Here’s a summary of the main component options available for this mid-tower desktop PC:




Component
Options




Motherboard
MSI PRO Z690-A DDR5 (Wi-Fi optional)


Processor
12th Generation Intel Core i5-12600K or i9-12900K


Memory
16 GB to 128 GB DDR5


NVMe storage (optional)
Up to two NVMe PCIe 4.0 x4 SSDs, up to 2 TB each


SATA storage (optional)
Up to two SATA SSDs, up to 7.68 TB each


Integrated graphics
Intel UHD 770


Discrete graphics (optional)
Nvidia Geforce RTX 4070 or 4090


Wireless (optional)
Wi-Fi 6E, 2400 Mbps, 802.11/a/b/g/n/ac/ax, Bluetooth 5.2


Operating system (optional)
Qubes OS 4.1 or Ubuntu 22.04 LTS




Of special note for Qubes users, the NitroPC Pro features a combined PS/2 port that supports both a PS/2 keyboard and a PS/2 mouse simultaneously with a Y-cable (not included). This allows for full control of dom0 without the need for USB keyboard or mouse passthrough. Nitrokey also offers a special tamper-evident shipping method for an additional fee. With this option, the case screws will be individually sealed and photographed, and the NitroPC Pro will be packed inside a sealed bag. Photographs of the seals will be sent to you by email, which you can use to determine whether the case was opened during transit.

The NitroPC Pro also comes with a “Dasharo Entry Subnoscription,” which includes the following:


Accesses to the latest firmware releases
Exclusive newsletter
Special firmware updates, including early access to updates enhancing privacy, security, performance, and compatibility
Early access to new firmware releases for newly-supported desktop platforms (https://docs.dasharo.com/variants/overview/#desktop) (please see the roadmap (https://github.com/Dasharo/presentations/blob/main/dug2_dasharo_roadmap.md#dasharo-desktop-roadmap))
Access to the Dasharo Premier Support invite-only live chat channel on the Matrix network, allowing direct access to the Dasharo Team and fellow subscribers with personalized and priority assistance
Insider’s view and influence on the Dasharo feature roadmap for a real impact on Dasharo development
Dasharo Tools Suite Entry Subnoscription (https://docs.dasharo.com/osf-trivia-list/dts/#what-is-dasharo-tools-suite-supporters-entrance) keys


For further product details, please see the official NitroPC Pro (https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitropc-pro-523) page.

Special note regarding the need for kernel-latest

Beginning with Qubes OS 4.1.2, the Qubes installer includes the kernel-latest package and allows users to select this kernel option from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. At the time of this announcement, kernel-latest is required for the NitroPC Pro’s graphics drivers to function properly. Therefore, all potential purchasers and users of this model should be aware that they will have to select a non-default option (Install Qubes OS RX using kernel-latest) from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. However, since Linux 6.1 has officially been promoted to being a long-term support (LTS) kernel, it will become the default kernel at some point, which means that the need for this non-default selection is only temporary.

About Nitrokey

Nitrokey (https://www.nitrokey.com/) is a world-leading company in open-source security hardware. Nitrokey develops IT security hardware for data encryption, key management and user authentication, as well as secure network devices, PCs, laptops, and smartphones. The company was founded in Berlin, Germany in 2015 and already counts tens of thousands of users from more than 120 countries, including numerous well-known international enterprises from various industries, among its customers. Learn more. (https://www.nitrokey.com/about)

About Dasharo

“Dasharo is an open-source firmware distribution focusing on seamless deployment, clean and simple code, long-term maintenance, professional support, transparent validation, superior documentation, privacy-respecting implementation, liberty for the owners and trustworthiness for all.” —the Dasharo documentation (https://docs.dasharo.com/)

Dasharo (https://www.dasharo.com/) is a registered trademark of and a product developed by 3mdeb (https://3mdeb.com/).

What is Qubes-certified hardware?

Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of [requirements], and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.

Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.

It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.

If anyone is looking to donate to QubesOS to help the project you can visit their official donation page here > qubes-os.org/donate

Anything helps! They accept Bitcoin, Ethereum and Monero as well as credit card or PayPal.


This message is not from QubesOS Team

Qubes Canary 036
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/09/12/canary-036/

We have published Qubes Canary 036 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-036-2023.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.

Qubes Canary 036


---===[ Qubes Canary 036 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is September 4, 2023.

2. There have been 93 Qubes security bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of December 2023. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.


Special announcements
----------------------

None.


Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.

The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.


Proof of freshness
-------------------

Mon, 04 Sep 2023 02:12:30 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
An Oasis in the Middle of the Ukraine War: The Pike - and the Drones - Come at Night
Spying and Sabotage at the OSCE: How Russia Is Paralyzing Europe's Peace Organization
MIT Economist Daron Acemoğlu Takes on Big Tech: "Our Future Will Be Very Dystopian"
BRICS and the emerging new world order: "Hypocrisy is fairly evenly distributed in the North and the South"
Investigating the Nord Stream Attack: All the Evidence Points To Kyiv

Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Zelensky Says He’ll Replace Oleksii Reznikov as Ukraine’s Defense Minister
Parisian Pools, Up Close and Personal
Turkey’s Women’s Volleyball Team Inspires Pride
How the Khakova Dam Disaster Continues to Devastate Ukraine
In Italy, Rape Cases Seize Attention and Expose Cultural Rifts

Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Ukraine War: Counter-offensive troops punch through Russia line, generals claim
Ukraine's defence minister Oleksii Reznikov dismissed
Child labour at 'critical moment' as more pushed into work: ILO
Teacher suicide exposes parent bullying in S Korea
Burning Man: Police investigating death during heavy rain

Source: Blockchain.info
0000000000000000000459349c4d92e353d07dd3e11701d27f2c5c756e0a66be


Footnotes
----------

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP

signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-036-2023.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=VY8Z
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-036-2023.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=2qMp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-036-2023.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.

What is a Qubes canary?

A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).

The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)

Why should I care about canaries?

Canaries provide an important indication about the security status of the project. If the canary is healthy, it’s a strong sign that things are running normally. However, if the canary is unhealthy, it could mean that the project or its members are being coerced in some way.

What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?

Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:


Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Every canary contains the same set of statements (sometimes along with special announcements, which are not the same in every canary). If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.


Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?

No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:


Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).


In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it, you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?

A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all canaries so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether canaries are genuine. The only way to be certain that a canary is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?

If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced. Falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software) for Windows and Mac options.)



Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1


(See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more ways to obtain the QMSK.)


View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.


pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494



Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more details and ideas for how to do that.

Tip: Record the genuine QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.


Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys

(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)

1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu

Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y

pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.

gpg> q



Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.



Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)

$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u



Verify signed Git tags.

$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit

tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100

Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]


The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.


Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]


Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.



For this announcement (Qubes Canary 036), the commands are:

$ gpg --verify canary-036-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-036-2023.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-036-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-036-2023.txt


You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 036 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

If anyone is looking to donate to QubesOS to help the project you can visit their official donation page here > qubes-os.org/donate

Anything helps! They accept Bitcoin, Ethereum and Monero as well as credit card or PayPal.


This message is not from QubesOS Team

Tickets for Qubes OS Summit 2023 are now available!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/09/19/tickets-for-qubes-os-summit-2023-now-available/

We have options for everyone:


Virtual Qubes Pass for online attendees
On-site Qubes Pass for those ready to join us in Berlin


Number of the On-site Qubes Passes is limited, so book only if you will be there. Both tickets are free. Read more at: https://bit.ly/qubes-os-summit-2023

Have insights to share? https://bit.ly/qubes-os-23-cfp

Want to be a sponsor? https://bit.ly/qubes-os-23-sponsors

XSAs released on 2023-09-20
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/09/20/xsas-released-on-2023-09-20/

The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
Therefore, no user action is required.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


(none)


XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


XSA-438 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-438.html)

Shadow paging is not built-in.




About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

XSAs released on 2023-09-25
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/09/27/xsas-released-on-2023-09-25/

The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
Therefore, user action is required.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


XSA-439 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-439.html)

Please see QSB-094 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/09/27/qsb-094/) for details.




XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


(none)


About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

QSB-094: x86/AMD: Divide speculative information leak
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/09/27/qsb-094/

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 094: x86/AMD: Divide speculative information leak (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-094-2023.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.

Qubes Security Bulletin 094


---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 094 ]===---

2023-09-27

x86/AMD: Divide speculative information leak

User action required
---------------------

Users must install the following specific packages in order to address
the issues discussed in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.14.6-2

For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.2-2

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.

Summary
--------

On 2023-09-25, the Xen Project published XSA-439, "x86/AMD: Divide
speculative information leak" [3]:

| In the Zen1 microarchitecture, there is one divider in the
| pipeline which services uops from both threads. In the case of #DE,
| the latched result from the previous DIV to execute will be forwarded
| speculatively.
|
| This is a covert channel that allows two threads to communicate
| without any system calls. In also allows userspace to obtain the
| result of the most recent DIV instruction executed (even
| speculatively) in the core, which can be from a higher privilege
| context.

For more information, see:
* https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7007.html

Impact
-------

On systems with an AMD Zen (first generation) CPU, an attacker who
compromises a VM can attempt to exploit this vulnerability in order to
infer the contents of data from a different execution context on the
same CPU core. This includes data belonging to a different VM (which
could be dom0) that was previously scheduled on that CPU core and Xen
itself. The latter is relevant because some system operations require
Xen to load data from a VM. This data may or may not be sensitive.
However, the attacker has no control over the data that Xen loads (and,
to some extent, no knowledge of what was loaded).

Credits
--------

See the original Xen Security Advisory.

References
-----------

[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-439.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-094-2023.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=HOO+
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-094-2023.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=yvp2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-094-2023.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. A list of all QSBs is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software) for Windows and Mac options.)



Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1


(See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more ways to obtain the QMSK.)

View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.


pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494



Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more details and ideas for how to do that.

Tip: Record the genuine QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.


Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)

1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu

Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y

pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.

gpg> q



Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.



Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)

$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported

gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u



Verify signed Git tags.

$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100

Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]


The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.


Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]


Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.



For this announcement (QSB-094), the commands are:

$ gpg --verify qsb-094-2023.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-094-2023.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-094-2023.txt.sig.simon qsb-094-2023.txt


You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-094 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.