Windmills are bad for the envoriment.
Don't believe the pseudoscience.
Trust God.
Don't believe the pseudoscience.
Trust God.
Media is too big
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
For the cat lovers
Someone said Putin was a WH.
People that claim this... Either have a wicked agenda, or just trying to justify their own feelings and hope.
I understand that people want to be saved.. It's just not happening. It takes efforts to make impacts.
WW2 is also fabricated and the socialist puppet Adolf Hitler was not a clever man, but had charismatic appearance. Actually Mein kampf is a follow up to Marx's biography..
They are all controlled.
Especially countries which seems to be left alone..
Cold War...
Oh you mean the county next to Canada?
USA and Russia are not that far away from one and another
People that claim this... Either have a wicked agenda, or just trying to justify their own feelings and hope.
I understand that people want to be saved.. It's just not happening. It takes efforts to make impacts.
WW2 is also fabricated and the socialist puppet Adolf Hitler was not a clever man, but had charismatic appearance. Actually Mein kampf is a follow up to Marx's biography..
They are all controlled.
Especially countries which seems to be left alone..
Cold War...
Oh you mean the county next to Canada?
USA and Russia are not that far away from one and another
John F. Kennedy, Jr. 01- OOA.pdf
5 MB
'John F. Kennedy, Jr. 01- OOA'
Forwarded from GEORGENEWS
SAVE AMERICA
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
JUNE 1, 2021
BEDMINSTER, NJ
Statement by Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States of America
RINO Former Congresswoman Barbara Comstock of Virginia, who lost her race conclusively to someone she should have easily beaten, now goes around telling Republicans how to get elected. She had no problems being with me while in the Oval Office, or when she needed something. She and other RINO losers like Mitt Romney, Little Ben Sasse, Lisa Murkowski, Liz Cheney, Adam Kinzinger, and Karl Rove are what’s really wrong with the Republican Party, not the great MAGA Republicans, Conservatives, and Patriots!
###
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
JUNE 1, 2021
BEDMINSTER, NJ
Statement by Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States of America
RINO Former Congresswoman Barbara Comstock of Virginia, who lost her race conclusively to someone she should have easily beaten, now goes around telling Republicans how to get elected. She had no problems being with me while in the Oval Office, or when she needed something. She and other RINO losers like Mitt Romney, Little Ben Sasse, Lisa Murkowski, Liz Cheney, Adam Kinzinger, and Karl Rove are what’s really wrong with the Republican Party, not the great MAGA Republicans, Conservatives, and Patriots!
###
Order Of Alpha [Public Channel]
@OrderOfAlpha - OOA
OOA <> [7TEAM]
D1G174L S0LD13R R3-S34RCH
___________________________
From my work through their documents while I gained login to their intranet.
Below is their documentation on their own words.
________
WHO
Emergencies preparedness, response
WHO post-outbreak biosafety guidelines for handling of SARS-CoV specimens and cultures
18 December 2003
During the SARS epidemic between November 2002 and June 2003, a large number of specimens were collected from suspected and confirmed SARS human cases and sent to different national and international laboratories for a variety of pathological tests. WHO’s guidelines for the safe handling of those specimens during the outbreak period were described in WHO biosafety guidelines for handling of SARS specimens. In addition, many specimens have been obtained from animal sources during investigations into the origin of SARS-CoV, and these should also be subject to the same guidelines for safe handling of specimens.
The following WHO biosafety guidelines have been prepared for handling SARS-CoV specimens in the post-outbreak period. The guidelines take into account the absence of chains of human transmission, and highlight the importance of strict adherence to biosafety procedures and practices for laboratory work with SARS-CoV. As detailed below and in previous biosafety guidelines, WHO strongly recommends Biosafety Level 3 (BSL3) as the appropriate containment level for working with live SARS-CoV material.
The possibility that a SARS outbreak could occur following a laboratory accident is a risk of considerable importance, given the relatively large number of laboratories currently conducting research using the SARS-CoV or retaining specimens from SARS patients. These laboratories currently represent the greatest threat for renewed SARS-CoV transmission through accidental exposure associated with breaches in laboratory biosafety.
Given the severity of the threat, WHO strongly recommends that national governments maintain a registry of laboratories that are approved to safely and securely hold and work with specimens of suspected or confirmed SARS patients or cultures containing SARS-CoV.
Appropriate national authorities should provide guidelines for laboratories to catalogue and control the storage of cultures and specimens of SARS-CoV for periodic inspections.
WHO also encourages the destruction of unwanted or unneeded clinical and animal specimens suspected or confirmed of containing SARS-CoV, and/or of stocks of SARS-CoV, that cannot be kept under secure conditions.
Any laboratory accidents, e.g. accidental spillage of material suspected of containing SARS-CoV should be reported to the appropriate authority, and all people potentially exposed to SARS-CoV resulting from such accidents should be closely followed for a period of 10 days for evidence of SARS-CoV infection. In addition, any cluster of acute lower respiratory tract illness in such a laboratory should be rapidly investigated to exclude SARS-CoV infection. Depending on the nature and severity of the illness, the exclusion of SARS-CoV infection may also be necessary in the event of sporadic cases of acute respiratory illness which do not fulfil the current WHO clinical case definition for a SARS alert.
To ensure the safety of laboratory personnel and to mitigate the potential for laboratory accidents in the post-outbreak period, WHO recommends the following guidelines for staff handling SARS-CoV, or specimens which may possibly contain SARS-CoV:
WHO biosafety guidelines for handling SARS-CoV specimens and viral stocks.
In cases where laboratory facilities do not meet at least basic laboratories – Biosafety Level 2 (BSL2) containment conditions, consideration should be given to referral of specimens to suitably equipped reference laboratories for primary diagnostic tests.
@OrderOfAlpha - OOA
OOA <> [7TEAM]
D1G174L S0LD13R R3-S34RCH
___________________________
From my work through their documents while I gained login to their intranet.
Below is their documentation on their own words.
________
WHO
Emergencies preparedness, response
WHO post-outbreak biosafety guidelines for handling of SARS-CoV specimens and cultures
18 December 2003
During the SARS epidemic between November 2002 and June 2003, a large number of specimens were collected from suspected and confirmed SARS human cases and sent to different national and international laboratories for a variety of pathological tests. WHO’s guidelines for the safe handling of those specimens during the outbreak period were described in WHO biosafety guidelines for handling of SARS specimens. In addition, many specimens have been obtained from animal sources during investigations into the origin of SARS-CoV, and these should also be subject to the same guidelines for safe handling of specimens.
The following WHO biosafety guidelines have been prepared for handling SARS-CoV specimens in the post-outbreak period. The guidelines take into account the absence of chains of human transmission, and highlight the importance of strict adherence to biosafety procedures and practices for laboratory work with SARS-CoV. As detailed below and in previous biosafety guidelines, WHO strongly recommends Biosafety Level 3 (BSL3) as the appropriate containment level for working with live SARS-CoV material.
The possibility that a SARS outbreak could occur following a laboratory accident is a risk of considerable importance, given the relatively large number of laboratories currently conducting research using the SARS-CoV or retaining specimens from SARS patients. These laboratories currently represent the greatest threat for renewed SARS-CoV transmission through accidental exposure associated with breaches in laboratory biosafety.
Given the severity of the threat, WHO strongly recommends that national governments maintain a registry of laboratories that are approved to safely and securely hold and work with specimens of suspected or confirmed SARS patients or cultures containing SARS-CoV.
Appropriate national authorities should provide guidelines for laboratories to catalogue and control the storage of cultures and specimens of SARS-CoV for periodic inspections.
WHO also encourages the destruction of unwanted or unneeded clinical and animal specimens suspected or confirmed of containing SARS-CoV, and/or of stocks of SARS-CoV, that cannot be kept under secure conditions.
Any laboratory accidents, e.g. accidental spillage of material suspected of containing SARS-CoV should be reported to the appropriate authority, and all people potentially exposed to SARS-CoV resulting from such accidents should be closely followed for a period of 10 days for evidence of SARS-CoV infection. In addition, any cluster of acute lower respiratory tract illness in such a laboratory should be rapidly investigated to exclude SARS-CoV infection. Depending on the nature and severity of the illness, the exclusion of SARS-CoV infection may also be necessary in the event of sporadic cases of acute respiratory illness which do not fulfil the current WHO clinical case definition for a SARS alert.
To ensure the safety of laboratory personnel and to mitigate the potential for laboratory accidents in the post-outbreak period, WHO recommends the following guidelines for staff handling SARS-CoV, or specimens which may possibly contain SARS-CoV:
WHO biosafety guidelines for handling SARS-CoV specimens and viral stocks.
In cases where laboratory facilities do not meet at least basic laboratories – Biosafety Level 2 (BSL2) containment conditions, consideration should be given to referral of specimens to suitably equipped reference laboratories for primary diagnostic tests.
The following activities may be performed in BSL2 facilities with appropriate basic laboratories – Biosafety Level 2 (BSL2) work practices, as described in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 2nd revised edition.
Routine diagnostic testing of serum and blood samples (including haematology and clinical chemistry)
Manipulations involving neutralized or inactivated (lysed, fixed or otherwise treated) virus particles and/or incomplete, non-infectious portions of the viral genome
Final packaging of specimens for transport to diagnostic laboratories for additional testing. Specimens should already be in a sealed, decontaminated primary container.
The following activities may be performed in BSL2 facilities with additional BSL3 work practices:
Examples of activities that require BSL3 working practices for work with SARS-CoV in BSL2 facilities include:
Aliquoting and/or diluting specimens
Inoculation of bacterial or mycological culture media
Performance of diagnostic tests that do not involve propagation of viral agents in vitro or in vivo
Nucleic acid extraction procedures involving untreated specimens
Preparation and chemical- or heat-fixing of smears for microscopic analysis
BSL3 practices include:
Any procedure that may generate aerosols or droplets should be performed in a biological safety cabinet (e.g., sonication, vortexing).
Laboratory workers should wear protective equipment, including disposable gloves, solid-front or wrap-around gowns, scrub suits, or coveralls with sleeves that fully cover the forearms, head covering and, where appropriate, shoe covers or dedicated shoes, eye protection and a surgical mask, or full-face shield, because of the risk of creating aerosols or droplets exposure when performing specific manipulations.
Centrifugation of specimens should be performed using sealed centrifuge rotors or sample cups. These rotors or cups should be unloaded in a biological safety cabinet.
Work surfaces and equipment should be decontaminated after specimens are processed. Standard decontamination agents that are effective against enveloped viruses should be sufficient if used according to the manufacturer’s recommendations. Generally, 5% bleach solutions are appropriate for dealing with biohazardous spillage. More information on disinfection and sterilization is provided in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 2nd revised edition.
Biological waste contaminated with suspect or confirmed SARS specimens, or with SARS-CoV, should be treated as outlined in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 2nd revised edition before disposal.
WHO strongly recommends that the BSL3 precautions described above are adopted and followed for work in BSL2 laboratories with SARS specimens.
When a procedure or process cannot be conducted within a biological safety cabinet, then appropriate combinations of personal protective equipment (e.g. respirators, face shields) and physical containment devices (e.g. centrifuge safety cups or sealed rotors) must be used.
The following activities should be performed in containment laboratories - Biosafety Level 3 (BSL3), by personnel trained in the use of appropriate BSL3 work practices.
Performance of diagnostic tests that involve propagation of viral agents in vitro or in vivo
Work involving the replication of SARS-CoV in cell culture and/or storage of cell culture isolates
Recovery of viral agents from cultures of SARS-CoV specimens
Manipulations involving growth or concentration of SARS-CoV
The following activities require Animal BSL3 facilities and Animal BSL3 work practices:
Animal studies with live SARS-CoV or with closely related viruses from wildlife sources
Any protocol involving animal inoculation for confirmation and/or characterization of putative SARS agents
Recommendations of the WHO SARS Laboratory Workshop, Geneva, 22 October 2003
Routine diagnostic testing of serum and blood samples (including haematology and clinical chemistry)
Manipulations involving neutralized or inactivated (lysed, fixed or otherwise treated) virus particles and/or incomplete, non-infectious portions of the viral genome
Final packaging of specimens for transport to diagnostic laboratories for additional testing. Specimens should already be in a sealed, decontaminated primary container.
The following activities may be performed in BSL2 facilities with additional BSL3 work practices:
Examples of activities that require BSL3 working practices for work with SARS-CoV in BSL2 facilities include:
Aliquoting and/or diluting specimens
Inoculation of bacterial or mycological culture media
Performance of diagnostic tests that do not involve propagation of viral agents in vitro or in vivo
Nucleic acid extraction procedures involving untreated specimens
Preparation and chemical- or heat-fixing of smears for microscopic analysis
BSL3 practices include:
Any procedure that may generate aerosols or droplets should be performed in a biological safety cabinet (e.g., sonication, vortexing).
Laboratory workers should wear protective equipment, including disposable gloves, solid-front or wrap-around gowns, scrub suits, or coveralls with sleeves that fully cover the forearms, head covering and, where appropriate, shoe covers or dedicated shoes, eye protection and a surgical mask, or full-face shield, because of the risk of creating aerosols or droplets exposure when performing specific manipulations.
Centrifugation of specimens should be performed using sealed centrifuge rotors or sample cups. These rotors or cups should be unloaded in a biological safety cabinet.
Work surfaces and equipment should be decontaminated after specimens are processed. Standard decontamination agents that are effective against enveloped viruses should be sufficient if used according to the manufacturer’s recommendations. Generally, 5% bleach solutions are appropriate for dealing with biohazardous spillage. More information on disinfection and sterilization is provided in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 2nd revised edition.
Biological waste contaminated with suspect or confirmed SARS specimens, or with SARS-CoV, should be treated as outlined in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 2nd revised edition before disposal.
WHO strongly recommends that the BSL3 precautions described above are adopted and followed for work in BSL2 laboratories with SARS specimens.
When a procedure or process cannot be conducted within a biological safety cabinet, then appropriate combinations of personal protective equipment (e.g. respirators, face shields) and physical containment devices (e.g. centrifuge safety cups or sealed rotors) must be used.
The following activities should be performed in containment laboratories - Biosafety Level 3 (BSL3), by personnel trained in the use of appropriate BSL3 work practices.
Performance of diagnostic tests that involve propagation of viral agents in vitro or in vivo
Work involving the replication of SARS-CoV in cell culture and/or storage of cell culture isolates
Recovery of viral agents from cultures of SARS-CoV specimens
Manipulations involving growth or concentration of SARS-CoV
The following activities require Animal BSL3 facilities and Animal BSL3 work practices:
Animal studies with live SARS-CoV or with closely related viruses from wildlife sources
Any protocol involving animal inoculation for confirmation and/or characterization of putative SARS agents
Recommendations of the WHO SARS Laboratory Workshop, Geneva, 22 October 2003