Say hello to our new website
https://xenproject.org/blog/say-hello-to-our-new-website/
Hello Xen Community,You may have noticed something different...We've refreshed our existing website!
https://xenproject.org/blog/say-hello-to-our-new-website/
Hello Xen Community,You may have noticed something different...We've refreshed our existing website!
Why did we do this? Well, all these new changes are part of an ongoing effort to increase our visibility and make it easier to find information on pages. We know how important it
Fedora 41 templates available
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/12/07/fedora-41-templates-available/
New Fedora 41 templates are now available for Qubes OS 4.2 in standard, minimal (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/minimal/), and Xfce (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/xfce/) varieties. There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Note: No user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/12/07/fedora-41-templates-available/
New Fedora 41 templates are now available for Qubes OS 4.2 in standard, minimal (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/minimal/), and Xfce (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/xfce/) varieties. There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Note: No user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
Welcome Honda to the Xen Project Board
https://xenproject.org/blog/welcome-honda-to-xen-project/
We're excited to announce our newest Advisory Board Member Honda, to Xen Project.
Since its foundation, Honda has been committed to "creating a society that is useful to people" by utilizing its technologies and ideas. Honda also focuses on environmental responsiveness and traffic safety, and continue
https://xenproject.org/blog/welcome-honda-to-xen-project/
We're excited to announce our newest Advisory Board Member Honda, to Xen Project.
Since its foundation, Honda has been committed to "creating a society that is useful to people" by utilizing its technologies and ideas. Honda also focuses on environmental responsiveness and traffic safety, and continue
🔥1
Channel Owner Announcement:
RockyOS is an open-source Linux operating system based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL). It was created to serve as a community-driven, downstream alternative after the discontinuation of CentOS Linux in December 2020. Designed for stability, security, and enterprise use, RockyOS provides a reliable platform for server environments, developers, and IT professionals who require a RHEL-compatible distribution.
The project was initiated by Gregory Kurtzer, one of the original founders of CentOS. Kurtzer created RockyOS to ensure the continued availability of a free and stable RHEL-compatible distribution, addressing concerns among users and organizations who relied on CentOS for production systems. Named in honor of his late CentOS co-founder, Rocky McGaugh, the project reflects a commitment to collaboration and community-driven development.
With that being said, I @Linus have created a new Community Channel for @RockyOS to fulfill the communities continued support for the old beloved CentOS.
At the moment the channel is under construction and should be ready between now and next year.
Feel free to join!
@RockyOS
RockyOS is an open-source Linux operating system based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL). It was created to serve as a community-driven, downstream alternative after the discontinuation of CentOS Linux in December 2020. Designed for stability, security, and enterprise use, RockyOS provides a reliable platform for server environments, developers, and IT professionals who require a RHEL-compatible distribution.
The project was initiated by Gregory Kurtzer, one of the original founders of CentOS. Kurtzer created RockyOS to ensure the continued availability of a free and stable RHEL-compatible distribution, addressing concerns among users and organizations who relied on CentOS for production systems. Named in honor of his late CentOS co-founder, Rocky McGaugh, the project reflects a commitment to collaboration and community-driven development.
With that being said, I @Linus have created a new Community Channel for @RockyOS to fulfill the communities continued support for the old beloved CentOS.
At the moment the channel is under construction and should be ready between now and next year.
Feel free to join!
@RockyOS
🔥3
XSAs released on 2024-12-17
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/12/18/xsas-released-on-2024-12-17/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-465 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-465.html)
Denial of service only
XSA-466 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-466.html)
Internal to domUs
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/12/18/xsas-released-on-2024-12-17/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-465 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-465.html)
Denial of service only
XSA-466 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-466.html)
Internal to domUs
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.4?
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
Included Fedora template upgraded from Fedora 40 to 41
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aclosed%20reason%3Acompleted%20closed%3A2024-09-17..2025-01-30%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20cannot%20reproduce%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20declined%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20duplicate%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20not%20applicable%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20self-closed%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20upstream%20issue%22).
When is the stable release?
That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this RC and their severity. As explained in our release schedule (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/#release-schedule) documentation, our usual process after issuing a new RC is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. If warranted, we then issue a new RC that includes the fixes and repeat the process. We continue this iterative procedure until we’re left with an RC that’s good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many RCs will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this as testing progresses.
Testing Qubes 4.2.4-rc1
If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this new RC, you can help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We encourage experienced users to join the testing team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190). The best way to test Qubes 4.2.4-rc1 is by performing a clean installation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) with the new ISO. We strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
As an alternative to a clean installation, there is also the option of performing an in-place upgrade without reinstalling. However, since Qubes 4.2.4 is simply Qubes 4.2 inclusive of all updates to date, this amounts to simply using a fully-updated 4.2 installation. In a sense, then, all current 4.2 users who are keeping up with updates are already testing 4.2.4-rc1, but this testing is only partial, since it does not cover things like the installation procedure.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
Included Fedora template upgraded from Fedora 40 to 41
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aclosed%20reason%3Acompleted%20closed%3A2024-09-17..2025-01-30%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20cannot%20reproduce%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20declined%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20duplicate%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20not%20applicable%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20self-closed%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20upstream%20issue%22).
When is the stable release?
That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this RC and their severity. As explained in our release schedule (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/#release-schedule) documentation, our usual process after issuing a new RC is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. If warranted, we then issue a new RC that includes the fixes and repeat the process. We continue this iterative procedure until we’re left with an RC that’s good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many RCs will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this as testing progresses.
Testing Qubes 4.2.4-rc1
If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this new RC, you can help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We encourage experienced users to join the testing team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190). The best way to test Qubes 4.2.4-rc1 is by performing a clean installation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) with the new ISO. We strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
As an alternative to a clean installation, there is also the option of performing an in-place upgrade without reinstalling. However, since Qubes 4.2.4 is simply Qubes 4.2 inclusive of all updates to date, this amounts to simply using a fully-updated 4.2 installation. In a sense, then, all current 4.2 users who are keeping up with updates are already testing 4.2.4-rc1, but this testing is only partial, since it does not cover things like the installation procedure.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
👍2🔥1
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What is a release candidate?
A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. RCs are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) and the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) in our documentation.
What is a patch release?
The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.2) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing the initial Qubes 4.2.0 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.2.4. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.
What is a release candidate?
A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. RCs are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) and the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) in our documentation.
What is a patch release?
The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.2) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing the initial Qubes 4.2.0 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.2.4. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.
Xen Project Winter Meetup
https://xenproject.org/blog/xen-project-winter-meetup/
We just wrapped up the Xen Winter Meetup 2025. It was an amazing opportunity to push Xen forward in a way that can only happen when people get together in person. Organized by Vates, we hosted it at the University of Grenoble IMAG building, a great spot for cutting-edge research
https://xenproject.org/blog/xen-project-winter-meetup/
We just wrapped up the Xen Winter Meetup 2025. It was an amazing opportunity to push Xen forward in a way that can only happen when people get together in person. Organized by Vates, we hosted it at the University of Grenoble IMAG building, a great spot for cutting-edge research
Qubes OS 4.2.4 has been released!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/02/18/qubes-os-4-2-4-has-been-released/
We’re pleased to announce the stable release of Qubes OS 4.2.4! This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.4?
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
Included Fedora template upgraded from Fedora 40 to 41
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aclosed%20reason%3Acompleted%20closed%3A2024-09-17..2025-01-30%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20cannot%20reproduce%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20declined%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20duplicate%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20not%20applicable%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20self-closed%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20upstream%20issue%22).
How to get Qubes 4.2.4
You have a couple different options, depending on your situation:
If you’d like to install Qubes OS for the first time or perform a clean reinstallation on an existing system, there’s never been a better time to do so! Simply download (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) the Qubes 4.2.4 ISO and follow our installation guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/).
If you’re currently on Qubes 4.2 (including 4.2.0, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.2.4-rc1), update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) (which includes upgrading any EOL templates and standalones (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol) you might have) in order to make your system essentially equivalent to the stable Qubes 4.2.4 release. No reinstallation or other special action is required.
Please note that Qubes 4.1 has reached end-of-life (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/) and extended security support for Qubes 4.1 has ended (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/). If you’re still on Qubes 4.1 or an earlier release, you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/).
In all cases, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder for those upgrading from Qubes 4.1 and earlier, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/02/18/qubes-os-4-2-4-has-been-released/
We’re pleased to announce the stable release of Qubes OS 4.2.4! This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.4?
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
Included Fedora template upgraded from Fedora 40 to 41
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aclosed%20reason%3Acompleted%20closed%3A2024-09-17..2025-01-30%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20cannot%20reproduce%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20declined%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20duplicate%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20not%20applicable%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20self-closed%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20upstream%20issue%22).
How to get Qubes 4.2.4
You have a couple different options, depending on your situation:
If you’d like to install Qubes OS for the first time or perform a clean reinstallation on an existing system, there’s never been a better time to do so! Simply download (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) the Qubes 4.2.4 ISO and follow our installation guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/).
If you’re currently on Qubes 4.2 (including 4.2.0, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.2.4-rc1), update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) (which includes upgrading any EOL templates and standalones (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol) you might have) in order to make your system essentially equivalent to the stable Qubes 4.2.4 release. No reinstallation or other special action is required.
Please note that Qubes 4.1 has reached end-of-life (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/) and extended security support for Qubes 4.1 has ended (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/). If you’re still on Qubes 4.1 or an earlier release, you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/).
In all cases, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder for those upgrading from Qubes 4.1 and earlier, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What is a patch release?
The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.2) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing the initial Qubes 4.2.0 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.2.4. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What is a patch release?
The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.2) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing the initial Qubes 4.2.0 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.2.4. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.
The NovaCustom V54 Series 14.0 inch coreboot laptop is Qubes certified!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/02/19/novacustom-v54-series-qubes-certified/
It is our pleasure to announce that the NovaCustom V54 Series 14.0 inch coreboot laptop (https://novacustom.com/product/v54-series/) is officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4!
V54 Series 14.0 inch coreboot laptop
Introducing the latest coreboot laptop equipped with cutting-edge technology. With an ultra-efficient 14th-gen Intel Meteor Lake CPU, a robust 73 WH battery, and a captivating 16:10 screen, your productivity will soar to new heights. Customize your device with a maximum of 96 GB DDR5 RAM and up to two lightning-fast PCIe SSDs. The Dasharo coreboot firmware ensures a reliable and secure foundation. Additionally, enjoy a variety of connectivity options such as Thunderbolt 4, Ethernet, plentiful USB ports, and optional Wi-Fi 7.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/02/19/novacustom-v54-series-qubes-certified/
It is our pleasure to announce that the NovaCustom V54 Series 14.0 inch coreboot laptop (https://novacustom.com/product/v54-series/) is officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4!
V54 Series 14.0 inch coreboot laptop
Introducing the latest coreboot laptop equipped with cutting-edge technology. With an ultra-efficient 14th-gen Intel Meteor Lake CPU, a robust 73 WH battery, and a captivating 16:10 screen, your productivity will soar to new heights. Customize your device with a maximum of 96 GB DDR5 RAM and up to two lightning-fast PCIe SSDs. The Dasharo coreboot firmware ensures a reliable and secure foundation. Additionally, enjoy a variety of connectivity options such as Thunderbolt 4, Ethernet, plentiful USB ports, and optional Wi-Fi 7.
Qubes-certified options
The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below.
Screen size
Certified: 14 inch
Note: The 14-inch model (V540TU) and the 16-inch model (V560TU) are two separate products. The 16-inch model has already been certified. (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/17/novacustom-v56-series-qubes-certified/)
Screen resolution
Certified: Full HD+ (1920 x 1200)
Certified: 2.8K (2880 x 1800)
Processor and graphics
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 5 Processor 125H, Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 7 Processor 155H, Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
The Nvidia discrete GPU options are not currently certified.
Memory
Certified: Any configuration with at least 16 GB of memory
Storage
Certified: All of the available options in these sections
Personalization
This section is merely cosmetic and therefore does not affect certification.
Firmware options
Qubes OS does not currently support UEFI secure boot.
The option to be kept up to date with firmware updates is merely an email notification service and therefore does not affect certification.
The coreboot+Heads option is not currently certified. This option is a separate firmware variant. As such, it requires a separate certification process, which we expect to occur in the future.
Disabling Intel Management Engine (HAP disabling) does not affect certification.
Operating system
Certified: Qubes OS 4.2.4 or newer (within Release 4).
Releases older than 4.2.4 are not certified.
You may choose either to have NovaCustom preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification.
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
Certified: Intel AX-210/211 (non vPro) Wi-Fi module 2.4 Gbps, 802.11AX/Wi-Fi6E + Bluetooth 5.3
Certified: Intel BE200 (non vPro) Wi-Fi module 5.8 Gbps, 802.11BE/Wi-Fi7 + Bluetooth 5.42
Certified: No Wi-Fi chip – no Bluetooth and Wi-Fi connection possible (only with USB adapter)
Disclaimers
In order for Wi-Fi to function properly, sys-net must currently be based on a Fedora template. The firmware package in Debian templates is currently too old for the certified Wi-Fi cards.
Currently requires kernel-latest: If you install Qubes OS yourself, you must select the Install Qubes OS RX using kernel-latest option on the GRUB menu when booting the installer. This non-default kernel option is currently required for the NovaCustom V54 Series to function properly.
Due to a known bug (https://github.com/Dasharo/dasharo-issues/issues/976), the bottom-right USB-C port is currently limited to USB 2.0 speeds.
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements), and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other
The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below.
Screen size
Certified: 14 inch
Note: The 14-inch model (V540TU) and the 16-inch model (V560TU) are two separate products. The 16-inch model has already been certified. (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/17/novacustom-v56-series-qubes-certified/)
Screen resolution
Certified: Full HD+ (1920 x 1200)
Certified: 2.8K (2880 x 1800)
Processor and graphics
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 5 Processor 125H, Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 7 Processor 155H, Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
The Nvidia discrete GPU options are not currently certified.
Memory
Certified: Any configuration with at least 16 GB of memory
Storage
Certified: All of the available options in these sections
Personalization
This section is merely cosmetic and therefore does not affect certification.
Firmware options
Qubes OS does not currently support UEFI secure boot.
The option to be kept up to date with firmware updates is merely an email notification service and therefore does not affect certification.
The coreboot+Heads option is not currently certified. This option is a separate firmware variant. As such, it requires a separate certification process, which we expect to occur in the future.
Disabling Intel Management Engine (HAP disabling) does not affect certification.
Operating system
Certified: Qubes OS 4.2.4 or newer (within Release 4).
Releases older than 4.2.4 are not certified.
You may choose either to have NovaCustom preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification.
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
Certified: Intel AX-210/211 (non vPro) Wi-Fi module 2.4 Gbps, 802.11AX/Wi-Fi6E + Bluetooth 5.3
Certified: Intel BE200 (non vPro) Wi-Fi module 5.8 Gbps, 802.11BE/Wi-Fi7 + Bluetooth 5.42
Certified: No Wi-Fi chip – no Bluetooth and Wi-Fi connection possible (only with USB adapter)
Disclaimers
In order for Wi-Fi to function properly, sys-net must currently be based on a Fedora template. The firmware package in Debian templates is currently too old for the certified Wi-Fi cards.
Currently requires kernel-latest: If you install Qubes OS yourself, you must select the Install Qubes OS RX using kernel-latest option on the GRUB menu when booting the installer. This non-default kernel option is currently required for the NovaCustom V54 Series to function properly.
Due to a known bug (https://github.com/Dasharo/dasharo-issues/issues/976), the bottom-right USB-C port is currently limited to USB 2.0 speeds.
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements), and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other
practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
XSAs released on 2025-02-27
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/02/27/xsas-released-on-2025-02-27/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-467 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-467.html)
Denial of service only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/02/27/xsas-released-on-2025-02-27/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-467 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-467.html)
Denial of service only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
Qubes Canary 042
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/03/08/canary-042/
We have published Qubes Canary 042 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/76f9e577bf8cfd15b423f42b5969012c068ccfd1/canaries/canary-042-2025.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 042
---===[ Qubes Canary 042 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is March 08, 2025.
2. There have been 106 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of June 2025. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Sat, 08 Mar 2025 00:05:15 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Europe on the Sidelines: Trump Steers America Away from Allies and Towards Autocracies
Military Funding: Iran Seeks to Access Billions in Frozen Hard Currency
A "Little Coalition" for Germany: Friedrich Merz Faces an Uphill Battle as negotiations in Berlin Heat Up
Three Years after the Invasion: The Churchill of Ukraine Seeks a New Role
Pankaj Mishra on the War in Gaza: Germany's Reputation Has Been Badly Tainted by its One-Sided Support for the Israeli Government"
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
More Than 140 Killed in Clashes Between Syrian Forces and Assad Loyalists
Russia Hits Ukrainian Power and Gas Facilities in Widespread Attack
How Trump’s ‘51st State’ Canada Talk Came to Be Seen as Deadly Serious
Panama Will Release Migrants From Detention Camp, Challenging Trump’s Deportation Efforts
Unexploded World War II Bomb Found at Gare du Nord in Paris Halts Trains
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Actor Gene Hackman and wife Betsy Arakawa died of natural causes one week apart
Syrian security forces accused of executing dozens of Alawites
Trump 'strongly considering' large-scale sanctions and tariffs on Russia
Poland announces military training plan for all men
'We're gutted' - Make-A-Wish trip cancelled after Eurostar bomb disruption
Source: Blockchain.info
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/03/08/canary-042/
We have published Qubes Canary 042 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/76f9e577bf8cfd15b423f42b5969012c068ccfd1/canaries/canary-042-2025.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 042
---===[ Qubes Canary 042 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is March 08, 2025.
2. There have been 106 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of June 2025. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Sat, 08 Mar 2025 00:05:15 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Europe on the Sidelines: Trump Steers America Away from Allies and Towards Autocracies
Military Funding: Iran Seeks to Access Billions in Frozen Hard Currency
A "Little Coalition" for Germany: Friedrich Merz Faces an Uphill Battle as negotiations in Berlin Heat Up
Three Years after the Invasion: The Churchill of Ukraine Seeks a New Role
Pankaj Mishra on the War in Gaza: Germany's Reputation Has Been Badly Tainted by its One-Sided Support for the Israeli Government"
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
More Than 140 Killed in Clashes Between Syrian Forces and Assad Loyalists
Russia Hits Ukrainian Power and Gas Facilities in Widespread Attack
How Trump’s ‘51st State’ Canada Talk Came to Be Seen as Deadly Serious
Panama Will Release Migrants From Detention Camp, Challenging Trump’s Deportation Efforts
Unexploded World War II Bomb Found at Gare du Nord in Paris Halts Trains
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Actor Gene Hackman and wife Betsy Arakawa died of natural causes one week apart
Syrian security forces accused of executing dozens of Alawites
Trump 'strongly considering' large-scale sanctions and tariffs on Russia
Poland announces military training plan for all men
'We're gutted' - Make-A-Wish trip cancelled after Eurostar bomb disruption
Source: Blockchain.info
00000000000000000002100e0b05177637c086916be9c8f9f5307436c25b80de
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: canary-042-2025.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/76f9e577bf8cfd15b423f42b5969012c068ccfd1/canaries/canary-042-2025.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=GP3G
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-042-2025.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/76f9e577bf8cfd15b423f42b5969012c068ccfd1/canaries/canary-042-2025.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=saK9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-042-2025.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/76f9e577bf8cfd15b423f42b5969012c068ccfd1/canaries/canary-042-2025.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: canary-042-2025.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/76f9e577bf8cfd15b423f42b5969012c068ccfd1/canaries/canary-042-2025.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmfLj3EACgkQ1lWk8hgw
4GpvfRAAn5av/l8+Mt0Eu6Z2pwX2Wuvlq/0haQWDycvq9lBaN2xn94BaEKwcQ/w3
9OhUu4e3OkmxH7Oxpbfit+XG5FaSpwebWo5a4dO0KOyfLwzm1t2q+nDbF6NfQSCO
v7PGTfoojrX3cK/u1dcbLVn9r3/zLbjXZmi7PRG+kwwcM+jq3y5KsQkm+VuSQ7g9
HYwKJXZYxt+qCSzxv0IZ8qACy47VDW9EwCyhabnGWU6iUlTrdpegRhrCr/eUI6GK
wZuhIQ8VqEU6naSBFTQ4qw99ZTuSI/oB6U1QebtlODyaMbyV3a+Hgo/BHNogxIzw
TbJveYewTofCXhB2TXEbZISLqMv1vbNwOuyfuEvRq8gbXHEiCSrqPhQcm8qWt76Q
YKyUdm8wywvyo7BRC6KMuhJ0dxwFfviNtBQmHWYhEGoznEtOQyyVy0vAsgSOwLOe
3wAfsn1z77i1kpvpuBKnsKuRfK5IbIuDog40DsJFQ7J9YRlmARhV+O4jZXEbxLJO
07jXdQxnN6WcSF5mFirAZETKdyZFSt40FJmhzf4UGNVqnqTLLFZGSkHSWGbSs0yD
Ci2EmG+yneQZ1qu+A4OFGhB7JSsnryJT4F4QJ6WCsiHUhm5wPrdKQd0BiD7Haw9U
gKP5OStJC1B6KXMzyV+vaSeDt/7xdCFlaIB5NJ6JbcCwI5zraf0=
=GP3G
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-042-2025.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/76f9e577bf8cfd15b423f42b5969012c068ccfd1/canaries/canary-042-2025.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=saK9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-042-2025.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/76f9e577bf8cfd15b423f42b5969012c068ccfd1/canaries/canary-042-2025.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).