Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-105), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-105-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-105-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-105 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-105), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-105-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-105-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-105 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
QSB-106: Information disclosure through uninitialized memory in libxl
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/11/12/qsb-106/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 106: Information disclosure through uninitialized memory in libxl (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4080eab216be36055bcaa6ae855e0023dec5a305/QSBs/qsb-106-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 106
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 106 ]===---
2024-11-12
Information disclosure through uninitialized memory in libxl
(XSA-464)
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
On 2024-11-12, the Xen Project published XSA-464, "libxl leaks data to PVH
guests via ACPI tables" (CVE-2024-45819) [3]:
| PVH guests have their ACPI tables constructed by the toolstack. The
| construction involves building the tables in local memory, which are
| then copied into guest memory. While actually used parts of the local
| memory are filled in correctly, excess space that is being allocated is
| left with its prior contents.
Qubes calls libxl via libvirtd. The memory that is not fully initialized
is allocated via malloc. So the prior content that is leaked to a PVH
qube might be anything that has been previously allocated and then freed
in the libvirtd process.
Impact
-------
The leaked memory usually doesn't contain important secrets [4] but can
reveal various information about other qubes and the host system that is
otherwise not available to a malicious qube. In particular the following
information might be present in libvirtd's memory:
about other qubes:
- Name
- UUID
- kernel version
- kernel cmdline
- IP/MAC addresses of virtual network devices (but not from physical
devices) [5]
- Assigned PCI devices
about the host system:
- Total system memory
- Available PCI devices
- DMI/SYSBIOS information (serial number as reported by firmware, RAM
DIMM product number, etc.)
The list not complete (for example doesn't list less interesting qube
settings like assigned audio qube), but should cover all important
categories.
Note that a malicious qube has very little control about what
information gets leaked in the uninitialized memory that is exposed to
it [6]. Additionally the leak happens only once per start of a qube. So
for a decent change of being leaked interesting information a malicious
qube has to wait a long time for a significant number of normal starts.
Alternatively it can also try to provoke starts of disposable qubes it
can control (for example via qubes.VMShell) or shut itself down and hope
for it being started again by the user or a qrexec call (both methods
easily noticed by a user as unusual activity).
Affected systems
-----------------
All supported version of Qubes are affected.
Only qubes in PVH virt mode are affected (in default setup, every qube
except sys-net and sys-usb).
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.5-4
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
--------
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/11/12/qsb-106/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 106: Information disclosure through uninitialized memory in libxl (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4080eab216be36055bcaa6ae855e0023dec5a305/QSBs/qsb-106-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 106
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 106 ]===---
2024-11-12
Information disclosure through uninitialized memory in libxl
(XSA-464)
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
On 2024-11-12, the Xen Project published XSA-464, "libxl leaks data to PVH
guests via ACPI tables" (CVE-2024-45819) [3]:
| PVH guests have their ACPI tables constructed by the toolstack. The
| construction involves building the tables in local memory, which are
| then copied into guest memory. While actually used parts of the local
| memory are filled in correctly, excess space that is being allocated is
| left with its prior contents.
Qubes calls libxl via libvirtd. The memory that is not fully initialized
is allocated via malloc. So the prior content that is leaked to a PVH
qube might be anything that has been previously allocated and then freed
in the libvirtd process.
Impact
-------
The leaked memory usually doesn't contain important secrets [4] but can
reveal various information about other qubes and the host system that is
otherwise not available to a malicious qube. In particular the following
information might be present in libvirtd's memory:
about other qubes:
- Name
- UUID
- kernel version
- kernel cmdline
- IP/MAC addresses of virtual network devices (but not from physical
devices) [5]
- Assigned PCI devices
about the host system:
- Total system memory
- Available PCI devices
- DMI/SYSBIOS information (serial number as reported by firmware, RAM
DIMM product number, etc.)
The list not complete (for example doesn't list less interesting qube
settings like assigned audio qube), but should cover all important
categories.
Note that a malicious qube has very little control about what
information gets leaked in the uninitialized memory that is exposed to
it [6]. Additionally the leak happens only once per start of a qube. So
for a decent change of being leaked interesting information a malicious
qube has to wait a long time for a significant number of normal starts.
Alternatively it can also try to provoke starts of disposable qubes it
can control (for example via qubes.VMShell) or shut itself down and hope
for it being started again by the user or a qrexec call (both methods
easily noticed by a user as unusual activity).
Affected systems
-----------------
All supported version of Qubes are affected.
Only qubes in PVH virt mode are affected (in default setup, every qube
except sys-net and sys-usb).
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.5-4
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
--------
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-464.html
[4] The leaked memory could reveal the ASLR secret of the libvirtd
process. But this is only useful when the attacker has knowledge of
a memory vulnerability in libvirtd/libxl that is reachable in Qubes
OS. Additionally in a unusual setup a user could have included a
secret in some of the leaked information of other qubes.
[5] Unless the user actively configures something else for a qube, it's
IP addresses is based on it's qid/dispid (number from 0 .. 10000)
and the MAC addresses is the same for all qubes.
[6] When starting a disposable qube via qrexec it could try to time the
start to it's favor.
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-106-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4080eab216be36055bcaa6ae855e0023dec5a305/QSBs/qsb-106-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=Fvqs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4080eab216be36055bcaa6ae855e0023dec5a305/QSBs/qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=c20Y
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4080eab216be36055bcaa6ae855e0023dec5a305/QSBs/qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-464.html
[4] The leaked memory could reveal the ASLR secret of the libvirtd
process. But this is only useful when the attacker has knowledge of
a memory vulnerability in libvirtd/libxl that is reachable in Qubes
OS. Additionally in a unusual setup a user could have included a
secret in some of the leaked information of other qubes.
[5] Unless the user actively configures something else for a qube, it's
IP addresses is based on it's qid/dispid (number from 0 .. 10000)
and the MAC addresses is the same for all qubes.
[6] When starting a disposable qube via qrexec it could try to time the
start to it's favor.
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-106-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4080eab216be36055bcaa6ae855e0023dec5a305/QSBs/qsb-106-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=Fvqs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4080eab216be36055bcaa6ae855e0023dec5a305/QSBs/qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=c20Y
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4080eab216be36055bcaa6ae855e0023dec5a305/QSBs/qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-106), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-106-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-106-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-106 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-106), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-106-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-106-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-106-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-106 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
⚠️ This channel is updated ASAP after devs make an announcement to the project.
Do you need Help? Do you want to participate in community conversations?
Join the group!
@QubesChat
Do you need Help? Do you want to participate in community conversations?
Join the group!
@QubesChat
👍2🔥1
XSAs released on 2024-11-12
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/11/29/xsas-released-on-2024-11-12/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
XSA-464 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-464.html)
See QSB-106 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/11/12/qsb-106/)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-463 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-463.html)
Denial of service only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/11/29/xsas-released-on-2024-11-12/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
XSA-464 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-464.html)
See QSB-106 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/11/12/qsb-106/)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-463 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-463.html)
Denial of service only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
👍1
XenSummit 2023 announced!
https://xenproject.org/blog/xensummit-2023-announced/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->The annual Xen Project Developer and Design Summit 2023 (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/xen-project-summit/?ref=xenproject.org) will be held 24-26 June. It will be a hybrid event, with the physical location in Prague, Czech Republic, co-located with the Embedded Open Source Summit (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/embedded-open-source-summit/?ref=xenproject.org). (If you’re already attending EOSS, Xen Summit registration will be an optional add-on)
https://xenproject.org/blog/xensummit-2023-announced/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->The annual Xen Project Developer and Design Summit 2023 (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/xen-project-summit/?ref=xenproject.org) will be held 24-26 June. It will be a hybrid event, with the physical location in Prague, Czech Republic, co-located with the Embedded Open Source Summit (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/embedded-open-source-summit/?ref=xenproject.org). (If you’re already attending EOSS, Xen Summit registration will be an optional add-on)
👍1
HELLO FROM YOUR NEW COMMUNITY MANAGER
https://xenproject.org/blog/hello-from-your-new-community-manager/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
Hello Xen Project Community!
I’m Kelly, joining The Xen Project as the new Community Manager.
I thought it would be best that I introduce myself as I get begin to get familiar with my role.
I started my career in marketing, before quickly transitioning into
https://xenproject.org/blog/hello-from-your-new-community-manager/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
Hello Xen Project Community!
I’m Kelly, joining The Xen Project as the new Community Manager.
I thought it would be best that I introduce myself as I get begin to get familiar with my role.
I started my career in marketing, before quickly transitioning into
🔥1
We have moved to Matrix!
https://xenproject.org/blog/we-have-moved-to-matrix/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
Hello Xen Community!
In a bid to improve communication and synchronization of messages, we have now moved channels to Matrix.
Our aim here is to encourage and foster positive interactions between the community and developers within The Xen Project. The move will make it easier for everyone to exchange ideas,
https://xenproject.org/blog/we-have-moved-to-matrix/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
Hello Xen Community!
In a bid to improve communication and synchronization of messages, we have now moved channels to Matrix.
Our aim here is to encourage and foster positive interactions between the community and developers within The Xen Project. The move will make it easier for everyone to exchange ideas,
🔥1
Enhancing Xen Documentation: Insights from the Community
https://xenproject.org/blog/enhancing-xen-documentation-insights-from-the-community/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
Greetings Xen Community,
I’m thrilled to share the valuable insights gathered from our recent documentation survey. Your feedback is instrumental in steering the course for Xen’s documentation.
Let’s delve into the details provided by the dedicated participants who generously shared their perspectives.
Participants and
https://xenproject.org/blog/enhancing-xen-documentation-insights-from-the-community/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
Greetings Xen Community,
I’m thrilled to share the valuable insights gathered from our recent documentation survey. Your feedback is instrumental in steering the course for Xen’s documentation.
Let’s delve into the details provided by the dedicated participants who generously shared their perspectives.
Participants and
Cambridge University Talk
https://xenproject.org/blog/cambridge-university-talk/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->Hello Xen Community!
I’m excited to share that we will be presenting a talk at Cambridge University!
This is free and open to everyone, including students and the public.
Make sure to add this to your calendars and come along.
Date: Thursday 9th November 2023
Time: 3 –
https://xenproject.org/blog/cambridge-university-talk/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->Hello Xen Community!
I’m excited to share that we will be presenting a talk at Cambridge University!
This is free and open to everyone, including students and the public.
Make sure to add this to your calendars and come along.
Date: Thursday 9th November 2023
Time: 3 –
Xen Project Releases Version 4.18 with New Security, Performance, and Architecture Enhancements for AI/ML Applications
https://xenproject.org/blog/xen-project-releases-version-4-18-with-new-security-performance-and-architecture-enhancements-for-ai-ml-applications/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
The Xen Project, an open source hypervisor hosted at the Linux Foundation, today announced the release of Xen Project Hypervisor 4.18 with architecture enhancements for High Performance Computing (HPC) and Machine Learning (ML) applications, as well as higher security and performance features.
As always, a loyal and very active
https://xenproject.org/blog/xen-project-releases-version-4-18-with-new-security-performance-and-architecture-enhancements-for-ai-ml-applications/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
The Xen Project, an open source hypervisor hosted at the Linux Foundation, today announced the release of Xen Project Hypervisor 4.18 with architecture enhancements for High Performance Computing (HPC) and Machine Learning (ML) applications, as well as higher security and performance features.
As always, a loyal and very active
Celebrating The Xen Project's 20th Anniversary
https://xenproject.org/blog/celebrating-the-xen-projects-20th-anniversary/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
Celebrating Two Decades of Innovation: The Xen Project’s 20th Anniversary
It’s hard to believe that two decades have passed since the inception of the Xen Project, a trailblazing force in the world of open-source virtualization. As we raise our glasses to commemorate this momentous occasion, it&
https://xenproject.org/blog/celebrating-the-xen-projects-20th-anniversary/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
Celebrating Two Decades of Innovation: The Xen Project’s 20th Anniversary
It’s hard to believe that two decades have passed since the inception of the Xen Project, a trailblazing force in the world of open-source virtualization. As we raise our glasses to commemorate this momentous occasion, it&
A 2023 Year-End Review
https://xenproject.org/blog/a-2023-year-end-review/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
As we bid farewell to 2023, it’s time to reflect on the incredible journey we’ve had in the community.
This year has been marked by significant achievements, collaborative efforts, and a huge commitment from our members to advancing open source technology.
Let’s take a
https://xenproject.org/blog/a-2023-year-end-review/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
As we bid farewell to 2023, it’s time to reflect on the incredible journey we’ve had in the community.
This year has been marked by significant achievements, collaborative efforts, and a huge commitment from our members to advancing open source technology.
Let’s take a
Join us at Xen Summit 2024
https://xenproject.org/blog/join-us-at-xen-summit-2024/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
We’re thrilled to announce Xen Summit 2024, hosted by the Linux Foundation.
As we gear up for this much-anticipated event, we’re excited to announce an open call to the community—join us for a celebration of open-source collaboration, shared knowledge, and genuine connections.
Our CFP
https://xenproject.org/blog/join-us-at-xen-summit-2024/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
We’re thrilled to announce Xen Summit 2024, hosted by the Linux Foundation.
As we gear up for this much-anticipated event, we’re excited to announce an open call to the community—join us for a celebration of open-source collaboration, shared knowledge, and genuine connections.
Our CFP
Why is Open Source important? Hear from our community member.
https://xenproject.org/blog/why-is-open-source-important-hear-from-our-community-member/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
Community is everything at The Xen Project.
We spoke to Ayan, a dedicated community member who has been working on the Xen Project on his experience.
Why do you think open source is important?
Open source software (like Linux kernel, uboot, xen, trusted firmware, etc) is an integral part
https://xenproject.org/blog/why-is-open-source-important-hear-from-our-community-member/
<!--kg-card-begin: html-->
Community is everything at The Xen Project.
We spoke to Ayan, a dedicated community member who has been working on the Xen Project on his experience.
Why do you think open source is important?
Open source software (like Linux kernel, uboot, xen, trusted firmware, etc) is an integral part
Qubes Canary 041
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/12/03/canary-041/
We have published Qubes Canary 041 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/346d660c82dd756c3729a9c76861023e3c98c23e/canaries/canary-041-2024.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 041
---===[ Qubes Canary 041 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is December 03, 2024.
2. There have been 106 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of March 2025. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Tue, 03 Dec 2024 00:46:10 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Human Rights Expert: "A Strong Case that Israel's Response Constitutes the Crime of Genocide"
Angela Merkel's Memoirs: An Interview with the Former Chancellor about Her Tenure
Germany's New Elections: What Would a Chancellor Merz Do Differently?
Brutality in the Desert: A Notorious Human Trafficker on Trial in the Netherlands
Whither the Global Economy?: "Many of the People Around Trump Subscribe to Crazy Ideas"
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Israel Builds Bases in Central Gaza, a Sign It May Be There to Stay
Russia and Iran Pledge Support for Syria’s al-Assad Against Advancing Rebels
What’s Behind the Protests in Georgia?
Trump Says There Will Be ‘Hell to Pay’ Unless Hostages in Gaza Are Released
An Arctic Hamlet is Sinking Into the Thawing Permafrost
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Vietnamese tycoon in race to raise $9bn to avoid execution
Musk's record $56bn pay deal rejected for second time
Australian suspect in 1977 murders extradited from Italy
Israel strikes Lebanon as Hezbollah targets military post
Ukraine’s exhausted troops in Russia told to cling on and wait for Trump
Source: Blockchain.info
0000000000000000000069c9056154a4b350475975fdda99158da440b09266b7
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/12/03/canary-041/
We have published Qubes Canary 041 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/346d660c82dd756c3729a9c76861023e3c98c23e/canaries/canary-041-2024.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 041
---===[ Qubes Canary 041 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is December 03, 2024.
2. There have been 106 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of March 2025. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Tue, 03 Dec 2024 00:46:10 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Human Rights Expert: "A Strong Case that Israel's Response Constitutes the Crime of Genocide"
Angela Merkel's Memoirs: An Interview with the Former Chancellor about Her Tenure
Germany's New Elections: What Would a Chancellor Merz Do Differently?
Brutality in the Desert: A Notorious Human Trafficker on Trial in the Netherlands
Whither the Global Economy?: "Many of the People Around Trump Subscribe to Crazy Ideas"
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Israel Builds Bases in Central Gaza, a Sign It May Be There to Stay
Russia and Iran Pledge Support for Syria’s al-Assad Against Advancing Rebels
What’s Behind the Protests in Georgia?
Trump Says There Will Be ‘Hell to Pay’ Unless Hostages in Gaza Are Released
An Arctic Hamlet is Sinking Into the Thawing Permafrost
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Vietnamese tycoon in race to raise $9bn to avoid execution
Musk's record $56bn pay deal rejected for second time
Australian suspect in 1977 murders extradited from Italy
Israel strikes Lebanon as Hezbollah targets military post
Ukraine’s exhausted troops in Russia told to cling on and wait for Trump
Source: Blockchain.info
0000000000000000000069c9056154a4b350475975fdda99158da440b09266b7
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: canary-041-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/346d660c82dd756c3729a9c76861023e3c98c23e/canaries/canary-041-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=6xSv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-041-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/346d660c82dd756c3729a9c76861023e3c98c23e/canaries/canary-041-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmdOjRcACgkQSsGN4REu
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Source: canary-041-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/346d660c82dd756c3729a9c76861023e3c98c23e/canaries/canary-041-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: canary-041-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/346d660c82dd756c3729a9c76861023e3c98c23e/canaries/canary-041-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
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Source: canary-041-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/346d660c82dd756c3729a9c76861023e3c98c23e/canaries/canary-041-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
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Source: canary-041-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/346d660c82dd756c3729a9c76861023e3c98c23e/canaries/canary-041-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?