they push the most expensive gas-fired power plants out of the system, reducing prices. This is known as the “merit-order effect”.
Recent analysis from ECIU found that large windfarms cut wholesale electricity prices by a third in 2025.
Lucy Dolton, renewable generation lead at Cornwall Insight, said in a statement that the AR7a results will provide a “surge in momentum as [the UK] pushes toward secure, homegrown energy”, adding:
“These investments ultimately strengthen the UK’s position against volatile gas markets. If the past few years have shown us anything, it’s that remaining tied to international energy markets comes with consequences.”
The projects that secured CfDs will help the UK avoid burning significant quantities of gas, “the bulk of which would have been imported at a cost which the UK cannot control”, said RenewableUK in its statement.
Together with previous CfD auction rounds, the latest new renewable projects are expected to generate some 155TWh of electricity once they are all operating, according to Carbon Brief analysis. This is around half of current UK demand.
Generating the same electricity from gas would require some 316TWh of fuel, which is similar to the 339TWh of gas produced by the UK’s North Sea operations in the most recent 12-month period for which data is available. This figure can also be compared with the 130TWh of gas that was imported by ship as liquified natural gas (LNG) in the same period.
The government added that the AR7a projects will support up to 10,000 jobs and bring £5bn in private investment to the UK.
(In total, the new projects secured via AR7 are expected to bring investments worth around £20-23bn to the UK, <a href='https://www.linkedin.com/posts/nicholas-civetta_ar7a-renewables-cp30-ugcpost-7426925115025846272-wg_-?utm_s[...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
of electricity, 14% of current demand. If this electricity were to be generated by gas-fired power plants, then it would require around 90TWh of fuel, because much of the energy in the gas is lost during combustion. This is several times more than the 25TWh…
ource=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAL7qHQBAyJW0oiRL6RFnZ3OBIpxayxUBHQ'>according to Aurora.)
Additionally, the onshore wind projects are expected to generate over £6.5m in “community benefit” funds for people living near them, according to RenewableUK.
The AR7a results were released alongside the publication of the Local Power Plan by the government and Great British Energy.
This is designed to provide £1bn in funding for communities to own and control their own clean energy projects across the UK. Back to top What does the auction mean for clean power by 2030?
The AR7a results put the UK “on track for its 2030 clean power target”, according to the government.
Over AR6 and AR7, several changes have been made to the CfD process to help facilitate more projects to secure contracts.
A total of 24GW has been secured over the last two auction rounds – which have taken place under the current Labour government – compared to 22GW across the five auction rounds previously.
As part of its goal for clean power to meet 100% of electricity demand by 2030 and to account for at least 95% of electricity generation, the UK government is aiming for 27-29GW of onshore wind and 45-47GW of solar by the end of the decade.
As of September 2025, the UK had 16.3GW of installed onshore wind capacity and more than 21GW of solar capacity. Taken together, the onshore technologies therefore need to double in operational capacity over the next four years to reach the 2030 targets. Analysis by RenewableUK suggests that the government will need to procure between 3.85GW to 4.85GW of onshore wind in the next two auctions for the 2030 goal to remain possible.
Writing on LinkedIn, Aurora’s Civetta said that the onshore clean power 2030 targets “remain a long way off”.
He continued that the gap for solar to reach its 45-47GW target is still a “whopping 18GW”, but added that there may be other ways for new capacity to be secured, beyond the CfD auctions.
He said these included a growing market for corporate “power purchase agreements” (PPAs), economic incentives for homes and businesses to install solar and the government’s recently released “warm homes plan”, all of which “should drive further procurement”. https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-11-at-2.32.24-PM.png Dolton from Cornwall Insight adds that “the challenge now is delivery”, continuing:
“2.5GW of the winners have a delivery year of 2027/28, and over half – 3.7GW – have a delivery year of 2028/29, which brings them very close to the government’s 2030 clean power target.
“Historically, renewable projects in the UK have faced delays, often due to grid connection backlogs and planning holdups. With AR7 and some of AR8 representing the only realistic pipeline for pre-2030 capacity, keeping to schedule wil[...]
Additionally, the onshore wind projects are expected to generate over £6.5m in “community benefit” funds for people living near them, according to RenewableUK.
The AR7a results were released alongside the publication of the Local Power Plan by the government and Great British Energy.
This is designed to provide £1bn in funding for communities to own and control their own clean energy projects across the UK. Back to top What does the auction mean for clean power by 2030?
The AR7a results put the UK “on track for its 2030 clean power target”, according to the government.
Over AR6 and AR7, several changes have been made to the CfD process to help facilitate more projects to secure contracts.
A total of 24GW has been secured over the last two auction rounds – which have taken place under the current Labour government – compared to 22GW across the five auction rounds previously.
As part of its goal for clean power to meet 100% of electricity demand by 2030 and to account for at least 95% of electricity generation, the UK government is aiming for 27-29GW of onshore wind and 45-47GW of solar by the end of the decade.
As of September 2025, the UK had 16.3GW of installed onshore wind capacity and more than 21GW of solar capacity. Taken together, the onshore technologies therefore need to double in operational capacity over the next four years to reach the 2030 targets. Analysis by RenewableUK suggests that the government will need to procure between 3.85GW to 4.85GW of onshore wind in the next two auctions for the 2030 goal to remain possible.
Writing on LinkedIn, Aurora’s Civetta said that the onshore clean power 2030 targets “remain a long way off”.
He continued that the gap for solar to reach its 45-47GW target is still a “whopping 18GW”, but added that there may be other ways for new capacity to be secured, beyond the CfD auctions.
He said these included a growing market for corporate “power purchase agreements” (PPAs), economic incentives for homes and businesses to install solar and the government’s recently released “warm homes plan”, all of which “should drive further procurement”. https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-11-at-2.32.24-PM.png Dolton from Cornwall Insight adds that “the challenge now is delivery”, continuing:
“2.5GW of the winners have a delivery year of 2027/28, and over half – 3.7GW – have a delivery year of 2028/29, which brings them very close to the government’s 2030 clean power target.
“Historically, renewable projects in the UK have faced delays, often due to grid connection backlogs and planning holdups. With AR7 and some of AR8 representing the only realistic pipeline for pre-2030 capacity, keeping to schedule wil[...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
ource=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAL7qHQBAyJW0oiRL6RFnZ3OBIpxayxUBHQ'>according to Aurora.) Additionally, the onshore wind projects are expected to generate over £6.5m in “community benefit” funds for people living near them, according to RenewableUK.…
l be essential.”
When built, the projects announced today will help to bring the total capacity of CfD-supported wind and solar to 50.6GW, according to Ember.
While solar and onshore wind are expected to play an important role in decarbonising the electricity system, offshore wind is set to be the “backbone”.
The government is targeting 43-50GW of offshore wind by 2030, up from around 17GW of installed capacity today.
This leaves a gap of 27-34GW to the government’s target range.
Prior to the AR7 auction, a further 10GW had already secured CfD contracts, excluding the cancelled Hornsea 4 project.
The 8.4GW secured in January brings the gap to reach the minimum of 43GW over the four years to just 7GW.
Back to top
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/2XGPNBG-300x200.jpg
G7 ‘falling behind’ China as world’s wind and solar plans reach new high in 2025
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23.01.26
The post Q&A: New UK onshore wind and solar is ‘50% cheaper’ than new gas appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Molly Lempriere
Source: https://www.carbonbrief.org/?p=61227
Nature Climate on Telegram by @NatureClimateTelegram
A @grttme project - Other backups: @Hallotme
When built, the projects announced today will help to bring the total capacity of CfD-supported wind and solar to 50.6GW, according to Ember.
While solar and onshore wind are expected to play an important role in decarbonising the electricity system, offshore wind is set to be the “backbone”.
The government is targeting 43-50GW of offshore wind by 2030, up from around 17GW of installed capacity today.
This leaves a gap of 27-34GW to the government’s target range.
Prior to the AR7 auction, a further 10GW had already secured CfD contracts, excluding the cancelled Hornsea 4 project.
The 8.4GW secured in January brings the gap to reach the minimum of 43GW over the four years to just 7GW.
Back to top
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/2XGPNBG-300x200.jpg
G7 ‘falling behind’ China as world’s wind and solar plans reach new high in 2025
International policy
|
10.02.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/3DKN5HJ-300x200.jpg
Five key climate and energy announcements in India’s budget for 2026
Explainers
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04.02.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2Y6MHE0-300x200.jpg
Analysis: EVs just outsold petrol cars in EU for first time ever
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<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2S87NPM-300x200.jpg
Q&A: What UK’s ‘warm homes plan’ means for climate change and energy bills
Energy
|
23.01.26
The post Q&A: New UK onshore wind and solar is ‘50% cheaper’ than new gas appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Molly Lempriere
Source: https://www.carbonbrief.org/?p=61227
Nature Climate on Telegram by @NatureClimateTelegram
A @grttme project - Other backups: @Hallotme
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
Photo
Cropped 11 February 2026: Aftershocks of US withdrawals | Biodiversity and business risks | Deep-sea mining tensions
We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter. Subscribe for free here. This is the last edition of Cropped for 2025. The newsletter will return on 14 January 2026.
Key developments
Economic risks from nature loss
RISKY BUSINESS: The “undervaluing” of nature by businesses is fuelling its decline and putting the global economy at risk, according to a new report covered by Carbon Brief. The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) “business and biodiversity” report “urg[ed] companies to act now or potentially face extinction themselves”, Reuters wrote.
BUSINESS ACTION: The report was agreed at an IPBES meeting in Manchester last week. Speaking to Carbon Brief at the meeting, IPBES chair, Dr David Obura, said the findings showed that “all sectors” of business “need to respond to biodiversity loss and minimise their impacts”. Bloomberg quoted Prof Stephen Polasky, co-chair of the report, as saying: “Too often, at present, what’s good for business is bad for nature and vice-versa.”
Tensions in deep-sea mining
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JAPAN’S TAKEOFF: Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, announced on 2 February that the country became the first in the world to extract rare earths from the deep seabed after successful retrievals near Minamitori Island, in the central Pacific Ocean, according to Asia Financial. The country hailed the move as a “first step toward industrialisation of domestically produced rare earth” metals, Takaichi said.
URGENT CALL: On 5 February, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) secretary general, Leticia Reis de Carvalho, called on EU officials to “quickly agree on an international rule book on the extraction of critical minerals in international waters”, due to be finalised later this year, Euractiv reported. The bloc has supported a proposed moratorium on deep-sea mining. However, the US has “taken the opposite approach”, fast-tracking a single permit for exploration and exploitation of seabed resources, and “might be pushing the EU – and others” to follow suit, the outlet added.
CAUTIONARY COMMENT: In the Inter Press Service, the former president of the Seychelles and a Swiss philanthropist highlighted the important role of African leadership in global ocean governance. It called for a precautionary pause on deep-sea mining due to the potential harmful effects of this extractive activity on biodiversity, food security and the economy. They wrote: “The accelerating push for deep-sea mining activities also raises concerns about repeating historic pattern[...]
We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter. Subscribe for free here. This is the last edition of Cropped for 2025. The newsletter will return on 14 January 2026.
Key developments
Economic risks from nature loss
RISKY BUSINESS: The “undervaluing” of nature by businesses is fuelling its decline and putting the global economy at risk, according to a new report covered by Carbon Brief. The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) “business and biodiversity” report “urg[ed] companies to act now or potentially face extinction themselves”, Reuters wrote.
BUSINESS ACTION: The report was agreed at an IPBES meeting in Manchester last week. Speaking to Carbon Brief at the meeting, IPBES chair, Dr David Obura, said the findings showed that “all sectors” of business “need to respond to biodiversity loss and minimise their impacts”. Bloomberg quoted Prof Stephen Polasky, co-chair of the report, as saying: “Too often, at present, what’s good for business is bad for nature and vice-versa.”
Tensions in deep-sea mining
Subscribe: Cropped
*
Sign up to Carbon Brief's free "Cropped" email newsletter. A fortnightly digest of food, land and nature news and views. Sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.
JAPAN’S TAKEOFF: Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, announced on 2 February that the country became the first in the world to extract rare earths from the deep seabed after successful retrievals near Minamitori Island, in the central Pacific Ocean, according to Asia Financial. The country hailed the move as a “first step toward industrialisation of domestically produced rare earth” metals, Takaichi said.
URGENT CALL: On 5 February, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) secretary general, Leticia Reis de Carvalho, called on EU officials to “quickly agree on an international rule book on the extraction of critical minerals in international waters”, due to be finalised later this year, Euractiv reported. The bloc has supported a proposed moratorium on deep-sea mining. However, the US has “taken the opposite approach”, fast-tracking a single permit for exploration and exploitation of seabed resources, and “might be pushing the EU – and others” to follow suit, the outlet added.
CAUTIONARY COMMENT: In the Inter Press Service, the former president of the Seychelles and a Swiss philanthropist highlighted the important role of African leadership in global ocean governance. It called for a precautionary pause on deep-sea mining due to the potential harmful effects of this extractive activity on biodiversity, food security and the economy. They wrote: “The accelerating push for deep-sea mining activities also raises concerns about repeating historic pattern[...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
Cropped 11 February 2026: Aftershocks of US withdrawals | Biodiversity and business risks | Deep-sea mining tensions We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight. This is…
s seen in other extractive sectors across Africa.” News and views
* ARGENTINE AUSTERITY: The Argentinian government’s response to the worst wildfires to hit Patagonia “in decades” has been hindered by president Javier Milei’s “gutting” of the country’s fire-management agency, the Associated Press reported. Carbon Brief covered a new rapid-attribution analysis of the fires, which found that climate change made the hot, dry conditions that preceded the fires more than twice as likely.
* CRISIS IN SOMALIA: The Somali government has begun “emergency talks” to address the drought that is gripping much of the country, according to Shabelle Media. The outlet wrote that the “crisis has reached a critical stage” amid “worsening shortages of water, food and pasture threatening both human life and livestock”.
* FOOD PRICES FALL: The UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s “food price index” – a measure of the costs of key food commodities around the world – fell in January for the fifth month in a row. The fall was driven by decreases in the price of dairy, meat and sugar, which “more than offset” increasing prices of cereals and vegetable oil, according to the FAO.
* HIGH STANDARDS: The Greenhouse Gas Protocol launched a new standard for companies to measure emissions and carbon removals from land use and emerging technologies. BusinessGreen said that the standard is “expected to provide a boost to the expanding carbon removals and carbon credit sectors by providing an agreed measurement protocol”.
* RUNNING OUT OF TIME: Negotiators from the seven US states that share the Colorado River basin met in Washington DC ahead of a 14 February deadline for agreeing a joint plan for managing the basin’s reservoirs. The Colorado Sun wrote: “The next agreement will impact growing cities, massive agricultural industries, hydroelectric power supplies and endangered species for years to come.”
* CORAL COVER: Malaysia has lost around 20% of its coral reefs since 2022, “with reef conditions continuing to deteriorate nationwide”, the Star – a Malaysian online news outlet – reported. The ongoing decline has many drivers, it added, including a global bleaching event in 2024, pollution and unsustainable tourism and development. Spotlight Aftershocks of US exiting major nature-science body
This week, Carbon Brief reports on the impacts of the US withdrawal from the global nature-science panel, IPBES.
The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw the US from the world’s main expert panel that advises policymakers on biodiversity and ecosystem science “harms everybody, including themselves”.
That’s according to Dr David Obura, chair of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, or IPBES.
IPBES is among the dozens of international organisations dealing with the fallout from the US government’s <a href='https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withd[...]
* ARGENTINE AUSTERITY: The Argentinian government’s response to the worst wildfires to hit Patagonia “in decades” has been hindered by president Javier Milei’s “gutting” of the country’s fire-management agency, the Associated Press reported. Carbon Brief covered a new rapid-attribution analysis of the fires, which found that climate change made the hot, dry conditions that preceded the fires more than twice as likely.
* CRISIS IN SOMALIA: The Somali government has begun “emergency talks” to address the drought that is gripping much of the country, according to Shabelle Media. The outlet wrote that the “crisis has reached a critical stage” amid “worsening shortages of water, food and pasture threatening both human life and livestock”.
* FOOD PRICES FALL: The UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s “food price index” – a measure of the costs of key food commodities around the world – fell in January for the fifth month in a row. The fall was driven by decreases in the price of dairy, meat and sugar, which “more than offset” increasing prices of cereals and vegetable oil, according to the FAO.
* HIGH STANDARDS: The Greenhouse Gas Protocol launched a new standard for companies to measure emissions and carbon removals from land use and emerging technologies. BusinessGreen said that the standard is “expected to provide a boost to the expanding carbon removals and carbon credit sectors by providing an agreed measurement protocol”.
* RUNNING OUT OF TIME: Negotiators from the seven US states that share the Colorado River basin met in Washington DC ahead of a 14 February deadline for agreeing a joint plan for managing the basin’s reservoirs. The Colorado Sun wrote: “The next agreement will impact growing cities, massive agricultural industries, hydroelectric power supplies and endangered species for years to come.”
* CORAL COVER: Malaysia has lost around 20% of its coral reefs since 2022, “with reef conditions continuing to deteriorate nationwide”, the Star – a Malaysian online news outlet – reported. The ongoing decline has many drivers, it added, including a global bleaching event in 2024, pollution and unsustainable tourism and development. Spotlight Aftershocks of US exiting major nature-science body
This week, Carbon Brief reports on the impacts of the US withdrawal from the global nature-science panel, IPBES.
The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw the US from the world’s main expert panel that advises policymakers on biodiversity and ecosystem science “harms everybody, including themselves”.
That’s according to Dr David Obura, chair of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, or IPBES.
IPBES is among the dozens of international organisations dealing with the fallout from the US government’s <a href='https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withd[...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
s seen in other extractive sectors across Africa.” News and views * ARGENTINE AUSTERITY: The Argentinian government’s response to the worst wildfires to hit Patagonia “in decades” has been hindered by president Javier Milei’s “gutting” of the country’s fire…
raws-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states/'>announcement last month.
The panel’s chief executive, Dr Luthando Dziba, told Carbon Brief that the exit impacts both the panel’s finances and the involvement of important scientists. He said:
“The US was one of the founding members of IPBES…A lot of US experts contribute to our assessments and they’ve led our assessments in various capacities. They’ve also served in various official bodies of the platform.”
Obura told Carbon Brief that “it’s very important to try and keep pushing through with the knowledge and keep doing the work that we’re doing”. He said he hopes the US will rejoin in future.
Carbon Brief attended the first IPBES meeting since Trump’s announcement, held last week in Manchester. At the meeting, countries finalised a new “business and biodiversity” report.
For the first time in the 14-year history of IPBES, there was no US government delegation present at the meeting, although some US scientists attended in other roles. Cashflow impacts
Dziba is still waiting for official confirmation of the US withdrawal, but impacts were being felt even before last month’s announcement.
Budget information [pdf] from last October shows that the US contributed the most money to IPBES of any country in 2024 – around $1.2m. In 2025, when Trump took office, it sent $0, as of October.
Despite this, IPBES actually received around $1.2m extra funding from countries in 2025, compared to 2024, as other nations filled the gap.
The UK, for example, increased its contribution from around $367,000 in 2024 to more than $1.7m in 2025. The EU, which did not contribute in 2024 but tends to make multi-year payments, paid around $2.7m last year. These two payments made up the bulk of the increase in overall funding. Wider effects of US exit Dziba said IPBES is looking at other ways of boosting funds in future, but noted that lost income is not the only concern:
“For us, the withdrawal of the US is actually much larger than just the budgetary implications, because you can find somebody who can come in and increase the contribution and close that gap.
“The US has got thousands of leading experts in the fields where we undertake assessments. We know that some of them work for [the] government and maybe [for] those it will be more challenging for them to continue…But there are many other experts that we hope, in some way, will still be able to contribute to the work of the platform.”
One person trying to keep US scientists involved is Prof Pam McElwee, a professor of human ecology at Rutgers University. She told Carbon Brief that “there are still a tonne of American scientists and other civil society organisations that want to stand up”.
McElwee and others have looked at ways for US scientists to access funding to continue working with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which the US has also withdrawn from. She said they will try and do the same at IPBES, adding:
“It’s basically a bottom-up initiative…to make the message clear that scientists in the US still support these institutions and we still are part of them.
“Climate science is what it is and we can’t deny or withdraw from it. So we’ll just keep trying to represent it as best we can.” Watch, read, listen
UNDER THE SEA: An article in bioGraphic explored whether the skeletons of dead corals “help or hinder recovery” on bleached reefs. [...]
The panel’s chief executive, Dr Luthando Dziba, told Carbon Brief that the exit impacts both the panel’s finances and the involvement of important scientists. He said:
“The US was one of the founding members of IPBES…A lot of US experts contribute to our assessments and they’ve led our assessments in various capacities. They’ve also served in various official bodies of the platform.”
Obura told Carbon Brief that “it’s very important to try and keep pushing through with the knowledge and keep doing the work that we’re doing”. He said he hopes the US will rejoin in future.
Carbon Brief attended the first IPBES meeting since Trump’s announcement, held last week in Manchester. At the meeting, countries finalised a new “business and biodiversity” report.
For the first time in the 14-year history of IPBES, there was no US government delegation present at the meeting, although some US scientists attended in other roles. Cashflow impacts
Dziba is still waiting for official confirmation of the US withdrawal, but impacts were being felt even before last month’s announcement.
Budget information [pdf] from last October shows that the US contributed the most money to IPBES of any country in 2024 – around $1.2m. In 2025, when Trump took office, it sent $0, as of October.
Despite this, IPBES actually received around $1.2m extra funding from countries in 2025, compared to 2024, as other nations filled the gap.
The UK, for example, increased its contribution from around $367,000 in 2024 to more than $1.7m in 2025. The EU, which did not contribute in 2024 but tends to make multi-year payments, paid around $2.7m last year. These two payments made up the bulk of the increase in overall funding. Wider effects of US exit Dziba said IPBES is looking at other ways of boosting funds in future, but noted that lost income is not the only concern:
“For us, the withdrawal of the US is actually much larger than just the budgetary implications, because you can find somebody who can come in and increase the contribution and close that gap.
“The US has got thousands of leading experts in the fields where we undertake assessments. We know that some of them work for [the] government and maybe [for] those it will be more challenging for them to continue…But there are many other experts that we hope, in some way, will still be able to contribute to the work of the platform.”
One person trying to keep US scientists involved is Prof Pam McElwee, a professor of human ecology at Rutgers University. She told Carbon Brief that “there are still a tonne of American scientists and other civil society organisations that want to stand up”.
McElwee and others have looked at ways for US scientists to access funding to continue working with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which the US has also withdrawn from. She said they will try and do the same at IPBES, adding:
“It’s basically a bottom-up initiative…to make the message clear that scientists in the US still support these institutions and we still are part of them.
“Climate science is what it is and we can’t deny or withdraw from it. So we’ll just keep trying to represent it as best we can.” Watch, read, listen
UNDER THE SEA: An article in bioGraphic explored whether the skeletons of dead corals “help or hinder recovery” on bleached reefs. [...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
raws-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states/'>announcement last month. The panel’s chief executive, Dr Luthando Dziba, told Carbon Brief that the exit impacts both the panel’s finances and…
MOSSY MOORS: BBC News covered how “extinct moss” is being reintroduced in some English moors in an effort to “create diverse habitats for wildlife”.
RIBBIT: Scientists are “racing” to map out Ecuador’s “unique biological heritage of more than 700 frog species”, reported Dialogue Earth.
MEAT COMEBACK: Grist examined the rise and fall of vegan fine dining. New science
* Areas suitable for grazing animals could shrink by 36-50% by 2100 due to continued climate change, with areas of extreme poverty and political fragility experiencing the highest losses | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
* The body condition of Svalbard polar bears increased after 2000, in a period of rapid loss of ice cover | Scientific Reports
* Studies projecting the possibility of reversing biodiversity loss are scarce and most do not account for additional drivers of loss, such as climate change, according to a meta-analysis of more than 55 papers | Science Advances In the diary
* 9-12 February: Climate and cryosphere open science conference | Wellington, New Zealand
* 18 February: International conservation technology conference | Lima, Peru
* 22-27 February: American Geophysical Union’s ocean sciences meeting | Glasgow, UK
Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/hero-5-01-2-300x200.png Cropped 28 January 2026: Ocean biodiversity boost; Nature and national security; Mangrove defence
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<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/hero-5-01-2-300x200.png Cropped 14 January 2026: Wildfires scorch three continents; EU trade; Food and nature in 2026
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<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/hero-5-01-2-300x200.png Cropped 17 December 2025: ‘Deadly’ Asia floods; Boosting London’s water birds; UN headwinds
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<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/hero-5-01-2-300x200.png Cropped 3 December 2025: Extreme weather in Africa; COP30 roundup; Saudi minister interview
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The post Cropped 11 February 2026: Aftershocks of US withdrawals | Biodiversity and business risks | Deep-sea mining tensions appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Carbon Brief Staff
Source: https://www.carbonbrief.org/?p=61228
Nature Climate on Telegram by @NatureClimateTelegram
A @grttme project - Other backups: @Hallotme
RIBBIT: Scientists are “racing” to map out Ecuador’s “unique biological heritage of more than 700 frog species”, reported Dialogue Earth.
MEAT COMEBACK: Grist examined the rise and fall of vegan fine dining. New science
* Areas suitable for grazing animals could shrink by 36-50% by 2100 due to continued climate change, with areas of extreme poverty and political fragility experiencing the highest losses | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
* The body condition of Svalbard polar bears increased after 2000, in a period of rapid loss of ice cover | Scientific Reports
* Studies projecting the possibility of reversing biodiversity loss are scarce and most do not account for additional drivers of loss, such as climate change, according to a meta-analysis of more than 55 papers | Science Advances In the diary
* 9-12 February: Climate and cryosphere open science conference | Wellington, New Zealand
* 18 February: International conservation technology conference | Lima, Peru
* 22-27 February: American Geophysical Union’s ocean sciences meeting | Glasgow, UK
Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/hero-5-01-2-300x200.png Cropped 28 January 2026: Ocean biodiversity boost; Nature and national security; Mangrove defence
Cropped
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28.01.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/hero-5-01-2-300x200.png Cropped 14 January 2026: Wildfires scorch three continents; EU trade; Food and nature in 2026
Cropped
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14.01.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/hero-5-01-2-300x200.png Cropped 17 December 2025: ‘Deadly’ Asia floods; Boosting London’s water birds; UN headwinds
Cropped
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17.12.25
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/hero-5-01-2-300x200.png Cropped 3 December 2025: Extreme weather in Africa; COP30 roundup; Saudi minister interview
Cropped
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03.12.25
The post Cropped 11 February 2026: Aftershocks of US withdrawals | Biodiversity and business risks | Deep-sea mining tensions appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Carbon Brief Staff
Source: https://www.carbonbrief.org/?p=61228
Nature Climate on Telegram by @NatureClimateTelegram
A @grttme project - Other backups: @Hallotme
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
Photo
Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions have now been ‘flat or falling’ for 21 months
China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell by 1% in the final quarter of 2025, likely securing a decline of 0.3% for the full year as a whole.
This extends a “flat or falling” trend in China’s CO2 emissions that began in March 2024 and has now lasted for nearly two years.
The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that, in 2025, emissions from fossil fuels increased by an estimated 0.1%, but this was more than offset by a 7% decline in CO2 from cement.
Other key findings include:
* CO2 emissions fell year-on-year in almost all major sectors in 2025, including transport (3%), power (1.5%) and building materials (7%).
* The key exception was the chemicals industry, where emissions grew 12%.
* Solar power output increased by 43% year-on-year, wind by 14% and nuclear 8%, helping push down coal generation by 1.9%.
* Energy storage capacity grew by a record 75 gigawatts (GW), well ahead of the rise in peak demand of 55GW.
* This means that growth in energy storage capacity and clean-power output topped the increases in peak and total electricity demand, respectively.
The CO2 numbers imply that China’s carbon intensity – its fossil-fuel emissions per unit of GDP – fell by 4.7% in 2025 and by 12% during 2020-25.
This is well short of the 18% target set for that period by the 14th five-year plan.
Moreover, China would now need to cut its carbon intensity by around 23% over the next five years in order to meet one of its key climate commitments under the Paris Agreement.
Whether Chinese policymakers remain committed to this target is a key open question ahead of the publication of the 15th five-year plan in March.
This will help determine if China’s emissions have already passed their peak, or if they will rise once again and only peak much closer to the officially targeted date of “before 2030”.
‘Flat or falling’
The latest analysis shows China’s CO2 emissions have now been flat or falling for 21 months, starting in March 2024. This trend continued in the final quarter of 2025, when emissions fell by 1% year-on-year.
The picture continues to be finely balanced, with emissions falling in all major sectors – including transport, power, cement and metals – but rising in the chemicals industry.
This combination of factors means that emissions continue to plateau at levels slightly below the peak reached in early 2024, as shown in the figure below.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/chinas-co2-emissions-now-flat-falling-21-months.png China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals until September 2025. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimate[...]
China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell by 1% in the final quarter of 2025, likely securing a decline of 0.3% for the full year as a whole.
This extends a “flat or falling” trend in China’s CO2 emissions that began in March 2024 and has now lasted for nearly two years.
The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that, in 2025, emissions from fossil fuels increased by an estimated 0.1%, but this was more than offset by a 7% decline in CO2 from cement.
Other key findings include:
* CO2 emissions fell year-on-year in almost all major sectors in 2025, including transport (3%), power (1.5%) and building materials (7%).
* The key exception was the chemicals industry, where emissions grew 12%.
* Solar power output increased by 43% year-on-year, wind by 14% and nuclear 8%, helping push down coal generation by 1.9%.
* Energy storage capacity grew by a record 75 gigawatts (GW), well ahead of the rise in peak demand of 55GW.
* This means that growth in energy storage capacity and clean-power output topped the increases in peak and total electricity demand, respectively.
The CO2 numbers imply that China’s carbon intensity – its fossil-fuel emissions per unit of GDP – fell by 4.7% in 2025 and by 12% during 2020-25.
This is well short of the 18% target set for that period by the 14th five-year plan.
Moreover, China would now need to cut its carbon intensity by around 23% over the next five years in order to meet one of its key climate commitments under the Paris Agreement.
Whether Chinese policymakers remain committed to this target is a key open question ahead of the publication of the 15th five-year plan in March.
This will help determine if China’s emissions have already passed their peak, or if they will rise once again and only peak much closer to the officially targeted date of “before 2030”.
‘Flat or falling’
The latest analysis shows China’s CO2 emissions have now been flat or falling for 21 months, starting in March 2024. This trend continued in the final quarter of 2025, when emissions fell by 1% year-on-year.
The picture continues to be finely balanced, with emissions falling in all major sectors – including transport, power, cement and metals – but rising in the chemicals industry.
This combination of factors means that emissions continue to plateau at levels slightly below the peak reached in early 2024, as shown in the figure below.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/chinas-co2-emissions-now-flat-falling-21-months.png China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals until September 2025. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimate[...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions have now been ‘flat or falling’ for 21 months China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell by 1% in the final quarter of 2025, likely securing a decline of 0.3% for the full year as a whole. This extends a “flat or falling”…
d using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec.
Power sector emissions fell by 1.5% year-on-year in 2025, with coal use falling 1.7% and gas use increasing 6%. Emissions from transportation fell 3% and from the production of cement and other building materials by 7%, while emissions from the metal industry fell 3%.
These declines are shown in the figure below. They were partially offset by rising coal and oil use in the chemical industry, up 15% and 10% respectively, which pushed up the sector’s CO2 emissions by 12% overall.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/surging-emissions-chemicals-industry-offset-elsewhere.png Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period January-September 2025, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec.
In other sectors – largely other industrial areas and building heat – gas use increased by 2%, more than offsetting the reduction in emissions from a 3% drop in their coal consumption.
Clean power covers electricity demand growth
In the power sector, which is China’s largest emitter by far, electricity demand grew by 520 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2025.
At the same time, power generation from solar increased by 43% and wind power generation by 14%, delivering 360TWh and 130TWh of additional clean electricity. Nuclear power generation grew 8%, supplying another 40TWh. The increased generation from these three sources – some 530TWh – therefore met all of the growth in demand.
Hydropower generation also increased by 3% and bioenergy by 3%, helping push power generation from fossil fuels down by 1%. Gas-fired power generation increased by 6% and, as a result, power generation from coal fell by 1.9%.
Furthermore, the surge in additions of new wind and solar capacity at the end of 2025 will only show up as increased clean-power generation in 2026.
On the other hand, the growth in solar and wind power generation has fallen short of the growth in capacity, implying a fall in capacity utilisation – a measure of actual output relative to the maximum possible. This is highly likely due to increased, unreported curtailment, where wind and[...]
Power sector emissions fell by 1.5% year-on-year in 2025, with coal use falling 1.7% and gas use increasing 6%. Emissions from transportation fell 3% and from the production of cement and other building materials by 7%, while emissions from the metal industry fell 3%.
These declines are shown in the figure below. They were partially offset by rising coal and oil use in the chemical industry, up 15% and 10% respectively, which pushed up the sector’s CO2 emissions by 12% overall.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/surging-emissions-chemicals-industry-offset-elsewhere.png Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period January-September 2025, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec.
In other sectors – largely other industrial areas and building heat – gas use increased by 2%, more than offsetting the reduction in emissions from a 3% drop in their coal consumption.
Clean power covers electricity demand growth
In the power sector, which is China’s largest emitter by far, electricity demand grew by 520 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2025.
At the same time, power generation from solar increased by 43% and wind power generation by 14%, delivering 360TWh and 130TWh of additional clean electricity. Nuclear power generation grew 8%, supplying another 40TWh. The increased generation from these three sources – some 530TWh – therefore met all of the growth in demand.
Hydropower generation also increased by 3% and bioenergy by 3%, helping push power generation from fossil fuels down by 1%. Gas-fired power generation increased by 6% and, as a result, power generation from coal fell by 1.9%.
Furthermore, the surge in additions of new wind and solar capacity at the end of 2025 will only show up as increased clean-power generation in 2026.
On the other hand, the growth in solar and wind power generation has fallen short of the growth in capacity, implying a fall in capacity utilisation – a measure of actual output relative to the maximum possible. This is highly likely due to increased, unreported curtailment, where wind and[...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
d using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec. Power sector emissions fell by 1.5%…
solar sites are switched off because the electricity grid is congested.
If these grid issues are resolved over the next few years, then generation from existing wind and solar capacity will increase over time.
Developments in 2025 extended the trend of clean-power generation growing faster than power demand overall, as shown in the top figure below. This trend started in 2023 and is the key reason why China’s emissions have been stable or falling since early 2024.
In addition, 2025 saw another potential inflection point, shown in the bottom figure below. It was the first year ever that energy storage capacity – mainly batteries – grew faster than peak electricity demand in 2025 and faster than the average growth in the past decade.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/generation-storage-overtaken-peak-demand-growth-1.png Top columns: Year-on-year change in annual electricity generation from clean energy excluding hydro, terawatt hours. Left solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in total electricity generation, TWh. Bottom columns: Year-on-year change in energy storage capacity, gigawatts. Right solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in peak electricity demand. Sources: Power generation and demand from Ember; peak loads from China Electric Power News since 2020; peak loads until 2019 and pumped hydro capacity from Wind Financial Terminal; battery storage capacity from China Energy Storage Alliance; analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta.
China’s energy storage capacity increased by 75GW year-on-year in 2025, while peak demand only increased by 55GW. The rise in storage capacity in 2025 is also larger than the three-year average increase in peak loads, some 72GW per year.
Peak demand growth matters, because power systems have to be designed to reliably provide enough electricity supply at the moment of highest demand.
Moreover, the increase in peak loads is a key driver of continued additions of coal and gas-fired power plants, which reached the highest level in a decade in 2025.
The growth in energy storage could provide China with an alternative way to meet peak loads without relying on increased fossil fuel-based capacity.
The growth in storage capacity is set to continue after a new policy issued by China’s top economic planner the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in January.
This policy means energy storage sites will be supported by so-called “capacity payments”, which to date have only been available to coal- and gas-fired power plants and pumped hydro storage.
Concerns about having sufficient “firm” power capacity in the grid – that which can be turned on at will – led the government to promote new coal and gas-fired power projects in recent years, leading to the largest fossil-fuel based capacity additions in a decade in 2025, with another 290GW of coal-fired capacity still under construction. <a href='https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/enhancing-zhejiangs-coal-power-flexibility-the-e[...]
If these grid issues are resolved over the next few years, then generation from existing wind and solar capacity will increase over time.
Developments in 2025 extended the trend of clean-power generation growing faster than power demand overall, as shown in the top figure below. This trend started in 2023 and is the key reason why China’s emissions have been stable or falling since early 2024.
In addition, 2025 saw another potential inflection point, shown in the bottom figure below. It was the first year ever that energy storage capacity – mainly batteries – grew faster than peak electricity demand in 2025 and faster than the average growth in the past decade.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/generation-storage-overtaken-peak-demand-growth-1.png Top columns: Year-on-year change in annual electricity generation from clean energy excluding hydro, terawatt hours. Left solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in total electricity generation, TWh. Bottom columns: Year-on-year change in energy storage capacity, gigawatts. Right solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in peak electricity demand. Sources: Power generation and demand from Ember; peak loads from China Electric Power News since 2020; peak loads until 2019 and pumped hydro capacity from Wind Financial Terminal; battery storage capacity from China Energy Storage Alliance; analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta.
China’s energy storage capacity increased by 75GW year-on-year in 2025, while peak demand only increased by 55GW. The rise in storage capacity in 2025 is also larger than the three-year average increase in peak loads, some 72GW per year.
Peak demand growth matters, because power systems have to be designed to reliably provide enough electricity supply at the moment of highest demand.
Moreover, the increase in peak loads is a key driver of continued additions of coal and gas-fired power plants, which reached the highest level in a decade in 2025.
The growth in energy storage could provide China with an alternative way to meet peak loads without relying on increased fossil fuel-based capacity.
The growth in storage capacity is set to continue after a new policy issued by China’s top economic planner the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in January.
This policy means energy storage sites will be supported by so-called “capacity payments”, which to date have only been available to coal- and gas-fired power plants and pumped hydro storage.
Concerns about having sufficient “firm” power capacity in the grid – that which can be turned on at will – led the government to promote new coal and gas-fired power projects in recent years, leading to the largest fossil-fuel based capacity additions in a decade in 2025, with another 290GW of coal-fired capacity still under construction. <a href='https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/enhancing-zhejiangs-coal-power-flexibility-the-e[...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
solar sites are switched off because the electricity grid is congested. If these grid issues are resolved over the next few years, then generation from existing wind and solar capacity will increase over time. Developments in 2025 extended the trend of clean…
conomic-and-climate-gains/'>Reforming the power system and increasing storage capacity would enable the grid to accommodate much higher shares of solar and wind, while reducing the need for new coal or gas capacity to meet rising peaks in demand.
This would both unlock more clean-power generation from existing capacity and improve the economics and risk profiles of new projects, stimulating more growth in capacity. Peaking power CO2 requires more clean-energy growth
China’s key climate commitments for the next five-year period until 2030 are to peak CO2 emissions and to reduce carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels. The latter target requires limiting CO2 emissions at or below their 2025 level in 2030.
The record clean-energy additions in 2023-25 have barely sufficed to stabilise power-sector emissions, showing that if rapid growth in power demand continues, meeting the 2030 targets requires keeping clean-energy additions close to 2025 levels over the next five years.
China’s central government continues to telegraph a much lower level of ambition, with the NDRC setting a target of “around” 30% of power generation in 2030 coming from solar and wind, up from around 22% in 2025.
If electricity demand grows in line with the State Grid forecast of 5.6% per year, then limiting the share of wind and solar to 30% would leave space for fossil-fuel generation to grow at 3% per year from 2025 to 2030, even after increases from nuclear and hydropower.
Such an increase would mean missing China’s Paris commitments for 2030.
Alternatively, in order to meet the forecast increase in electricity demand without increasing generation from fossil fuels would require wind and solar’s share to reach 37% in 2030.
Similarly, China’s target of a non-fossil energy share of 25% in 2030 will not be sufficient to meet its carbon-intensity reduction commitment for 2030, unless energy demand growth slows down sharply.
This target is unlikely to be upgraded, since it is already enshrined in China’s Paris Agreement pledge, so in practice the target would need to be substantially overachieved if the country is to meet its other commitments.
If energy demand growth continues at the 2025 rate and the share of non-fossil energy only rises from 22% in 2025 to 25% in 2030, then the consumption of fossil fuels would increase by 3% per year, with a similar rise in CO2 emissions.
Still, another recent sign that clean-energy growth could keep exceeding government targets came in early February when the China Electricity Council projected solar and wind capacity additions of more than 300GW in 2026 – well beyond the government goal of “over 200GW”. Chemical industry
The only significant source of growth in CO2 emissions in 2025 was the chemical industry, with sharp increases in the consumption of both coal and oil.
This is shown in the figure below, which illustrates how CO2 emissions appear to have peaked from cement production, transport, the power sector and others, whereas the chemicals industry is posting strong increases.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/almost-every-part-chinas-economy-cutting-co2-emissions.png Sectoral emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, <a href='http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/zfxxgk/[...]
This would both unlock more clean-power generation from existing capacity and improve the economics and risk profiles of new projects, stimulating more growth in capacity. Peaking power CO2 requires more clean-energy growth
China’s key climate commitments for the next five-year period until 2030 are to peak CO2 emissions and to reduce carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels. The latter target requires limiting CO2 emissions at or below their 2025 level in 2030.
The record clean-energy additions in 2023-25 have barely sufficed to stabilise power-sector emissions, showing that if rapid growth in power demand continues, meeting the 2030 targets requires keeping clean-energy additions close to 2025 levels over the next five years.
China’s central government continues to telegraph a much lower level of ambition, with the NDRC setting a target of “around” 30% of power generation in 2030 coming from solar and wind, up from around 22% in 2025.
If electricity demand grows in line with the State Grid forecast of 5.6% per year, then limiting the share of wind and solar to 30% would leave space for fossil-fuel generation to grow at 3% per year from 2025 to 2030, even after increases from nuclear and hydropower.
Such an increase would mean missing China’s Paris commitments for 2030.
Alternatively, in order to meet the forecast increase in electricity demand without increasing generation from fossil fuels would require wind and solar’s share to reach 37% in 2030.
Similarly, China’s target of a non-fossil energy share of 25% in 2030 will not be sufficient to meet its carbon-intensity reduction commitment for 2030, unless energy demand growth slows down sharply.
This target is unlikely to be upgraded, since it is already enshrined in China’s Paris Agreement pledge, so in practice the target would need to be substantially overachieved if the country is to meet its other commitments.
If energy demand growth continues at the 2025 rate and the share of non-fossil energy only rises from 22% in 2025 to 25% in 2030, then the consumption of fossil fuels would increase by 3% per year, with a similar rise in CO2 emissions.
Still, another recent sign that clean-energy growth could keep exceeding government targets came in early February when the China Electricity Council projected solar and wind capacity additions of more than 300GW in 2026 – well beyond the government goal of “over 200GW”. Chemical industry
The only significant source of growth in CO2 emissions in 2025 was the chemical industry, with sharp increases in the consumption of both coal and oil.
This is shown in the figure below, which illustrates how CO2 emissions appear to have peaked from cement production, transport, the power sector and others, whereas the chemicals industry is posting strong increases.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/almost-every-part-chinas-economy-cutting-co2-emissions.png Sectoral emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, <a href='http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/zfxxgk/[...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
conomic-and-climate-gains/'>Reforming the power system and increasing storage capacity would enable the grid to accommodate much higher shares of solar and wind, while reducing the need for new coal or gas capacity to meet rising peaks in demand. This would…
2799825/302274/302275/3761834/index.html'>China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.
Even though chemical-industry emissions are small relative to other sectors – at roughly 13% of China’s total – the pace of expansion is creating an outsize impact.
Without the increase from the chemicals sector, China’s total CO2 emissions would have fallen by an estimated 2%, instead of the 0.3% reported here.
Without changes to policy, emission growth is set to continue, as the coal-to-chemicals industry is planning major increases in capacity.
Whether these expansion plans receive backing in the upcoming five-year plan for 2026-30 will have a major impact on China’s emission trends.
Another key factor is the development of oil and gas prices. Production in the coal-based chemical industry is only profitable when coal is significantly cheaper than crude oil.
The current coal-to-chemicals capacity in China is dominated by plants producing higher-value – and therefore less price-sensitive – chemicals such as olefins and aromatics, as feedstocks for the production of plastics.
In contrast, the planned expansion of the sector is expected to be largely driven by plants producing oil products and synthetic gas to be used for energy. For these products, electrification and clean-electricity generation provide a direct alternative, meaning they are even more sensitive to low oil and gas prices than chemicals production. Outlook for China’s emissions
This is the latest analysis for Carbon Brief to show that China’s CO2 emissions have now been stable or falling for seven quarters or 21 months, marking the first such streak on record that has not been associated with a slowdown in energy demand growth.
Notably, while emissions have stabilised or begun a slow decline, there has not yet been a substantial reduction from the level reached in early 2024. This means that a small jump in emissions could see them exceed the previous peak level.
China’s official plans only call for peaking emissions shortly before 2030, which would allow for a rebound from the current plateau before the ultimate emissions peak.
If China is to meet its 2030 carbon intensity commitment – a 65% reduction on 2005 levels – then emissions would have to fall from the peak back to current levels by 2030.
Whether China’s policymakers are still committed to meeting this carbon intensity pledge, after the setbacks during the previous five-year period, is a key open question. The 2030 energy targets set to date have fallen short of what would be required.
The most important signal will be whether the top-level five-year plan for 2026-30, due in March, sets a carbon intensity target aligned with the 2030 Paris commitment.
Officially, China is sticking to the timeline of peaking CO2 emissions “be[...]
Even though chemical-industry emissions are small relative to other sectors – at roughly 13% of China’s total – the pace of expansion is creating an outsize impact.
Without the increase from the chemicals sector, China’s total CO2 emissions would have fallen by an estimated 2%, instead of the 0.3% reported here.
Without changes to policy, emission growth is set to continue, as the coal-to-chemicals industry is planning major increases in capacity.
Whether these expansion plans receive backing in the upcoming five-year plan for 2026-30 will have a major impact on China’s emission trends.
Another key factor is the development of oil and gas prices. Production in the coal-based chemical industry is only profitable when coal is significantly cheaper than crude oil.
The current coal-to-chemicals capacity in China is dominated by plants producing higher-value – and therefore less price-sensitive – chemicals such as olefins and aromatics, as feedstocks for the production of plastics.
In contrast, the planned expansion of the sector is expected to be largely driven by plants producing oil products and synthetic gas to be used for energy. For these products, electrification and clean-electricity generation provide a direct alternative, meaning they are even more sensitive to low oil and gas prices than chemicals production. Outlook for China’s emissions
This is the latest analysis for Carbon Brief to show that China’s CO2 emissions have now been stable or falling for seven quarters or 21 months, marking the first such streak on record that has not been associated with a slowdown in energy demand growth.
Notably, while emissions have stabilised or begun a slow decline, there has not yet been a substantial reduction from the level reached in early 2024. This means that a small jump in emissions could see them exceed the previous peak level.
China’s official plans only call for peaking emissions shortly before 2030, which would allow for a rebound from the current plateau before the ultimate emissions peak.
If China is to meet its 2030 carbon intensity commitment – a 65% reduction on 2005 levels – then emissions would have to fall from the peak back to current levels by 2030.
Whether China’s policymakers are still committed to meeting this carbon intensity pledge, after the setbacks during the previous five-year period, is a key open question. The 2030 energy targets set to date have fallen short of what would be required.
The most important signal will be whether the top-level five-year plan for 2026-30, due in March, sets a carbon intensity target aligned with the 2030 Paris commitment.
Officially, China is sticking to the timeline of peaking CO2 emissions “be[...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
2799825/302274/302275/3761834/index.html'>China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors…
fore 2030”, which was announced by president Xi Jinping in 2020.
According to an authoritative explainer on the recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the upcoming five-year plan, published by state-backed news agency Xinhua, coal consumption should “reach its peak and enter a plateau” from 2027.
It says that continued increases in demand for coal from electricity generators and the chemicals industry would be offset by reductions elsewhere. This is despite the fact that China’s coal consumption overall has already been falling for close to two years.
The reference to a “plateau” in coal consumption indicates that in official plans, meaningful absolute reductions in emissions would have to wait until after 2030. Any increase in coal consumption from 2025 to 2027, before the targeted plateau, would need to be offset by reductions in oil consumption, to meet the carbon intensity target.
Moreover, allowing coal consumption in the power sector to grow beyond the peak of overall coal use and emissions implies slowing down China’s clean-energy boom. So far, the boom has continued to exceed official targets by a wide margin.
In addition, the explainer’s expectation of further growth in coal use by the chemicals industry indicates a green light for at least a part of its sizable expansion plans.
The Xinhua article recognises that oil product consumption has already peaked, but says that oil use in the chemicals industry has kept growing. It adds that overall oil consumption should peak in 2026.
Elsewhere, the article speaks of “vigorously” developing non-fossil energy and “actively” developing “distributed” solar, which has slowed down due to recent pricing policies.
Yet it also calls for “high-quality development” of fossil fuels and increased efforts in domestic oil and gas production, suggesting that China continues to take an “all of the above” approach to energy policy.
The outcome of all this depends on how things turn out in reality. The past few years show it is possible that clean energy will continue to overperform its targets, preventing growth in energy consumption from fossil fuels despite this policy support.
The key role of the clean-energy boom in driving GDP growth and investments is one key motivator for policymakers to keep the boom going, even when central targets would allow for a slowdown. It is also possible that the five-year plans of provinces and state-owned enterprises could play a key role in raising ambition, as they did in 2022.
About the data
Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, as well as from industry data provider WIND Information and from Sinopec, China’s largest oil refiner.
Electricity generation from wind and solar, along with thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using [...]
According to an authoritative explainer on the recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the upcoming five-year plan, published by state-backed news agency Xinhua, coal consumption should “reach its peak and enter a plateau” from 2027.
It says that continued increases in demand for coal from electricity generators and the chemicals industry would be offset by reductions elsewhere. This is despite the fact that China’s coal consumption overall has already been falling for close to two years.
The reference to a “plateau” in coal consumption indicates that in official plans, meaningful absolute reductions in emissions would have to wait until after 2030. Any increase in coal consumption from 2025 to 2027, before the targeted plateau, would need to be offset by reductions in oil consumption, to meet the carbon intensity target.
Moreover, allowing coal consumption in the power sector to grow beyond the peak of overall coal use and emissions implies slowing down China’s clean-energy boom. So far, the boom has continued to exceed official targets by a wide margin.
In addition, the explainer’s expectation of further growth in coal use by the chemicals industry indicates a green light for at least a part of its sizable expansion plans.
The Xinhua article recognises that oil product consumption has already peaked, but says that oil use in the chemicals industry has kept growing. It adds that overall oil consumption should peak in 2026.
Elsewhere, the article speaks of “vigorously” developing non-fossil energy and “actively” developing “distributed” solar, which has slowed down due to recent pricing policies.
Yet it also calls for “high-quality development” of fossil fuels and increased efforts in domestic oil and gas production, suggesting that China continues to take an “all of the above” approach to energy policy.
The outcome of all this depends on how things turn out in reality. The past few years show it is possible that clean energy will continue to overperform its targets, preventing growth in energy consumption from fossil fuels despite this policy support.
The key role of the clean-energy boom in driving GDP growth and investments is one key motivator for policymakers to keep the boom going, even when central targets would allow for a slowdown. It is also possible that the five-year plans of provinces and state-owned enterprises could play a key role in raising ambition, as they did in 2022.
About the data
Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, as well as from industry data provider WIND Information and from Sinopec, China’s largest oil refiner.
Electricity generation from wind and solar, along with thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using [...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
fore 2030”, which was announced by president Xi Jinping in 2020. According to an authoritative explainer on the recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the upcoming five-year plan, published by state-backed news agency Xinhua,…
data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.
Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power were taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.
Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power-sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data.
CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. The CO2 emissions factor for cement is based on annual estimates up to 2024.
For oil, apparent consumption of transport fuels – diesel, petrol and jet fuel – is taken from Sinopec quarterly results, with monthly disaggregation based on production minus net exports. The consumption of these three fuels is labeled as oil product consumption in transportation, as it is the dominant sector for their use.
Apparent consumption of other oil products is calculated from refinery throughput, with the production of the transport fuels and the net exports of other oil products subtracted. Fossil-fuel consumption includes non-energy use such as plastics, as most products are short-lived and incineration is the dominant disposal method.
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/3BNHRRA-300x200.jpg 分析：清洁能源2025年为中国GDP增长贡献超过三分之一
China energy
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05.02.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/3BNHRRA-300x200.jpg Analysis: Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025
China energy
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05.02.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/2X4CYDT-300x200.jpg ‘Rush’ for new coal in China hits record high in 2025 as climate deadline looms
China energy
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03.02.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/3CHDAWE-300x200.jpg Explainer: Why gas plays a minimal role in China’s climate strategy
China energy
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22.01.26
The post Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions have now been ‘flat or falling’ for 21 months appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Lauri Myllyvirta
Source: https://www.carbonbrief.org/?p=61181
Nature Climate on Telegram by @NatureClimateTelegram
A @grttme project - Other backups: @Hallotme
Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power were taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.
Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power-sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data.
CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. The CO2 emissions factor for cement is based on annual estimates up to 2024.
For oil, apparent consumption of transport fuels – diesel, petrol and jet fuel – is taken from Sinopec quarterly results, with monthly disaggregation based on production minus net exports. The consumption of these three fuels is labeled as oil product consumption in transportation, as it is the dominant sector for their use.
Apparent consumption of other oil products is calculated from refinery throughput, with the production of the transport fuels and the net exports of other oil products subtracted. Fossil-fuel consumption includes non-energy use such as plastics, as most products are short-lived and incineration is the dominant disposal method.
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/3BNHRRA-300x200.jpg 分析：清洁能源2025年为中国GDP增长贡献超过三分之一
China energy
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05.02.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/3BNHRRA-300x200.jpg Analysis: Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025
China energy
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05.02.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/2X4CYDT-300x200.jpg ‘Rush’ for new coal in China hits record high in 2025 as climate deadline looms
China energy
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03.02.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/3CHDAWE-300x200.jpg Explainer: Why gas plays a minimal role in China’s climate strategy
China energy
|
22.01.26
The post Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions have now been ‘flat or falling’ for 21 months appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Lauri Myllyvirta
Source: https://www.carbonbrief.org/?p=61181
Nature Climate on Telegram by @NatureClimateTelegram
A @grttme project - Other backups: @Hallotme
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
Photo
Analysis: Trump has overseen more coal retirements than any other US president
Donald Trump has overseen more retirements of coal-fired power stations than any other US president, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
His administration’s latest efforts to roll back US climate policy have been presented by interior secretary Doug Burgum as an opportunity to revive “clean, beautiful, American coal”.
The administration is in the process of attempting to repeal the 2009 “endangerment” finding, which is the legal underpinning of many federal climate regulations.
On 11 February, the White House issued an executive order on “America’s beautiful clean coal power generation fleet”, calling for government contracts and subsidies to keep plants open.
On the same day, Trump was presented with a trophy by coal-mining executives declaring him to be the “undisputed champion of beautiful clean coal”.
These words are in sharp contrast to Trump’s record in office, with more coal-fired power plants having retired under his leadership than any other president, as shown in the figure below.
This is because coal plants have been uneconomic to operate compared with cheaper gas and renewables – and because most of the US coal fleet is extremely old.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/SOCIAL_MEDIA-Trump_coal_retirements-1-1024x568.png Capacity of coal-fired power plants retiring under recent US presidents, gigawatts (GW). Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from Global Energy Monitor.
In total, some 57 gigawatts (GW) of coal capacity has already been retired during Trump’s first and second terms in office, compared with 48GW under Obama’s two full terms and 41GW under Biden’s single term.
Even in relative terms, the US has lost a larger proportion of its remaining coal fleet for each year of Trump’s presidencies than for either of his recent predecessors.
Trump’s record hints at the many practical and economic factors that have driven US coal closures, regardless of the preferences of the president of the day.
Indeed, Trump made variousefforts to prop up coal power during his first term in office. These were ultimatelyunsuccessful, as the figure below illustrates.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/2_The_size_of_US_coal-power_fleet_has_nearly_halved_since_2010-1024x567.png Coal-fired power capacity in the US, GW. Source: Global Energy Monitor.
Coal plants have been retiring in large numbers over the past 20 years because they were uneconomic relative to <[...]
Donald Trump has overseen more retirements of coal-fired power stations than any other US president, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
His administration’s latest efforts to roll back US climate policy have been presented by interior secretary Doug Burgum as an opportunity to revive “clean, beautiful, American coal”.
The administration is in the process of attempting to repeal the 2009 “endangerment” finding, which is the legal underpinning of many federal climate regulations.
On 11 February, the White House issued an executive order on “America’s beautiful clean coal power generation fleet”, calling for government contracts and subsidies to keep plants open.
On the same day, Trump was presented with a trophy by coal-mining executives declaring him to be the “undisputed champion of beautiful clean coal”.
These words are in sharp contrast to Trump’s record in office, with more coal-fired power plants having retired under his leadership than any other president, as shown in the figure below.
This is because coal plants have been uneconomic to operate compared with cheaper gas and renewables – and because most of the US coal fleet is extremely old.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/SOCIAL_MEDIA-Trump_coal_retirements-1-1024x568.png Capacity of coal-fired power plants retiring under recent US presidents, gigawatts (GW). Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from Global Energy Monitor.
In total, some 57 gigawatts (GW) of coal capacity has already been retired during Trump’s first and second terms in office, compared with 48GW under Obama’s two full terms and 41GW under Biden’s single term.
Even in relative terms, the US has lost a larger proportion of its remaining coal fleet for each year of Trump’s presidencies than for either of his recent predecessors.
Trump’s record hints at the many practical and economic factors that have driven US coal closures, regardless of the preferences of the president of the day.
Indeed, Trump made variousefforts to prop up coal power during his first term in office. These were ultimatelyunsuccessful, as the figure below illustrates.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/2_The_size_of_US_coal-power_fleet_has_nearly_halved_since_2010-1024x567.png Coal-fired power capacity in the US, GW. Source: Global Energy Monitor.
Coal plants have been retiring in large numbers over the past 20 years because they were uneconomic relative to <[...]
Nature Climate Change by Springer Science Journal and Carbon Brief on Telegram by GRT : Pubmedgram , Pubmed on Tg
Analysis: Trump has overseen more coal retirements than any other US president Donald Trump has overseen more retirements of coal-fired power stations than any other US president, according to Carbon Brief analysis. His administration’s latest efforts to…
a href='https://www.wri.org/insights/trump-coal-plant-extension-cost-impacts'>cheaper sources of electricity, including renewables and gas.
These unfavourable market conditions, alongside air pollution regulations unrelated to climate change, have resulted in a steady parade of coal closures under successive presidents.
By 2024, wind and solar were generating more electricity in the US than coal.
More recently, analysis from the US Energy Information Administration shows that surging power prices have improved the economics of both coal and gas-fired power plants.
These rising prices have been driven by increasing demand, including from data centres, and by higher gas prices, due to increasing exports at liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals.
These factors saw coal-power output increase by 13% year-on-year in 2025, only the second rise in a decade of steady decline for the fuel, according to the Rhodium Group.
Nevertheless, many utilities have still been looking to shutter their ageing coal-fired power plants.
The vast majority of US coal plants are nearing retirement. Three-quarters of US coal capacity is more than four decades old and only 14% is less than 20 years old, as shown in the figure below.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/3_The_vast_majority_of_US_coal-fired_power_plants_are_very_old-1024x586.png Capacity of US coal plants by age group, GW. Source: Global Energy Monitor.
In response, the Trump administration has recently invoked legislation designed for wartime emergencies to force a number of uneconomic coal plants to remain open.
Despite Trump’s efforts, clean energy made up 96% of the new electricity generation capacity added to the US grid in 2025. None of the new capacity came from coal power.
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2E97KJ7-300x200.jpg Analysis: Coal power drops in China and India for first time in 52 years after clean-energy records
China energy
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13.01.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/3D58NGG-300x200.jpg IEA: Declining coal demand in China set to outweigh Trump’s pro-coal policies
Coal
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17.12.25
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/coal-plant-bushra-RYG0W8-300x200.jpg Guest post: China and India account for 87% of new coal-power capacity so far in 2025
China energy
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27.08.25
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/2XFTMAM-300x200.jpg Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
China energy
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12.08.25
The post Analysis: Trump has overseen more coal retirements than any other US president appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Simon Evans
Source: https://www.carbonbrief.org/?p=61260
Nature Climate on Telegram by @NatureClimateTelegram
A @grttme project - Other backups: @Hallotme
These unfavourable market conditions, alongside air pollution regulations unrelated to climate change, have resulted in a steady parade of coal closures under successive presidents.
By 2024, wind and solar were generating more electricity in the US than coal.
More recently, analysis from the US Energy Information Administration shows that surging power prices have improved the economics of both coal and gas-fired power plants.
These rising prices have been driven by increasing demand, including from data centres, and by higher gas prices, due to increasing exports at liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals.
These factors saw coal-power output increase by 13% year-on-year in 2025, only the second rise in a decade of steady decline for the fuel, according to the Rhodium Group.
Nevertheless, many utilities have still been looking to shutter their ageing coal-fired power plants.
The vast majority of US coal plants are nearing retirement. Three-quarters of US coal capacity is more than four decades old and only 14% is less than 20 years old, as shown in the figure below.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/3_The_vast_majority_of_US_coal-fired_power_plants_are_very_old-1024x586.png Capacity of US coal plants by age group, GW. Source: Global Energy Monitor.
In response, the Trump administration has recently invoked legislation designed for wartime emergencies to force a number of uneconomic coal plants to remain open.
Despite Trump’s efforts, clean energy made up 96% of the new electricity generation capacity added to the US grid in 2025. None of the new capacity came from coal power.
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2E97KJ7-300x200.jpg Analysis: Coal power drops in China and India for first time in 52 years after clean-energy records
China energy
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13.01.26
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/3D58NGG-300x200.jpg IEA: Declining coal demand in China set to outweigh Trump’s pro-coal policies
Coal
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17.12.25
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/coal-plant-bushra-RYG0W8-300x200.jpg Guest post: China and India account for 87% of new coal-power capacity so far in 2025
China energy
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27.08.25
<picturehttps://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/2XFTMAM-300x200.jpg Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
China energy
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12.08.25
The post Analysis: Trump has overseen more coal retirements than any other US president appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Simon Evans
Source: https://www.carbonbrief.org/?p=61260
Nature Climate on Telegram by @NatureClimateTelegram
A @grttme project - Other backups: @Hallotme