Special note regarding the need for kernel-latest on Qubes OS 4.1
Beginning with Qubes OS 4.1.2, the Qubes installer includes the kernel-latest package and allows users to select this kernel option from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. If you purchase a StarBook with Qubes OS 4.2 preinstalled, you don’t have to worry about this, as Qubes OS 4.2 is confirmed to work with the default kernel option and does not require kernel-latest. However, if you plan to install Qubes OS 4.1 on the StarBook, please be aware that you will have to select this non-default option.
About Star Labs
In short, we’re just a bunch of geeks. Back in 2016, Star Labs was formed in a pub. We all depended on using Linux, all with different laptops and all with different complaints about them. It always perplexed us that a laptop had never been made specifically for Linux. Whilst many had been “converted” to run Linux - they seldom offered the experience that macOS and Windows users had. So, after a few pints, we decided to make one. Read the full story on the Star Labs website. (https://us.starlabs.systems/pages/about-us)
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of [requirements], and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
Beginning with Qubes OS 4.1.2, the Qubes installer includes the kernel-latest package and allows users to select this kernel option from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. If you purchase a StarBook with Qubes OS 4.2 preinstalled, you don’t have to worry about this, as Qubes OS 4.2 is confirmed to work with the default kernel option and does not require kernel-latest. However, if you plan to install Qubes OS 4.1 on the StarBook, please be aware that you will have to select this non-default option.
About Star Labs
In short, we’re just a bunch of geeks. Back in 2016, Star Labs was formed in a pub. We all depended on using Linux, all with different laptops and all with different complaints about them. It always perplexed us that a laptop had never been made specifically for Linux. Whilst many had been “converted” to run Linux - they seldom offered the experience that macOS and Windows users had. So, after a few pints, we decided to make one. Read the full story on the Star Labs website. (https://us.starlabs.systems/pages/about-us)
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of [requirements], and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
🔥2
QSB-099: Qrexec policy leak via policy.RegisterArgument service
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/01/19/qsb-099/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 099: Qrexec policy leak via policy.RegisterArgument service (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Security Bulletin 099
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 099 ]===---
2024-01-19
Qrexec policy leak via policy.RegisterArgument service
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
The policy.RegisterArgument service prints the whole qrexec policy due
to a leftover debug message.
Impact
-------
A qube that is given permission to call the policy.RegisterArgument
service can learn the whole qrexec policy. The default qrexec policy
does not contain any secrets, but users can customize it to include qube
names, tag names, custom service names, and service arguments (like key
handles for the U2F/CTAP proxy).
Affected systems
-----------------
Only Qubes OS 4.2 systems in which at least one qube is allowed to use
the policy.RegisterArgument service are affected. In the default
configuration, no qube is allowed to use this service, but users who use
the U2F/CTAP proxy may enable sys-usb to use it, e.g., with the Qubes
Global Config tool's "Enable registering new keys with the U2F Proxy
service" option.
Qubes OS 4.1 is not affected.
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- qubes-core-qrexec-dom0 version 4.2.17
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Credits
--------
The issue was discovered by Ben Grande.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=Yoxz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmWpq0cACgkQSsGN4REu
FJCrjBAAlnpUKfDYDYHJufXAHLmP67HW+Mo4uVSI8T3EsWNBcQVAtgFKnJLeF/3z
DjRJyM51BPSiQ0nNuIfczxNpnamOwYl8o0oepAvNuU7X6vReq9hj9iVX/UAQ8gVb
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/01/19/qsb-099/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 099: Qrexec policy leak via policy.RegisterArgument service (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Security Bulletin 099
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 099 ]===---
2024-01-19
Qrexec policy leak via policy.RegisterArgument service
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
The policy.RegisterArgument service prints the whole qrexec policy due
to a leftover debug message.
Impact
-------
A qube that is given permission to call the policy.RegisterArgument
service can learn the whole qrexec policy. The default qrexec policy
does not contain any secrets, but users can customize it to include qube
names, tag names, custom service names, and service arguments (like key
handles for the U2F/CTAP proxy).
Affected systems
-----------------
Only Qubes OS 4.2 systems in which at least one qube is allowed to use
the policy.RegisterArgument service are affected. In the default
configuration, no qube is allowed to use this service, but users who use
the U2F/CTAP proxy may enable sys-usb to use it, e.g., with the Qubes
Global Config tool's "Enable registering new keys with the U2F Proxy
service" option.
Qubes OS 4.1 is not affected.
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- qubes-core-qrexec-dom0 version 4.2.17
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Credits
--------
The issue was discovered by Ben Grande.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=Yoxz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmWpq0cACgkQSsGN4REu
FJCrjBAAlnpUKfDYDYHJufXAHLmP67HW+Mo4uVSI8T3EsWNBcQVAtgFKnJLeF/3z
DjRJyM51BPSiQ0nNuIfczxNpnamOwYl8o0oepAvNuU7X6vReq9hj9iVX/UAQ8gVb
👍1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=kC92
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
77Dgj88IdW6/tDQDDjqgmcoLubTQST7wf/JhoEkytLedRWtJeut1y+IpFNQ6iWgX
r7Q8v3pcGgancOVQWxGW9zJ3z58FmS7g0d3w/nn/pVU5Wu9SCPQFYrrTF7CHTwIb
D0m3rpyMqe1bn6dqfENvWm6ucl+YwZdCg2kPMHR++oQAH3a9eyPzEH/9+t5AtgIH
AKFzbemgw2qKiQaoKfFJrWD2mUIQOGt6Lef6ROuSHHdY5+bRGdcMB0/4H4fSim92
A7gsIpbAsuCct0Th1GKawn1RZTwVPVopVCLSEV2O5aZrBQ3mfullpdbssEqA1y7m
JEAzdHWEa448WvZkLoI8BsMCvgmsB8x5CwboBZkGa/FKC1n+Lt99TMeXCEmlmhM4
v/d8mz2SkmWwdmuz/EjJLAdqDybwaatrivgACtukLxzZwLD+1Qz7p0bvBnwA4mo3
pHU3YbcdZJix2LWOMa/3eDlluguO/ez/kRTAjjv0klJPa8NazSw=
=kC92
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-099), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-099-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-099-2024.txt
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-099), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-099-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-099-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-099-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-099 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
👍1
QSB-100: Incorrect handling of PCI devices with phantom functions (XSA-449)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/01/30/qsb-100/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 100: Incorrect handling of PCI devices with phantom functions (XSA-449) (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Security Bulletin 100
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 100 ]===---
2024-01-30
Incorrect handling of PCI devices with phantom functions (XSA-449)
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
On 2024-01-30, the Xen Project published XSA-449, "pci: phantom
functions assigned to incorrect contexts" [3]:
| PCI devices can make use of a functionality called phantom functions,
| that when enabled allows the device to generate requests using the IDs
| of functions that are otherwise unpopulated. This allows a device to
| extend the number of outstanding requests.
|
| Such phantom functions need an IOMMU context setup, but failure to
| setup the context is not fatal when the device is assigned. Not
| failing device assignment when such failure happens can lead to the
| primary device being assigned to a guest, while some of the phantom
| functions are assigned to a different domain.
Impact
-------
The impact as described by the Xen Project:
| Under certain circumstances a malicious guest assigned a PCI device
| with phantom functions may be able to access memory from a previous
| owner of the device.
In Qubes OS this means a PCI device that should be assigned to some qube
(like sys-net or sys-usb) may retain access to dom0 memory. When that
happens, the qube to which that device is assigned can compromise the
whole system. But, a malicious qube cannot itself cause this condition,
as it happens before it is running. For such attack to be feasible, it
needs to be combined with some other method to cause PCI device
assignment to fail.
Affected systems
-----------------
All Qubes OS versions are affected. Only systems on which at lest one
passed-through PCI device has phantom functions are affected.
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.14.6-6
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.3-2
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
--------
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-449.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmW5Di0ACgkQ1lWk8hgw
4GphzQ//Ta+g8Y7Cjmx0w+byISlTHoxao0yhUcwHj11ssJfjVqf1P4TNTUuzQEae
0byIay9e2jo7y8nYKsvQ5gn7aSWHBtdw/ylwghMSuQ2iXRVKgI20Iuei1pA4H9Ct
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/01/30/qsb-100/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 100: Incorrect handling of PCI devices with phantom functions (XSA-449) (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Security Bulletin 100
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 100 ]===---
2024-01-30
Incorrect handling of PCI devices with phantom functions (XSA-449)
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
On 2024-01-30, the Xen Project published XSA-449, "pci: phantom
functions assigned to incorrect contexts" [3]:
| PCI devices can make use of a functionality called phantom functions,
| that when enabled allows the device to generate requests using the IDs
| of functions that are otherwise unpopulated. This allows a device to
| extend the number of outstanding requests.
|
| Such phantom functions need an IOMMU context setup, but failure to
| setup the context is not fatal when the device is assigned. Not
| failing device assignment when such failure happens can lead to the
| primary device being assigned to a guest, while some of the phantom
| functions are assigned to a different domain.
Impact
-------
The impact as described by the Xen Project:
| Under certain circumstances a malicious guest assigned a PCI device
| with phantom functions may be able to access memory from a previous
| owner of the device.
In Qubes OS this means a PCI device that should be assigned to some qube
(like sys-net or sys-usb) may retain access to dom0 memory. When that
happens, the qube to which that device is assigned can compromise the
whole system. But, a malicious qube cannot itself cause this condition,
as it happens before it is running. For such attack to be feasible, it
needs to be combined with some other method to cause PCI device
assignment to fail.
Affected systems
-----------------
All Qubes OS versions are affected. Only systems on which at lest one
passed-through PCI device has phantom functions are affected.
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.14.6-6
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.3-2
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
--------
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-449.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmW5Di0ACgkQ1lWk8hgw
4GphzQ//Ta+g8Y7Cjmx0w+byISlTHoxao0yhUcwHj11ssJfjVqf1P4TNTUuzQEae
0byIay9e2jo7y8nYKsvQ5gn7aSWHBtdw/ylwghMSuQ2iXRVKgI20Iuei1pA4H9Ct
👍1
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WsIOY8w+469DPt+Y2NdGH3thbtPlbJcwflRdTqq0SJ4d8IRtscOYTHsiE0+xPMgu
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H4Ninf3Tfhq4zA8bfjmxp10uI3VsYNOH3Tgv2MgmOcxsqdK6ZoA=
=/jv7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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fXXjOT8mc5B6D1kNdvHVez3Q6dKO3eTgGdUSUvmOrHYbPUeLq/E=
=LKzj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
zqHKDVGhzasVZOLgi91PcGHkvK33K8YIWCSzqWO7x6sw7+FX+9IgXciQ8gbGJcmc
eazNizU5H5NQNTMBghSswXKHMgi9ldNhfN8UL5Mnxz8RgN0xGRVmN01tOftJFvig
sBEfADIFtToEl8rh9n4AaQR+msK87sS1VYiC6k24FzzKizaFIW08jiQv9rzZST6u
YxMUXd2q64mcGzRY2QdYx/Z+07Cp3h2crLCeJXclMuD2jawBL/br/nVfdHQfqf8R
8WZUOCrlV6ekuE1L+PgSkQpOozAg4j2EDQSPYoOcrnfSuGyI08AdDl+11B4Wj1Vb
WsIOY8w+469DPt+Y2NdGH3thbtPlbJcwflRdTqq0SJ4d8IRtscOYTHsiE0+xPMgu
QGAZaK7YJg1c1rB40/dbLirG1j9+WR+JVLLVASi8S012qYZ5zeal7ZT6rG+gr8mK
H4Ninf3Tfhq4zA8bfjmxp10uI3VsYNOH3Tgv2MgmOcxsqdK6ZoA=
=/jv7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=LKzj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-100), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-100-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-100-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-100 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-100), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-100-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-100-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-100 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
XSAs released on 2024-01-30
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/05/xsas-released-on-2024-01-30/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
XSA-449 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-449.html)
See QSB-100 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/01/30/qsb-100/).
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-450 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-450.html)
Affects only builds with HVM support disabled
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/05/xsas-released-on-2024-01-30/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
XSA-449 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-449.html)
See QSB-100 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/01/30/qsb-100/).
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-450 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-450.html)
Affects only builds with HVM support disabled
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
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XSAs released on 2024-01-22
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/05/xsas-released-on-2024-01-22/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-448 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-448.html)
Denial of service (DoS) only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/05/xsas-released-on-2024-01-22/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-448 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-448.html)
Denial of service (DoS) only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
Whonix 17 templates available for Qubes OS 4.1
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/05/whonix-17-templates-available-for-qubes-os-4-1/
Until now, Whonix 17 has been available only on Qubes OS 4.2. Since Whonix 16 reached EOL (end-of-life) on 2024-01-18 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/22/whonix-16-approaching-eol/), this left users still on Qubes OS 4.1 without a supported way to use Whonix. In an effort to accommodate this group of users, the Whonix and Qubes teams have now made Whonix 17 available for Qubes OS 4.1.
There are two ways to upgrade to Whonix 17 on Qubes OS 4.1:
Recommended: Install fresh Whonix templates to replace the existing ones. (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Install) After you install the new templates, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old templates to the new templates (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching).
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade from Whonix 16 to Whonix 17 (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Release_Upgrade_16_to_17). This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the templates, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
If you wish, you also still have the option of performing a clean installation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) of Qubes OS 4.2.0 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/18/qubes-os-4-2-0-has-been-released/), which comes with Whonix 17 templates preinstalled (if selected during installation).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/05/whonix-17-templates-available-for-qubes-os-4-1/
Until now, Whonix 17 has been available only on Qubes OS 4.2. Since Whonix 16 reached EOL (end-of-life) on 2024-01-18 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/22/whonix-16-approaching-eol/), this left users still on Qubes OS 4.1 without a supported way to use Whonix. In an effort to accommodate this group of users, the Whonix and Qubes teams have now made Whonix 17 available for Qubes OS 4.1.
There are two ways to upgrade to Whonix 17 on Qubes OS 4.1:
Recommended: Install fresh Whonix templates to replace the existing ones. (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Install) After you install the new templates, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old templates to the new templates (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching).
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade from Whonix 16 to Whonix 17 (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Release_Upgrade_16_to_17). This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the templates, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
If you wish, you also still have the option of performing a clean installation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) of Qubes OS 4.2.0 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/18/qubes-os-4-2-0-has-been-released/), which comes with Whonix 17 templates preinstalled (if selected during installation).
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Fedora 39 templates available; Fedora 38 approaching EOL
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/13/fedora-39-templates-available-fedora-38-approaching-eol/
New Fedora 39 templates are now available in standard, minimal (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/minimal/), and Xfce (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/xfce/) varieties. In addition, Fedora 38 is currently scheduled (https://fedorapeople.org/groups/schedule/f-38/f-38-key-tasks.html) to reach EOL (end-of-life (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life)) on 2024-05-14 (approximately three months from now). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol).
There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/13/fedora-39-templates-available-fedora-38-approaching-eol/
New Fedora 39 templates are now available in standard, minimal (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/minimal/), and Xfce (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/xfce/) varieties. In addition, Fedora 38 is currently scheduled (https://fedorapeople.org/groups/schedule/f-38/f-38-key-tasks.html) to reach EOL (end-of-life (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life)) on 2024-05-14 (approximately three months from now). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol).
There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
XSAs released on 2024-02-27
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/27/xsas-released-on-2024-02-27/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-451 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-451.html)
Denial of service (DoS) only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/27/xsas-released-on-2024-02-27/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-451 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-451.html)
Denial of service (DoS) only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
The NitroPC Pro 2 is Qubes-certified!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/29/nitropc-pro-2-qubes-certified/
It is our pleasure to announce that the NitroPC Pro 2 (https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropc-pro-2-523) is officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4!
The NitroPC Pro 2: a secure, powerful workstation
The NitroPC Pro 2 (https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropc-pro-2-523) is a workstation for high security and performance requirements. The open-source Dasharo (https://www.dasharo.com/) coreboot (https://www.coreboot.org/) firmware ensures high transparency and security while avoiding backdoors and security holes in the firmware. The device is certified for compatibility with Qubes OS 4 by the Qubes developers. Carefully selected components ensure high performance, stability, and durability. The Dasharo Entry Subnoscription guarantees continuous firmware development and fast firmware updates.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/29/nitropc-pro-2-qubes-certified/
It is our pleasure to announce that the NitroPC Pro 2 (https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropc-pro-2-523) is officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4!
The NitroPC Pro 2: a secure, powerful workstation
The NitroPC Pro 2 (https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropc-pro-2-523) is a workstation for high security and performance requirements. The open-source Dasharo (https://www.dasharo.com/) coreboot (https://www.coreboot.org/) firmware ensures high transparency and security while avoiding backdoors and security holes in the firmware. The device is certified for compatibility with Qubes OS 4 by the Qubes developers. Carefully selected components ensure high performance, stability, and durability. The Dasharo Entry Subnoscription guarantees continuous firmware development and fast firmware updates.
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Here’s a summary of the main component options available for this mid-tower desktop PC:
Component
Options
Motherboard
MSI PRO Z790-P DDR5 (Wi-Fi optional)
Processor
14th Generation Intel Core i5-14600K or i9-14900K
Memory
16 GB to 128 GB DDR5
NVMe storage (optional)
Up to two NVMe PCIe 4.0 x4 SSDs, up to 2 TB each
SATA storage (optional)
Up to two SATA SSDs, up to 7.68 TB each
Wireless (optional)
Wi-Fi 6E, 2400 Mbps, 802.11/a/b/g/n/ac/ax, Bluetooth 5.2
Operating system (optional)
Qubes OS 4.2 or Ubuntu 22.04 LTS
Of special note for Qubes users, the NitroPC Pro 2 features a combined PS/2 port that supports both a PS/2 keyboard and a PS/2 mouse simultaneously with a Y-cable (not included). This allows for full control of dom0 without the need for USB keyboard or mouse passthrough. Nitrokey also offers a special tamper-evident shipping method for an additional fee. With this option, the case screws will be individually sealed and photographed, and the NitroPC Pro 2 will be packed inside a sealed bag. Photographs of the seals will be sent to you by email, which you can use to determine whether the case was opened during transit.
Important note: When configuring your NitroPC Pro 2 on the Nitrokey website, there is an option for a discrete graphics card (e.g., Nvidia GeForce RTX 4070 or 4090) in addition to integrated graphics (e.g., Intel UHD 770, which is always included because it is physically built into the CPU). NitroPC Pro 2 configurations that include discrete graphics cards are not Qubes-certified. The only NitroPC Pro 2 configurations that are Qubes-certified are those that contain only integrated graphics.
The NitroPC Pro 2 also comes with a “Dasharo Entry Subnoscription,” which includes the following:
Accesses to the latest firmware releases
Exclusive newsletter
Special updates, including early access to updates enhancing privacy, security, performance, and compatibility
Early access to new firmware releases for newly-supported desktop platforms (https://docs.dasharo.com/variants/overview/#desktop) (please see the roadmap (https://github.com/Dasharo/presentations/blob/main/dasharo_roadmap.md#dasharo-desktop-roadmap))
Access to the Dasharo Premier Support invite-only live chat channel on the Matrix network, allowing direct access to the Dasharo Team and fellow subscribers with personalized and priority assistance
Insider’s view and influence on the Dasharo feature roadmap for a real impact on Dasharo development
Dasharo Tools Suite Entry Subnoscription (https://docs.dasharo.com/osf-trivia-list/dts/#what-is-dasharo-tools-suite-supporters-entrance) keys
For further product details, please see the official NitroPC Pro 2 (https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropc-pro-2-523) page.
Special note regarding the need for kernel-latest on Qubes 4.1
Beginning with Qubes OS 4.1.2, the Qubes installer includes the kernel-latest package and allows users to select this kernel option from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. At the time of this announcement, kernel-latest is required for the NitroPC Pro’s graphics drivers to function properly on Qubes OS 4.1. It is not required on Qubes OS 4.2. Therefore, potential purchasers and users of this model who intend to run Qubes 4.1 should be aware that they will have to select a non-default option (Install Qubes OS RX using kernel-latest) from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. However, since Linux 6.1 has officially been promoted to being a long-term support (LTS) kernel, it will become the default kernel at some point, which means that the need for this non-default selection is only temporary.
About Nitrokey
Component
Options
Motherboard
MSI PRO Z790-P DDR5 (Wi-Fi optional)
Processor
14th Generation Intel Core i5-14600K or i9-14900K
Memory
16 GB to 128 GB DDR5
NVMe storage (optional)
Up to two NVMe PCIe 4.0 x4 SSDs, up to 2 TB each
SATA storage (optional)
Up to two SATA SSDs, up to 7.68 TB each
Wireless (optional)
Wi-Fi 6E, 2400 Mbps, 802.11/a/b/g/n/ac/ax, Bluetooth 5.2
Operating system (optional)
Qubes OS 4.2 or Ubuntu 22.04 LTS
Of special note for Qubes users, the NitroPC Pro 2 features a combined PS/2 port that supports both a PS/2 keyboard and a PS/2 mouse simultaneously with a Y-cable (not included). This allows for full control of dom0 without the need for USB keyboard or mouse passthrough. Nitrokey also offers a special tamper-evident shipping method for an additional fee. With this option, the case screws will be individually sealed and photographed, and the NitroPC Pro 2 will be packed inside a sealed bag. Photographs of the seals will be sent to you by email, which you can use to determine whether the case was opened during transit.
Important note: When configuring your NitroPC Pro 2 on the Nitrokey website, there is an option for a discrete graphics card (e.g., Nvidia GeForce RTX 4070 or 4090) in addition to integrated graphics (e.g., Intel UHD 770, which is always included because it is physically built into the CPU). NitroPC Pro 2 configurations that include discrete graphics cards are not Qubes-certified. The only NitroPC Pro 2 configurations that are Qubes-certified are those that contain only integrated graphics.
The NitroPC Pro 2 also comes with a “Dasharo Entry Subnoscription,” which includes the following:
Accesses to the latest firmware releases
Exclusive newsletter
Special updates, including early access to updates enhancing privacy, security, performance, and compatibility
Early access to new firmware releases for newly-supported desktop platforms (https://docs.dasharo.com/variants/overview/#desktop) (please see the roadmap (https://github.com/Dasharo/presentations/blob/main/dasharo_roadmap.md#dasharo-desktop-roadmap))
Access to the Dasharo Premier Support invite-only live chat channel on the Matrix network, allowing direct access to the Dasharo Team and fellow subscribers with personalized and priority assistance
Insider’s view and influence on the Dasharo feature roadmap for a real impact on Dasharo development
Dasharo Tools Suite Entry Subnoscription (https://docs.dasharo.com/osf-trivia-list/dts/#what-is-dasharo-tools-suite-supporters-entrance) keys
For further product details, please see the official NitroPC Pro 2 (https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropc-pro-2-523) page.
Special note regarding the need for kernel-latest on Qubes 4.1
Beginning with Qubes OS 4.1.2, the Qubes installer includes the kernel-latest package and allows users to select this kernel option from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. At the time of this announcement, kernel-latest is required for the NitroPC Pro’s graphics drivers to function properly on Qubes OS 4.1. It is not required on Qubes OS 4.2. Therefore, potential purchasers and users of this model who intend to run Qubes 4.1 should be aware that they will have to select a non-default option (Install Qubes OS RX using kernel-latest) from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. However, since Linux 6.1 has officially been promoted to being a long-term support (LTS) kernel, it will become the default kernel at some point, which means that the need for this non-default selection is only temporary.
About Nitrokey
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Nitrokey (https://www.nitrokey.com/) is a world-leading company in open-source security hardware. Nitrokey develops IT security hardware for data encryption, key management and user authentication, as well as secure network devices, PCs, laptops, and smartphones. The company was founded in Berlin, Germany in 2015 and already counts tens of thousands of users from more than 120 countries, including numerous well-known international enterprises from various industries, among its customers. Learn more. (https://www.nitrokey.com/about)
About Dasharo
“Dasharo is an open-source firmware distribution focusing on seamless deployment, clean and simple code, long-term maintenance, professional support, transparent validation, superior documentation, privacy-respecting implementation, liberty for the owners and trustworthiness for all.” —the Dasharo documentation (https://docs.dasharo.com/)
Dasharo (https://www.dasharo.com/) is a registered trademark of and a product developed by 3mdeb (https://3mdeb.com/).
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of [requirements], and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
About Dasharo
“Dasharo is an open-source firmware distribution focusing on seamless deployment, clean and simple code, long-term maintenance, professional support, transparent validation, superior documentation, privacy-respecting implementation, liberty for the owners and trustworthiness for all.” —the Dasharo documentation (https://docs.dasharo.com/)
Dasharo (https://www.dasharo.com/) is a registered trademark of and a product developed by 3mdeb (https://3mdeb.com/).
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of [requirements], and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.