Netsec – Telegram
Netsec
7.37K subscribers
22.3K links
This channel posts the feed from r/netsec.
For any suggestions dm @streaak
Donate to keep the bot running https://www.paypal.me/akhilgv
Download Telegram
Bypassing Browser Security Warnings with Pseudo Password Fields
http://ift.tt/2ynwuOS

Submitted November 03, 2017 at 02:09AM by julian88888888
via reddit http://ift.tt/2h78p7r
How do I change my reddit user account email address?
Using my other reddit account, recently I saw a warning at the top of every page on reddit: "Uh oh! We have suspended your account due to suspicious activity. Not to worry. You can continue using Reddit by resetting your password."When I click the link to reset my password, it asks me to send a Password Reset email... but the email address that is pre-set (and not changeable in its text box) is not mine. It's a gmail account in the format of first.last@gmail.com with a Turkish man's name.I'm assuming my account was hacked and someone changed my email address but not my password.My username and password combo work just fine. I would just like to change my password without sending an email to a fraudulent email address I've never heard of, and I would not be able to answer anyway.

Submitted November 03, 2017 at 05:44AM by TheSimpsonsContext
via reddit http://ift.tt/2A3LsWm
Safe and Convenient Password Management
http://ift.tt/2A3zGvw

Submitted November 03, 2017 at 10:40AM by randian_lurker
via reddit http://ift.tt/2hyfgUq
FaceID and depth camera security issues
A lot of people are concerned about how secure your face data is on the new iPhone X, I have some answers but I ain’t 100% sure, when setting up faceID for the first time it is then saved and encrypted on the Secure Enclave (SEP) and is left there, no apps can see these details except for some instances that I’ll explain in a bit. When apps ask you to unlock with your faceID then it is safe as it is an API that is linked to the system that uses the normal FaceID scan process and then it tells the app if it is really you or it failed to authorize your face, this is completely safe but If you use an app that can see your pictures (in other words is allowed to go through your pictures) then you are screwed as starting from iOS 11 apple added depth information in photos taken as portrait mode that exists only on the iPhone 7+,8+ and X. So if you took a portrait selfie of yourself then it will create a depth information in that picture and that app can read it, but you don’t need to worry as this won’t help them to unlock your device.(If you have anything question then feel free to ask me)

Submitted November 03, 2017 at 11:40AM by pierre949
via reddit http://ift.tt/2ztikeW
Let’s Talk About SSH Configuration Hardening...
The ProblemA lot of administrators install the SSH service and assume its in top shape. What they don't realize is that system packages tend to be optimized for compatibility, not security. While a lot of systems include defaults that are fine for most cases, there is still a lot of room for improvement--especially for high-security environments.Depending on how old the package for your distribution is, the default configuration may have the following problems:Small host keys: 1024-bit RSA or DSA.Weak key exchanges: Diffie-Hellman groups using small 1024-bit moduli, or exchanges using deprecated hash algorithms like SHA-1.Vulnerable ciphers: 3DES, RC4, and SWEET32-vulnerable ciphers like Blowfish and CAST.MACs based on weak hash algorithms: MD5 or SHA-1.As long as your users have reasonably modern SSH clients, you can fix all of the problems above without interoperability issues. And for those users who are lagging behind, well... chances are their client software has unpatched security problems anyway (note that 4 vulnerabilities have been fixed in PuTTY so far in 2017).Ubuntu and RHEL DefaultsLet's take a look at a fully-patched Ubuntu 16.04 LTS server. Its default config comes with a good selection of ciphers (chacha20-poly1305 is the default with backups using AES in CTR & GCM modes), but it supports some SHA-1 based algorithms for MACs and key exchange. Furthermore, its default RSA key is 2048-bit, which is equivalent to 112-bits of brute-force strength; to get 128-bits of security, this needs to be re-generated with a 3072-bit key. [1]Things are much worse for RHEL/CentOS 6 (which is supported until 2024). Its default config supports 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman key exchanges (this is believed to be breakable by state-level adversaries! [2]), along with the weak RC4 cipher, Blowfish & CAST (both affected by the SWEET32 attack), as well as several MACs based on MD5 and SHA-1! Unless you take specific steps after installation, the RHEL/CentOS 6 SSH service is pretty abysmal.Scanning ToolsThe excellent (and open-source) ssh-audit tool will help you find problematic options enabled in your SSH service. But since not all admins are comfortable with command-line tools, I've gone ahead and written a web front-end to it for convenience, which also includes a comprehensive list of references for all discovered problems. You can find it here: http://ift.tt/2ysa1zWHardening GuidesStribik András wrote this excellent, general-purpose hardening guide in early 2015. While it does a great job in breaking down the different options available, it is slowly becoming out of date, and doesn't take specific versions of OpenSSH into consideration (for example, newer versions of OpenSSH support DH Groups 16 & 18 from RFC3526, but a fully patched Ubuntu 16.04 LTS system uses a slightly older version that doesn’t include them). To compensate, I've written a set of guides specific to OS releases that optimize security for each platform.You can find the improved hardening guides here: http://ift.tt/2yqMuj9References[1] U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Special Publication 800-57, Part 1, Revision 4, Recommendation for Key Management, Part 1: General", http://ift.tt/1P17KJc, Jan. 2016, pg. 53.[2] Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P., Green, M., Halderman, J., Heninger, N., Springall, D., Thomé, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E., Zanella-Béguelin, S., and Zimmermann, P., "Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice", http://ift.tt/1RbPYEP, Oct. 2015.

Submitted November 01, 2017 at 08:36PM by therealjoetesta
via reddit http://ift.tt/2irX92j