For instance, an economy that uses mostly public transit, renewable energy, multi-unit housing and plant-based protein can meet human needs with a fraction of the impact of an economy that produces a lot of SUVs, fossil fuels, mansions and industrial beef, and which allocates a bunch of totally unnecessary production to service the fantasies of overconsuming elites.
Remember, we know it is possible to provide decent living standards (DLS) for 8.5 billion people with 30% of current global energy and material use, by ensuring efficient technologies and focusing production on socially necessary goods and services.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2452292924000493
Remember, we know it is possible to provide decent living standards (DLS) for 8.5 billion people with 30% of current global energy and material use, by ensuring efficient technologies and focusing production on socially necessary goods and services.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2452292924000493
Come mostrato da un report del 2018 di Unodc, l’agenzia Onu con competenza sul crimine transnazionale, l’organizzazione e la dimensione delle attività inerenti il traffico di migranti variano ampiamente, coinvolgendo di frequente strutture ben diverse dalle reti del traffico così tanto spesso evocate. I dati che emergono da studi e ricerche suggeriscono che coloro che a essere colpiti dalle politiche repressive degli stati del nord globale sono nella maggior parte dei casi individui (e non gruppi organizzati) e, nel contesto europeo in particolare, persone migranti che cercano di limitare il costo da corrispondere ai facilitatori o che si ritrovano a vario titolo coinvolte in maniera del tutto occasionale in processi di aiuto alla migrazione irregolare.
Ricerche condotte in Italia e in Grecia hanno sistematicamente dimostrato, ad esempio, che nella migrazione via mare le persone migranti spesso prendono il controllo delle imbarcazioni su cui viaggiano o svolgono altri compiti di navigazione al solo scopo di salvare la propria vita e quella di coloro che viaggiano insieme a loro. Eppure, nel corso delle indagini queste persone vengono sovente identificate o etichettate come membri di reti criminali
La proposta di direttiva anti-traffico recentemente presentata dalla Commissione continua a riprodurre una concezione pericolosamente monolitica e riduttiva del favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione irregolare come dominio esclusivo di reti transnazionali del crimine organizzato, ignorando deliberatamente l’enorme quantità di dati empirici che indicano invece la netta prevalenza di fenomeni di favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione su piccola scala e senza il coinvolgimento di organizzazioni criminali, nei quali appare difficilmente riscontrabile alcun intento criminale o profitto
https://jacobinitalia.it/sui-migranti-lue-persevera-negli-errori/
Ricerche condotte in Italia e in Grecia hanno sistematicamente dimostrato, ad esempio, che nella migrazione via mare le persone migranti spesso prendono il controllo delle imbarcazioni su cui viaggiano o svolgono altri compiti di navigazione al solo scopo di salvare la propria vita e quella di coloro che viaggiano insieme a loro. Eppure, nel corso delle indagini queste persone vengono sovente identificate o etichettate come membri di reti criminali
La proposta di direttiva anti-traffico recentemente presentata dalla Commissione continua a riprodurre una concezione pericolosamente monolitica e riduttiva del favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione irregolare come dominio esclusivo di reti transnazionali del crimine organizzato, ignorando deliberatamente l’enorme quantità di dati empirici che indicano invece la netta prevalenza di fenomeni di favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione su piccola scala e senza il coinvolgimento di organizzazioni criminali, nei quali appare difficilmente riscontrabile alcun intento criminale o profitto
https://jacobinitalia.it/sui-migranti-lue-persevera-negli-errori/
Jacobin Italia
Sui migranti l'Ue persevera negli errori - Jacobin Italia
La proposta di direttiva sull'immigrazione recentemente presentata dalla Commissione continua a riprodurre le visioni del passato su ragioni e natura del fenomeno
"Far from being peculiar to this or that crisis, workers' control initiatives have arisen along with every revolutionary crisis that has yet occurred in industrialized or even partly industrialized countries.
Lenin never spelled out what aspects of the production process the workers would be empowered to judge. What this meant in practice, however, is clearly suggested in his remarks about Taylorism, namely, that if a given method can quadruple productivity for the benefit of the capitalists, it can just as well do so for the benefit of the working class. In line with this approach, the Soviet government reacted with consistent disfavor to workers' managerial initiatives, even where the alternative was a factory-shutdown. [...] The acceptance of Taylorist methods was just one component--albeit a central one--of Lenin's larger view of the Russian economy as still requiring full development of the capitalist production process even if under (presumed) working class leadership. [...] Lenin treats workers' self-management as being not only premature but even counterproductive to his overall strategy for reaching socialism by way of state capitalism.
In the Italian factories, by contrast, "absenteeism among workers was negligible, discipline effective, combativity widely diffused. Antonio Gramsci gave a clear example of such a link when he wrote: "The proletarian dictatorship can only be embodied in a type of organization that is specific to the activity
of producers, not wage-earners, the slaves of capital. The factory council is the nucleus of this organization.... The factory council is the model of the proletarian State."
The Spanish Civil War provided the occasion, in certain regions of the country, for the closest approach yet made to a society fully based on workers' control. The most notable aspects of the Spanish experience may be summarized as follows. First, workers' control was practiced in every sector of the economy. While it went furthest in agriculture, in at least one city (Barcelona) it was also introduced in all industries and services. Second, the structural changes were very radical, often entailing the elimination of certain managerial positions, the equalization of wages, and, in some peasant collectives, the abolition of money. Particularly impressive is the fact that, where land-expropriations took place, the peasants almost invariably preferred communal ownership to parcellization. Third, even the most radical of the changes were introduced directly and immediately, placing maximum reliance on the participation of the masses to the highest level of their abilities. Fourth, contrary to many stereotypes, the changes in question were not necessarily made at the expense of efficiency, but instead often involved advances in technology or coordination, as in the consolidation of the Barcelona bakeries and the vertical integration of the Catalan lumber industry. And finally, it was in some places close to three years before the self-managed operations were suppressed by force of arms. There was thus ample time for them to prove themselves as practical arrangements.
Allende's Chile was a direct successor to revolutionary Spain in more ways than one: electoral stimulus, workers' initiatives, conflicts within the left, decisive foreign support to the right, and crushing defeat. In some ways, of course, Chile never reached the levels attained in Spain. Thus, the
Chilean workers and peasants remained for the most part unarmed, and there were no whole regions of the country that they controlled. Nevertheless, there is one important sense in which the Chilean case carries the accumulated experience of workers' control another step forward: namely, that the
interaction between class-conscious workers and the elected government was a great deal more fluid. In effect, the autonomous workers' initiatives were, to a greater extent than in either Italy or Spain, an offshoot of the struggle that was being conducted at state level.
Lenin never spelled out what aspects of the production process the workers would be empowered to judge. What this meant in practice, however, is clearly suggested in his remarks about Taylorism, namely, that if a given method can quadruple productivity for the benefit of the capitalists, it can just as well do so for the benefit of the working class. In line with this approach, the Soviet government reacted with consistent disfavor to workers' managerial initiatives, even where the alternative was a factory-shutdown. [...] The acceptance of Taylorist methods was just one component--albeit a central one--of Lenin's larger view of the Russian economy as still requiring full development of the capitalist production process even if under (presumed) working class leadership. [...] Lenin treats workers' self-management as being not only premature but even counterproductive to his overall strategy for reaching socialism by way of state capitalism.
In the Italian factories, by contrast, "absenteeism among workers was negligible, discipline effective, combativity widely diffused. Antonio Gramsci gave a clear example of such a link when he wrote: "The proletarian dictatorship can only be embodied in a type of organization that is specific to the activity
of producers, not wage-earners, the slaves of capital. The factory council is the nucleus of this organization.... The factory council is the model of the proletarian State."
The Spanish Civil War provided the occasion, in certain regions of the country, for the closest approach yet made to a society fully based on workers' control. The most notable aspects of the Spanish experience may be summarized as follows. First, workers' control was practiced in every sector of the economy. While it went furthest in agriculture, in at least one city (Barcelona) it was also introduced in all industries and services. Second, the structural changes were very radical, often entailing the elimination of certain managerial positions, the equalization of wages, and, in some peasant collectives, the abolition of money. Particularly impressive is the fact that, where land-expropriations took place, the peasants almost invariably preferred communal ownership to parcellization. Third, even the most radical of the changes were introduced directly and immediately, placing maximum reliance on the participation of the masses to the highest level of their abilities. Fourth, contrary to many stereotypes, the changes in question were not necessarily made at the expense of efficiency, but instead often involved advances in technology or coordination, as in the consolidation of the Barcelona bakeries and the vertical integration of the Catalan lumber industry. And finally, it was in some places close to three years before the self-managed operations were suppressed by force of arms. There was thus ample time for them to prove themselves as practical arrangements.
Allende's Chile was a direct successor to revolutionary Spain in more ways than one: electoral stimulus, workers' initiatives, conflicts within the left, decisive foreign support to the right, and crushing defeat. In some ways, of course, Chile never reached the levels attained in Spain. Thus, the
Chilean workers and peasants remained for the most part unarmed, and there were no whole regions of the country that they controlled. Nevertheless, there is one important sense in which the Chilean case carries the accumulated experience of workers' control another step forward: namely, that the
interaction between class-conscious workers and the elected government was a great deal more fluid. In effect, the autonomous workers' initiatives were, to a greater extent than in either Italy or Spain, an offshoot of the struggle that was being conducted at state level.
It should hardly be necessary to say that the struggles for workers' control and for socialism are inseparable. And yet the problem that has arisen again and again in practice is that they have found themselves organizationally in conflict. "Socialism" has been the formal monopoly of a political party (or parties), while self- management has been the direct expression of the workers and peasants themselves. Whichever one has prevailed, the result has been a setback in the movement toward a classless society. "Socialism" without self- management has revived or perpetuated rigid social strata,
while self- management without a strong political direction has simply been suppressed"
http://www.net4dem.org/cyrev/archive/Misc.%20Articles/WorkersControl/WorkersControl.pdf
while self- management without a strong political direction has simply been suppressed"
http://www.net4dem.org/cyrev/archive/Misc.%20Articles/WorkersControl/WorkersControl.pdf
https://prospect.org/labor/2025-03-17-trump-pick-union-busting-attorney-key-labor-law-position-nlrb/
The American Prospect
Trump to Pick Union-Busting Attorney for Key Labor Law Position
The National Labor Relations Board general counsel is a key policymaker shaping labor law. Crystal Carey, an attorney at anti-union firm Morgan Lewis, is the apparent choice.
Israel is preparing to forcibly displace the entire population of Gaza — through a combination of evacuation orders and intense bombardment — into an enclosed and possibly fenced-off area. Anyone caught outside its boundaries would be killed, and buildings throughout the rest of the enclave would likely be razed to the ground.
Without mincing words, this “humanitarian zone,” as Magal so kindly put it, in which the army intends to corral Gaza’s 2 million residents, can be summed up in just two words: concentration camp. This is not hyperbole; it is simply the most precise definition to help us better understand what we are facing.
[...]
For “voluntary departure” to be sufficiently successful to enable annexation and re-establishment of Jewish settlements in the Strip, one would think that at least 70 percent of Gaza’s residents would have to be removed — meaning more than 1.5 million people. This goal is utterly unrealistic given the current political circumstances, both within Gaza and across the Arab world.
https://www.972mag.com/israel-gaza-concentration-camp-expulsion/
Without mincing words, this “humanitarian zone,” as Magal so kindly put it, in which the army intends to corral Gaza’s 2 million residents, can be summed up in just two words: concentration camp. This is not hyperbole; it is simply the most precise definition to help us better understand what we are facing.
[...]
For “voluntary departure” to be sufficiently successful to enable annexation and re-establishment of Jewish settlements in the Strip, one would think that at least 70 percent of Gaza’s residents would have to be removed — meaning more than 1.5 million people. This goal is utterly unrealistic given the current political circumstances, both within Gaza and across the Arab world.
https://www.972mag.com/israel-gaza-concentration-camp-expulsion/
+972 Magazine
Israel’s latest vision for Gaza has a name: Concentration camp
Unable to immediately expel Gazans en masse, Israel seems intent on forcing them into a confined zone — and letting starvation and desperation do the rest.
Senza un piano di politiche industriali e misure di stimolo economico per l’industria dell’auto mirate alla transizione alla mobilità elettrica, al 2030 il valore della produzione del comparto potrebbe infatti registrare un calo del 56-58%, per un valore stimato fino a 7,49 miliardi di dollari.
Causando, nel peggiore degli scenari, la perdita di 94mila posti di lavoro con un conseguente “costo” in termini di cassa integrazione di due miliardi di dollari.
Sono i risultati dell’analisi commissionata da ECCO, il think tank italiano sul clima, e dalla Federazione europei dei trasporti e dell’ambiente (Transport and Environment, T&E), a un gruppo di economisti della Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna di Pisa e del Centro ricerche Enrico Fermi di Roma.
https://altreconomia.it/i-costi-della-mancata-transizione-allelettrico-dellindustria-automobilistica-italiana/
Causando, nel peggiore degli scenari, la perdita di 94mila posti di lavoro con un conseguente “costo” in termini di cassa integrazione di due miliardi di dollari.
Sono i risultati dell’analisi commissionata da ECCO, il think tank italiano sul clima, e dalla Federazione europei dei trasporti e dell’ambiente (Transport and Environment, T&E), a un gruppo di economisti della Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna di Pisa e del Centro ricerche Enrico Fermi di Roma.
https://altreconomia.it/i-costi-della-mancata-transizione-allelettrico-dellindustria-automobilistica-italiana/
Altreconomia
I costi della mancata transizione all'elettrico dell'industria automobilistica italiana
Se non verranno adottate misure rapide ed efficaci per la conversione del settore auto all'elettrico il valore della produzione calerà drasticamente nel prossimo decennio, causando un danno economico di 7,5 miliardi di dollari e la perdita di più di 60mila…
"The variety of capitalism that has formed in China—marked by overcapacity, real estate crises, surging local government debt, unemployment, and slowing growth—has driven the country’s own version of militarised neoliberalism. Put simply, as with Bidenomics, the Chinese version of militarised neoliberalism emerges as a response to pressure in the global capitalist system but also reflects China’s different position within that system in relation to the United States."
"repressive Gulf State regimes with access to capital markets. As widely reported, Prosperity7, part of the Saudi Arabian state-owned oil group Aramco’s venture capital arm, has added to Chinese Government funds for developing a new national rival to the United States’ OpenAI (Olcott 2024). The investment is indicative of Saudi Arabia’s new accumulation strategy to support an ecosystem that could guard against Silicon Valley dominance in AI by investing in China’s global production networks. Concurrently, Chinese companies such as Lenovo and Tencent Cloud have reportedly expanded into Saudi Arabia and built manufacturing plants there."
"Superficially it would appear that the appointment of these engineers reflects a version of technocracy in which ‘scientific experts advise the decision-makers and politicians consult scientists in accordance with practical needs’ (Habermas 1970: 66–67). Yet, our argument is that this is not simply about the dominance of these engineering technocrats or a new form of nationalist industrial policy but rather is symptomatic of the emergence of a new capitalist class. In particular, this group is inextricably linked to the new constellation of state capital and finance that now occupies a central position within the current investment-heavy regime (Chen 2020; Cheng 2022). As explained earlier, SOEs with specialisations mirroring those of US industry incumbents in key areas have sprung to prominence, as the state realises the enormity of the self-sufficiency project in the wake of global ‘de-risking China’ imperatives. Therefore, the emergence of technocratic elites is indicative of the growing clout of the military-industrial engineers and scientists in the processes of Chinese state capitalist accumulation amid combined pressures."
"Even though China’s technocracy is led by engineers who are well-equipped with advanced education, rich corporate experience, and technological knowhow, they are, first and foremost, party-state cadres and statist business-class elites. Their promotion to top CCP leadership positions is indicative of ‘the party-state’s further control of the economy by enlarging the state sector to such an extent that it overwhelms the private sector’ (Wu 2024: 4). In this setting, unlike in the United States, would-be entrepreneurs find it difficult to access investment capital given the government’s strong emphasis on technology and heavy industries, which by nature require a more state-led approach. As Suzuki (2024) reports, startups once nurtured under the slogan ‘massive entrepreneurship and innovation by all’ (大众创业万众创流), popularised by the late Li Keqiang, have been rolling back their business.
In China, a key feature of technology-centred accumulation is the rise of what we call the new STEM technocrats—engineers and applied technology specialists who play a crucial role in shaping industrial policy, from electric vehicles to AI. Equally important is the growing influence of what we term the ‘interior bourgeoisie’—a domestic capitalist class rooted in and shaped by the Chinese State but increasingly oriented towards global markets. This interior bourgeoisie, comprising both key state-owned and private firms, has emerged as the new hegemonic faction within the state structure. This position enables them to implement distributive measures while continuing to develop transnational linkages and alliances."
https://madeinchinajournal.com/2025/03/20/engineering-chinas-militarised-neoliberalism-class-state-and-technology/
"repressive Gulf State regimes with access to capital markets. As widely reported, Prosperity7, part of the Saudi Arabian state-owned oil group Aramco’s venture capital arm, has added to Chinese Government funds for developing a new national rival to the United States’ OpenAI (Olcott 2024). The investment is indicative of Saudi Arabia’s new accumulation strategy to support an ecosystem that could guard against Silicon Valley dominance in AI by investing in China’s global production networks. Concurrently, Chinese companies such as Lenovo and Tencent Cloud have reportedly expanded into Saudi Arabia and built manufacturing plants there."
"Superficially it would appear that the appointment of these engineers reflects a version of technocracy in which ‘scientific experts advise the decision-makers and politicians consult scientists in accordance with practical needs’ (Habermas 1970: 66–67). Yet, our argument is that this is not simply about the dominance of these engineering technocrats or a new form of nationalist industrial policy but rather is symptomatic of the emergence of a new capitalist class. In particular, this group is inextricably linked to the new constellation of state capital and finance that now occupies a central position within the current investment-heavy regime (Chen 2020; Cheng 2022). As explained earlier, SOEs with specialisations mirroring those of US industry incumbents in key areas have sprung to prominence, as the state realises the enormity of the self-sufficiency project in the wake of global ‘de-risking China’ imperatives. Therefore, the emergence of technocratic elites is indicative of the growing clout of the military-industrial engineers and scientists in the processes of Chinese state capitalist accumulation amid combined pressures."
"Even though China’s technocracy is led by engineers who are well-equipped with advanced education, rich corporate experience, and technological knowhow, they are, first and foremost, party-state cadres and statist business-class elites. Their promotion to top CCP leadership positions is indicative of ‘the party-state’s further control of the economy by enlarging the state sector to such an extent that it overwhelms the private sector’ (Wu 2024: 4). In this setting, unlike in the United States, would-be entrepreneurs find it difficult to access investment capital given the government’s strong emphasis on technology and heavy industries, which by nature require a more state-led approach. As Suzuki (2024) reports, startups once nurtured under the slogan ‘massive entrepreneurship and innovation by all’ (大众创业万众创流), popularised by the late Li Keqiang, have been rolling back their business.
In China, a key feature of technology-centred accumulation is the rise of what we call the new STEM technocrats—engineers and applied technology specialists who play a crucial role in shaping industrial policy, from electric vehicles to AI. Equally important is the growing influence of what we term the ‘interior bourgeoisie’—a domestic capitalist class rooted in and shaped by the Chinese State but increasingly oriented towards global markets. This interior bourgeoisie, comprising both key state-owned and private firms, has emerged as the new hegemonic faction within the state structure. This position enables them to implement distributive measures while continuing to develop transnational linkages and alliances."
https://madeinchinajournal.com/2025/03/20/engineering-chinas-militarised-neoliberalism-class-state-and-technology/
Made in China Journal
Engineering China’s Militarised Neoliberalism: Class, State, and Technology | Made in China Journal
An industrial policy renaissance, trade controls, and geopolitical challenges are further complicating the permanent features of the current global (dis)order that is already facing a polycrisis: economic stagnation, climate crisis, and interstate war. The…