Russia’s interests in the NSR can be viewed from strategic and geopolitical perspectives. The Arctic was seen as a barrier region, inaccessible through marine transportation with great natural defense capabilities (Mackinder, 1919: 54). Nonetheless, in the 21st Century, the Arctic Ocean is opening to transportation, practically year-round in some parts (Balão, 2016: 133). Indeed, the interest in commercial shipping through the NSR is increasing, which will, according to Bai, “...result in the proliferation of shipping activity in the region” (2015: 698).

An international voyage through the NSR can be reduced by up to 40% when compared to the Suez Canal (Figure 4) (Todorov, 2017: 62). For instance, an international transit through the NSR between the ports of Hamburg (Germany) and Shanghai (China) will save a week of voyage, be risk-free from piracy, and save more than half a million dollars in fuel (Gavrilov, 2015: 256).

Global warming has increased the strategic importance of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (henceforth AZRF) as the recent official Russian documents show: (i) “Foundations of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic for the Period to 2035” (Putin, 2020a) (henceforth Arctic Policy); and (ii) “Strategy of Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and the Provision of National Security for the Period to 2035” (Putin, 2020b) (henceforth Arctic Strategy). These documents describe Russian interests in defense, mineral resources, and maritime transportation, as well as environmental, social, and sustainable development issues (Putin, 2020a).