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XSAs released on 2024-05-07
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/05/08/xsas-released-on-2024-05-07/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-457 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-457.html)
Denial of service (DoS) only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/05/08/xsas-released-on-2024-05-07/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-457 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-457.html)
Denial of service (DoS) only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
👍1
Qubes OS 4.1 to receive extended security support until 2024-07-31
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/05/10/qubes-os-4-1-to-receive-extended-support-until-2024-07-31/
Qubes OS 4.1 will reach official end-of-life (EOL) on 2024-06-18. After this date, Qubes OS 4.1 will continue to receive extended security support until 2024-07-31. This security support extension is sponsored by Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) (https://freedom.press/) in support of the SecureDrop (https://securedrop.org/) project.
What’s happening?
According to the Qubes OS Project’s release support policy (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/), Qubes OS releases are supported for six months after each subsequent major or minor release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/). This means that Qubes 4.1 will reach EOL six months after Qubes 4.2 was released. Since Qubes 4.2 was released (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/18/qubes-os-4-2-0-has-been-released/) on 2023-12-18, Qubes 4.1 is scheduled (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/03/26/qubes-os-4-1-reaches-eol-on-2024-06-18/) to reach EOL six months later on 2024-06-18.
SecureDrop (https://securedrop.org/) currently relies on Qubes 4.1 for the SecureDrop Workstation (https://workstation.securedrop.org/). To allow for additional time to ensure full compatibility of the SecureDrop Workstation with Qubes 4.2, and to help existing users migrate, FPF has offered to sponsor an extension of post-EOL Qubes 4.1 security support until 2024-07-31, and the Qubes OS Project has agreed.
What does extended security support cover?
The Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) will continue to publish Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/) and release security updates for security vulnerabilities affecting Qubes 4.1, as it deems appropriate, until 2024-07-31. Extended security support does not cover regular bug fixes, improvements, or the implementation of new features.
In short, if you currently have a Qubes 4.1 installation that serves your needs, you may safely continue to use it until 2024-07-31, but we strongly recommend upgrading to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/) by that date.
What’s involved in extending security support for Qubes 4.1?
Extending support for a Qubes release is more challenging than it might seem on the surface. Here are some of the main considerations involved:
Xen support: Official support for Xen 4.14 has already ended, which means that backporting Xen-related security fixes will require more work than usual.
Template support: Qubes 4.1 supports Debian 11, which has quite old software. This is known to cause problems and to require workarounds (e.g., with salt and app-u2f). There will be no Fedora 40 template for Qubes 4.1, but that’s okay since Fedora 39 doesn’t reach EOL until November.
Other dom0 software: Qubes 4.1’s dom0 is based on Fedora 32, which is now quite old. If we end up having to backport any fixes here (e.g., due to an RPM or GPG bug), it may be quite complicated.
Whonix support: Any extension of the support period for a Qubes release must also take into consideration Whonix support. Previously, Whonix 16 reached EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/22/whonix-16-approaching-eol/) even though Qubes 4.1 has not yet reached EOL. Whonix 17 did not support Qubes 4.1 at the time, which meant users on Qubes 4.1 were at risk of being left without any supported way to continue using Whonix. The Whonix and Qubes teams successfully bridged this gap by making Whonix 17 available on Qubes 4.1 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/05/whonix-17-templates-available-for-qubes-os-4-1/). Now, Qubes 4.1 will receive extended security support, which will require a commensurate extension of security support for Whonix 17 on Qubes 4.1. FPF and the Whonix Project have arranged for the required Whonix 17 support extension to be included
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/05/10/qubes-os-4-1-to-receive-extended-support-until-2024-07-31/
Qubes OS 4.1 will reach official end-of-life (EOL) on 2024-06-18. After this date, Qubes OS 4.1 will continue to receive extended security support until 2024-07-31. This security support extension is sponsored by Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) (https://freedom.press/) in support of the SecureDrop (https://securedrop.org/) project.
What’s happening?
According to the Qubes OS Project’s release support policy (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/), Qubes OS releases are supported for six months after each subsequent major or minor release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/). This means that Qubes 4.1 will reach EOL six months after Qubes 4.2 was released. Since Qubes 4.2 was released (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/18/qubes-os-4-2-0-has-been-released/) on 2023-12-18, Qubes 4.1 is scheduled (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/03/26/qubes-os-4-1-reaches-eol-on-2024-06-18/) to reach EOL six months later on 2024-06-18.
SecureDrop (https://securedrop.org/) currently relies on Qubes 4.1 for the SecureDrop Workstation (https://workstation.securedrop.org/). To allow for additional time to ensure full compatibility of the SecureDrop Workstation with Qubes 4.2, and to help existing users migrate, FPF has offered to sponsor an extension of post-EOL Qubes 4.1 security support until 2024-07-31, and the Qubes OS Project has agreed.
What does extended security support cover?
The Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) will continue to publish Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/) and release security updates for security vulnerabilities affecting Qubes 4.1, as it deems appropriate, until 2024-07-31. Extended security support does not cover regular bug fixes, improvements, or the implementation of new features.
In short, if you currently have a Qubes 4.1 installation that serves your needs, you may safely continue to use it until 2024-07-31, but we strongly recommend upgrading to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/) by that date.
What’s involved in extending security support for Qubes 4.1?
Extending support for a Qubes release is more challenging than it might seem on the surface. Here are some of the main considerations involved:
Xen support: Official support for Xen 4.14 has already ended, which means that backporting Xen-related security fixes will require more work than usual.
Template support: Qubes 4.1 supports Debian 11, which has quite old software. This is known to cause problems and to require workarounds (e.g., with salt and app-u2f). There will be no Fedora 40 template for Qubes 4.1, but that’s okay since Fedora 39 doesn’t reach EOL until November.
Other dom0 software: Qubes 4.1’s dom0 is based on Fedora 32, which is now quite old. If we end up having to backport any fixes here (e.g., due to an RPM or GPG bug), it may be quite complicated.
Whonix support: Any extension of the support period for a Qubes release must also take into consideration Whonix support. Previously, Whonix 16 reached EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/22/whonix-16-approaching-eol/) even though Qubes 4.1 has not yet reached EOL. Whonix 17 did not support Qubes 4.1 at the time, which meant users on Qubes 4.1 were at risk of being left without any supported way to continue using Whonix. The Whonix and Qubes teams successfully bridged this gap by making Whonix 17 available on Qubes 4.1 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/02/05/whonix-17-templates-available-for-qubes-os-4-1/). Now, Qubes 4.1 will receive extended security support, which will require a commensurate extension of security support for Whonix 17 on Qubes 4.1. FPF and the Whonix Project have arranged for the required Whonix 17 support extension to be included
❤1
with the Qubes 4.1 extension, so Whonix 17 security support on Qubes 4.1 will continue until 2024-07-31.
Debian 11 (Bullseye) approaching EOL
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/05/22/debian-11-approaching-eol/
The Debian Project currently estimates (https://wiki.debian.org/DebianReleases) that Debian 11 (Bullseye) will reach EOL (end-of-life) sometime around July 2024 (approximately two months from now). Please upgrade all of your Debian 11 templates and standalones to Debian 12 (Bookworm) (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/08/27/debian-12-templates-available/) by then. For general information about upgrading, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol).
There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Debian release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace the existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/debian/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. In the old Debian template, see /var/log/dpkg.log and /var/log/apt/history.log for logs of package manager actions.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Debian template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/debian/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Note on Qubes 4.2
Please note that Qubes 4.2 does not support Debian 11 templates (see Supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#templates) and Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/#notes)). If you have any Debian 11 templates on Qubes 4.2 (e.g., as a result of upgrading from Qubes 4.1), please upgrade them to Debian 12 immediately.
Note on Debian LTS
Debian releases have two EOL dates: regular and long-term support (LTS) (https://wiki.debian.org/LTS). See Debian Production Releases (https://wiki.debian.org/DebianReleases#Production_Releases) for a chart that illustrates this. Qubes OS support for Debian templates ends at the regular EOL date, not the LTS EOL date.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/05/22/debian-11-approaching-eol/
The Debian Project currently estimates (https://wiki.debian.org/DebianReleases) that Debian 11 (Bullseye) will reach EOL (end-of-life) sometime around July 2024 (approximately two months from now). Please upgrade all of your Debian 11 templates and standalones to Debian 12 (Bookworm) (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/08/27/debian-12-templates-available/) by then. For general information about upgrading, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol).
There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Debian release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace the existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/debian/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. In the old Debian template, see /var/log/dpkg.log and /var/log/apt/history.log for logs of package manager actions.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Debian template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/debian/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Note on Qubes 4.2
Please note that Qubes 4.2 does not support Debian 11 templates (see Supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#templates) and Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/#notes)). If you have any Debian 11 templates on Qubes 4.2 (e.g., as a result of upgrading from Qubes 4.1), please upgrade them to Debian 12 immediately.
Note on Debian LTS
Debian releases have two EOL dates: regular and long-term support (LTS) (https://wiki.debian.org/LTS). See Debian Production Releases (https://wiki.debian.org/DebianReleases#Production_Releases) for a chart that illustrates this. Qubes OS support for Debian templates ends at the regular EOL date, not the LTS EOL date.
👍4
[Video] Marta Marczykowska-Górecka's Prototype Fund project: Streamlining Qubes OS device management (youtube.com)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/10/marta-marczykowska-goreckas-prototype-fund-project-streamlining-qubes-os-device-management/
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/10/marta-marczykowska-goreckas-prototype-fund-project-streamlining-qubes-os-device-management/
Fedora 40 templates available
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/12/fedora-40-templates-available/
New Fedora 40 templates are now available for Qubes OS 4.2 in standard, minimal (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/minimal/), and Xfce (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/xfce/) varieties. There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Please note:
This announcement concerns only Qubes 4.2. Fedora 40 templates will not be available for Qubes 4.1.
No user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/12/fedora-40-templates-available/
New Fedora 40 templates are now available for Qubes OS 4.2 in standard, minimal (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/minimal/), and Xfce (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/xfce/) varieties. There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Please note:
This announcement concerns only Qubes 4.2. Fedora 40 templates will not be available for Qubes 4.1.
No user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
Qubes Canary 039
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/14/canary-039/
We have published Qubes Canary 039 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-039-2024.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 039
---===[ Qubes Canary 039 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is June 14, 2024.
2. There have been 102 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of September 2024. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
Beginning with Qubes OS 4.3, there will be a new release signing key
(RSK) [3] for every new major and minor Qubes OS release. [4] Until now,
our policy has been to have one RSK for every major release (e.g., a
single RSK for the entire Qubes OS 4 release series, beginning with
Qubes OS 4.0). [5] Under the new policy, in addition to creating a new
RSK for every major release (e.g., 4.0), we will also create a new RSK
for every minor release (e.g., 4.3). Patch releases (e.g., 4.0.4 and
4.3.1) will use the same RSKs as their respective major and minor
releases. (For example, 4.0.4 would use the 4.0 RSK, while 4.3.1 would
use the 4.3 RSK.)
We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since it
constitutes a change in our RSK management policy. The goal of this
change is to reduce the scope and duration for which RSKs are used,
which is a good key management practice in general. Creating a new RSK
for each new major and minor release is technically and organizationally
easy to implement, unlike, for example, a time-based scheme, which could
require rotating keys mid-release.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Fri, 14 Jun 2024 00:34:33 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
My Jewish Family History: The Optimists Ended Up in Auschwitz
Fortress Europe: Migrants Abandoned on the Edge of the Sahara
Israel-Gaza-War: Why the Founder of Human Rights Watch Accuses Israel of Genocide
Populist Push: Europe's Right Wing Eyes a Post-Election Alliance
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/14/canary-039/
We have published Qubes Canary 039 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-039-2024.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 039
---===[ Qubes Canary 039 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is June 14, 2024.
2. There have been 102 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of September 2024. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
Beginning with Qubes OS 4.3, there will be a new release signing key
(RSK) [3] for every new major and minor Qubes OS release. [4] Until now,
our policy has been to have one RSK for every major release (e.g., a
single RSK for the entire Qubes OS 4 release series, beginning with
Qubes OS 4.0). [5] Under the new policy, in addition to creating a new
RSK for every major release (e.g., 4.0), we will also create a new RSK
for every minor release (e.g., 4.3). Patch releases (e.g., 4.0.4 and
4.3.1) will use the same RSKs as their respective major and minor
releases. (For example, 4.0.4 would use the 4.0 RSK, while 4.3.1 would
use the 4.3 RSK.)
We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since it
constitutes a change in our RSK management policy. The goal of this
change is to reduce the scope and duration for which RSKs are used,
which is a good key management practice in general. Creating a new RSK
for each new major and minor release is technically and organizationally
easy to implement, unlike, for example, a time-based scheme, which could
require rotating keys mid-release.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Fri, 14 Jun 2024 00:34:33 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
My Jewish Family History: The Optimists Ended Up in Auschwitz
Fortress Europe: Migrants Abandoned on the Edge of the Sahara
Israel-Gaza-War: Why the Founder of Human Rights Watch Accuses Israel of Genocide
Populist Push: Europe's Right Wing Eyes a Post-Election Alliance
Rwanda Classified: Europe's Deals with an Autocrat
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Middle East Crisis: Hezbollah Again Fires Rockets Into Northern Israel as Border Clashes Intensify
G7 Leaders Agree on Plan for $50 Billion Loan to Ukraine
Blinken Calls Hamas Changes to Gaza Cease-Fire Proposal Unworkable
What We Know About the U.N. Report on Israeli and Palestinian War Crimes
G7 Leaders Gather in Italy to Discuss an Unruly World
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Tesla investors back record-breaking Musk pay deal
G7 agrees $50bn loan for Ukraine from Russian assets
Supreme Court rejects challenge to restrict abortion drug access
Trump visits Capitol Hill for first time since Jan 6 riot
S Africa's ANC edging closer to forming unity government
Source: Blockchain.info
000000000000000000020b40ab12d314b072eff36605e539ebb09c7c57f89242
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
[3] For a guide to release signing keys (RSKs), see:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys
[4] For an explanation of Qubes OS release versioning, see:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/
[5] As explained in the special announcement in Qubes Canary 032
(https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/), the creation
of a new RSK for Qubes OS 4.2 was an exception to the RSK policy at
the time.
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-039-2024.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=/rjJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-039-2024.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=X479
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Middle East Crisis: Hezbollah Again Fires Rockets Into Northern Israel as Border Clashes Intensify
G7 Leaders Agree on Plan for $50 Billion Loan to Ukraine
Blinken Calls Hamas Changes to Gaza Cease-Fire Proposal Unworkable
What We Know About the U.N. Report on Israeli and Palestinian War Crimes
G7 Leaders Gather in Italy to Discuss an Unruly World
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Tesla investors back record-breaking Musk pay deal
G7 agrees $50bn loan for Ukraine from Russian assets
Supreme Court rejects challenge to restrict abortion drug access
Trump visits Capitol Hill for first time since Jan 6 riot
S Africa's ANC edging closer to forming unity government
Source: Blockchain.info
000000000000000000020b40ab12d314b072eff36605e539ebb09c7c57f89242
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
[3] For a guide to release signing keys (RSKs), see:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys
[4] For an explanation of Qubes OS release versioning, see:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/
[5] As explained in the special announcement in Qubes Canary 032
(https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/), the creation
of a new RSK for Qubes OS 4.2 was an exception to the RSK policy at
the time.
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-039-2024.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=/rjJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-039-2024.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmZrpvMACgkQSsGN4REu
FJD2OA/+KdS9ISdQpTi1KcaWxGhSsWmAQ2rw4vrNEq9+gbLeW+T273APfC8dJHuT
v4kULjV1QcmQG4QYUsIDRovJt2/FkkzN3dclLBu4c4ROAToxQ29Qiz0IIhBx17Tz
FHBRuXgTCzxzI6UR0lwgfZP8wAmkBCoRTCaaB9gINgGomGBF8Af7/+wf7oXPTEBA
eZ7RnPNeGSCCsFgNBhMriIrdfM9oUxhIo351E14j6CJ7HgJ9APOm0uCSEFkZMH6J
zMfgkGn+++4Wuk/GamOK6fqZLl8OUilmfk5cG8iSQLgEs8mFX645Br5w7fYgZLzs
TyvxsTng8ttIGW/1JtKHhyalWJmJWeg0PgOyOG/k9KpLFkkVUtEdGmrf4Ztoy6dz
2qs9fCT5TMnQJqy9gZRjSn+qShONlwS1ykg2cMceAG7DpQQUWFUMidCFXbVVo+H5
GYtB8eVp8KGn3wYNNLQnwj/2SKogNdJTJ7p/5KsQzbMt1xJhnI14ITom/+1AqkeV
E43QcC+S6zSeKIheitYaTamx5J1RWjkoAGhHpGIQ5Mhz2hvqjW6XeTQGwKtQNSTu
Ha2o5+VuETu74r1xQ8v8miFwkQ97yu2c0fvPWigg0jOv8TwTrr7mCDVO5E9RfbX6
/1by9cYhGFCNVp0TNhEZUqtFYMaTawsyYr+bAvH4XBTGGCBpzzk=
=X479
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-039-2024.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?
Canaries provide an important indication about the security status of the project. If the canary is healthy, it’s a strong sign that things are running normally. However, if the canary is unhealthy, it could mean that the project or its members are being coerced in some way.
What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?
Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Every canary contains the same set of statements (sometimes along with special announcements, which are not the same in every canary). If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.
Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?
No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?
Canaries provide an important indication about the security status of the project. If the canary is healthy, it’s a strong sign that things are running normally. However, if the canary is unhealthy, it could mean that the project or its members are being coerced in some way.
What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?
Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Every canary contains the same set of statements (sometimes along with special announcements, which are not the same in every canary). If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.
Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?
No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).
In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it, you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all canaries so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether canaries are genuine. The only way to be certain that a canary is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?
If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced. Falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).
In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it, you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all canaries so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether canaries are genuine. The only way to be certain that a canary is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?
If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced. Falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
👍1
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (Qubes Canary 039), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify canary-039-2024.txt.sig.marmarek canary-039-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-039-2024.txt.sig.simon canary-039-2024.txt
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (Qubes Canary 039), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify canary-039-2024.txt.sig.marmarek canary-039-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-039-2024.txt.sig.simon canary-039-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 039 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
[Video] Marek Marczykowski-Górecki: Linux Stubdomains Status Update (youtube.com)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/15/marek-marczykowski-gorecki-linux-stubdomains-status-update/
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/15/marek-marczykowski-gorecki-linux-stubdomains-status-update/
[Video] Marek Marczykowski-Górecki: Host and Guest Suspend Under Xen - S3 and S0ix (youtube.com)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/15/marek-marczykowski-gorecki-host-and-guest-suspend-under-xen-s3-and-s0ix/
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/15/marek-marczykowski-gorecki-host-and-guest-suspend-under-xen-s3-and-s0ix/
[Video] Demi Marie Obenour: Reasonably Secure GPU Acceleration (youtube.com)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/15/demi-marie-obenour-reasonably-secure-gpu-acceleration/
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/15/demi-marie-obenour-reasonably-secure-gpu-acceleration/
👍3🔥2
Qubes OS 4.1 has reached end-of-life; extended security support continues until 2024-07-31
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/03/26/qubes-os-4-1-reaches-eol-on-2024-06-18/), the Qubes OS 4.1 release series has officially reached end-of-life (EOL) as of today, 2024-06-18. However, Qubes OS 4.1 will continue to receive extended security support until 2024-07-31 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/05/10/qubes-os-4-1-to-receive-extended-support-until-2024-07-31/). We recommend that all remaining Qubes 4.1 users upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/) at this time.
Recommended actions
If you’re already using Qubes 4.2, then you don’t have to do anything. This announcement doesn’t affect you.
If you’re still using Qubes 4.1, then you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 at your earliest convenience but no later than 2024-07-31. There are two ways to do this:
Perform a clean reinstallation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) using the latest stable Qubes OS 4.2.1 ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/).
Perform an in-place upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/#in-place-upgrade).
Both of these options are covered in further detail in the Qubes 4.1 to 4.2 upgrade guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/). In either case, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand. If you need help, please consult our help and support (https://www.qubes-os.org/support/) page.
What does end-of-life (EOL) mean?
When a Qubes OS release reaches end-of-life (EOL), it is no longer supported. In the case of Qubes 4.1, this means that enhancements will no longer be added and non-security bugs will no longer be fixed. Security bugs will still be fixed until 2024-07-31, since Qubes 4.1 has extended security support (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/05/10/qubes-os-4-1-to-receive-extended-support-until-2024-07-31/) until then. After 2024-07-31, Qubes 4.1 will no longer have security support either, which means that it will not be supported at all.
What is extended security support?
Extended security support means that the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) will continue to publish Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/) and release security updates for security vulnerabilities affecting Qubes 4.1, as it deems appropriate, until 2024-07-31. Extended security support does not cover regular bug fixes, improvements, or the implementation of new features.
What about patch releases?
The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... When a major or minor release reaches EOL, all of its patch releases also reach EOL. For example, in this case, when we say that “Qubes 4.1” (without specifying a number) has reached EOL, we’re specifying a particular minor release inclusive of all patch releases within it. This means that Qubes 4.1.0, 4.1.1, and 4.1.2 have all reached EOL, since they are all patch releases of the same minor release.
How are EOL dates determined?
According to our support policy (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/), stable Qubes OS releases are supported for six months after each subsequent major or minor release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/). This means that the EOL date for Qubes 4.1 was set at the time Qubes 4.2 was released by adding six months to the Qubes 4.2 release date. Qubes 4.2.0 was released on 2023-12-18 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/18/qubes-os-4-2-0-has-been-released/). Adding six months to this date gives us 2024-06-18, which is Qubes 4.1’s EOL date.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/03/26/qubes-os-4-1-reaches-eol-on-2024-06-18/), the Qubes OS 4.1 release series has officially reached end-of-life (EOL) as of today, 2024-06-18. However, Qubes OS 4.1 will continue to receive extended security support until 2024-07-31 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/05/10/qubes-os-4-1-to-receive-extended-support-until-2024-07-31/). We recommend that all remaining Qubes 4.1 users upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/) at this time.
Recommended actions
If you’re already using Qubes 4.2, then you don’t have to do anything. This announcement doesn’t affect you.
If you’re still using Qubes 4.1, then you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 at your earliest convenience but no later than 2024-07-31. There are two ways to do this:
Perform a clean reinstallation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) using the latest stable Qubes OS 4.2.1 ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/).
Perform an in-place upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/#in-place-upgrade).
Both of these options are covered in further detail in the Qubes 4.1 to 4.2 upgrade guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/). In either case, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand. If you need help, please consult our help and support (https://www.qubes-os.org/support/) page.
What does end-of-life (EOL) mean?
When a Qubes OS release reaches end-of-life (EOL), it is no longer supported. In the case of Qubes 4.1, this means that enhancements will no longer be added and non-security bugs will no longer be fixed. Security bugs will still be fixed until 2024-07-31, since Qubes 4.1 has extended security support (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/05/10/qubes-os-4-1-to-receive-extended-support-until-2024-07-31/) until then. After 2024-07-31, Qubes 4.1 will no longer have security support either, which means that it will not be supported at all.
What is extended security support?
Extended security support means that the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) will continue to publish Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/) and release security updates for security vulnerabilities affecting Qubes 4.1, as it deems appropriate, until 2024-07-31. Extended security support does not cover regular bug fixes, improvements, or the implementation of new features.
What about patch releases?
The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... When a major or minor release reaches EOL, all of its patch releases also reach EOL. For example, in this case, when we say that “Qubes 4.1” (without specifying a number) has reached EOL, we’re specifying a particular minor release inclusive of all patch releases within it. This means that Qubes 4.1.0, 4.1.1, and 4.1.2 have all reached EOL, since they are all patch releases of the same minor release.
How are EOL dates determined?
According to our support policy (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/), stable Qubes OS releases are supported for six months after each subsequent major or minor release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/). This means that the EOL date for Qubes 4.1 was set at the time Qubes 4.2 was released by adding six months to the Qubes 4.2 release date. Qubes 4.2.0 was released on 2023-12-18 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/12/18/qubes-os-4-2-0-has-been-released/). Adding six months to this date gives us 2024-06-18, which is Qubes 4.1’s EOL date.
Qubes OS 4.2.2-rc1 is available for testing
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/27/qubes-os-4-2-2-rc1-available-for-testing/
We’re pleased to announce that the first release candidate (RC) for Qubes OS 4.2.2 is now available for testing. This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.2?
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
Included Fedora template upgraded from Fedora 39 to 40
Fixed #8332: File-copy qrexec service is overly restrictive (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8332) (see below)
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed+reason%3Acompleted+closed%3A2024-03-26..2024-06-23+-label%3A%22R%3A+cannot+reproduce%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+declined%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+duplicate%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+not+applicable%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+self-closed%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+upstream+issue%22).
Copying and moving files between qubes is less restrictive
Qubes 4.2.2 includes a fix for #8332: File-copy qrexec service is overly restrictive (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8332). As explained in the issue comments, we introduced a change in Qubes 4.2.0 that caused inter-qube file-copy/move actions to reject filenames containing, e.g., non-Latin characters and certain symbols. The rationale for this change was to mitigate the security risks associated with unusual unicode characters and invalid encoding in filenames, which some software might handle in an unsafe manner and which might cause confusion for users. Such a change represents a trade-off between security and usability.
After the change went live, we received several user reports indicating more severe usability problems than we had anticipated. Moreover, these problems were prompting users to resort to dangerous workarounds (such as packing files into an archive format prior to copying) that carry far more risk than the original risk posed by the unrestricted filenames. In addition, we realized that this was a backward-incompatible change that should not have been introduced in a minor release in the first place.
Therefore, we have decided, for the time being, to restore the original (pre-4.2) behavior by introducing a new allow-all-names argument for the qubes.Filecopy service. By default, qvm-copy and similar tools will use this less restrictive service (qubes.Filecopy+allow-all-names) whenever they detect any files that would be have been blocked by the more restrictive service (qubes.Filecopy+). If no such files are detected, they will use the more restrictive service.
Users who wish to opt for the more restrictive 4.2.0 and 4.2.1 behavior can do so by modifying their RPC policy rules. To switch a single rule to the more restrictive behavior, change * in the argument column to + (i.e., change “any argument” to “only empty”). To use the more restrictive behavior globally, add a “deny” rule for qubes.Filecopy+allow-all-names before all other relevant rules. For more information, see RPC policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/rpc-policy/) and Qube configuration interface (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vm-interface/#qubes-rpc).
When is the stable release?
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/27/qubes-os-4-2-2-rc1-available-for-testing/
We’re pleased to announce that the first release candidate (RC) for Qubes OS 4.2.2 is now available for testing. This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.2?
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
Included Fedora template upgraded from Fedora 39 to 40
Fixed #8332: File-copy qrexec service is overly restrictive (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8332) (see below)
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed+reason%3Acompleted+closed%3A2024-03-26..2024-06-23+-label%3A%22R%3A+cannot+reproduce%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+declined%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+duplicate%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+not+applicable%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+self-closed%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+upstream+issue%22).
Copying and moving files between qubes is less restrictive
Qubes 4.2.2 includes a fix for #8332: File-copy qrexec service is overly restrictive (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8332). As explained in the issue comments, we introduced a change in Qubes 4.2.0 that caused inter-qube file-copy/move actions to reject filenames containing, e.g., non-Latin characters and certain symbols. The rationale for this change was to mitigate the security risks associated with unusual unicode characters and invalid encoding in filenames, which some software might handle in an unsafe manner and which might cause confusion for users. Such a change represents a trade-off between security and usability.
After the change went live, we received several user reports indicating more severe usability problems than we had anticipated. Moreover, these problems were prompting users to resort to dangerous workarounds (such as packing files into an archive format prior to copying) that carry far more risk than the original risk posed by the unrestricted filenames. In addition, we realized that this was a backward-incompatible change that should not have been introduced in a minor release in the first place.
Therefore, we have decided, for the time being, to restore the original (pre-4.2) behavior by introducing a new allow-all-names argument for the qubes.Filecopy service. By default, qvm-copy and similar tools will use this less restrictive service (qubes.Filecopy+allow-all-names) whenever they detect any files that would be have been blocked by the more restrictive service (qubes.Filecopy+). If no such files are detected, they will use the more restrictive service.
Users who wish to opt for the more restrictive 4.2.0 and 4.2.1 behavior can do so by modifying their RPC policy rules. To switch a single rule to the more restrictive behavior, change * in the argument column to + (i.e., change “any argument” to “only empty”). To use the more restrictive behavior globally, add a “deny” rule for qubes.Filecopy+allow-all-names before all other relevant rules. For more information, see RPC policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/rpc-policy/) and Qube configuration interface (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vm-interface/#qubes-rpc).
When is the stable release?
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That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this RC and their severity. As explained in our release schedule (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/#release-schedule) documentation, our usual process after issuing a new RC is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. If warranted, we then issue a new RC that includes the fixes and repeat the process. We continue this iterative procedure until we’re left with an RC that’s good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many RCs will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this as testing progresses.
Testing Qubes 4.2.2-rc1
If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this new RC, you can help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We encourage experienced users to join the testing team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190). The best way to test Qubes 4.2.2-rc1 is by performing a clean installation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) with the new ISO. We strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
As an alternative to a clean installation, there is also the option of performing an in-place upgrade without reinstalling. However, since Qubes 4.2.2 is simply Qubes 4.2 inclusive of all updates to date, this amounts to simply using a fully-updated 4.2 installation. In a sense, then, all current 4.2 users who are keeping up with updates are already testing 4.2.2-rc1, but this testing is only partial, since it does not cover things like the installation procedure.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What is a release candidate?
A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. RCs are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) and the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) in our documentation.
What is a patch release?
Testing Qubes 4.2.2-rc1
If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this new RC, you can help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We encourage experienced users to join the testing team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190). The best way to test Qubes 4.2.2-rc1 is by performing a clean installation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) with the new ISO. We strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
As an alternative to a clean installation, there is also the option of performing an in-place upgrade without reinstalling. However, since Qubes 4.2.2 is simply Qubes 4.2 inclusive of all updates to date, this amounts to simply using a fully-updated 4.2 installation. In a sense, then, all current 4.2 users who are keeping up with updates are already testing 4.2.2-rc1, but this testing is only partial, since it does not cover things like the installation procedure.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What is a release candidate?
A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. RCs are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) and the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) in our documentation.
What is a patch release?
❤2👍1
The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.2) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing the initial Qubes 4.2.0 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.2.2. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.
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