"This paper presents the first systematic approach for detecting and exploiting Object Injection Vulnerabilities in .NET applications including the framework and libraries."
https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/serialdetector-principled-and-practical-exploration-of-object-injection-vulnerabilities-for-the-web/
https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/serialdetector-principled-and-practical-exploration-of-object-injection-vulnerabilities-for-the-web/
Критика нашумевшей статьи о новом алгоритме факторизации, который (цитата): "...destroys the RSA cryptosystem": https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/88582/does-schnorrs-2021-factoring-method-show-that-the-rsa-cryptosystem-is-not-secur
TL/DR: сенсации в этот раз не случилось, увы.
TL/DR: сенсации в этот раз не случилось, увы.
Cryptography Stack Exchange
Does Schnorr's 2021 factoring method show that the RSA cryptosystem is not secure?
Claus Peter Schnorr recently posted a 12-page factoring method by SVP algorithms. Is it correct?
It says that the algorithm factors integers $N \approx 2^{400}$ and $N \approx 2^{800}$ by $4.2 \cdo...
It says that the algorithm factors integers $N \approx 2^{400}$ and $N \approx 2^{800}$ by $4.2 \cdo...
Quantum Collision Attacks on Reduced SHA-256 and SHA-512
"In this paper, we for the first time show dedicated quantum collision attacks on SHA-256 and SHA-512. The attacks reach 38 and 39 steps, respectively, which significantly improve the classical attacks for 31 and 27 steps. Both attacks adopt the framework of the previous work that converts many semi-free-start collisions into a 2-block collision, and are faster than the generic attack in the cost metric of time-space tradeoff. We observe that the number of required semi-free-start collisions can be reduced in the quantum setting, which allows us to convert the previous classical 38 and 39 step semi-free-start collisions into a collision. The idea behind our attacks is simple and will also be applicable to other cryptographic hash functions."
https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/292
"In this paper, we for the first time show dedicated quantum collision attacks on SHA-256 and SHA-512. The attacks reach 38 and 39 steps, respectively, which significantly improve the classical attacks for 31 and 27 steps. Both attacks adopt the framework of the previous work that converts many semi-free-start collisions into a 2-block collision, and are faster than the generic attack in the cost metric of time-space tradeoff. We observe that the number of required semi-free-start collisions can be reduced in the quantum setting, which allows us to convert the previous classical 38 and 39 step semi-free-start collisions into a collision. The idea behind our attacks is simple and will also be applicable to other cryptographic hash functions."
https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/292