Xen Project 4.7.4 and 4.9.1 are available
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/11/27/xen-project-4-7-4-and-4-9-1-are-available/
I am pleased to announce the release of Xen 4.7.4 and 4.9.1. Xen Project Maintenance releases are released in line with our Maintenance Release Policy. We recommend that all users of the 4.7 and 4.9 stable series update to the latest point release. These releases are available from their git repositories xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/stable-4.7 (tag RELEASE-4.7.4) xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/stable-4.9 […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/11/27/xen-project-4-7-4-and-4-9-1-are-available/
I am pleased to announce the release of Xen 4.7.4 and 4.9.1. Xen Project Maintenance releases are released in line with our Maintenance Release Policy. We recommend that all users of the 4.7 and 4.9 stable series update to the latest point release. These releases are available from their git repositories xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/stable-4.7 (tag RELEASE-4.7.4) xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/stable-4.9 […]
Qubes OS 4.0-rc3 has been released!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/11/27/qubes-40-rc3/
We’re pleased to announce the third release candidate for Qubes 4.0! Our
goal for this release candidate is to improve the stability and
reliability of Qubes 4.0, so we’ve prioritized fixing known bugs over
introducing new features. Many of the bugs discovered in our previous
release candidate (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/10/23/qubes-40-rc2/) are now resolved. A full list of
the Qubes 4.0 issues closed so far is available here (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+milestone%3A%22Release+4.0%22+is%3Aclosed).
As always, we’re immensely grateful to our community of testers for
taking the time to discover and report bugs (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/reporting-bugs/). Thanks to your efforts,
we’re able to fix these bugs before the final release of Qubes 4.0. We
encourage you to continue diligently testing this third release
candidate so that we can work together to improve Qubes 4.0 before the
stable release.
Current users of Qubes 4.0-rc2 can upgrade in-place by downloading the
latest updates from the testing repositories in both
dom0 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/software-update-dom0/#testing-repositories) and TemplateVMs (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/software-update-vm/#testing-repositories). Further details,
including full installation instructions, are available in the Qubes
4.0 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.0/release-notes/). The new installation image is
available on the Downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/11/27/qubes-40-rc3/
We’re pleased to announce the third release candidate for Qubes 4.0! Our
goal for this release candidate is to improve the stability and
reliability of Qubes 4.0, so we’ve prioritized fixing known bugs over
introducing new features. Many of the bugs discovered in our previous
release candidate (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/10/23/qubes-40-rc2/) are now resolved. A full list of
the Qubes 4.0 issues closed so far is available here (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+milestone%3A%22Release+4.0%22+is%3Aclosed).
As always, we’re immensely grateful to our community of testers for
taking the time to discover and report bugs (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/reporting-bugs/). Thanks to your efforts,
we’re able to fix these bugs before the final release of Qubes 4.0. We
encourage you to continue diligently testing this third release
candidate so that we can work together to improve Qubes 4.0 before the
stable release.
Current users of Qubes 4.0-rc2 can upgrade in-place by downloading the
latest updates from the testing repositories in both
dom0 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/software-update-dom0/#testing-repositories) and TemplateVMs (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/software-update-vm/#testing-repositories). Further details,
including full installation instructions, are available in the Qubes
4.0 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.0/release-notes/). The new installation image is
available on the Downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
QSB #36: Xen hypervisor issue in populate-on-demand code (XSA-247)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/11/28/qsb-36/
Dear Qubes Community,
We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) #36:
Xen hypervisor issue in populate-on-demand code (XSA-247).
The text of this QSB is reproduced below. This QSB and its accompanying
signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View QSB #36 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-036-2017.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past QSBs:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/bulletins/
View XSA-247 in the XSA Tracker:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#247
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin #36 ]===---
November 28, 2017
Xen hypervisor issue in populate-on-demand code (XSA-247)
Summary
========
The Xen Security Team has published Xen Security Advisory 247, which
concerns an issue with the populate-on-demand mechanism used to overbook
memory. We believe it would be very difficult, in practice, to exploit
this issue for privilege escalation.
Additionally, the Xen Security Team has published Xen Security
Advisory 246 (x86: infinite loop due to missing PoD error checking),
with the impact being denial of service only.
Technical details
==================
Xen Security Advisory 247 [1]:
| Certain actions require modification of entries in a guest's P2M
| (Physical-to-Machine) table. When large pages are in use for this
| table, such an operation may incur a memory allocation (to replace a
| large mapping with individual smaller ones). If this allocation
| fails, the p2m_set_entry() function will return an error.
|
| Unfortunately, several places in the populate-on-demand code don't
| check the return value of p2m_set_entry() to see if it succeeded.
|
| In some cases, the operation was meant to remove an entry from the p2m
| table. If this removal fails, a malicious guest may engineer that the
| page be returned to the Xen free list, making it available to be
| allocated to another domain, while it retains a writable mapping to
| the page.
|
| In other cases, the operation was meant to remove special
| populate-on-demand entries; if this removal fails, the internal
| accounting becomes inconsistent and may eventually hit a BUG().
|
| The allocation involved comes from a separate pool of memory created
| when the domain is created; under normal operating conditions it never
| fails, but a malicious guest may be able to engineer situations where
| this pool is exhausted.
|
| An unprivileged guest can retain a writable mapping of freed memory.
| Depending on how this page is used, it could result in either an
| information leak, or full privilege escalation.
|
| Alternatively, an unprivileged guest can cause Xen to hit a BUG(),
| causing a clean crash - ie, host-wide denial-of-service (DoS).
Xen Security Advisory 246 [2]:
| Failure to recognize errors being returned from low level functions in
| Populate on Demand (PoD) code may result in higher level code entering
| an infinite loop.
|
| A malicious HVM guest can cause one pcpu to permanently hang. This
| normally cascades into the whole system freezing, resulting in a a
| host Denial of Service (DoS).
Compromise Recovery
====================
Beginning with Qubes 3.2, we offer Paranoid Backup Restore Mode, which
was designed specifically to aid in the recovery of a potentially
compromised Qubes OS system. If you believe your system may be
compromised (perhaps because of the issue discussed in this bulletin),
please read and follow the procedure described here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/04/26/qubes-compromise-recovery/
Patching
=========
The specific packages that resolve the problem discussed in this
bulletin are as follows:
For Qubes 3.2:
- Xen packages, version 4.6.6-35
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/11/28/qsb-36/
Dear Qubes Community,
We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) #36:
Xen hypervisor issue in populate-on-demand code (XSA-247).
The text of this QSB is reproduced below. This QSB and its accompanying
signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View QSB #36 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-036-2017.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past QSBs:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/bulletins/
View XSA-247 in the XSA Tracker:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#247
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin #36 ]===---
November 28, 2017
Xen hypervisor issue in populate-on-demand code (XSA-247)
Summary
========
The Xen Security Team has published Xen Security Advisory 247, which
concerns an issue with the populate-on-demand mechanism used to overbook
memory. We believe it would be very difficult, in practice, to exploit
this issue for privilege escalation.
Additionally, the Xen Security Team has published Xen Security
Advisory 246 (x86: infinite loop due to missing PoD error checking),
with the impact being denial of service only.
Technical details
==================
Xen Security Advisory 247 [1]:
| Certain actions require modification of entries in a guest's P2M
| (Physical-to-Machine) table. When large pages are in use for this
| table, such an operation may incur a memory allocation (to replace a
| large mapping with individual smaller ones). If this allocation
| fails, the p2m_set_entry() function will return an error.
|
| Unfortunately, several places in the populate-on-demand code don't
| check the return value of p2m_set_entry() to see if it succeeded.
|
| In some cases, the operation was meant to remove an entry from the p2m
| table. If this removal fails, a malicious guest may engineer that the
| page be returned to the Xen free list, making it available to be
| allocated to another domain, while it retains a writable mapping to
| the page.
|
| In other cases, the operation was meant to remove special
| populate-on-demand entries; if this removal fails, the internal
| accounting becomes inconsistent and may eventually hit a BUG().
|
| The allocation involved comes from a separate pool of memory created
| when the domain is created; under normal operating conditions it never
| fails, but a malicious guest may be able to engineer situations where
| this pool is exhausted.
|
| An unprivileged guest can retain a writable mapping of freed memory.
| Depending on how this page is used, it could result in either an
| information leak, or full privilege escalation.
|
| Alternatively, an unprivileged guest can cause Xen to hit a BUG(),
| causing a clean crash - ie, host-wide denial-of-service (DoS).
Xen Security Advisory 246 [2]:
| Failure to recognize errors being returned from low level functions in
| Populate on Demand (PoD) code may result in higher level code entering
| an infinite loop.
|
| A malicious HVM guest can cause one pcpu to permanently hang. This
| normally cascades into the whole system freezing, resulting in a a
| host Denial of Service (DoS).
Compromise Recovery
====================
Beginning with Qubes 3.2, we offer Paranoid Backup Restore Mode, which
was designed specifically to aid in the recovery of a potentially
compromised Qubes OS system. If you believe your system may be
compromised (perhaps because of the issue discussed in this bulletin),
please read and follow the procedure described here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/04/26/qubes-compromise-recovery/
Patching
=========
The specific packages that resolve the problem discussed in this
bulletin are as follows:
For Qubes 3.2:
- Xen packages, version 4.6.6-35
For Qubes 4.0:
- Xen packages, version 4.8.2-11
The packages are to be installed in dom0 via the Qubes VM Manager or via
the qubes-dom0-update command as follows:
For updates from the stable repository (not immediately available):
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update
For updates from the security-testing repository:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-security-testing
A system restart will be required afterwards.
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
========
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
===========
[1] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-247.html
[2] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-246.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
- Xen packages, version 4.8.2-11
The packages are to be installed in dom0 via the Qubes VM Manager or via
the qubes-dom0-update command as follows:
For updates from the stable repository (not immediately available):
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update
For updates from the security-testing repository:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-security-testing
A system restart will be required afterwards.
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
========
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
===========
[1] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-247.html
[2] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-246.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Xen Project Contributor Spotlight: Aporeto
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/11/28/xen-project-contributor-spotlight-aporeto/
The Xen Project is comprised of a diverse set of member companies and contributors that are committed to the growth and success of the Xen Project Hypervisor. The Xen Project Hypervisor is a staple technology for server and cloud vendors, and is gaining traction in the embedded, security and automotive space. This blog series highlights […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/11/28/xen-project-contributor-spotlight-aporeto/
The Xen Project is comprised of a diverse set of member companies and contributors that are committed to the growth and success of the Xen Project Hypervisor. The Xen Project Hypervisor is a staple technology for server and cloud vendors, and is gaining traction in the embedded, security and automotive space. This blog series highlights […]
Unikraft: Unleashing the Power of Unikernels
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/05/unikraft-unleashing-the-power-of-unikernels/
This blog post was written by Dr. Felipe Huici, Chief Researcher, Systems and Machine Learning Group, at NEC Laboratories Europe The team at NEC Laboratories Europe spent quite a bit of time over the last few years developing unikernels – specialized virtual machine images targeting specific applications. This technology is fascinating to us because of […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/05/unikraft-unleashing-the-power-of-unikernels/
This blog post was written by Dr. Felipe Huici, Chief Researcher, Systems and Machine Learning Group, at NEC Laboratories Europe The team at NEC Laboratories Europe spent quite a bit of time over the last few years developing unikernels – specialized virtual machine images targeting specific applications. This technology is fascinating to us because of […]
Xen Project Contributor Spotlight: Mike Latimer
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/06/xen-project-contributor-spotlight-mike-latimer/
The Xen Project is comprised of a diverse set of member companies and contributors that are committed to the growth and success of the Xen Project Hypervisor. The Xen Project Hypervisor is a staple technology for server and cloud vendors, and is gaining traction in the embedded, security and automotive space. This blog series highlights […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/06/xen-project-contributor-spotlight-mike-latimer/
The Xen Project is comprised of a diverse set of member companies and contributors that are committed to the growth and success of the Xen Project Hypervisor. The Xen Project Hypervisor is a staple technology for server and cloud vendors, and is gaining traction in the embedded, security and automotive space. This blog series highlights […]
Qubes Canary #14
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/12/11/canary-14/
Dear Qubes community,
We have published Qubes Canary #14. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be
available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View Canary #14 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-014-2017.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past canaries:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/
---===[ Qubes Canary #14 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is December 10, 2017.
2. There have been 36 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of March 2018. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.
The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
$ date -R -u
Sun, 10 Dec 2017 20:50:18 +0000
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss
Trump's Jerusalem Folly: Time for Europe to Take the Lead on Peace
U.S. Economy: Trump Tax Plan Worries Europe
Alleged INF Treaty Violation: U.S. Demands NATO Action on Russian Missiles
Donald Trump and Jerusalem: 'I Don't See Potential Upsides'
Liberated Raqqa: The Stench of Death amid Hopes for Life
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
For Older Venezuelans, Fleeing Crisis Means ‘Starting From Zero,’ Even at 90
Protests in Lebanon Near U.S. Embassy After Trump’s Jerusalem Decision
Jerusalem: It’s Tense, Crowded and Can Feel Like a Jail
The Interpreter: The Jerusalem Issue, Explained
Macron Steps Into Middle East Role as U.S. Retreats
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml
Netanyahu: Palestinians must face reality over Jerusalem
Nobel Peace Prize winner Ican warns nuclear war 'a tantrum away'
Actress Zaira Wasim: I was molested on flight
Star Wars: The Last Jedi - tributes to Carrie Fisher at LA premiere
North Korea: Urgent need to open channels, UN says after visit
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u http://feeds.reuters.com/reuters/worldnews
Palestinian stabs Israeli in Jerusalem; anti-Trump protest flares in Beirut
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/12/11/canary-14/
Dear Qubes community,
We have published Qubes Canary #14. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be
available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View Canary #14 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-014-2017.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past canaries:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/
---===[ Qubes Canary #14 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is December 10, 2017.
2. There have been 36 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of March 2018. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.
The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
$ date -R -u
Sun, 10 Dec 2017 20:50:18 +0000
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss
Trump's Jerusalem Folly: Time for Europe to Take the Lead on Peace
U.S. Economy: Trump Tax Plan Worries Europe
Alleged INF Treaty Violation: U.S. Demands NATO Action on Russian Missiles
Donald Trump and Jerusalem: 'I Don't See Potential Upsides'
Liberated Raqqa: The Stench of Death amid Hopes for Life
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
For Older Venezuelans, Fleeing Crisis Means ‘Starting From Zero,’ Even at 90
Protests in Lebanon Near U.S. Embassy After Trump’s Jerusalem Decision
Jerusalem: It’s Tense, Crowded and Can Feel Like a Jail
The Interpreter: The Jerusalem Issue, Explained
Macron Steps Into Middle East Role as U.S. Retreats
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml
Netanyahu: Palestinians must face reality over Jerusalem
Nobel Peace Prize winner Ican warns nuclear war 'a tantrum away'
Actress Zaira Wasim: I was molested on flight
Star Wars: The Last Jedi - tributes to Carrie Fisher at LA premiere
North Korea: Urgent need to open channels, UN says after visit
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u http://feeds.reuters.com/reuters/worldnews
Palestinian stabs Israeli in Jerusalem; anti-Trump protest flares in Beirut
Iraq holds victory parade after defeating Islamic State
With foes absent, Venezuela's socialists to gain from local vote
UK's Johnson meets Iran president as he lobbies for jailed aid worker
Honduras tribunal says partial vote recount shows same result
$ curl -s 'https://blockchain.info/blocks/?format=json'
$ python3 -c 'import sys, json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['\''blocks'\''][10]['\''hash'\''])'
0000000000000000005f669c5a625a7fbebec488d864723433d9e5c50b1cb01b
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
With foes absent, Venezuela's socialists to gain from local vote
UK's Johnson meets Iran president as he lobbies for jailed aid worker
Honduras tribunal says partial vote recount shows same result
$ curl -s 'https://blockchain.info/blocks/?format=json'
$ python3 -c 'import sys, json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['\''blocks'\''][10]['\''hash'\''])'
0000000000000000005f669c5a625a7fbebec488d864723433d9e5c50b1cb01b
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
Xen Project Contributor Spotlight: Irby Thompson
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/12/xen-project-contributor-spotlight-irby-thompson/
The Xen Project is comprised of a diverse set of member companies and contributors that are committed to the growth and success of the Xen Project Hypervisor. The Xen Project Hypervisor is a staple technology for server and cloud vendors, and is gaining traction in the embedded, security and automotive space. This blog series highlights […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/12/xen-project-contributor-spotlight-irby-thompson/
The Xen Project is comprised of a diverse set of member companies and contributors that are committed to the growth and success of the Xen Project Hypervisor. The Xen Project Hypervisor is a staple technology for server and cloud vendors, and is gaining traction in the embedded, security and automotive space. This blog series highlights […]
XSA-248 through XSA-251 do not affect the security of Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/12/12/xsa-245-251-qubes-not-affected/
The Xen Project has published Xen Security Advisories 248 through 251 (XSA-248 through XSA-251).
These XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary.
These XSAs have been added to the XSA Tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/):
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#248
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#249
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#250
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#251
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/12/12/xsa-245-251-qubes-not-affected/
The Xen Project has published Xen Security Advisories 248 through 251 (XSA-248 through XSA-251).
These XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary.
These XSAs have been added to the XSA Tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/):
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#248
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#249
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#250
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#251
What’s New in the Xen Project Hypervisor 4.10
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/14/whats-new-in-the-xen-project-hypervisor-4-10/
I am pleased to announce the release of the Xen Project Hypervisor 4.10. As always, we focused on improving code quality, security hardening as well as enabling new features. The Xen Project Hypervisor 4.10 continues to take a security-first approach with improved architecture and more centralized documentation. The release is equipped with the latest hardware […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/14/whats-new-in-the-xen-project-hypervisor-4-10/
I am pleased to announce the release of the Xen Project Hypervisor 4.10. As always, we focused on improving code quality, security hardening as well as enabling new features. The Xen Project Hypervisor 4.10 continues to take a security-first approach with improved architecture and more centralized documentation. The release is equipped with the latest hardware […]
Xen Project Member Spotlight: Bitdefender
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/18/xen-project-member-spotlight-bitdefender/
The Xen Project is comprised of a diverse set of member companies and contributors that are committed to the growth and success of the Xen Project Hypervisor. The Xen Project Hypervisor is a staple technology for server and cloud vendors, and is gaining traction in the embedded, security and automotive space. This blog series highlights […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/18/xen-project-member-spotlight-bitdefender/
The Xen Project is comprised of a diverse set of member companies and contributors that are committed to the growth and success of the Xen Project Hypervisor. The Xen Project Hypervisor is a staple technology for server and cloud vendors, and is gaining traction in the embedded, security and automotive space. This blog series highlights […]
Comment on Unikraft: Unleashing the Power of Unikernels by Unikraft: Unleashing the Power of Unikernels – Nerd Junkie
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/05/unikraft-unleashing-the-power-of-unikernels/#comment-421
[…] This article originally appeared at Xen Project. […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/05/unikraft-unleashing-the-power-of-unikernels/#comment-421
[…] This article originally appeared at Xen Project. […]
Comment on Unikraft: Unleashing the Power of Unikernels by Проект Xen представил Unikraft для выполнения приложений поверх гипервизора
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/05/unikraft-unleashing-the-power-of-unikernels/#comment-423
[…] гипервизора Xen анонсировали проект Unikraft, в рамках которого развивается […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/05/unikraft-unleashing-the-power-of-unikernels/#comment-423
[…] гипервизора Xen анонсировали проект Unikraft, в рамках которого развивается […]
Announcing the Windows PV HID Drivers
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/20/announcing-the-windows-pv-hid-drivers/
Some recent patches to the QEMU source fix a long standing problem where the PV vkbd backend was unable to function correctly without the PV fb backend, which effectively made it pointless to implement PV HID (i.e. keyboard and mouse) frontends for HVM guests. Now that the problem has been fixed, I’m happy to announce […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/20/announcing-the-windows-pv-hid-drivers/
Some recent patches to the QEMU source fix a long standing problem where the PV vkbd backend was unable to function correctly without the PV fb backend, which effectively made it pointless to implement PV HID (i.e. keyboard and mouse) frontends for HVM guests. Now that the problem has been fixed, I’m happy to announce […]
Comment on What’s New in the Xen Project Hypervisor 4.10 by fbifido
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/12/whats-new-in-the-xen-project-hypervisor-4-10/#comment-436
When are we going to get native hyper-converge like pernixdata-fvp?
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/12/whats-new-in-the-xen-project-hypervisor-4-10/#comment-436
When are we going to get native hyper-converge like pernixdata-fvp?
Comment on What’s New in the Xen Project Hypervisor 4.10 by Xen Hypervisor 4.10 Focuses on Security and Better ARM Support
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/12/whats-new-in-the-xen-project-hypervisor-4-10/#comment-438
[…] Xen Project released version 4.10 of their hypervisor with an improved architecture for x86, support for ARM processor hardware […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/12/12/whats-new-in-the-xen-project-hypervisor-4-10/#comment-438
[…] Xen Project released version 4.10 of their hypervisor with an improved architecture for x86, support for ARM processor hardware […]