Fedora 40 approaching end of life
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/03/16/fedora-40-approaching-end-of-life/
Fedora 40 is currently scheduled (https://fedorapeople.org/groups/schedule/f-40/f-40-key-tasks.html) to reach end of life (EOL) (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life) on 2025-05-13 (approximately two months from the date of this announcement). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol).
There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/03/16/fedora-40-approaching-end-of-life/
Fedora 40 is currently scheduled (https://fedorapeople.org/groups/schedule/f-40/f-40-key-tasks.html) to reach end of life (EOL) (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life) on 2025-05-13 (approximately two months from the date of this announcement). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol).
There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
🔥1
Let’s Grow Xen Together!
https://xenproject.org/blog/lets-grow-xen-together/
Xen is open, secure, and built for the future. As the new Community Manager, I’m focused on growing the Xen community, welcoming new contributors, and ensuring a thriving ecosystem. Let’s build the future of virtualization together!
https://xenproject.org/blog/lets-grow-xen-together/
Xen is open, secure, and built for the future. As the new Community Manager, I’m focused on growing the Xen community, welcoming new contributors, and ensuring a thriving ecosystem. Let’s build the future of virtualization together!
👍1
Invisible Things Lab is hiring a Linux graphics stack developer to work on Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/08/invisible-things-lab-hiring-linux-graphics-stack-developer/
Position: Linux graphics stack developer
Company: Invisible Things Lab (https://invisiblethingslab.com/)
Location: Fully remote
Employment type: Full-time (part-time considered)
Salary range: €70,000–€90,000/year (full-time base salary with potential for bonuses)
(Note: For part-time contracts, the full-time base salary will be scaled accordingly.)
Job denoscription
We’re seeking a talented developer with a focus on the Linux graphics stack in a virtualized environment, specifically in Qubes OS (https://www.qubes-os.org/). Qubes OS is a free and open-source security-oriented operating system that uses the Xen hypervisor to securely compartmentalize the user’s applications, data, and devices into isolated virtual machines called “qubes” so that the compromise of any one qube does not affect the rest of the system.
This role presents exciting challenges and the opportunity to work on pioneering solutions that have never been attempted before. As a key member of our team, you will lead the migration of the Qubes OS graphics stack from X11 to Wayland, as well as implement support for rendering hardware acceleration, all while maintaining the robust security properties for which Qubes OS is known.
Responsibilities
Lead the migration of the Qubes OS graphics stack from X11 to Wayland
Implement support for rendering hardware acceleration
Ensure the strong security properties of Qubes OS are preserved throughout the development process
Collaborate with team members and contribute to open-source projects
Requirements
Strong knowledge of the Linux graphics stack, especially Wayland (familiarity with X11 a plus)
Basic understanding of kernel drivers and virtualization
Proficiency in the C programming language
Previous contributions to an open-source project
Experience with Git
Ability to work independently, proactively solve problems, and seek assistance when needed
Preferred skills
Rust
Python
RPM packaging
DEB packaging
What we offer
Fully remote work with flexible hours
Long-term contract opportunities
A collaborative and innovative work environment
How to apply
If you’re passionate about pushing the boundaries of technology and want to be part of a groundbreaking project, we would love to hear from you! Please send your CV or résumé to jobs[at]invisiblethingslab[dot]com.
Join us in shaping the future of secure computing with Qubes OS!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/08/invisible-things-lab-hiring-linux-graphics-stack-developer/
Position: Linux graphics stack developer
Company: Invisible Things Lab (https://invisiblethingslab.com/)
Location: Fully remote
Employment type: Full-time (part-time considered)
Salary range: €70,000–€90,000/year (full-time base salary with potential for bonuses)
(Note: For part-time contracts, the full-time base salary will be scaled accordingly.)
Job denoscription
We’re seeking a talented developer with a focus on the Linux graphics stack in a virtualized environment, specifically in Qubes OS (https://www.qubes-os.org/). Qubes OS is a free and open-source security-oriented operating system that uses the Xen hypervisor to securely compartmentalize the user’s applications, data, and devices into isolated virtual machines called “qubes” so that the compromise of any one qube does not affect the rest of the system.
This role presents exciting challenges and the opportunity to work on pioneering solutions that have never been attempted before. As a key member of our team, you will lead the migration of the Qubes OS graphics stack from X11 to Wayland, as well as implement support for rendering hardware acceleration, all while maintaining the robust security properties for which Qubes OS is known.
Responsibilities
Lead the migration of the Qubes OS graphics stack from X11 to Wayland
Implement support for rendering hardware acceleration
Ensure the strong security properties of Qubes OS are preserved throughout the development process
Collaborate with team members and contribute to open-source projects
Requirements
Strong knowledge of the Linux graphics stack, especially Wayland (familiarity with X11 a plus)
Basic understanding of kernel drivers and virtualization
Proficiency in the C programming language
Previous contributions to an open-source project
Experience with Git
Ability to work independently, proactively solve problems, and seek assistance when needed
Preferred skills
Rust
Python
RPM packaging
DEB packaging
What we offer
Fully remote work with flexible hours
Long-term contract opportunities
A collaborative and innovative work environment
How to apply
If you’re passionate about pushing the boundaries of technology and want to be part of a groundbreaking project, we would love to hear from you! Please send your CV or résumé to jobs[at]invisiblethingslab[dot]com.
Join us in shaping the future of secure computing with Qubes OS!
🔥4
XSAs released on 2025-05-12
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/15/xsas-released-on-2025-05-12/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
XSA-469 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-469.html)
See QSB-107 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/15/qsb-107/)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
(none)
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/15/xsas-released-on-2025-05-12/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
XSA-469 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-469.html)
See QSB-107 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/15/qsb-107/)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
(none)
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
QSB-107: Multiple CPU branch prediction vulnerabilities
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/15/qsb-107/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 107: Multiple CPU branch prediction vulnerabilities (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/750ad7196b72dd30c1377a95af2fed3bb4844028/QSBs/qsb-107-2025.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 107
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 107 ]===---
2025-05-15
Multiple CPU branch prediction vulnerabilities
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
Multiple organizations have recently reported vulnerabilities that
affect CPU branch prediction behavior. Common among these
vulnerabilities is their ability to allow an attacker to manipulate the
branch prediction of the CPU to mount a speculative execution attack
(like the original Spectre v2 attack) even with existing mitigations
enabled.
On 2025-05-12, researchers from the Systems and Network Security Group
at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VUSec) published "Training Solo," [3]
which includes the following:
- Indirect Target Selection (ITS; CVE-2024-28956, XSA-469 [5], part of
INTEL-SA-01153 [7])
- Lion Cove BPU issue (CVE-2025-24495, part of INTEL-SA-01322 [8])
- IP-based attacks
- History-based attacks
On 2025-05-13, researchers from the computer security group at ETH
Zürich (COMSEC) published "Branch Privilege Injection: Exploiting Branch
Predictor Race Conditions" [4] (BPRC; CVE-2024-45332, XSN-3 [6], part of
INTEL-SA-01247 [9])
In addition to the coordinated disclosures above, Intel also reported
internally discovering the following:
- CVE-2025-20623 (part of INTEL-SA-01247 [9])
- CVE-2024-43420 (part of INTEL-SA-01247 [9])
See the linked publications for further details.
Impact
-------
History-based attacks are believed not to affect Xen. [5]
For all other vulnerabilities mentioned, on affected systems, an
attacker who manages to compromise a qube may be able to use it to infer
the contents of arbitrary system memory, including memory assigned to
other qubes.
Affected systems
-----------------
Only systems with Intel CPUs are believed to be affected. According to
Intel's denoscriptions:
- ITS affects Intel CPUs from Whiskey Lake (8th Generation Intel Core)
to Tiger Lake (11th Generation Intel Core). [7]
- The Lion Cove BPU issue affects Intel Lunar Lake and Arrow Lake (Core
Ultra Series 2) models. [8]
- BPRC affects most Intel CPUs since 8th Generation Intel Core (but see
the caveat below). [9]
- CVE-2025-20623 affects some 10th Generation Intel Core CPUs. [9]
- CVE-2024-43420 affects some Intel Atom CPUs. [9]
See the linked Intel security advisories for more complete and detailed
lists of affected CPU models.
Note: The information above is based on Intel's security advisories. In
general, Intel assesses whether a vulnerability affects a given CPU
model only if that model still receives microcode updates. Therefore, if
a given CPU model no longer receives microcode updates, one should not
infer that a vulnerability does not affect that model merely because
Intel does not report it as affected. In particular, COMSEC observed
that BPRC affects CPUs as far back as 7th Generation Intel Core. [4]
To determine whether your CPU still receives microcode updates, see
"Changes in Customer Support and Servicing Updates for Select Intel
Processors," [10] or check your model's official Intel product page for
an "End of Servicing Updates" (ESU) date. Note that only models that
have reached or will soon reach their ESU date have an ESU date listed.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/15/qsb-107/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 107: Multiple CPU branch prediction vulnerabilities (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/750ad7196b72dd30c1377a95af2fed3bb4844028/QSBs/qsb-107-2025.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 107
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 107 ]===---
2025-05-15
Multiple CPU branch prediction vulnerabilities
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
Multiple organizations have recently reported vulnerabilities that
affect CPU branch prediction behavior. Common among these
vulnerabilities is their ability to allow an attacker to manipulate the
branch prediction of the CPU to mount a speculative execution attack
(like the original Spectre v2 attack) even with existing mitigations
enabled.
On 2025-05-12, researchers from the Systems and Network Security Group
at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VUSec) published "Training Solo," [3]
which includes the following:
- Indirect Target Selection (ITS; CVE-2024-28956, XSA-469 [5], part of
INTEL-SA-01153 [7])
- Lion Cove BPU issue (CVE-2025-24495, part of INTEL-SA-01322 [8])
- IP-based attacks
- History-based attacks
On 2025-05-13, researchers from the computer security group at ETH
Zürich (COMSEC) published "Branch Privilege Injection: Exploiting Branch
Predictor Race Conditions" [4] (BPRC; CVE-2024-45332, XSN-3 [6], part of
INTEL-SA-01247 [9])
In addition to the coordinated disclosures above, Intel also reported
internally discovering the following:
- CVE-2025-20623 (part of INTEL-SA-01247 [9])
- CVE-2024-43420 (part of INTEL-SA-01247 [9])
See the linked publications for further details.
Impact
-------
History-based attacks are believed not to affect Xen. [5]
For all other vulnerabilities mentioned, on affected systems, an
attacker who manages to compromise a qube may be able to use it to infer
the contents of arbitrary system memory, including memory assigned to
other qubes.
Affected systems
-----------------
Only systems with Intel CPUs are believed to be affected. According to
Intel's denoscriptions:
- ITS affects Intel CPUs from Whiskey Lake (8th Generation Intel Core)
to Tiger Lake (11th Generation Intel Core). [7]
- The Lion Cove BPU issue affects Intel Lunar Lake and Arrow Lake (Core
Ultra Series 2) models. [8]
- BPRC affects most Intel CPUs since 8th Generation Intel Core (but see
the caveat below). [9]
- CVE-2025-20623 affects some 10th Generation Intel Core CPUs. [9]
- CVE-2024-43420 affects some Intel Atom CPUs. [9]
See the linked Intel security advisories for more complete and detailed
lists of affected CPU models.
Note: The information above is based on Intel's security advisories. In
general, Intel assesses whether a vulnerability affects a given CPU
model only if that model still receives microcode updates. Therefore, if
a given CPU model no longer receives microcode updates, one should not
infer that a vulnerability does not affect that model merely because
Intel does not report it as affected. In particular, COMSEC observed
that BPRC affects CPUs as far back as 7th Generation Intel Core. [4]
To determine whether your CPU still receives microcode updates, see
"Changes in Customer Support and Servicing Updates for Select Intel
Processors," [10] or check your model's official Intel product page for
an "End of Servicing Updates" (ESU) date. Note that only models that
have reached or will soon reach their ESU date have an ESU date listed.
Newer models that are still fully supported typically have no ESU date
listed.
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that, when applied to
systems with Intel CPUs that still receive microcode updates, will
address the vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.5-7
- microcode_ctl version 2.1.20250512
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages should be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new Xen
binaries.
Credits
--------
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://vusec.net/projects/training-solo
[4] https://comsec.ethz.ch/research/microarch/branch-privilege-injection/
[5] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-469.html
[6] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2025-05/msg00632.html
[7] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01153.html
[8] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01322.html
[9] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01247.html
[10] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000022396/processors.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-107-2025.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/750ad7196b72dd30c1377a95af2fed3bb4844028/QSBs/qsb-107-2025.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
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Source: qsb-107-2025.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/750ad7196b72dd30c1377a95af2fed3bb4844028/QSBs/qsb-107-2025.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
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listed.
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that, when applied to
systems with Intel CPUs that still receive microcode updates, will
address the vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.5-7
- microcode_ctl version 2.1.20250512
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages should be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new Xen
binaries.
Credits
--------
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://vusec.net/projects/training-solo
[4] https://comsec.ethz.ch/research/microarch/branch-privilege-injection/
[5] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-469.html
[6] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2025-05/msg00632.html
[7] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01153.html
[8] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01322.html
[9] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01247.html
[10] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000022396/processors.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-107-2025.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/750ad7196b72dd30c1377a95af2fed3bb4844028/QSBs/qsb-107-2025.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=wbzX
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-107-2025.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/750ad7196b72dd30c1377a95af2fed3bb4844028/QSBs/qsb-107-2025.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmglK+EACgkQSsGN4REu
FJBYcQ/+Nmvky9JNQZrzo8aJwkJu53z1Pp8T0msS97pfnom+8cQgXkdnxpTBCrjD
66sF+VWp7O5z3zEPdy6uFg0u/i86CO0Hx4+2A5occjhjiNk46QbOmx4k+YUNmoy9
qK8A0/246TpaVU57xhD91lIeCYuMVNor0Zn1RrCYrz2suzXYVl0AW9wrz2NI55K/
hjmdJl2PBD9I5Yh7vU8NQLV0S6EmnucZm9n2Aaonw+j7BRdb367W12gIzOU2FUJO
mvU5L9lx+jDavxDRoSfb7MY4tyJ+fczh89m6F6SUPPESznI/ewuXYkn55uoyDwsw
fA+o/720IK3SF0fudbIlc4iJ/xkQrAk1iFvtyv0KJB5lNWfQgyF7jbnQfqQHD2KP
Tc9sUMKs0smPR6Pqm1FRQdCfI67J7fcm04wEFptte/4nPCNqTISB9c+3XfiLCTvt
Gw/n1BeMUrqsA6+lNhzLlhUBsFmLdeJ3O7VzAxvaEgsJLGkP3n8h5UnwtJVKsnbW
I8BE4hRMNaDaWZsr64jK0+UIzvFxoGUf+N5y7ISgck1+e3QM9OsYm5rxEmX+dRV4
0Tc9P6yWCoR80uMZKNYbnoXVE+NstiQ1g9d1wh36Kk7IR/fHw69Wa+Vm9ZTLxIhJ
S3dYheReCOOk5kMQrQO/pwXqLKzlwkNnRFLV/sxFaSoc5h0N2vg=
=smTO
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-107-2025.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/750ad7196b72dd30c1377a95af2fed3bb4844028/QSBs/qsb-107-2025.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-107), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-107-2025.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-107-2025.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-107-2025.txt.sig.simon qsb-107-2025.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-107 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-107), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-107-2025.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-107-2025.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-107-2025.txt.sig.simon qsb-107-2025.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-107 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
👍1
Qubes-certified NovaCustom V54 and V56 Series laptops now available with Heads firmware
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/20/qubes-certified-novacustom-v54-v56-now-available-with-heads/
We’re pleased to announce that the NovaCustom (https://novacustom.com/) V54 Series (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/novacustom-v54-series/) and V56 Series (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/novacustom-v56-series/) laptops, both of which are already officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS 4, are now available with Heads (https://osresearch.net/), which is a new Qubes-certified firmware option for these models.
When you configure your V54 Series (https://novacustom.com/product/v54-series/) or V56 Series (https://novacustom.com/product/v56-series/) laptop on the NovaCustom website, you can now choose Heads by selecting the firmware option labeled, “Yes - deploy coreboot+Heads (instead of coreboot+EDK-II).” Current owners of these models can also upgrade to Heads with the Dasharo Pro Package (https://novacustom.com/product/dasharo-pro-package/).
Heads firmware enhances security by establishing a strong chain of trust, using the hardware TPM to protect against firmware manipulation, ensure boot verification, and support USB security device functionality during startup. However, if you’d prefer not to use Heads for any reason, the original coreboot+EDK-II firmware option remains certified.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/20/qubes-certified-novacustom-v54-v56-now-available-with-heads/
We’re pleased to announce that the NovaCustom (https://novacustom.com/) V54 Series (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/novacustom-v54-series/) and V56 Series (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/novacustom-v56-series/) laptops, both of which are already officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS 4, are now available with Heads (https://osresearch.net/), which is a new Qubes-certified firmware option for these models.
When you configure your V54 Series (https://novacustom.com/product/v54-series/) or V56 Series (https://novacustom.com/product/v56-series/) laptop on the NovaCustom website, you can now choose Heads by selecting the firmware option labeled, “Yes - deploy coreboot+Heads (instead of coreboot+EDK-II).” Current owners of these models can also upgrade to Heads with the Dasharo Pro Package (https://novacustom.com/product/dasharo-pro-package/).
Heads firmware enhances security by establishing a strong chain of trust, using the hardware TPM to protect against firmware manipulation, ensure boot verification, and support USB security device functionality during startup. However, if you’d prefer not to use Heads for any reason, the original coreboot+EDK-II firmware option remains certified.
XSAs released on 2025-05-27
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/27/xsas-released-on-2025-05-27/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-468 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-468.html)
In-guest privilege escalation only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/05/27/xsas-released-on-2025-05-27/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-468 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-468.html)
In-guest privilege escalation only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
Qubes Canary 043
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/06/04/canary-043/
We have published Qubes Canary 043 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/b0211f33f0c10f13c4ee25600e5dbecbb92bebc8/canaries/canary-043-2025.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 043
---===[ Qubes Canary 043 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is June 03, 2025.
2. There have been 107 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of September 2025. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Tue, 03 Jun 2025 06:49:12 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Interview with Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen: "If Trump Wants a Trade War, We Will Respond"
A Difficult Relationship: How the Gaza War Is Changing Germany's View of Israel
The German Chancellor's Diplomacy Offensive: Can Friedrich Merz Help Keep Trump from Abandoning Europe?
Death Zone Drama on K2: "Brother, It's Just Me and You"
Ruqqia Fights for Survival: Children in Gaza Facing Malnourishment as Humanitarian Situation Worsens
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Gaza Cease-Fire Negotiations Hit A New Impasse Over An Old Dispute
South Korea’s New President Will Lead A Country More Divided Than Ever
Ukraine and Russia Met for 2nd Round of Talks as Attacks Escalate
In Drone Attacks on Russia, Ukraine Aims for Strategic and Symbolic Blow
Poland Election: Karol Nawrocki Wins Presidential Vote
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Suspect in Colorado fire attack planned for a year, FBI says
Russia and Ukraine fail again to agree ceasefire but commit to prisoner swap
How Ukraine carried out daring 'Spider Web' attack on Russian bombers
Disney makes hundreds more layoffs as it cuts costs
Mount Etna erupts as large plumes rise from volcano
Source: Blockchain.info
00000000000000000000ad08ae4d191a62914466df62c55d1785bea4b4fd2b01
Footnotes
----------
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/06/04/canary-043/
We have published Qubes Canary 043 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/b0211f33f0c10f13c4ee25600e5dbecbb92bebc8/canaries/canary-043-2025.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 043
---===[ Qubes Canary 043 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is June 03, 2025.
2. There have been 107 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of September 2025. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Tue, 03 Jun 2025 06:49:12 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Interview with Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen: "If Trump Wants a Trade War, We Will Respond"
A Difficult Relationship: How the Gaza War Is Changing Germany's View of Israel
The German Chancellor's Diplomacy Offensive: Can Friedrich Merz Help Keep Trump from Abandoning Europe?
Death Zone Drama on K2: "Brother, It's Just Me and You"
Ruqqia Fights for Survival: Children in Gaza Facing Malnourishment as Humanitarian Situation Worsens
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Gaza Cease-Fire Negotiations Hit A New Impasse Over An Old Dispute
South Korea’s New President Will Lead A Country More Divided Than Ever
Ukraine and Russia Met for 2nd Round of Talks as Attacks Escalate
In Drone Attacks on Russia, Ukraine Aims for Strategic and Symbolic Blow
Poland Election: Karol Nawrocki Wins Presidential Vote
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Suspect in Colorado fire attack planned for a year, FBI says
Russia and Ukraine fail again to agree ceasefire but commit to prisoner swap
How Ukraine carried out daring 'Spider Web' attack on Russian bombers
Disney makes hundreds more layoffs as it cuts costs
Mount Etna erupts as large plumes rise from volcano
Source: Blockchain.info
00000000000000000000ad08ae4d191a62914466df62c55d1785bea4b4fd2b01
Footnotes
----------
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: canary-043-2025.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/b0211f33f0c10f13c4ee25600e5dbecbb92bebc8/canaries/canary-043-2025.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=xzVH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-043-2025.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/b0211f33f0c10f13c4ee25600e5dbecbb92bebc8/canaries/canary-043-2025.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=2iCq
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-043-2025.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/b0211f33f0c10f13c4ee25600e5dbecbb92bebc8/canaries/canary-043-2025.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: canary-043-2025.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/b0211f33f0c10f13c4ee25600e5dbecbb92bebc8/canaries/canary-043-2025.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=xzVH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-043-2025.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/b0211f33f0c10f13c4ee25600e5dbecbb92bebc8/canaries/canary-043-2025.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=2iCq
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-043-2025.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/b0211f33f0c10f13c4ee25600e5dbecbb92bebc8/canaries/canary-043-2025.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?
What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?
Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Canaries include a set of numbered statements at the top. These statements are generally the same across canaries, except for specific numbers and dates that have changed since the previous canary. If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.
Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?
No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of the statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).
In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it (with valid signatures), you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?
Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Canaries include a set of numbered statements at the top. These statements are generally the same across canaries, except for specific numbers and dates that have changed since the previous canary. If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.
Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?
No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of the statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).
In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it (with valid signatures), you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all canaries so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether canaries are genuine. The only way to be certain that a canary is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?
If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced.
Alternatively, an adversary could fabricate a canary in an attempt to deceive the public. Such a canary would not be validly signed, but users who neglect to check the signatures on the fake canary would not be aware of this, so they may mistakenly believe it to be genuine, especially if it closely mimics the language of authentic canaries. Such falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?
If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced.
Alternatively, an adversary could fabricate a canary in an attempt to deceive the public. Such a canary would not be validly signed, but users who neglect to check the signatures on the fake canary would not be aware of this, so they may mistakenly believe it to be genuine, especially if it closely mimics the language of authentic canaries. Such falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (Qubes Canary 043), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify canary-043-2025.txt.sig.marmarek canary-043-2025.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-043-2025.txt.sig.simon canary-043-2025.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 043 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (Qubes Canary 043), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify canary-043-2025.txt.sig.marmarek canary-043-2025.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-043-2025.txt.sig.simon canary-043-2025.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 043 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
🛠️ Xen Summit 2025: Find Your Place in the Future of Virtualization
https://xenproject.org/blog/xen-summit-2025-find-your-place-in-the-future-of-virtualization/
The annual Xen Summit is right around the corner, and there has never been a more exciting time to be part of the Xen Project.As enterprise and industrial needs shift and proprietary vendors rethink their licensing, the industry is ready for strong, open alternatives. Xen stands out not only
https://xenproject.org/blog/xen-summit-2025-find-your-place-in-the-future-of-virtualization/
The annual Xen Summit is right around the corner, and there has never been a more exciting time to be part of the Xen Project.As enterprise and industrial needs shift and proprietary vendors rethink their licensing, the industry is ready for strong, open alternatives. Xen stands out not only
XSAs released on 2025-07-01
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/07/01/xsas-released-on-2025-07-01/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-470 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-470.html)
Denial of service only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2025/07/01/xsas-released-on-2025-07-01/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-470 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-470.html)
Denial of service only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.