QSB-098: CPU microcode updates not loaded with dom0 kernel version 6.6.x
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/15/qsb-098/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 098: CPU microcode updates not loaded with dom0 kernel version 6.6.x (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-098-2023.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Security Bulletin 098
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 098 ]===---
2023-12-15
CPU microcode updates not loaded with dom0 kernel version 6.6.x
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
Linux kernel version 6.6.0 removed the CONFIG_MICROCODE_INTEL and
CONFIG_MICROCODE_AMD options for loading Intel and AMD CPU microcode
updates, respectively, leaving only the generic CONFIG_MICROCODE option.
Dracut is the tool responsible for generating dom0's initramfs. It
determines whether the Linux kernel supports microcode loading by
checking for the presence of CONFIG_MICROCODE_INTEL or
CONFIG_MICROCODE_AMD in the kernel's config. If present, dracut includes
the appropriate microcode updates in the initramfs. In kernel versions
6.6.0 and later, where the CONFIG_MICROCODE_INTEL and
CONFIG_MICROCODE_AMD options have been removed, dracut concludes that
microcode loading is not supported and does not include microcode
updates in the initramfs. With the security updates described in the
"Patching" section below, dracut checks for the presence of
CONFIG_MICROCODE, which is also the case in an upcoming upstream dracut
version that has not yet been released.
Impact
-------
On affected systems, CPU microcode updates are not loaded. CPU microcode
updates are sometimes necessary in order to address important security
vulnerabilities. If CPU microcode updates are not properly loaded, these
security vulnerabilities may remain exploitable.
Affected systems
-----------------
All and only systems that satisfy both of the following conditions are
affected:
1. The system is running Linux kernel version 6.6.0 or later in dom0.
2. The system's microcode updates must be loaded by the operating system
(as opposed to the firmware).
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- dracut-050-62.git20200529
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- dracut-059-4
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
initramfs binaries.
Credits
--------
Discovered by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki while debugging an issue
reported by Thierry Laurion [3].
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8763
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-098-2023.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmV8e3YACgkQ1lWk8hgw
4GoAKw//fRyRuNtp+Pi3vcHoV5gDVKV1YZn3z/cYrtQzzTRV14ZVe7auUfbgwpVi
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/15/qsb-098/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 098: CPU microcode updates not loaded with dom0 kernel version 6.6.x (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-098-2023.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Security Bulletin 098
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 098 ]===---
2023-12-15
CPU microcode updates not loaded with dom0 kernel version 6.6.x
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
Linux kernel version 6.6.0 removed the CONFIG_MICROCODE_INTEL and
CONFIG_MICROCODE_AMD options for loading Intel and AMD CPU microcode
updates, respectively, leaving only the generic CONFIG_MICROCODE option.
Dracut is the tool responsible for generating dom0's initramfs. It
determines whether the Linux kernel supports microcode loading by
checking for the presence of CONFIG_MICROCODE_INTEL or
CONFIG_MICROCODE_AMD in the kernel's config. If present, dracut includes
the appropriate microcode updates in the initramfs. In kernel versions
6.6.0 and later, where the CONFIG_MICROCODE_INTEL and
CONFIG_MICROCODE_AMD options have been removed, dracut concludes that
microcode loading is not supported and does not include microcode
updates in the initramfs. With the security updates described in the
"Patching" section below, dracut checks for the presence of
CONFIG_MICROCODE, which is also the case in an upcoming upstream dracut
version that has not yet been released.
Impact
-------
On affected systems, CPU microcode updates are not loaded. CPU microcode
updates are sometimes necessary in order to address important security
vulnerabilities. If CPU microcode updates are not properly loaded, these
security vulnerabilities may remain exploitable.
Affected systems
-----------------
All and only systems that satisfy both of the following conditions are
affected:
1. The system is running Linux kernel version 6.6.0 or later in dom0.
2. The system's microcode updates must be loaded by the operating system
(as opposed to the firmware).
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- dracut-050-62.git20200529
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- dracut-059-4
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
initramfs binaries.
Credits
--------
Discovered by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki while debugging an issue
reported by Thierry Laurion [3].
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8763
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-098-2023.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
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Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-098-2023.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
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=BnDK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-098-2023.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
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c905F9inPCsnxrpQe/+2He/wHdTIB8vpoSJLqKAX1k3odNmDycU=
=IUre
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-098-2023.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=BnDK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-098-2023.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
👍1
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-098), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-098-2023.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-098-2023.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-098-2023.txt.sig.simon qsb-098-2023.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-098 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-098), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-098-2023.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-098-2023.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-098-2023.txt.sig.simon qsb-098-2023.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-098 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
Qubes OS 4.2.0 has been released!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/18/qubes-os-4-2-0-has-been-released/
Qubes OS 4.2.0 brings a host of new features, major improvements, and numerous bug fixes. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes OS 4.2.0?
Dom0 upgraded to Fedora 37 (#6982 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6982))
Xen upgraded to version 4.17
Default Debian template upgraded to Debian 12
Default Fedora and Debian templates use Xfce instead of GNOME (#7784 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7784))
SELinux support in Fedora templates (#4239 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4239))
Several GUI applications rewritten, including:
Applications Menu (also available as preview in R4.1) (#6665 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6665)), (#5677 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5677))
Qubes Global Settings (#6898 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6898))
Create New Qube
Qubes Update (#7443 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7443))
Unified grub.cfg location for both UEFI and legacy boot (#7985 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7985))
PipeWire support (#6358 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6358))
fwupd integration for firmware updates (#4855 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4855))
Optional automatic clipboard clearing (#3415 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3415))
Official packages built using Qubes Builder v2 (#6486 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6486))
Split GPG management in Qubes Global Settings
Qrexec services use new qrexec policy format by default (but old format is still supported) (#8000 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8000))
For further details, see the Qubes 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed for Qubes 4.2 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed+reason%3Acompleted+milestone%3A%22Release+4.2%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+cannot+reproduce%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+declined%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+duplicate%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+not+applicable%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+self-closed%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+upstream+issue%22+).
Known issues in Qubes OS 4.2.0
DomU firewalls have completely switched to nftables. Users should add their custom rules to the custom-input and custom-forward chains. (For more information, see issues #5031 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5031) and #6062 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6062).)
Also see the full list of open bug reports affecting Qubes 4.2 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+label%3Aaffects-4.2+label%3A%22T%3A+bug%22+is%3Aopen).
We strongly recommend updating Qubes OS (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) immediately after installation in order to apply all available bug fixes.
How to get Qubes OS 4.2.0
If you don’t have Qubes OS installed, or if you’re currently on Qubes 4.0 or earlier, follow the installation guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/).
If you’re currently on Qubes 4.1, learn how to upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/).
If you’re currently on a Qubes 4.2 release candidate (RC), update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/).
In all cases, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
Reminder: new release signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/18/qubes-os-4-2-0-has-been-released/
Qubes OS 4.2.0 brings a host of new features, major improvements, and numerous bug fixes. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes OS 4.2.0?
Dom0 upgraded to Fedora 37 (#6982 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6982))
Xen upgraded to version 4.17
Default Debian template upgraded to Debian 12
Default Fedora and Debian templates use Xfce instead of GNOME (#7784 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7784))
SELinux support in Fedora templates (#4239 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4239))
Several GUI applications rewritten, including:
Applications Menu (also available as preview in R4.1) (#6665 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6665)), (#5677 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5677))
Qubes Global Settings (#6898 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6898))
Create New Qube
Qubes Update (#7443 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7443))
Unified grub.cfg location for both UEFI and legacy boot (#7985 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7985))
PipeWire support (#6358 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6358))
fwupd integration for firmware updates (#4855 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4855))
Optional automatic clipboard clearing (#3415 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3415))
Official packages built using Qubes Builder v2 (#6486 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6486))
Split GPG management in Qubes Global Settings
Qrexec services use new qrexec policy format by default (but old format is still supported) (#8000 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8000))
For further details, see the Qubes 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed for Qubes 4.2 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed+reason%3Acompleted+milestone%3A%22Release+4.2%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+cannot+reproduce%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+declined%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+duplicate%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+not+applicable%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+self-closed%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+upstream+issue%22+).
Known issues in Qubes OS 4.2.0
DomU firewalls have completely switched to nftables. Users should add their custom rules to the custom-input and custom-forward chains. (For more information, see issues #5031 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5031) and #6062 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6062).)
Also see the full list of open bug reports affecting Qubes 4.2 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+label%3Aaffects-4.2+label%3A%22T%3A+bug%22+is%3Aopen).
We strongly recommend updating Qubes OS (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) immediately after installation in order to apply all available bug fixes.
How to get Qubes OS 4.2.0
If you don’t have Qubes OS installed, or if you’re currently on Qubes 4.0 or earlier, follow the installation guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/).
If you’re currently on Qubes 4.1, learn how to upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/).
If you’re currently on a Qubes 4.2 release candidate (RC), update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/).
In all cases, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
Reminder: new release signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
👍2🎉2
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the new Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page under the Qubes OS 4.2.0-rc5 ISO.
Support for older releases
In accordance with our release support policy (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#qubes-os), Qubes 4.1 will remain supported for six months after the release of Qubes 4.2, until 2024-06-18. After that, Qubes 4.1 will no longer receive security updates or bug fixes.
Whonix templates (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes) are created and supported by our partner, the Whonix Project (https://www.whonix.org/). The Whonix Project has set its own support policy for Whonix templates in Qubes. For more information, see Qubes-Whonix version support policy (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/About#Qubes_Hosts).
Thank you to our partners, donors, contributors, and testers!
This release would not be possible without generous support from our partners (https://www.qubes-os.org/partners/) and donors (https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/), as well as contributions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/contributing/) from our active community members, especially bug reports (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/) from our testers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/). We are eternally grateful to our excellent community for making the Qubes OS Project a great example of open-source collaboration.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the new Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page under the Qubes OS 4.2.0-rc5 ISO.
Support for older releases
In accordance with our release support policy (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#qubes-os), Qubes 4.1 will remain supported for six months after the release of Qubes 4.2, until 2024-06-18. After that, Qubes 4.1 will no longer receive security updates or bug fixes.
Whonix templates (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes) are created and supported by our partner, the Whonix Project (https://www.whonix.org/). The Whonix Project has set its own support policy for Whonix templates in Qubes. For more information, see Qubes-Whonix version support policy (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/About#Qubes_Hosts).
Thank you to our partners, donors, contributors, and testers!
This release would not be possible without generous support from our partners (https://www.qubes-os.org/partners/) and donors (https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/), as well as contributions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/contributing/) from our active community members, especially bug reports (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/) from our testers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/). We are eternally grateful to our excellent community for making the Qubes OS Project a great example of open-source collaboration.
👍5👏2🍾2
Whonix 16 approaching EOL
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/22/whonix-16-approaching-eol/
Whonix 16 is currently scheduled (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/About#Qubes_Hosts) to reach EOL (end-of-life) on 2024-01-18. We strongly recommend that all Whonix users upgrade to Whonix 17 before then. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol). Please note that Whonix 17 is available only on Qubes OS 4.2.
There are three ways to upgrade to Whonix 17:
Recommended: Perform a clean installation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) of Qubes OS 4.2.0 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/18/qubes-os-4-2-0-has-been-released/), which comes with Whonix 17 templates preinstalled (if selected during installation).
Recommended: Install fresh Whonix templates to replace the existing ones. (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Install) After you install the new templates, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old templates to the new templates (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching).
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade from Whonix 16 to Whonix 17 (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Release_Upgrade_16_to_17). This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the templates, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/22/whonix-16-approaching-eol/
Whonix 16 is currently scheduled (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/About#Qubes_Hosts) to reach EOL (end-of-life) on 2024-01-18. We strongly recommend that all Whonix users upgrade to Whonix 17 before then. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol). Please note that Whonix 17 is available only on Qubes OS 4.2.
There are three ways to upgrade to Whonix 17:
Recommended: Perform a clean installation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) of Qubes OS 4.2.0 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/18/qubes-os-4-2-0-has-been-released/), which comes with Whonix 17 templates preinstalled (if selected during installation).
Recommended: Install fresh Whonix templates to replace the existing ones. (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Install) After you install the new templates, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old templates to the new templates (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching).
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade from Whonix 16 to Whonix 17 (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Release_Upgrade_16_to_17). This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the templates, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
The Star Labs StarBook is Qubes-certified!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/01/10/starlabs-starbook-qubes-certified/
It is our pleasure to announce that the Star Labs StarBook (https://starlabs.systems/pages/starbook) is officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4!
The Star Labs StarBook
The Star Labs StarBook (https://starlabs.systems/pages/starbook) is a 14-inch laptop featuring open-source coreboot and EDK II firmware. In addition, the StarBook is currently the only Qubes-certified computer with out-of-the-box support for qubes-fwupdmgr, a new feature in Qubes OS 4.2 that allows Qubes OS to securely update the computer’s firmware.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/01/10/starlabs-starbook-qubes-certified/
It is our pleasure to announce that the Star Labs StarBook (https://starlabs.systems/pages/starbook) is officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4!
The Star Labs StarBook
The Star Labs StarBook (https://starlabs.systems/pages/starbook) is a 14-inch laptop featuring open-source coreboot and EDK II firmware. In addition, the StarBook is currently the only Qubes-certified computer with out-of-the-box support for qubes-fwupdmgr, a new feature in Qubes OS 4.2 that allows Qubes OS to securely update the computer’s firmware.
🥰2
The Qubes developers have tested and certified the following StarBook configuration options for Qubes OS 4.X:
Component
Qubes-certified options
Processor
13th Generation Intel Core i3-1315U or i7-1360P
Memory
8 GB, 16 GB, 32 GB, or 64 GB RAM
Storage
512 GB, 1 TB, or 2 TB SSD
Graphics
Intel (integrated graphics)
Networking
Intel Wi-Fi 6 AX210 (no built-in wired Ethernet)
Firmware
coreboot 8.97 (2023-10-03)
Operating system
Qubes OS (pre-installation optional)
Component
Qubes-certified options
Processor
13th Generation Intel Core i3-1315U or i7-1360P
Memory
8 GB, 16 GB, 32 GB, or 64 GB RAM
Storage
512 GB, 1 TB, or 2 TB SSD
Graphics
Intel (integrated graphics)
Networking
Intel Wi-Fi 6 AX210 (no built-in wired Ethernet)
Firmware
coreboot 8.97 (2023-10-03)
Operating system
Qubes OS (pre-installation optional)
The StarBook features a true matte 14-inch IPS display at 1920x1080 full HD resolution with 400cd/m² of brightness, 178° viewing angles, and a 180° hinge. The backlit keyboard is available in US English, UK English, French, German, Nordic, and Spanish layouts.
The StarBook includes four USB ports (1x USB-C with Thunderbolt 4, 2x USB 3.0, and 1x USB 2.0), one HDMI port, a microSD slot, an audio input/output combo jack, and a DC jack for charging. For more information, see the official Star Labs StarBook (https://starlabs.systems/pages/starbook) page.
Special note regarding the need for kernel-latest on Qubes OS 4.1
Beginning with Qubes OS 4.1.2, the Qubes installer includes the kernel-latest package and allows users to select this kernel option from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. If you purchase a StarBook with Qubes OS 4.2 preinstalled, you don’t have to worry about this, as Qubes OS 4.2 is confirmed to work with the default kernel option and does not require kernel-latest. However, if you plan to install Qubes OS 4.1 on the StarBook, please be aware that you will have to select this non-default option.
About Star Labs
In short, we’re just a bunch of geeks. Back in 2016, Star Labs was formed in a pub. We all depended on using Linux, all with different laptops and all with different complaints about them. It always perplexed us that a laptop had never been made specifically for Linux. Whilst many had been “converted” to run Linux - they seldom offered the experience that macOS and Windows users had. So, after a few pints, we decided to make one. Read the full story on the Star Labs website. (https://us.starlabs.systems/pages/about-us)
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of [requirements], and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
Beginning with Qubes OS 4.1.2, the Qubes installer includes the kernel-latest package and allows users to select this kernel option from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. If you purchase a StarBook with Qubes OS 4.2 preinstalled, you don’t have to worry about this, as Qubes OS 4.2 is confirmed to work with the default kernel option and does not require kernel-latest. However, if you plan to install Qubes OS 4.1 on the StarBook, please be aware that you will have to select this non-default option.
About Star Labs
In short, we’re just a bunch of geeks. Back in 2016, Star Labs was formed in a pub. We all depended on using Linux, all with different laptops and all with different complaints about them. It always perplexed us that a laptop had never been made specifically for Linux. Whilst many had been “converted” to run Linux - they seldom offered the experience that macOS and Windows users had. So, after a few pints, we decided to make one. Read the full story on the Star Labs website. (https://us.starlabs.systems/pages/about-us)
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of [requirements], and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
🔥2
QSB-099: Qrexec policy leak via policy.RegisterArgument service
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/01/19/qsb-099/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 099: Qrexec policy leak via policy.RegisterArgument service (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Security Bulletin 099
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 099 ]===---
2024-01-19
Qrexec policy leak via policy.RegisterArgument service
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
The policy.RegisterArgument service prints the whole qrexec policy due
to a leftover debug message.
Impact
-------
A qube that is given permission to call the policy.RegisterArgument
service can learn the whole qrexec policy. The default qrexec policy
does not contain any secrets, but users can customize it to include qube
names, tag names, custom service names, and service arguments (like key
handles for the U2F/CTAP proxy).
Affected systems
-----------------
Only Qubes OS 4.2 systems in which at least one qube is allowed to use
the policy.RegisterArgument service are affected. In the default
configuration, no qube is allowed to use this service, but users who use
the U2F/CTAP proxy may enable sys-usb to use it, e.g., with the Qubes
Global Config tool's "Enable registering new keys with the U2F Proxy
service" option.
Qubes OS 4.1 is not affected.
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- qubes-core-qrexec-dom0 version 4.2.17
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Credits
--------
The issue was discovered by Ben Grande.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmWpq0cACgkQSsGN4REu
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https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/01/19/qsb-099/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 099: Qrexec policy leak via policy.RegisterArgument service (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Security Bulletin 099
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 099 ]===---
2024-01-19
Qrexec policy leak via policy.RegisterArgument service
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
The policy.RegisterArgument service prints the whole qrexec policy due
to a leftover debug message.
Impact
-------
A qube that is given permission to call the policy.RegisterArgument
service can learn the whole qrexec policy. The default qrexec policy
does not contain any secrets, but users can customize it to include qube
names, tag names, custom service names, and service arguments (like key
handles for the U2F/CTAP proxy).
Affected systems
-----------------
Only Qubes OS 4.2 systems in which at least one qube is allowed to use
the policy.RegisterArgument service are affected. In the default
configuration, no qube is allowed to use this service, but users who use
the U2F/CTAP proxy may enable sys-usb to use it, e.g., with the Qubes
Global Config tool's "Enable registering new keys with the U2F Proxy
service" option.
Qubes OS 4.1 is not affected.
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- qubes-core-qrexec-dom0 version 4.2.17
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Credits
--------
The issue was discovered by Ben Grande.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmWpq0cACgkQSsGN4REu
FJCrjBAAlnpUKfDYDYHJufXAHLmP67HW+Mo4uVSI8T3EsWNBcQVAtgFKnJLeF/3z
DjRJyM51BPSiQ0nNuIfczxNpnamOwYl8o0oepAvNuU7X6vReq9hj9iVX/UAQ8gVb
👍1
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
77Dgj88IdW6/tDQDDjqgmcoLubTQST7wf/JhoEkytLedRWtJeut1y+IpFNQ6iWgX
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AKFzbemgw2qKiQaoKfFJrWD2mUIQOGt6Lef6ROuSHHdY5+bRGdcMB0/4H4fSim92
A7gsIpbAsuCct0Th1GKawn1RZTwVPVopVCLSEV2O5aZrBQ3mfullpdbssEqA1y7m
JEAzdHWEa448WvZkLoI8BsMCvgmsB8x5CwboBZkGa/FKC1n+Lt99TMeXCEmlmhM4
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pHU3YbcdZJix2LWOMa/3eDlluguO/ez/kRTAjjv0klJPa8NazSw=
=kC92
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported