Toward a Reasonably Secure Laptop
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/07/08/toward-a-reasonably-secure-laptop/
It’s no secret that hardware selection is one of the biggest hurdles Qubes
users face. Finding a computer that is secure, trustworthy, and compatible
is more difficult than it should be. In an effort to address the compatibility
aspect of that problem, we introduced the Qubes-certified laptop
program (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2015/12/09/purism-partnership/) back in 2015.
So far, only one laptop has been Qubes-certified: the Purism Librem 13v1.
A number of users purchased this laptop comfortable in the knowledge that it
would be compatible with Qubes, and it served them well in that regard.
However, the Librem 13v1 is no longer being manufactured, and the Librem 13v2
has not undergone Qubes-certification (nor has any other laptop yet). This
means that the need for compatible hardware is more pressing than ever.
It’s important to remember that Qubes-certification is only about
compatibility – not security, trustworthiness, or anything else. Being
Qubes-certified has always meant that a computer has been tested to
ensure that it runs Qubes OS well – nothing more, nothing less. But we know
that security-conscious users care about more than just compatibility, which
is why we announced updated requirements for Qubes 4.x certification (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/07/21/new-hw-certification-for-q4/)
last year.
So far, no third-party manufacturers have produced a computer
that satisfies these requirements. However, ITL has entered initial talks with
a promising partner with whom we can foresee creating a true Reasonably Secure
Laptop. Our plan is to introduce a tier-based model of laptop support:
Level 0: Qubes Compatible Laptop. As with the Purism Librem 13v1, this
will be a laptop that comes with no guarantees regarding security or
trustworthiness. We’ll guarantee only that the laptop is compatible with
Qubes OS. In practice, a vendor who wishes to introduce a Level 0
laptop will typically have to allow for specific choices regarding the GPU,
Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth modules. The vendor will also have to be willing to
“freeze” the configuration of the laptop for at least one year.
Level 1: Qubes Certified Laptop. In addition to meeting all the
requirements of Level 0, this laptop will also have to conform to our
updated requirements for Qubes 4.x certification (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/07/21/new-hw-certification-for-q4/).
Level 2: Qubes Stateless Laptop. For details about this, please see
Joanna Rutkowska’s paper State Considered Harmful (https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/state_harmful.pdf). We can foresee
multiple levels of compatibility here. However, we expect that it will be at
least two years before a true stateless laptop can be created. In the
immediate future, therefore, we intend to pursue a Level 1 laptop.
Please note that laptops on the Qubes Hardware Compatibility List (HCL) (https://www.qubes-os.org/hcl/)
do not have a specific level. This is because neither ITL nor the Qubes OS
Project makes any affirmations regarding the vast majority of laptops on this
list. Rather, the list is compiled from voluntary contributions from members
of the community like you!
This is just the beginning. There’s a long road ahead before we can make
a Reasonably Secure Laptop a reality, but the need is too great to ignore.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/07/08/toward-a-reasonably-secure-laptop/
It’s no secret that hardware selection is one of the biggest hurdles Qubes
users face. Finding a computer that is secure, trustworthy, and compatible
is more difficult than it should be. In an effort to address the compatibility
aspect of that problem, we introduced the Qubes-certified laptop
program (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2015/12/09/purism-partnership/) back in 2015.
So far, only one laptop has been Qubes-certified: the Purism Librem 13v1.
A number of users purchased this laptop comfortable in the knowledge that it
would be compatible with Qubes, and it served them well in that regard.
However, the Librem 13v1 is no longer being manufactured, and the Librem 13v2
has not undergone Qubes-certification (nor has any other laptop yet). This
means that the need for compatible hardware is more pressing than ever.
It’s important to remember that Qubes-certification is only about
compatibility – not security, trustworthiness, or anything else. Being
Qubes-certified has always meant that a computer has been tested to
ensure that it runs Qubes OS well – nothing more, nothing less. But we know
that security-conscious users care about more than just compatibility, which
is why we announced updated requirements for Qubes 4.x certification (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/07/21/new-hw-certification-for-q4/)
last year.
So far, no third-party manufacturers have produced a computer
that satisfies these requirements. However, ITL has entered initial talks with
a promising partner with whom we can foresee creating a true Reasonably Secure
Laptop. Our plan is to introduce a tier-based model of laptop support:
Level 0: Qubes Compatible Laptop. As with the Purism Librem 13v1, this
will be a laptop that comes with no guarantees regarding security or
trustworthiness. We’ll guarantee only that the laptop is compatible with
Qubes OS. In practice, a vendor who wishes to introduce a Level 0
laptop will typically have to allow for specific choices regarding the GPU,
Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth modules. The vendor will also have to be willing to
“freeze” the configuration of the laptop for at least one year.
Level 1: Qubes Certified Laptop. In addition to meeting all the
requirements of Level 0, this laptop will also have to conform to our
updated requirements for Qubes 4.x certification (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/07/21/new-hw-certification-for-q4/).
Level 2: Qubes Stateless Laptop. For details about this, please see
Joanna Rutkowska’s paper State Considered Harmful (https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/state_harmful.pdf). We can foresee
multiple levels of compatibility here. However, we expect that it will be at
least two years before a true stateless laptop can be created. In the
immediate future, therefore, we intend to pursue a Level 1 laptop.
Please note that laptops on the Qubes Hardware Compatibility List (HCL) (https://www.qubes-os.org/hcl/)
do not have a specific level. This is because neither ITL nor the Qubes OS
Project makes any affirmations regarding the vast majority of laptops on this
list. Rather, the list is compiled from voluntary contributions from members
of the community like you!
This is just the beginning. There’s a long road ahead before we can make
a Reasonably Secure Laptop a reality, but the need is too great to ignore.
Recommended:
Upgrading the Standard Fedora 23 Template to Fedora 24
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-23-to-24/
Upgrading the Standard Fedora 23 Template to Fedora 24
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-23-to-24/
RT @SwiftOnSecurity: Security isn't about broken parts. Parts break all the time.
Security is understanding the leverage and traversal between working parts.
Security is understanding the leverage and traversal between working parts.
RT @pwnallthethings: Don't assume you're not important enough to hack. One of DC Leaks' victims was a WH intern. And phishing is easy and low risk for hackers.
Comment on What’s New in the Xen Project Hypervisor 4.9? by fbifido
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/06/28/whats-new-in-the-xen-project-hypervisor-4-9/#comment-399
When is xen getting a native hyperconverged system/feature?
native unmap for NFS?
Please & Thanks.
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/06/28/whats-new-in-the-xen-project-hypervisor-4-9/#comment-399
When is xen getting a native hyperconverged system/feature?
native unmap for NFS?
Please & Thanks.
Comment on Best Quality and Quantity of Contributions in the New Xen Project 4.6 Release by Xen 4.6 strengthens security and Intel support – Technology Up2date
https://blog.xenproject.org/2015/10/13/xen-4-6/#comment-404
[…] Xen Project has released version 4.6 of its hypervisor project that helps power Amazon EC2 and other major cloud […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2015/10/13/xen-4-6/#comment-404
[…] Xen Project has released version 4.6 of its hypervisor project that helps power Amazon EC2 and other major cloud […]
RT @rootkovska: I'm glad the defenses we've built into @QubesOS yrs ago could finally be appreciated, as attackers seem to move to target net/USB stacks :) https://t.co/F6MnSeg2VR
Twitter
mig5
An attacker within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the Wi-Fi chip” https://t.co/1osz0DN3YB I need a @QubesOS phone…
ProTip: set Qubes firewall for your build VM to allow only https (& perhaps specific IPs) or no network at all, to assure more secure build. https://t.co/57TrnB73Zk
Twitter
Jann Horn
Especially funny when the sources are gpg-signed but pull dependencies over git:// and http:// without any visible checksum/sig checks https://t.co/Y6DFq7PqZF
Recap of LinuxCon China and Xen Project’s Growth in the Region
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/07/25/recap-of-linuxcon-china-and-xen-projects-growth-in-the-region/
It’s been a very busy month or so for the Xen Project. During mid-June, I was lucky to attend and speak at LinuxCon + ContainerCon China held in Beijing. There I spoke on the topic of securing embedded systems with the hypervisor and live patching, virtual machine introspection and vulnerability management alongside my colleague Cheng Zhang of Citrix. […]
https://blog.xenproject.org/2017/07/25/recap-of-linuxcon-china-and-xen-projects-growth-in-the-region/
It’s been a very busy month or so for the Xen Project. During mid-June, I was lucky to attend and speak at LinuxCon + ContainerCon China held in Beijing. There I spoke on the topic of securing embedded systems with the hypervisor and live patching, virtual machine introspection and vulnerability management alongside my colleague Cheng Zhang of Citrix. […]
RT @andrewdavidwong: Fedora 24 is approaching EOL. We recommend upgrading Fedora-based TemplateVMs and StandaloneVMs to Fedora 25.
https://t.co/edIxpMQhlU
https://t.co/edIxpMQhlU
Qubes OS
Qubes OS is a security-oriented, open-source operating system for personal computers. It uses virtualization to implement security by compartmentalization and supports both Linux and Windows virtual environments.
Recommended Fedora 25 TemplateVM Upgrade for Qubes 3.2
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/07/29/fedora-25-upgrade/
Fedora 24, one of the supported TemplateVM versions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#templatevms) in Qubes 3.2, is
scheduled to reach EOL (end of life) approximately
one month (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_Release_Life_Cycle#Maintenance_Schedule) after the release of Fedora 26,
which was on 2017-07-11. This places the expected EOL date for Fedora 24
somewhere in the second week of August.
Options for migrating to Fedora 25 are now available for Qubes 3.2.
If you’re currently using Fedora 24 (or older) TemplateVMs or StandaloneVMs,
we strongly recommend upgrading them to Fedora 25 before then. We provide
step-by-step instructions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-24-to-25/) for upgrading your existing TemplateVMs
and StandaloneVMs in-place.
We also provide fresh Fedora 25 TemplateVM packages through the official
Qubes repositories, which you can get with the following commands (in dom0).
Standard Fedora 25 TemplateVM:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-25
Minimal (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora-minimal/) Fedora 25 TemplateVM:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-25-minimal
After upgrading to a Fedora 25 TemplateVM, please remember to set all
qubes that were using the old template to use the new one. This can be
done in dom0 either with the Qubes VM Manager or with the qvm-prefs
command-line tool.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in
dom0. If you’re using Qubes 3.2, there is no dom0 OS upgrade available,
since none is currently required. For details, please see here (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#dom0).
If you’re using an older version of Qubes, we strongly recommend that
you upgrade to 3.2, as older versions are no longer supported.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/07/29/fedora-25-upgrade/
Fedora 24, one of the supported TemplateVM versions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#templatevms) in Qubes 3.2, is
scheduled to reach EOL (end of life) approximately
one month (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_Release_Life_Cycle#Maintenance_Schedule) after the release of Fedora 26,
which was on 2017-07-11. This places the expected EOL date for Fedora 24
somewhere in the second week of August.
Options for migrating to Fedora 25 are now available for Qubes 3.2.
If you’re currently using Fedora 24 (or older) TemplateVMs or StandaloneVMs,
we strongly recommend upgrading them to Fedora 25 before then. We provide
step-by-step instructions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-24-to-25/) for upgrading your existing TemplateVMs
and StandaloneVMs in-place.
We also provide fresh Fedora 25 TemplateVM packages through the official
Qubes repositories, which you can get with the following commands (in dom0).
Standard Fedora 25 TemplateVM:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-25
Minimal (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora-minimal/) Fedora 25 TemplateVM:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-25-minimal
After upgrading to a Fedora 25 TemplateVM, please remember to set all
qubes that were using the old template to use the new one. This can be
done in dom0 either with the Qubes VM Manager or with the qvm-prefs
command-line tool.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in
dom0. If you’re using Qubes 3.2, there is no dom0 OS upgrade available,
since none is currently required. For details, please see here (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#dom0).
If you’re using an older version of Qubes, we strongly recommend that
you upgrade to 3.2, as older versions are no longer supported.
Forwarded from Pavel Durov
Since some journalists don’t read my Telegram channel (a shame!), I made a Telegraph story about rumors on Telegram moving servers to weird places. It repeats some of the stuff from the last two posts from here, but could be useful as a summary of all our CDN-related posts. Spread the word!
http://telegra.ph/On-Rumors-About-Telegram-Servers-in-Weird-Places-07-30
http://telegra.ph/On-Rumors-About-Telegram-Servers-in-Weird-Places-07-30
Telegraph – Pavel Durov
On Rumors About Telegram Servers in Weird Places
There are some reports that the Iranian Minister of Communication Mahmoud Vaezi said that "Telegram moved some of its servers to Iran". Since there are no Telegram servers in Iran, this is probably another piece of fake news or incorrect translation. But…
RT @rootkovska: FWIW, Qubes' main goal & challenge is in how to provide *integration* on top of isolated compartments, without negating the isolation... https://t.co/7qSLP7Yp65
Twitter
Paul Harvey
@daveaitel Qubes for isolation, grsec for integrity, containers because Linux user/process isolation is now meaningless on desktops