Qubes OS 4.1.1-rc1 has been released!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/06/27/qubes-4-1-1-rc1/

We’re pleased to announce the first release candidate for Qubes 4.1.1!
This release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes,
and upstream template OS upgrades that have occurred since the initial
Qubes 4.1.0 release in February. Our goal is to provide a secure and
convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable
Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO.

Qubes 4.1.1-rc1 is available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.

What is a release candidate?

A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to
become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in
testing. Release candidates are intended for more advanced (or
adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of
software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read
more about the Qubes OS release process in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/)
documentation.

What is a patch release?

The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version
numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to
releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch
release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of
Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release
(in this case, 4.1.0) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point.
Installing Qubes 4.1.0 and fully updating it results in essentially the
same system as installing Qubes 4.1.1. You can learn more about how
Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.

What’s new in Qubes 4.1.1?

Qubes 4.1.1-rc1 includes numerous updates over the initial 4.1.0
release, in particular:


All 4.1.0 dom0 updates to date
Fedora 36 template (upgraded from Fedora 34)
Linux kernel 5.15 (upgraded from 5.10)


How to test Qubes 4.1.1-rc1

If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this release candidate, you can help to
improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you
encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We strongly encourage experience users to join the testing
team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190)!

Release candidate planning

If no significant bugs are discovered in 4.1.1-rc1, we expect to
announce the stable release of 4.1.1 in two to three weeks.

Qubes OS 4.0 reaches EOL on 2022-08-04
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/04/qubes-os-4-0-eol-on-2022-08-04/

Qubes OS 4.0 is scheduled to reach end-of-life (EOL) on 2022-08-04 — one
month from the date of this announcement.

What about patch releases?

The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/)
standard. Version numbers are written as ... When a
major or minor release reaches EOL, all of its patch releases also reach EOL.
For example, in this case, when we say that “Qubes 4.0” (without specifying a
number) is approaching EOL, we’re specifying a particular minor
release, inclusive of all patch releases within it. This means that Qubes
4.0.0, 4.0.1, 4.0.2, 4.0.3, and 4.0.4 will all reach EOL at the same time (on
2022-08-04), since they are all just patch releases of the same minor release.

How are EOL dates determined?

According to our support policy (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/), stable Qubes OS
releases are supported for six months after each subsequent major or minor
release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/). This means that Qubes 4.0 reaches EOL six
months after Qubes 4.1 was released. Since Qubes 4.1.0 was released on
2022-02-04 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/02/04/qubes-4-1-0/), Qubes 4.0’s EOL date is six months
later, on 2022-08-04.

Fun fact: Qubes 4.0.0 was initially released on
2018-03-28 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/03/28/qubes-40/), which means that it will be four
years, four months, and one week old when it reaches EOL. That’s the longest
support period for a stable Qubes release in our project’s history!

What should I do?

First off, if you’re already using Qubes 4.1, then you don’t have to do
anything. This announcement doesn’t affect you.

However, if you’ve stood by the venerable Qubes 4.0 till now, then you’ll want
to make sure you upgrade to Qubes 4.1 by 2022-08-04. When you upgrade,
though, depends on a few factors. You have several options (in no particular
order):



Perform an in-place upgrade (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.1/#in-place-upgrade) any time
between now and 2022-08-04.


Perform a clean install now using the stable Qubes 4.1.0
ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/#qubes-release-4-1-0), which was published on
2022-02-04 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/02/04/qubes-4-1-0/).


Perform a clean install now using the first release candidate for Qubes
4.1.1 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/06/27/qubes-4-1-1-rc1/).


Wait to see whether the stable Qubes 4.1.1 ISO is published within the next
month.



Allow me to explain what I mean by the last option: While we certainly hope
to be able to announce the stable 4.1.1 release within the next few weeks, we
cannot guarantee that outcome. After all, the entire point of having release
candidates is because sometimes major bugs are discovered in builds that were
thought to be nearly ready for release. While we don’t expect any, we can never
be certain that no such bug will be found.

So, for those looking for a clean installation option, the main advantage of
the existing 4.1.0 ISO is that it is already available right now, while
there’s a decent chance but no guarantee that the stable 4.1.1 ISO will be
ready in time. Meanwhile, the release candidate is intended for testers and
adventurous types who don’t mind a bit of risk. The release candidates are not
intended for cases in which system reliability is required for important work.

The main disadvantage of the existing 4.1.0 ISO is that it’s quite old by
now. It’s missing some security updates (which you should download immediately
after installing, if you choose to go that route) and comes with an old Fedora
template that has already reached EOL (which you should upgrade immediately
after installing or refrain from using in favor of other templates).

If you’re not in any particular hurry to upgrade (and, if you’ve been content

to stick with 4.0 until now, then you’re probably not), one strategy is simply
to wait until closer to the EOL date, and see whether the stable 4.1.1 ISO
arrives in time. If it does, great! You can preform a clean install using that.
If it doesn’t, then you haven’t lost anything. You still have the same choices
you have right now. Just make sure you to leave yourself enough time to upgrade
one way or another!

XSAs released on 2022-07-05
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/05/xsas-released-on-2022-07-05/

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen Security Advisories (XSAs).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
Therefore, user action is required.

XSAs that affect the security of Qubes OS (user action required)

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


XSA-403
XSA-405


Please see QSB-082 for the actions users must take in order to
protect themselves, as well as further details about these XSAs:

https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/05/qsb-082/

XSAs that do not affect the security of Qubes OS (no user action required)

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


XSA-406 (ARM architecture only)


Related links


Xen XSA list: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/
Qubes XSA tracker: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/
Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack): https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
Qubes security bulletins (QSBs): https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/

QSB-082: Memory management issues in PV frontend drivers
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/05/qsb-082/

We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 082:
Memory management issues in PV frontend drivers.
The text of this QSB is reproduced below. This QSB and its accompanying
signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).

View QSB-082 in the qubes-secpack:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-082-2022.txt

In addition, you may wish to:


Get the qubes-secpack: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past QSBs: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/
View the XSA Tracker: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/



---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 082 ]===---

2022-07-05

Memory management issues in PV frontend drivers


User action required
---------------------

Users must install the following specific packages in order to address
the issues discussed in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.0, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.8.5-42
- Linux kernel packages (kernel*-qubes-vm), versions 5.4.203, 5.8.9,
4.19.250

For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.14.5-5
- Linux kernel packages (kernel*-qubes-vm), versions 5.15.52, 5.8.9,
5.10.128

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [1] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [2]

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen and Linux binaries.


Summary
--------

The following security advisories were published on 2022-07-05:

XSA-403 [3] "Linux disk/nic frontends data leaks":

| Linux Block and Network PV device frontends don't zero memory regions
| before sharing them with the backend. Additionally the granularity of
| the grant table doesn't allow sharing less than a 4K page, leading to
| unrelated data residing in the same 4K page as data shared with a
| backend being accessible by such backend.
|
| An untrusted backend can access data not intended to be shared. If
| such mappings are made with write permissions the backend could also
| cause malfunctions and/or crashes to consumers of contiguous data in
| the shared pages.


XSA-405 [4] "The PV network backend may cause Linux netfront to use
freed SKBs":

| While adding logic to support XDP (eXpress Data Path), a code label
| was moved in a way allowing for SKBs having references (pointers)
| retained for further processing to nevertheless be freed.
|
| A misbehaving or malicious backend may cause a Denial of Service (DoS)
| in the guest. Information leaks or privilege escalation cannot be
| ruled out.


Impact
-------

These vulnerabilities, if exploited, could allow a malicious VM that
serves as a network or a block backend to leak data from its frontend.
The ability to execute code in the frontend cannot be ruled out.

In the default Qubes OS configuration, this means that sys-net could
attack sys-firewall, and sys-firewall could attack qubes connected to
it. Furthermore, a qube to which a block device is assigned from an
untrusted backend qube can be attacked by that backend. (For example,
sys-usb could attack qubes to which a USB drive is attached as a block
device.) Qubes that do not have any NetVM set and to which no block
devices are assigned are not affected.


Credits
--------

See the original Xen Security Advisory.


References
-----------

[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-403.html
[4] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-405.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

XSAs released on 2022-07-12
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/13/xsas-released-on-2022-07-12/

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen Security Advisories (XSAs).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
Therefore, user action is required.

XSAs that affect the security of Qubes OS (user action required)

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


XSA-407


Please see QSB-083 for the actions users must take in order to
protect themselves, as well as further details about these XSAs:

https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/13/qsb-083/

XSAs that do not affect the security of Qubes OS (no user action required)

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


(none)


Related links


Xen XSA list: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/
Qubes XSA tracker: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/
Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack): https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
Qubes security bulletins (QSBs): https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/

QSB-083: Retbleed: Arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions (XSA-407)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/13/qsb-083/

We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 083: Retbleed:
Arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions (XSA-407).
The text of this QSB is reproduced below. This QSB and its accompanying
signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack
(qubes-secpack).

View QSB-083 in the qubes-secpack:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-083-2022.txt

In addition, you may wish to:


Get the qubes-secpack: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past QSBs: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/
View the XSA Tracker: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/



---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 083 ]===---

2022-07-12

Retbleed

Arbitrary speculative code execution
with return instructions (XSA-407)


User action required
---------------------

Users must install the following specific packages in order to address
the issues discussed in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.0, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.8.5-43

For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.14.5-6

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [1] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [2]

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.


Summary
--------

On 2022-07-12, the Xen Project published XSA-407, "Retbleed -
arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions" [3]:

| Researchers at ETH Zurich have discovered Retbleed, allowing for
| arbitrary speculative execution in a victim context.
|
| For more details, see:
| https://comsec.ethz.ch/retbleed
|
| ETH Zurich have allocated CVE-2022-29900 for AMD and CVE-2022-29901 for
| Intel.
|
| Despite the similar preconditions, these are very different
| microarchitectural behaviours between vendors.
|
| On AMD CPUs, Retbleed is one specific instance of a more general
| microarchitectural behaviour called Branch Type Confusion. AMD have
| assigned CVE-2022-23816 (Retbleed) and CVE-2022-23825 (Branch Type
| Confusion).
|
| For more details, see:
| https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1037
|
| On Intel CPUs, Retbleed is not a new vulnerability; it is only
| applicable to software which did not follow Intel's original
| Spectre-v2 guidance. Intel are using the ETH Zurich allocated
| CVE-2022-29901.
|
| For more details, see:
| https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00702.html
| https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/return-stack-buffer-underflow.html
|
| ARM have indicated existing guidance on Spectre-v2 is sufficient.


Impact
-------

This is yet another speculative execution issue, which allows an
attacker to infer content of memory they shouldn't have access to. This
includes one VM extracting secrets from another. Any VM can perform this
attack on an affected hardware.

AMD systems based on Zen 1 - Zen 2 microarchitectures are affected.
Specifically those are AMD Ryzen processors with model names 1xxx - 4xxx
and some 5xxxU [4]. Zen 3 microarchitecture (AMD Ryzen 5xxx or newer)
are not affected.

Pre-existing Xen mitigations on Intel machines are effective to prevent
this issue, so Intel systems are not affected.

Credits
--------

See the original Xen Security Advisory.


References
-----------

[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/

[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-407.html
[4] Unlike other 5xxxU models, Ryzen 3 5300U, Ryzen 5 5500U and
Ryzen 7 5700U are Zen 2, not Zen 3. See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zen2
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zen3

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

Qubes OS 4.1.1 has been released!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/18/qubes-4-1-1/

We’re pleased to announce the stable release of Qubes 4.1.1! This release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and upstream template OS upgrades that have occurred since the initial Qubes 4.1.0 release in February. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO.

Qubes 4.1.1 is available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.

Reminder: Qubes 4.0 approaching end-of-life

As we recently announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/04/qubes-os-4-0-eol-on-2022-08-04/), Qubes 4.0 reaches EOL (end-of-life) on 2022-08-04. If you’re using Qubes 4.0 and have been waiting for an opportunity to upgrade to Qubes 4.1 via the clean reinstallation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.1/#clean-installation) method, we strongly recommend using this Qubes 4.1.1 release to do so, as this is the last Qubes 4.1 patch release before Qubes 4.0 reaches EOL.

Existing Qubes 4.1.0 and release candidate users

If you are already using Qubes 4.1.0 or Qubes 4.1.1-rc1 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/06/27/qubes-4-1-1-rc1/), then you should simply update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) (which includes upgrading any EOL templates (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol) you might have) in order to make your system essentially equivalent to this stable Qubes 4.1.1 release. No special action is required on your part.

What’s new in Qubes 4.1.1?

Qubes 4.1.1 includes numerous updates over the initial 4.1.0 release, in particular:


All 4.1.0 dom0 updates to date
Fedora 36 template (upgraded from Fedora 34)
Linux kernel 5.15 (upgraded from 5.10)


What is a patch release?

The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.1.0) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. Installing Qubes 4.1.0 and fully updating it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.1.1. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.

XSAs released on 2022-07-26
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/26/xsas-released-on-2022-07-26/

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen Security Advisories (XSAs).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
Therefore, no user action is required.

XSAs that affect the security of Qubes OS (user action required)

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


(none)


XSAs that do not affect the security of Qubes OS (no user action required)

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


XSA-408 (shadow mode is disabled at build time)


Related links


Xen XSA list: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/
Qubes XSA tracker: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/
Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack): https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
Qubes security bulletins (QSBs): https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/

Qubes OS Summit 2022: September 9-11 in Berlin
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/29/qubes-os-summit-2022/

In conjunction with 3mdeb (https://3mdeb.com/), the fourth edition of our Qubes OS Summit will be held live this year from September 9 to 11 in Berlin, Germany! For more information about this event, including the CFP (which is open until August 29), please see: https://qubesos.3mdeb.com (https://qubesos.3mdeb.com/)

Qubes OS 4.0 has reached EOL
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/08/04/qubes-4-0-has-reached-eol/

As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/04/qubes-os-4-0-eol-on-2022-08-04/), all releases in the Qubes 4.0 series (which includes the most recent 4.0.4 patch release) have officially reached EOL (end-of-life) as of today, 2022-08-04. We strongly urge all remaining Qubes 4.0 users to upgrade to Qubes 4.1 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.1/) immediately. As always, the support statuses of all Qubes OS and template releases are available on the supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) page, and the latest release is available to download on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.

What should I do?

If you’re already using Qubes 4.1, then no action is required on your part. This announcement concerns only the 4.0 minor release series.

If you’re still using Qubes 4.0 (including the most recent 4.0.4 patch release), then you should upgrade to 4.1 immediately. You have two options:


Perform a clean reinstallation using the latest stable Qubes 4.1.1 ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/#qubes-release-4-1-1), which was published on 2022-07-18 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/18/qubes-4-1-1/).
Perform an in-place upgrade (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.1/#in-place-upgrade) to 4.1.


Both of these options are covered in further detail in the Qubes 4.0 to 4.1 upgrade guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.1/). If you need help, please consult our help and support (https://www.qubes-os.org/support/) page.

QSB-084: Split GPG: GnuPG file denoscriptor confusion and file existence leak
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/08/06/qsb-084/

We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 084: Split GPG: GnuPG file denoscriptor confusion and file existence leak (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-084-2022.txt). The text of this QSB is reproduced below. This QSB and its accompanying signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). More information about QSBs, including a complete historical list, is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).


---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 084 ]===---

2022-08-06

Split GPG: GnuPG file denoscriptor confusion and file existence leak

User action required
---------------------

Users must install the following specific packages in order to address the
issues discussed in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.1, in templates and standalones:
- qubes-gpg-split 2.0.63

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [1] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [2]


Summary
--------

Split GPG [3] is designed to isolate private keys from the application
using them in order to protect them from being extracted and to allow
the user to retain control over when they are used. This isolation is
implemented by forwarding calls from an application in a frontend qube,
where `qubes-gpg-client` is executed, to an instance of `gpg` in a
backend qube that holds the private keys, all while allowing only
specific `gpg` options. This option filtering mechanism is designed to
reject options like `--export-secret-keys` that might leak private keys
to the frontend qube. However, it has been discovered that certain
combinations of options allow the frontend qube to access data in the
backend qube in unintended ways.

Two separate types of attack were discovered:

1. Interaction via `--command-fd` allows the frontend qube to check for
the existence of arbitrary files in the backend qube, including files
unrelated to GnuPG.

2. Using the same `--*-fd` option several times allows the frontend qube
to redirect GnuPG input and output to the wrong file denoscriptor. This
can be used to:

- Corrupt files used by GnuPG. (We have confirmed this only in the
case of `trustdb`, but other files cannot be ruled out.)
- Issue arbitrary commands to `gpg-agent`, which can be used to
perform actions like generating new secret keys and deleting
existing keys.
- Set various environment variables for the `pinentry` process,
thereby providing an indirect avenue of attack against this
process.

However, our testing did not reveal any way to exploit this
vulnerability in order to read `gpg-agent`'s responses, which means
that certain actions, such as extracting secret keys, should not be
possible.


Impact
-------

An attacker controlling a Split GPG frontend qube can check for the
existence of arbitrary files in a backend qube, corrupt the `trustdb`
file in a backend qube, issue arbitrary commands to `gpg-agent` in a
backend qube, and issue arbitrary commands to a smart card daemon in a
backend qube. While this vulnerability can be exploited in order to
generate and delete keys in the backend qube (or on a smart card
attached to the backend qube), it is unlikely that it can be used to
exfiltrate private keys out of the backend qube (or off of a smart card
attached to the backend qube). If this vulnerability were to be chained
with a hypothetical vulnerability in `gpg-agent`, `scdaemon`, or
`pinentry` (or in one of the libraries they use), then arbitrary code
execution could be possible.


Credits
--------

This issue was discovered by Demi Marie Obenour.

References

-----------

[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[3] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/split-gpg/

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

Qubes OS Summit: History from organizer's perspective
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/07/qubes-os-summit-history/

Editor’s note: This is a guest article by Michał Żygowski from
3mdeb (https://3mdeb.com/) about the history of Qubes OS Summits.
Thanks for sharing with us today, Michał!

Introduction

The next Qubes OS Summit 2022 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/07/29/qubes-os-summit-2022/)
edition is upcoming. This year it will be held in Berlin from September 9th to
11th in hybrid format, in person and live-streamed for remote access. More
details here (https://qubesos.3mdeb.com/). Don’t miss the event and more
importantly how it started. In the article the history and organizer’s
perspective of the event will be described.

How did all of this start?

In May 2019 3mdeb funded Linux training for its employees, having no idea who
the instructor will be. At some point, it occurred that the mysterious
instructor will be none other than Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, the same person
who leads the Qubes OS project. As huge fans of Qubes OS and its approach to
security, as also fans of Joanna Rutkowska security research in the area of
firmware and computer architecture, we were delighted to meet him in person in
our office in Gdańsk, Poland. The time has come when the idea of a short event
focused on firmware impact on Qubes OS security has been born. We asked Marek
if he has some spare time to discuss firmware impacts on Qubes OS security and
he liked the idea. The event has been called humorously a “minisummit”. That is
how the first Qubes OS summit started, one day, in a small conference room,
with a tiny group of people passionate about firmware and system security,
nothing outrageous (in the meaning of scale). One may still read what topics
have been discussed
here (https://blog.3mdeb.com/2019/2019-08-07-qubes-os-and-3mdeb-minisummit/).
The main focus was on Qubes OS certification and ecosystem as well as the
firmware-related security technologies support like TPM 2.0 and DRTM (Anti Evil
Maid). The event helped 3mdeb realize how to get involved in Qubes OS project
and help to improve it with our expertise.

The past of Qubes OS Summits

Everyone enjoyed that one particular day so much, that we decided to repeat the
event next year. The environment we created together, bending and crossing the
event horizon between firmware and operating system, was something wonderful,
both to hear and to speak about. The potential we saw in that kind of event, to
bring various companies together and collaborate on the project on every
possible layer, has been pushing us forward to enlarge the community and
introduce more open-source firmware to the Qubes OS world.

Another May has come, the year 2020, the pandemic dominated the world. But it
didn’t stop us from holding the event again! It even gave us a better
opportunity to attract and gather more people virtually to attend the event.
Thanks to our 3mdeb colleagues, who set up the live recording and streaming of
the whole Qubes OS 2020 Summit, it is possible to see and listen to the talks
given by Qubes OS and 3mdeb experts on
Youtube (https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLuISieMwVBpIwhPXcuYKtS50CHQOvt_BO)
over and over again. From 3mdeb side we continued firmware-related topics, for
example first time Qubes OS Anti Evil Maid on AMD platform. It was quite a
challenge for us because we have organized such a virtual event for the first
time. Fortunately, everything went smoothly and finished with success after 4
sessions 2.5 hours long.

In August 2021 we held yet another Qubes OS Summit together with the Qubes OS
team, still virtually, unfortunately. However, this year brought more speakers
from other companies and projects, which we were very happy about. There were 2
sessions almost 4 hours each and one may watch the talks at
Youtube (https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLuISieMwVBpIoLQzpYeZnkupURheXky6r).

This time, the 3mdeb’s stage belonged to Piotr Król (CEO of 3mdeb) who presented
his adventures using Qubes OS as an everyday device, talking about USB camera
and cryptocurrency wallets. Of course firmware-related topics could not be
missing and Piotr also showed continuation of his previous year’s efforts of
securing the VMs with SRTM and Secure Boot.

The future of Qubes OS Summits

Finally, the time has come when we may meet together in person, after three
years! The Qubes OS Summit 2022 is fast approaching, with only a few days left
before the start of the event in Berlin. As it is no longer held only virtually
(but still possible to attend remotely for those who can’t be with us in
person) the organization is more complicated, both from the logistics and
presentations side. Every year we try our best to dig into hardcore security
topics on the verge of firmware and operating systems. All this time we have
been gradually building plans and ideas, and getting closer and closer to the
goal of improving the security of Qubes OS, especially in areas we feel best
at, i.e. SRTM and DRTM (AEM). In the upcoming event, we have prepared a few
interesting projects and ideas around Anti Evil Maid support and open-source
firmware on modern hardware.
Here (https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/schedule/#) you may find the
full schedule. Among others we welcome the following speakers:


Wessel Klein Snakenborg from Novacustom with a story of open-source on modern
laptops as a candidate to Qubes OS certification
Brent Cowing from Protectli talking about security of his small form factor
computers also running open-source firmware
Jan Suhr from Nitrokey talking about how enterprise requirements tied to
Windows can be met with Qubes OS
Arthur Rasmusson from Arc Compute talking about GPU virtualization and its
possible benefits to Qubes oS
Puck Meerburg from Spectrum OS telling about the power of Wayland for GUI
isolation and how it benefits systems like Qubes OS or Spectrum OS
And everyone from 3mdeb, Qubes OS team, and others


We hope that the event and community around it and the Qubes OS project will
grow in the future, bringing reasonable trustworthiness and collaboration for
everybody. Definitely, 3mdeb will try its best to co-organize the event in the
upcoming years.

Summary

By a mere coincidence, meeting Marek Marczykowski-Górecki gave birth to a
fascinating series of Qubes OS Summits and led us to this day.

Together with Invisible Things Lab we (3mdeb) are very proud to be the
co-organizers of the 4th edition of the event. Looking forward to seeing each
other again, but most important to talk and share knowledge and passion with
everyone again after a long time.

Many thanks to the Qubes OS team for holding up the tradition with us. See you
all in Berlin!

Qubes Canary 032
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/

We have published Qubes Canary 032. The text of this canary is
reproduced below.

This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in
the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack).

View Qubes Canary 032 in the qubes-secpack:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-032-2022.txt

Learn how to obtain and authenticate the qubes-secpack and all the
signatures it contains:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

View all past canaries:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/


---===[ Qubes Canary 032 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is September 13, 2022.

2. There have been 84 Qubes security bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of December 2022. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.


Special announcements
----------------------

We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) [3] for Qubes OS 4.2.
Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the
4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a
complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution,
we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1
release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the
cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in
one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary
special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is
an exception to our usual RSK management policy.


Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.

The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.


Proof of freshness
-------------------

Tue, 13 Sep 2022 02:47:47 +0000

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