Fedora 39 approaching end-of-life
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/13/fedora-39-approaching-end-of-life/
Fedora 39 is currently scheduled (https://fedorapeople.org/groups/schedule/f-39/f-39-key-tasks.html) to reach end-of-life (EOL) (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life) on 2024-11-12 (approximately two months from now). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol).
There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/13/fedora-39-approaching-end-of-life/
Fedora 39 is currently scheduled (https://fedorapeople.org/groups/schedule/f-39/f-39-key-tasks.html) to reach end-of-life (EOL) (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life) on 2024-11-12 (approximately two months from now). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol).
There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
👍2
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/17/qubes-os-4-2-3-has-been-released/
We’re pleased to announce the stable release of Qubes OS 4.2.3! This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.3?
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed+reason%3Acompleted+closed%3A2024-03-26..2024-09-09+-label%3A%22R%3A+cannot+reproduce%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+declined%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+duplicate%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+not+applicable%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+self-closed%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+upstream+issue%22).
How to get Qubes 4.2.3
You have a couple different options, depending on your situation:
If you’d like to install Qubes OS for the first time or perform a clean reinstallation on an existing system, there’s never been a better time to do so! Simply download (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) the Qubes 4.2.3 ISO and follow our installation guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/).
If you’re currently on Qubes 4.2 (including 4.2.0, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3-rc1), update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) (which includes upgrading any EOL templates (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol) you might have) in order to make your system essentially equivalent to the stable Qubes 4.2.3 release. No reinstallation or other special action is required.
Please note that Qubes 4.1 has reached end-of-life (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/) and extended security support for Qubes 4.1 has ended (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/). If you’re still on Qubes 4.1 or an earlier release, you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/).
In all cases, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder for those upgrading from Qubes 4.1 and earlier, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
We’re pleased to announce the stable release of Qubes OS 4.2.3! This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.3?
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed+reason%3Acompleted+closed%3A2024-03-26..2024-09-09+-label%3A%22R%3A+cannot+reproduce%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+declined%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+duplicate%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+not+applicable%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+self-closed%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+upstream+issue%22).
How to get Qubes 4.2.3
You have a couple different options, depending on your situation:
If you’d like to install Qubes OS for the first time or perform a clean reinstallation on an existing system, there’s never been a better time to do so! Simply download (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) the Qubes 4.2.3 ISO and follow our installation guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/).
If you’re currently on Qubes 4.2 (including 4.2.0, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3-rc1), update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) (which includes upgrading any EOL templates (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol) you might have) in order to make your system essentially equivalent to the stable Qubes 4.2.3 release. No reinstallation or other special action is required.
Please note that Qubes 4.1 has reached end-of-life (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/) and extended security support for Qubes 4.1 has ended (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/). If you’re still on Qubes 4.1 or an earlier release, you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/).
In all cases, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder for those upgrading from Qubes 4.1 and earlier, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What is a patch release?
The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.2) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing the initial Qubes 4.2.0 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.2.3. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.
What is a patch release?
The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.2) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing the initial Qubes 4.2.0 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.2.3. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.
The NovaCustom V56 Series 16.0 inch coreboot laptop is Qubes certified!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/17/novacustom-v56-series-qubes-certified/
It is our pleasure to announce that the NovaCustom V56 Series 16.0 inch coreboot laptop (https://novacustom.com/product/v56-series/) is the eighth computer to be officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4 and the second such model from NovaCustom (https://novacustom.com/)!
V56 Series 16.0 inch coreboot laptop
Meet the world’s most modern coreboot laptop. Thanks to an energy-efficient 14th generation Intel Meteor Lake processor, a powerful 73 WH battery, and a stunning 16:10 display, you’ll be more productive than ever before. Configure this laptop with up to 96 GB of DDR5 memory and a blazing-fast PCIe SSD. Dasharo coreboot firmware provides you with a secure and stable base. Furthermore, this laptop features useful ports, including Thunderbolt 4, an Ethernet port, and plenty of USB ports. On top of that, this laptop is optionally available with Wi-Fi 7 support.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/17/novacustom-v56-series-qubes-certified/
It is our pleasure to announce that the NovaCustom V56 Series 16.0 inch coreboot laptop (https://novacustom.com/product/v56-series/) is the eighth computer to be officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4 and the second such model from NovaCustom (https://novacustom.com/)!
V56 Series 16.0 inch coreboot laptop
Meet the world’s most modern coreboot laptop. Thanks to an energy-efficient 14th generation Intel Meteor Lake processor, a powerful 73 WH battery, and a stunning 16:10 display, you’ll be more productive than ever before. Configure this laptop with up to 96 GB of DDR5 memory and a blazing-fast PCIe SSD. Dasharo coreboot firmware provides you with a secure and stable base. Furthermore, this laptop features useful ports, including Thunderbolt 4, an Ethernet port, and plenty of USB ports. On top of that, this laptop is optionally available with Wi-Fi 7 support.
Qubes-certified options
The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below.
Screen size
Certified: 16 inch model (V560TU)
The 14-inch model (V540TU) is not currently certified.
Screen resolution
Certified: Full HD+ (1920 x 1200)
Certified: Q-HD+ (2560 x 1600)
Processor and graphics
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 5 Processor 125H + Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 7 Processor 155H + Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
The Nvidia discrete GPU options are not currently certified.
Memory
Certified: Any configuration with at least 16 GB of memory
Storage
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
Personalization
This section is merely cosmetic and therefore does not affect certification.
Firmware options
Qubes OS does not currently support UEFI secure boot.
Keeping up-to-date with firmware updates is merely an email notification service and therefore does not affect certification.
Deploying coreboot+Heads does not affect certification, but it is not currently an available option for this model anyway.
Disabling Intel Management Engine (HAP disabling) does not affect certification.
Operating system
Certified: Qubes OS 4.2.3 or newer (within Release 4).
Releases older than 4.2.3 are not certified.
You may choose either to have NovaCustom preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification.
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
Certified: Intel AX-210/211 (non vPro) Wi-Fi module 2.4 Gbps, 802.11AX/Wi-Fi6E + Bluetooth 5.3
Certified: Intel BE200 (non vPro) Wi-Fi module 5.8 Gbps, 802.11BE/Wi-Fi7 + Bluetooth 5.42
Certified: No Wi-Fi chip - no Bluetooth and Wi-Fi connection possible (only with USB adapter)
Disclaimers
In order for Wi-Fi to function properly, sys-net must currently be based on a Fedora template. The firmware package in Debian templates is currently too old for the certified Wi-Fi cards.
Currently requires kernel-latest: If you install Qubes OS yourself, you must select the Install Qubes OS RX using kernel-latest option on the GRUB menu when booting the installer. This non-default kernel option is currently required for the NovaCustom V56 Series to function properly.
Due to a known bug (https://github.com/Dasharo/dasharo-issues/issues/976), the bottom-right USB-C port is currently limited to USB 2.0 speeds.
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements), and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below.
Screen size
Certified: 16 inch model (V560TU)
The 14-inch model (V540TU) is not currently certified.
Screen resolution
Certified: Full HD+ (1920 x 1200)
Certified: Q-HD+ (2560 x 1600)
Processor and graphics
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 5 Processor 125H + Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 7 Processor 155H + Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
The Nvidia discrete GPU options are not currently certified.
Memory
Certified: Any configuration with at least 16 GB of memory
Storage
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
Personalization
This section is merely cosmetic and therefore does not affect certification.
Firmware options
Qubes OS does not currently support UEFI secure boot.
Keeping up-to-date with firmware updates is merely an email notification service and therefore does not affect certification.
Deploying coreboot+Heads does not affect certification, but it is not currently an available option for this model anyway.
Disabling Intel Management Engine (HAP disabling) does not affect certification.
Operating system
Certified: Qubes OS 4.2.3 or newer (within Release 4).
Releases older than 4.2.3 are not certified.
You may choose either to have NovaCustom preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification.
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
Certified: Intel AX-210/211 (non vPro) Wi-Fi module 2.4 Gbps, 802.11AX/Wi-Fi6E + Bluetooth 5.3
Certified: Intel BE200 (non vPro) Wi-Fi module 5.8 Gbps, 802.11BE/Wi-Fi7 + Bluetooth 5.42
Certified: No Wi-Fi chip - no Bluetooth and Wi-Fi connection possible (only with USB adapter)
Disclaimers
In order for Wi-Fi to function properly, sys-net must currently be based on a Fedora template. The firmware package in Debian templates is currently too old for the certified Wi-Fi cards.
Currently requires kernel-latest: If you install Qubes OS yourself, you must select the Install Qubes OS RX using kernel-latest option on the GRUB menu when booting the installer. This non-default kernel option is currently required for the NovaCustom V56 Series to function properly.
Due to a known bug (https://github.com/Dasharo/dasharo-issues/issues/976), the bottom-right USB-C port is currently limited to USB 2.0 speeds.
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements), and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
Reminder: Qubes OS Summit 2024 starts tomorrow!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/19/reminder-qubes-os-summit-2024-starts-tomorrow/
Join us tomorrow, September 20, at 10:00 AM (CEST) for Qubes OS Summit 2024 (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/)!
Free virtual tickets (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/#tickets) are still available. For those with on-site tickets, see you at The Social Hub in Berlin!
This year’s summit will continue until September 22 at 8:00 PM (20:00 CEST).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/19/reminder-qubes-os-summit-2024-starts-tomorrow/
Join us tomorrow, September 20, at 10:00 AM (CEST) for Qubes OS Summit 2024 (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/)!
Free virtual tickets (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/#tickets) are still available. For those with on-site tickets, see you at The Social Hub in Berlin!
This year’s summit will continue until September 22 at 8:00 PM (20:00 CEST).
Qubes OS Summit 2024 has concluded; videos now available
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/22/qubes-os-summit-2024-has-concluded-videos-now-available/
Thank you to everyone who attended this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/), both physically and virtually, and a special thanks to 3mdeb (https://3mdeb.com/) for their tireless efforts in organizing Qubes OS Summits over the years!
If you missed the summit, or if you’d like to review any of the presentations, video recordings from this year’s summit are now available!
Qubes OS Summit 2024: Day 1
Qubes OS Summit 2024: Day 2
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/22/qubes-os-summit-2024-has-concluded-videos-now-available/
Thank you to everyone who attended this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/), both physically and virtually, and a special thanks to 3mdeb (https://3mdeb.com/) for their tireless efforts in organizing Qubes OS Summits over the years!
If you missed the summit, or if you’d like to review any of the presentations, video recordings from this year’s summit are now available!
Qubes OS Summit 2024: Day 1
Qubes OS Summit 2024: Day 2
XSAs released on 2024-09-24
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/24/xsas-released-on-2024-09-24/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-462 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-462.html)
Denial of service only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/24/xsas-released-on-2024-09-24/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-462 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-462.html)
Denial of service only
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
The NitroPad V56 is Qubes certified!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/10/03/nitropad-v56-qubes-certified/
We’re pleased to announce that the NitroPad V56 (https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropad-v56-684) from Nitrokey (https://www.nitrokey.com/) is officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4!
Secure working in insecure environments thanks to unique hardware protection
Do you believe that your computer hardware is secure? Can you rule out the possibility that someone has tampered with your computer in your absence? In a world where most users have no real control over their hardware and must blindly trust manufacturers’ security promises, NitroPad offers a refreshingly new security experience. The NitroPad is significantly more secure than normal computers. NitroPad gives you more control over your hardware and data than ever before, while making it easy to use.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/10/03/nitropad-v56-qubes-certified/
We’re pleased to announce that the NitroPad V56 (https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropad-v56-684) from Nitrokey (https://www.nitrokey.com/) is officially certified (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4!
Secure working in insecure environments thanks to unique hardware protection
Do you believe that your computer hardware is secure? Can you rule out the possibility that someone has tampered with your computer in your absence? In a world where most users have no real control over their hardware and must blindly trust manufacturers’ security promises, NitroPad offers a refreshingly new security experience. The NitroPad is significantly more secure than normal computers. NitroPad gives you more control over your hardware and data than ever before, while making it easy to use.
Qubes-certified options
The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below.
Processor and graphics card
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 5 Processor 125H, Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 7 Processor 155H, Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
The Nvidia GPU options are not currently certified.
Memory (RAM) DDR5, 5600 MHz
Certified: All options 16 GB (2x8 GB) and higher
1st Hard Disk SSD NVMe PCIe 4.0 x4
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
2nd Hard Disk SSD NVMe PCIe 4.0 x4
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
Keyboard
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
Wireless interfaces
Certified: Wi-Fi 6E + Bluetooth 5.3, Intel AX-210/211 (non vPro) WLAN module 2.4 Gbps, 802.11ax
Certified: Wi-Fi 7 + Bluetooth 5.42, Intel BE200 (non vPro) WLAN module 5.8 Gbps, 802.11be
Certified: No wireless
Webcam and microphone
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
Type
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
Firmware
Certified: Dasharo TianoCore UEFI without Measured boot, without Nitrokey
The option “Dasharo HEADS with Measured Boot, requires Nitrokey!” is not yet certified.
Operating system
Certified: Qubes OS 4.2.3 or newer (within Release 4).
Releases older than 4.2.3 are not certified.
You may choose either to have Nitrokey preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification.
Nitrokey
Certified: None – for TianoCore only!
The Nitrokey options are currently not applicable to Qubes hardware certification. (See the Firmware section above.)
Shipment of Nitrokey
This section does not affect Qubes hardware certification.
Tamper-evident packaging
This section does not affect Qubes hardware certification.
Disclaimers
In order for Wi-Fi to function properly, sys-net must currently be based on a Fedora template. The firmware package in Debian templates is currently too old for the certified Wi-Fi cards.
Currently requires kernel-latest: If you install Qubes OS yourself, you must select the Install Qubes OS RX using kernel-latest option on the GRUB menu when booting the installer. This non-default kernel option is currently required for the NitroPad V56 to function properly.
Due to a known bug (https://github.com/Dasharo/dasharo-issues/issues/976), the bottom-right USB-C port is currently limited to USB 2.0 speeds.
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements), and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below.
Processor and graphics card
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 5 Processor 125H, Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
Certified: Intel Core Ultra 7 Processor 155H, Intel Arc iGPU with AI Boost
The Nvidia GPU options are not currently certified.
Memory (RAM) DDR5, 5600 MHz
Certified: All options 16 GB (2x8 GB) and higher
1st Hard Disk SSD NVMe PCIe 4.0 x4
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
2nd Hard Disk SSD NVMe PCIe 4.0 x4
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
Keyboard
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
Wireless interfaces
Certified: Wi-Fi 6E + Bluetooth 5.3, Intel AX-210/211 (non vPro) WLAN module 2.4 Gbps, 802.11ax
Certified: Wi-Fi 7 + Bluetooth 5.42, Intel BE200 (non vPro) WLAN module 5.8 Gbps, 802.11be
Certified: No wireless
Webcam and microphone
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
Type
Certified: Any of the available options in this section
Firmware
Certified: Dasharo TianoCore UEFI without Measured boot, without Nitrokey
The option “Dasharo HEADS with Measured Boot, requires Nitrokey!” is not yet certified.
Operating system
Certified: Qubes OS 4.2.3 or newer (within Release 4).
Releases older than 4.2.3 are not certified.
You may choose either to have Nitrokey preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification.
Nitrokey
Certified: None – for TianoCore only!
The Nitrokey options are currently not applicable to Qubes hardware certification. (See the Firmware section above.)
Shipment of Nitrokey
This section does not affect Qubes hardware certification.
Tamper-evident packaging
This section does not affect Qubes hardware certification.
Disclaimers
In order for Wi-Fi to function properly, sys-net must currently be based on a Fedora template. The firmware package in Debian templates is currently too old for the certified Wi-Fi cards.
Currently requires kernel-latest: If you install Qubes OS yourself, you must select the Install Qubes OS RX using kernel-latest option on the GRUB menu when booting the installer. This non-default kernel option is currently required for the NitroPad V56 to function properly.
Due to a known bug (https://github.com/Dasharo/dasharo-issues/issues/976), the bottom-right USB-C port is currently limited to USB 2.0 speeds.
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements), and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
QSB-105: Missing enforced decorations for stubdomain windows under KDE
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/10/17/qsb-105/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 105: Missing enforced decorations for stubdomain windows under KDE (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/456deebda28055ab64f08623b7d31212c94a3a06/QSBs/qsb-105-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 105
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 105 ]===---
2024-10-17
Missing enforced decorations for stubdomain windows under KDE
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
Qubes OS enforces the drawing of specific window decorations (e.g.,
colored borders around windows) in order to assist the user in
recognizing which window belongs to which qube. This applies both to
normal windows with noscript bars as well as other windows like menus
(which, behind the scenes, are separate windows). For normal windows,
the color of the noscript bar and border matches the qube's color
label, and the text in the noscript bar is prefixed with the qube's
name in brackets. Windows without noscript bars have only colored
borders.
A qube running in HVM mode may optionally use an emulated display
instead of the seamless Qubes GUI integration. This emulation is done by
QEMU running in a so-called stubdomain, which is a little helper VM
running alongside the main VM. There is also a GUI daemon that is
responsible for handling the GUI requests that come from the stubdomain.
Due to an error, when running under KDE, this GUI daemon is not being
instructed to set the window properties (as required by KDE) necessary
to display the correct noscript prefix and colored border.
Impact
-------
An attacker who manages to compromise an HVM qube's stubdomain (which
would require discovering and exploiting an independent vulnerability)
can create windows that are missing the usual enforced decorations. Such
windows would instead have the same noscript bar and borders as normal dom0
windows. An attacker could attempt to use such a window to deceive or
confuse the user into thinking that the window belongs to dom0.
An attacker could also attempt to make such a window appear to belong to
another qube by prefixing the text in the noscript bar with that qube's
name. However, since the attacker cannot control the windows' border
color, the border will not match that qube's color label. Instead, the
borders of such windows will always use the default color set by the
window manager theme in dom0.
Moreover, every window has an icon that is displayed, by default, in the
noscript bar, the taskbar, and the task switcher. These icons are still
correctly colored in accordance with their respective qubes' color
labels. In addition, all windows without noscript bars still have their
correct border colors.
Affected systems
-----------------
Only systems using KDE as the desktop environment in dom0 are affected.
The default desktop environment in Qubes OS is Xfce, and KDE is not
installed by default. This means that users must manually install KDE in
dom0 and opt to use it as their desktop environment in order for their
systems to be affected by this vulnerability.
Only qubes running in HVM mode are affected. In the default Qubes OS
configuration, only sys-net and sys-usb run in HVM mode.
If an HVM qube has the `gui-emulated` feature set to '' (i.e., the empty
string, not to be confused with an unset feature) and the `debug`
property set to "false," then that HVM qube is not affected by this
vulnerability, since there will be no running GUI daemon for its
stubdomain unless manually requested by the user.
Patching
---------
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/10/17/qsb-105/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 105: Missing enforced decorations for stubdomain windows under KDE (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/456deebda28055ab64f08623b7d31212c94a3a06/QSBs/qsb-105-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 105
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 105 ]===---
2024-10-17
Missing enforced decorations for stubdomain windows under KDE
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
Qubes OS enforces the drawing of specific window decorations (e.g.,
colored borders around windows) in order to assist the user in
recognizing which window belongs to which qube. This applies both to
normal windows with noscript bars as well as other windows like menus
(which, behind the scenes, are separate windows). For normal windows,
the color of the noscript bar and border matches the qube's color
label, and the text in the noscript bar is prefixed with the qube's
name in brackets. Windows without noscript bars have only colored
borders.
A qube running in HVM mode may optionally use an emulated display
instead of the seamless Qubes GUI integration. This emulation is done by
QEMU running in a so-called stubdomain, which is a little helper VM
running alongside the main VM. There is also a GUI daemon that is
responsible for handling the GUI requests that come from the stubdomain.
Due to an error, when running under KDE, this GUI daemon is not being
instructed to set the window properties (as required by KDE) necessary
to display the correct noscript prefix and colored border.
Impact
-------
An attacker who manages to compromise an HVM qube's stubdomain (which
would require discovering and exploiting an independent vulnerability)
can create windows that are missing the usual enforced decorations. Such
windows would instead have the same noscript bar and borders as normal dom0
windows. An attacker could attempt to use such a window to deceive or
confuse the user into thinking that the window belongs to dom0.
An attacker could also attempt to make such a window appear to belong to
another qube by prefixing the text in the noscript bar with that qube's
name. However, since the attacker cannot control the windows' border
color, the border will not match that qube's color label. Instead, the
borders of such windows will always use the default color set by the
window manager theme in dom0.
Moreover, every window has an icon that is displayed, by default, in the
noscript bar, the taskbar, and the task switcher. These icons are still
correctly colored in accordance with their respective qubes' color
labels. In addition, all windows without noscript bars still have their
correct border colors.
Affected systems
-----------------
Only systems using KDE as the desktop environment in dom0 are affected.
The default desktop environment in Qubes OS is Xfce, and KDE is not
installed by default. This means that users must manually install KDE in
dom0 and opt to use it as their desktop environment in order for their
systems to be affected by this vulnerability.
Only qubes running in HVM mode are affected. In the default Qubes OS
configuration, only sys-net and sys-usb run in HVM mode.
If an HVM qube has the `gui-emulated` feature set to '' (i.e., the empty
string, not to be confused with an unset feature) and the `debug`
property set to "false," then that HVM qube is not affected by this
vulnerability, since there will be no running GUI daemon for its
stubdomain unless manually requested by the user.
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- python3-qubesadmin version 4.2.15
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
In order for the update to take effect, the graphical user session in
dom0 must be restarted. This can be accomplished either by logging out
and back in again or by a full restart of the system.
Credits
--------
The bug was reported by Yaroslav Bolyukin.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-105-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/456deebda28055ab64f08623b7d31212c94a3a06/QSBs/qsb-105-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
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Source: qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/456deebda28055ab64f08623b7d31212c94a3a06/QSBs/qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
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Source: qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/456deebda28055ab64f08623b7d31212c94a3a06/QSBs/qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- python3-qubesadmin version 4.2.15
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
In order for the update to take effect, the graphical user session in
dom0 must be restarted. This can be accomplished either by logging out
and back in again or by a full restart of the system.
Credits
--------
The bug was reported by Yaroslav Bolyukin.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-105-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/456deebda28055ab64f08623b7d31212c94a3a06/QSBs/qsb-105-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
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Source: qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/456deebda28055ab64f08623b7d31212c94a3a06/QSBs/qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
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09P5OFit2OGltlS3jHVVfnUR4ofw/lCMkfxAr5sBHNxHYGcQ4puET94dUcdh6o3X
Kd6Xv1RutCt9FkR9LNWcv6pvGcQCATKnTIP3rnuI2NhP9PPQ/alnVuwG1GR96MwM
bgmIRqfQbrJ+iF4+QeCnWiL5eqngMkfU+bSYxkIETxQOJszbISNACtQgFqTga/G7
fkLevv+j3LI+bgCiHU0qI+cwBSYPbEJaBbcEvlxEf+9o6G9T7CcxdB8G39TwUCFW
cnavbbuUcsyseGjCt70JKY3+aLWXs/l7OvoJOyT87vHyqoVqj5r2FdPxcrwKDUDP
vyW+nNHfAzLFcPrfVPw76MKbc8WA+dRfLmjmYidMMUrKdA1480syyzDZ+iyifSDd
oyMYXKoE6XxJ3BTcFoLpJBxMIeBMrSDHvpOainX7/HNYMwzGwlM=
=65Fy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/456deebda28055ab64f08623b7d31212c94a3a06/QSBs/qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-105), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-105-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-105-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-105 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-105), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-105-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-105-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-105-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-105 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
QSB-106: Information disclosure through uninitialized memory in libxl
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/11/12/qsb-106/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 106: Information disclosure through uninitialized memory in libxl (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4080eab216be36055bcaa6ae855e0023dec5a305/QSBs/qsb-106-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 106
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 106 ]===---
2024-11-12
Information disclosure through uninitialized memory in libxl
(XSA-464)
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
On 2024-11-12, the Xen Project published XSA-464, "libxl leaks data to PVH
guests via ACPI tables" (CVE-2024-45819) [3]:
| PVH guests have their ACPI tables constructed by the toolstack. The
| construction involves building the tables in local memory, which are
| then copied into guest memory. While actually used parts of the local
| memory are filled in correctly, excess space that is being allocated is
| left with its prior contents.
Qubes calls libxl via libvirtd. The memory that is not fully initialized
is allocated via malloc. So the prior content that is leaked to a PVH
qube might be anything that has been previously allocated and then freed
in the libvirtd process.
Impact
-------
The leaked memory usually doesn't contain important secrets [4] but can
reveal various information about other qubes and the host system that is
otherwise not available to a malicious qube. In particular the following
information might be present in libvirtd's memory:
about other qubes:
- Name
- UUID
- kernel version
- kernel cmdline
- IP/MAC addresses of virtual network devices (but not from physical
devices) [5]
- Assigned PCI devices
about the host system:
- Total system memory
- Available PCI devices
- DMI/SYSBIOS information (serial number as reported by firmware, RAM
DIMM product number, etc.)
The list not complete (for example doesn't list less interesting qube
settings like assigned audio qube), but should cover all important
categories.
Note that a malicious qube has very little control about what
information gets leaked in the uninitialized memory that is exposed to
it [6]. Additionally the leak happens only once per start of a qube. So
for a decent change of being leaked interesting information a malicious
qube has to wait a long time for a significant number of normal starts.
Alternatively it can also try to provoke starts of disposable qubes it
can control (for example via qubes.VMShell) or shut itself down and hope
for it being started again by the user or a qrexec call (both methods
easily noticed by a user as unusual activity).
Affected systems
-----------------
All supported version of Qubes are affected.
Only qubes in PVH virt mode are affected (in default setup, every qube
except sys-net and sys-usb).
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.5-4
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
--------
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/11/12/qsb-106/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 106: Information disclosure through uninitialized memory in libxl (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4080eab216be36055bcaa6ae855e0023dec5a305/QSBs/qsb-106-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 106
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 106 ]===---
2024-11-12
Information disclosure through uninitialized memory in libxl
(XSA-464)
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
On 2024-11-12, the Xen Project published XSA-464, "libxl leaks data to PVH
guests via ACPI tables" (CVE-2024-45819) [3]:
| PVH guests have their ACPI tables constructed by the toolstack. The
| construction involves building the tables in local memory, which are
| then copied into guest memory. While actually used parts of the local
| memory are filled in correctly, excess space that is being allocated is
| left with its prior contents.
Qubes calls libxl via libvirtd. The memory that is not fully initialized
is allocated via malloc. So the prior content that is leaked to a PVH
qube might be anything that has been previously allocated and then freed
in the libvirtd process.
Impact
-------
The leaked memory usually doesn't contain important secrets [4] but can
reveal various information about other qubes and the host system that is
otherwise not available to a malicious qube. In particular the following
information might be present in libvirtd's memory:
about other qubes:
- Name
- UUID
- kernel version
- kernel cmdline
- IP/MAC addresses of virtual network devices (but not from physical
devices) [5]
- Assigned PCI devices
about the host system:
- Total system memory
- Available PCI devices
- DMI/SYSBIOS information (serial number as reported by firmware, RAM
DIMM product number, etc.)
The list not complete (for example doesn't list less interesting qube
settings like assigned audio qube), but should cover all important
categories.
Note that a malicious qube has very little control about what
information gets leaked in the uninitialized memory that is exposed to
it [6]. Additionally the leak happens only once per start of a qube. So
for a decent change of being leaked interesting information a malicious
qube has to wait a long time for a significant number of normal starts.
Alternatively it can also try to provoke starts of disposable qubes it
can control (for example via qubes.VMShell) or shut itself down and hope
for it being started again by the user or a qrexec call (both methods
easily noticed by a user as unusual activity).
Affected systems
-----------------
All supported version of Qubes are affected.
Only qubes in PVH virt mode are affected (in default setup, every qube
except sys-net and sys-usb).
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.5-4
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
--------