Operasjonssentralen varslet interne og eksterne styrker via telefon. Politidistriktet har ikke noe system for massevarsling av egne styrker eller samvirkeaktører.
The operations center notified internal and external forces by telephone. The police district has no system for mass notification of its own forces or cooperative actors.
Mange tjenestepersoner ringte selv inn og tilbød sine tjenester og mobiliserte pa egenha nd, da de ikke lyktes i a oppna kontakt med operasjonssentralen i eget distrikt.
Many service personnel called in themselves and offered their services and mobilized on their own, as they did not succeed in establishing contact with the operations center in their own district.
Oslo har en løsning for massevarsling av stabsmedarbeiderne, men løsningen ble ikke benyttet da den ligger pa samme skjerm som alarmregistrering og nasjonal varsling.
Oslo has a solution for mass notification of the staff, but the solution was not used as it is on the same screen as alarm registration and national notification.
Det ble ikke benyttet massevarslingssystem for varsling av egne mannskaper verken i Oslo eller Nordre Buskerud.
No mass notification system was used to notify own crews either in Oslo or Nordre Buskerud.
Politiet hadde ikke kapasitet til a ha ndtere alle innkomne telefoner pa 112 selv om operasjonssentraler og sentralbord ble bemannet opp.
The police did not have the capacity to handle all incoming 112 calls, even though operation centers and switchboards were staffed.
Ved varsling av personell via ICCS (operasjonssentralen med det nye nødnettet) ma tte man grunnet en teknisk feil ringe alle mobiltelefoner to ganger. Dette førte til at varslingen tok lang tid.
When notifying personnel via ICCS (the operations center with the new emergency network), all mobile phones had to be called twice due to a technical error. This meant that the notification took a long time.
The operations center notified internal and external forces by telephone. The police district has no system for mass notification of its own forces or cooperative actors.
Mange tjenestepersoner ringte selv inn og tilbød sine tjenester og mobiliserte pa egenha nd, da de ikke lyktes i a oppna kontakt med operasjonssentralen i eget distrikt.
Many service personnel called in themselves and offered their services and mobilized on their own, as they did not succeed in establishing contact with the operations center in their own district.
Oslo har en løsning for massevarsling av stabsmedarbeiderne, men løsningen ble ikke benyttet da den ligger pa samme skjerm som alarmregistrering og nasjonal varsling.
Oslo has a solution for mass notification of the staff, but the solution was not used as it is on the same screen as alarm registration and national notification.
Det ble ikke benyttet massevarslingssystem for varsling av egne mannskaper verken i Oslo eller Nordre Buskerud.
No mass notification system was used to notify own crews either in Oslo or Nordre Buskerud.
Politiet hadde ikke kapasitet til a ha ndtere alle innkomne telefoner pa 112 selv om operasjonssentraler og sentralbord ble bemannet opp.
The police did not have the capacity to handle all incoming 112 calls, even though operation centers and switchboards were staffed.
Ved varsling av personell via ICCS (operasjonssentralen med det nye nødnettet) ma tte man grunnet en teknisk feil ringe alle mobiltelefoner to ganger. Dette førte til at varslingen tok lang tid.
When notifying personnel via ICCS (the operations center with the new emergency network), all mobile phones had to be called twice due to a technical error. This meant that the notification took a long time.
Vidnet Andreas Olsen kontakter politiet og fortæller, at han så en nordisk udseende mand iført politiuniform og bevæbnet med pistol. At manden fem minutter inden eksplosionen forlod området i en bil med nummerpladen VH 24605. Der bliver ikke meldt noget ud om observationerne - hverken til det lokale politi eller offentligheden.
The witness Andreas Olsen contacts the police and says that he saw a Nordic-looking man wearing a police uniform and armed with a gun. That the man left the area five minutes before the explosion in a car with the number plate VH 24605. Nothing is reported about the observations - neither to the local police nor to the public https://perma.cc/SC9X-LFEM
Andreas Olsens observationer bliver dog ikke videregivet – den vagthavende skriver hans oplysninger ned på en gul seddel og går hen for at aflevere sedlen til en operationsleder – men vedkommende er optaget, så den gule seddel bliver i stedet lagt på et bord https://perma.cc/S29S-RCCQ
However, Andreas Olsen's observations are not passed on – the duty officer writes his information down on a yellow note and goes to hand the note to an operations manager – but the person is busy, so the yellow note is instead placed on a table.
15.34: Meldingen ble ikke loggført i PO.
The message was not logged in PO.
20 minutes later: Vitnet som ringte inn om kjøretøy kl. 15.34, ringes opp. Han bekrefter meldingen og gir mer informasjon.
The witness who called in about vehicles at 15.34, call up. He confirms the message and provides more information.
30 MINUTES LATER: Operasjonslederen ber Kripos sende ut ”riksalarm” om kjøretøy VH 24605.
The operations manager asks Kripos to send out a "national alert" about vehicle VH 24605.
På det tidspunktet hadde Breivik akkurat kommet seg ut av Oslo. Han passerte Lysaker på vei ut av Oslo klokken 15.56, 22 minutter etter at tipseren først hadde meldt fra om den mulige gjerningsmannen.
At that time, Breivik had just got out of Oslo. He passed Lysaker on his way out of Oslo at 15.56, 22 minutes after
The witness Andreas Olsen contacts the police and says that he saw a Nordic-looking man wearing a police uniform and armed with a gun. That the man left the area five minutes before the explosion in a car with the number plate VH 24605. Nothing is reported about the observations - neither to the local police nor to the public https://perma.cc/SC9X-LFEM
Andreas Olsens observationer bliver dog ikke videregivet – den vagthavende skriver hans oplysninger ned på en gul seddel og går hen for at aflevere sedlen til en operationsleder – men vedkommende er optaget, så den gule seddel bliver i stedet lagt på et bord https://perma.cc/S29S-RCCQ
However, Andreas Olsen's observations are not passed on – the duty officer writes his information down on a yellow note and goes to hand the note to an operations manager – but the person is busy, so the yellow note is instead placed on a table.
15.34: Meldingen ble ikke loggført i PO.
The message was not logged in PO.
20 minutes later: Vitnet som ringte inn om kjøretøy kl. 15.34, ringes opp. Han bekrefter meldingen og gir mer informasjon.
The witness who called in about vehicles at 15.34, call up. He confirms the message and provides more information.
30 MINUTES LATER: Operasjonslederen ber Kripos sende ut ”riksalarm” om kjøretøy VH 24605.
The operations manager asks Kripos to send out a "national alert" about vehicle VH 24605.
På det tidspunktet hadde Breivik akkurat kommet seg ut av Oslo. Han passerte Lysaker på vei ut av Oslo klokken 15.56, 22 minutter etter at tipseren først hadde meldt fra om den mulige gjerningsmannen.
At that time, Breivik had just got out of Oslo. He passed Lysaker on his way out of Oslo at 15.56, 22 minutes after
Norway and Germany - an organisational disaster Part 4
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
At that time, Breivik had just got out of Oslo. He passed Lysaker on his way out of Oslo at 15.56, 22 minutes after the tipster had first reported the possible perpetrator https://perma.cc/S84U-MZWY
Etter at en operatør var blitt ledig og hadde fått snakket med tipseren, som altså kunne oppgi registreringsnummeret på den mistenkelige «politimannens» bil, var operasjonslederen i kontakt med Kripos og ba dem sende ut riksalarm på det aktuelle registreringsnummeret.
Da var klokken 16.04, en halvtime etter at tipseren først ringte politiets nødtelefon med opplysninger om det som skulle vise seg å være Anders Behring Breivik.
After an operator had become available and had been able to speak to the tipster, who could therefore provide the registration number of the suspicious "policeman's" car, the operations manager was in contact with Kripos and asked them to send out a national alert on the registration number in question.
It was then 16:04, half an hour after the tipster first called the police emergency number with information about what turned out to be Anders Behring Breivik.
Det var først da jeg så en enslig politimann med noe jeg oppfattet som et våpen, som deretter satte seg inn i en sivil bil og kjørte i feil kjøreretning, at jeg tenkte at her må det være noe galt, og at det var viktig å observere mer detaljert, sier Olsen https://perma.cc/Q4PD-VTAC
It was only when I saw a lone policeman with what I perceived to be a weapon, who then got into a civilian car and drove in the wrong direction, that I thought that there must be something wrong here, and that it was important to observe in more detail, says Olsen.
Færgen MS Thorbjørn sejler fra Utøya. Om bord er seks deltagere fra sommerlejren – blandt dem AUF-leder Eskil Pedersen. Desuden er skibets kaptajn og en besætning på to personer ombord på færgen.
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
At that time, Breivik had just got out of Oslo. He passed Lysaker on his way out of Oslo at 15.56, 22 minutes after the tipster had first reported the possible perpetrator https://perma.cc/S84U-MZWY
Etter at en operatør var blitt ledig og hadde fått snakket med tipseren, som altså kunne oppgi registreringsnummeret på den mistenkelige «politimannens» bil, var operasjonslederen i kontakt med Kripos og ba dem sende ut riksalarm på det aktuelle registreringsnummeret.
Da var klokken 16.04, en halvtime etter at tipseren først ringte politiets nødtelefon med opplysninger om det som skulle vise seg å være Anders Behring Breivik.
After an operator had become available and had been able to speak to the tipster, who could therefore provide the registration number of the suspicious "policeman's" car, the operations manager was in contact with Kripos and asked them to send out a national alert on the registration number in question.
It was then 16:04, half an hour after the tipster first called the police emergency number with information about what turned out to be Anders Behring Breivik.
Det var først da jeg så en enslig politimann med noe jeg oppfattet som et våpen, som deretter satte seg inn i en sivil bil og kjørte i feil kjøreretning, at jeg tenkte at her må det være noe galt, og at det var viktig å observere mer detaljert, sier Olsen https://perma.cc/Q4PD-VTAC
It was only when I saw a lone policeman with what I perceived to be a weapon, who then got into a civilian car and drove in the wrong direction, that I thought that there must be something wrong here, and that it was important to observe in more detail, says Olsen.
Færgen MS Thorbjørn sejler fra Utøya. Om bord er seks deltagere fra sommerlejren – blandt dem AUF-leder Eskil Pedersen. Desuden er skibets kaptajn og en besætning på to personer ombord på færgen.
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Le due telefonate della Capitaneria di Porto al comandante Schettino della nave Costa Concordia
Norway and Germany - an organisational disaster Part 5
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
MS Thorbjørn er godkendt til 50 passagerer, men de ombordværende sejler i sikkerhed på bagsiden af Utøya uden at hjælpe de omkring 200, som snart efter forsøger at svømme fra øen. De bliver i stedet reddet af af folk, der trodser Breiviks kugler og sejler ud i små både fra landsiden https://perma.cc/65A5-2TSY
The ferry MS Thorbjørn sails from Utøya. On board are six participants from the summer camp – among them AUF leader Eskil Pedersen. In addition, the ship's captain and a crew of two are on board the ferry. MS Thorbjørn is approved for 50 passengers, but those on board sail to safety at the back of Utøya without helping the 200 or so who soon after try to swim off the island. They are instead rescued by people who defy Breivik's bullets and sail out in small boats from the land side.
Hjetland var om bord på MS «Thorbjørn» sammen med daværende AUF-leder Eskil Pedersen og syv andre som kom seg vekk fra øya med fergen mens skytingen pågikk 22. juli https://perma.cc/S9R3-7NKG
Hjetland was on board the MS "Thorbjørn" together with then AUF leader Eskil Pedersen and seven others who got away from the island by ferry while the shooting was taking place on 22 July.
MS «Thorbjørn» forlot Utøya rundt 17.30, et kvarters tid etter at Anders Behring Breivik kom i land. Mens skipperen styrte fergen, lå de åtte andre flatt i bunnen av båten. Flere av dem fikk melding på telefonene sine om at det ble skutt vilt på øya.
MS "Thorbjørn" left Utøya around 17.30, a quarter of an hour after Anders Behring Breivik came ashore. While the skipper steered the ferry, the other eight lay flat in the bottom of the boat. Several of them received a message on their phones that game had been shot on the island.
Meanwhile the most important question is: HAVE YOU MADE A TRIP TO ICELAND WITH THIS BOAT??! SINCE POLICE WAS NOT ABLE TO USE THAT, so why?!!!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/589
Near all issues with the boats the policed had ...
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
MS Thorbjørn er godkendt til 50 passagerer, men de ombordværende sejler i sikkerhed på bagsiden af Utøya uden at hjælpe de omkring 200, som snart efter forsøger at svømme fra øen. De bliver i stedet reddet af af folk, der trodser Breiviks kugler og sejler ud i små både fra landsiden https://perma.cc/65A5-2TSY
The ferry MS Thorbjørn sails from Utøya. On board are six participants from the summer camp – among them AUF leader Eskil Pedersen. In addition, the ship's captain and a crew of two are on board the ferry. MS Thorbjørn is approved for 50 passengers, but those on board sail to safety at the back of Utøya without helping the 200 or so who soon after try to swim off the island. They are instead rescued by people who defy Breivik's bullets and sail out in small boats from the land side.
Hjetland var om bord på MS «Thorbjørn» sammen med daværende AUF-leder Eskil Pedersen og syv andre som kom seg vekk fra øya med fergen mens skytingen pågikk 22. juli https://perma.cc/S9R3-7NKG
Hjetland was on board the MS "Thorbjørn" together with then AUF leader Eskil Pedersen and seven others who got away from the island by ferry while the shooting was taking place on 22 July.
MS «Thorbjørn» forlot Utøya rundt 17.30, et kvarters tid etter at Anders Behring Breivik kom i land. Mens skipperen styrte fergen, lå de åtte andre flatt i bunnen av båten. Flere av dem fikk melding på telefonene sine om at det ble skutt vilt på øya.
MS "Thorbjørn" left Utøya around 17.30, a quarter of an hour after Anders Behring Breivik came ashore. While the skipper steered the ferry, the other eight lay flat in the bottom of the boat. Several of them received a message on their phones that game had been shot on the island.
Meanwhile the most important question is: HAVE YOU MADE A TRIP TO ICELAND WITH THIS BOAT??! SINCE POLICE WAS NOT ABLE TO USE THAT, so why?!!!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/589
Near all issues with the boats the policed had ...
Norway and Germany - an organisational disaster Part 6
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
Ni personer rømte med ferja mens skytingen pågikk.
Jeg tror jeg handlet slik folk gjør i slike situasjoner. Man handler på instinkt.
Nine people escaped by ferry while the shooting was going on.
I think I acted as people do in such situations? Do you mean like Schettino?!
If you left at 17.25 - 17.30
https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/35
https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/33
and Breivik was in another place ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/344
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/700
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/919
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/589
even if all maps show a bit different things ..
No matter what, the real question is, what happened to the boat???!
20 minutes later: To betjente fra Nordre Buskerud politidistrikt ankommer som de første til færgelejet ved Utvika https://perma.cc/E5PD-SP9U
Two officers from the Nordre Buskerud police district are the first to arrive at the ferry berth at Utvika.
De får først at vide, at de ikke skal tage ud til Utøya – at de i stedet skal blive på land og observere. Næste ordre går på, at de skal gøre sig klar til at blive hentet af politiets egen båd og deltage i indsatsstyrkens aktion på Utøya.
They are first told that they should not go out to Utøya – that they should instead stay on land and observe. The next order is for them to get ready to be picked up by the police's own boat and participate in the task force's action on Utøya.
Den endelige ordre bliver dog, at de skal blive på kajen og sørge for, at ambulancerne kan nå frem. Betjentene er bevæbnede med pistol og maskinpistol og iført skudsikre veste.
However, the final order is that they must stay on the dock and ensure that the ambulances can arrive. The officers are armed with pistols and submachine guns and wear bulletproof vests.
30 minutes later: Tungtbevæbnede Delta-styrker ankommer til kajanlægget ved Utvika ud for Utøya efter først at være kørt for langt.
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
Ni personer rømte med ferja mens skytingen pågikk.
Jeg tror jeg handlet slik folk gjør i slike situasjoner. Man handler på instinkt.
Nine people escaped by ferry while the shooting was going on.
I think I acted as people do in such situations? Do you mean like Schettino?!
If you left at 17.25 - 17.30
https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/35
https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/33
and Breivik was in another place ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/344
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/700
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/919
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/589
even if all maps show a bit different things ..
No matter what, the real question is, what happened to the boat???!
20 minutes later: To betjente fra Nordre Buskerud politidistrikt ankommer som de første til færgelejet ved Utvika https://perma.cc/E5PD-SP9U
Two officers from the Nordre Buskerud police district are the first to arrive at the ferry berth at Utvika.
De får først at vide, at de ikke skal tage ud til Utøya – at de i stedet skal blive på land og observere. Næste ordre går på, at de skal gøre sig klar til at blive hentet af politiets egen båd og deltage i indsatsstyrkens aktion på Utøya.
They are first told that they should not go out to Utøya – that they should instead stay on land and observe. The next order is for them to get ready to be picked up by the police's own boat and participate in the task force's action on Utøya.
Den endelige ordre bliver dog, at de skal blive på kajen og sørge for, at ambulancerne kan nå frem. Betjentene er bevæbnede med pistol og maskinpistol og iført skudsikre veste.
However, the final order is that they must stay on the dock and ensure that the ambulances can arrive. The officers are armed with pistols and submachine guns and wear bulletproof vests.
30 minutes later: Tungtbevæbnede Delta-styrker ankommer til kajanlægget ved Utvika ud for Utøya efter først at være kørt for langt.
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Telephone call between Costa Concordia Captain and Italian Coast Guard (ENGLISH SUB)
Norway and Germany - an organisational disaster Part 7
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
30 minutes later: Heavily armed Delta forces arrive at the quay facility at Utvika off Utøya after initially driving too far.
Kampklare politifolk er parat til at sejle over, men har på det tidspunkt ingen båd. De ender efter nogen forvirring med at køre længere nordpå til et mødested ved Storøya. Senere kommer det frem, at der er både tilgængelige ved campingpladsen 700 meter væk https://perma.cc/E5PD-SP9U
Combat-ready policemen are prepared to sail over, but at that time have no boat.
After some confusion, they end up driving further north to a meeting point at Storøya. Later it emerges that there are boats available at the campsite 700 meters away.
NORWEGIAN SCHETTINO; WHERE IS THE BOAT????!!!
Where the fuck is MS "Thorbjørn"?!
Ved Sundvollen, 3,7 km fra Utøya, finder Delta-styrkerne en rød gummibåd. Efter godt 400 meter trænger der vand ind i båden, der får motorstop. To motorbåde ankommer, og Deltastyrkerne fordeler sig i stedet i dem.
At Sundvollen, 3.7 km from Utøya, the Delta forces find a red rubber boat. After about 400 metres, water enters the boat and the engine stops. Two speedboats arrive, and the Delta forces deploy in them instead.
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/589
1 hour later: Breivik taler med politiet for anden og sidste gang. Han beder om at blive stillet videre til operationslederen i beredskabsenheden, men samtalen bliver afbrudt, og politiet kan ikke ringe tilbage.
Breivik speaks to the police for the second and last time. He asks to be put through to the operations manager in the emergency unit, but the conversation is interrupted and the police cannot call back.
https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/18
De fire første politifolk fra Delta-gruppen går i land på Utøya hjulpet af en sejler i en civil båd. Efter at have talt med nogle af de unge bevæger politifolkene sig mod Kafebygget, hvor de unge har set en gerningsmand iklædt politiuniform.
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
30 minutes later: Heavily armed Delta forces arrive at the quay facility at Utvika off Utøya after initially driving too far.
Kampklare politifolk er parat til at sejle over, men har på det tidspunkt ingen båd. De ender efter nogen forvirring med at køre længere nordpå til et mødested ved Storøya. Senere kommer det frem, at der er både tilgængelige ved campingpladsen 700 meter væk https://perma.cc/E5PD-SP9U
Combat-ready policemen are prepared to sail over, but at that time have no boat.
After some confusion, they end up driving further north to a meeting point at Storøya. Later it emerges that there are boats available at the campsite 700 meters away.
NORWEGIAN SCHETTINO; WHERE IS THE BOAT????!!!
Where the fuck is MS "Thorbjørn"?!
Ved Sundvollen, 3,7 km fra Utøya, finder Delta-styrkerne en rød gummibåd. Efter godt 400 meter trænger der vand ind i båden, der får motorstop. To motorbåde ankommer, og Deltastyrkerne fordeler sig i stedet i dem.
At Sundvollen, 3.7 km from Utøya, the Delta forces find a red rubber boat. After about 400 metres, water enters the boat and the engine stops. Two speedboats arrive, and the Delta forces deploy in them instead.
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/589
1 hour later: Breivik taler med politiet for anden og sidste gang. Han beder om at blive stillet videre til operationslederen i beredskabsenheden, men samtalen bliver afbrudt, og politiet kan ikke ringe tilbage.
Breivik speaks to the police for the second and last time. He asks to be put through to the operations manager in the emergency unit, but the conversation is interrupted and the police cannot call back.
https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/18
De fire første politifolk fra Delta-gruppen går i land på Utøya hjulpet af en sejler i en civil båd. Efter at have talt med nogle af de unge bevæger politifolkene sig mod Kafebygget, hvor de unge har set en gerningsmand iklædt politiuniform.
Norway and Germany - an organisational disaster Part 8
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
1 hour after 🇳🇴 Schettino Eskil Pedersen left Utøya
The first four policemen from the Delta group go ashore on Utøya helped by a sailor in a civilian boat. After talking to some of the young people, the police move towards the Kafebygget, where the young people have seen a perpetrator dressed in a police uniform.
Det er lett å si at det er det folk ville gjort, at de fleste ville flyktet fra stedet. Men dette var lederen for gruppa på øya. Det er som om kapteinen forlater skuta, sier Ihler https://perma.cc/7P97-LL6L
It's easy to say that's what people would do, that most would flee the place. But this was the leader of the group on the island. It is as if the captain is leaving the ship, says Ihler.
No matter what, the question about the boat is much more important! If police could use such boat ... BUT IT WAS NOT THE CASE AT ALL!
Det ene alternativet var at jeg gikk og konfronterte skytteren. Jeg tror vi alle forstår hvilket resultat det ville blitt. Det andre alternativet var å gjemme seg. Da ville det vært umulig for meg å ringe mine kontakter for å bidra til en raskere mobilisering, sier Pedersen.
The only option was for me to go and confront the shooter. I think we all understand what the outcome would be. The other option was to hide. Then it would be impossible for me to call my contacts to contribute to faster mobilization, says Pedersen.
The first option MAKE NO SENSE AT ALL (except if you have weapons)! Is not Costa Concordia ... but is still not an excuses to left kids alone on Utøya.
How exactly do you have contributed to "faster mobilization", if Utøya rescue was just an EPIC FAIL!
You could still help other people (for example by waiting a bit more) or bring the boat to the police! which was NOT the case ... you could even return back to Utøya. We need to remember there were two police officers
https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/37 ...
Det er umulig å gå tilbake i tid når vi i etterkant har alle svarene
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
1 hour after 🇳🇴 Schettino Eskil Pedersen left Utøya
The first four policemen from the Delta group go ashore on Utøya helped by a sailor in a civilian boat. After talking to some of the young people, the police move towards the Kafebygget, where the young people have seen a perpetrator dressed in a police uniform.
Det er lett å si at det er det folk ville gjort, at de fleste ville flyktet fra stedet. Men dette var lederen for gruppa på øya. Det er som om kapteinen forlater skuta, sier Ihler https://perma.cc/7P97-LL6L
It's easy to say that's what people would do, that most would flee the place. But this was the leader of the group on the island. It is as if the captain is leaving the ship, says Ihler.
No matter what, the question about the boat is much more important! If police could use such boat ... BUT IT WAS NOT THE CASE AT ALL!
Det ene alternativet var at jeg gikk og konfronterte skytteren. Jeg tror vi alle forstår hvilket resultat det ville blitt. Det andre alternativet var å gjemme seg. Da ville det vært umulig for meg å ringe mine kontakter for å bidra til en raskere mobilisering, sier Pedersen.
The only option was for me to go and confront the shooter. I think we all understand what the outcome would be. The other option was to hide. Then it would be impossible for me to call my contacts to contribute to faster mobilization, says Pedersen.
The first option MAKE NO SENSE AT ALL (except if you have weapons)! Is not Costa Concordia ... but is still not an excuses to left kids alone on Utøya.
How exactly do you have contributed to "faster mobilization", if Utøya rescue was just an EPIC FAIL!
You could still help other people (for example by waiting a bit more) or bring the boat to the police! which was NOT the case ... you could even return back to Utøya. We need to remember there were two police officers
https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/37 ...
Det er umulig å gå tilbake i tid når vi i etterkant har alle svarene
Norway and Germany - an organisational disaster Part 9
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
MS Thorbjørn la om kurs mot nord og gradvis forsvant ut av syne.
MS Thorbjørn changed course to the north and gradually disappeared from sight.
YES EXACTLY!!!!!!!!!!!! WTF
«Det kan ikke ha vært lenge etter at jeg oppdaget «MS Thorbjørn» ute i fjorden, midt i ferjeleie. Båten så tom ut. Den drev sakte mot landssiden. Det lå et håp i å se den. Noen hadde kommet seg unna. Det betydde jo også at noen ville komme tilbake. Var det derfor den hadde stoppet opp? Da den istedenfor å snu eller fortsette inn til brygga, brått la om kurs mot nord og gradvis forsvant ut av syne, var det ikke til å fatte. Skjedde det noe på landsiden? Hvorfor la den ikke til? Vi var fanget på øy med en mann som ville drepe oss. «MS Thorbjørn» var vårt eneste håp for å komme oss vekk og nå hadde den forlatt oss. Våt, kald og alene - fra min plass på steinen virket Utøya nå som det mest forlatte stedet på jordens overflate», skriver Pracon.
"It cannot have been long after I discovered "MS Thorbjørn" out in the fjord, in the middle of the ferry berth. The boat looked empty. It drifted slowly towards the land side. There was hope in seeing it. Some had gotten away. It also meant that someone would come back. Was that why it had stopped? When, instead of turning around or continuing to the jetty, it suddenly changed course to the north and gradually disappeared from sight, it was unbelievable. Did something happen on the land side? Why didn't it add? We were trapped on an island with a man who wanted to kill us. "MS Thorbjørn" was our only hope to get away and now it had left us. Wet, cold and alone - from my place on the rock, Utøya now seemed like the most abandoned place on the face of the earth", writes Pracon.
It is impossible to go back in time when we have all the answers afterwards https://perma.cc/7P97-LL6L
Eskil Pedersen er en tidligere politiker for Arbeiderpartiet som var leder i Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AUF) fra 2010 til 2014.
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
MS Thorbjørn la om kurs mot nord og gradvis forsvant ut av syne.
MS Thorbjørn changed course to the north and gradually disappeared from sight.
YES EXACTLY!!!!!!!!!!!! WTF
«Det kan ikke ha vært lenge etter at jeg oppdaget «MS Thorbjørn» ute i fjorden, midt i ferjeleie. Båten så tom ut. Den drev sakte mot landssiden. Det lå et håp i å se den. Noen hadde kommet seg unna. Det betydde jo også at noen ville komme tilbake. Var det derfor den hadde stoppet opp? Da den istedenfor å snu eller fortsette inn til brygga, brått la om kurs mot nord og gradvis forsvant ut av syne, var det ikke til å fatte. Skjedde det noe på landsiden? Hvorfor la den ikke til? Vi var fanget på øy med en mann som ville drepe oss. «MS Thorbjørn» var vårt eneste håp for å komme oss vekk og nå hadde den forlatt oss. Våt, kald og alene - fra min plass på steinen virket Utøya nå som det mest forlatte stedet på jordens overflate», skriver Pracon.
"It cannot have been long after I discovered "MS Thorbjørn" out in the fjord, in the middle of the ferry berth. The boat looked empty. It drifted slowly towards the land side. There was hope in seeing it. Some had gotten away. It also meant that someone would come back. Was that why it had stopped? When, instead of turning around or continuing to the jetty, it suddenly changed course to the north and gradually disappeared from sight, it was unbelievable. Did something happen on the land side? Why didn't it add? We were trapped on an island with a man who wanted to kill us. "MS Thorbjørn" was our only hope to get away and now it had left us. Wet, cold and alone - from my place on the rock, Utøya now seemed like the most abandoned place on the face of the earth", writes Pracon.
It is impossible to go back in time when we have all the answers afterwards https://perma.cc/7P97-LL6L
Eskil Pedersen er en tidligere politiker for Arbeiderpartiet som var leder i Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AUF) fra 2010 til 2014.
Norway and Germany - an organisational disaster Part 10
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
Eskil Pedersen is a former politician for the Labor Party who was LEADER of Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AUF) from 2010 to 2014 https://perma.cc/SXR4-L8NC
It is impossible to go back ... DIMISSIONS? Taking responsibility? Obviously nope! Like no one in Norway took responsibility for the disaster they did before, during and after the attack!
WHICH IS A SHAME!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/HumanRightsChecklist/128
Because yes, from one side we need to learn ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/LearnWithNorway
but we need to take responsibility, not just "i'm sorry" ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/SoSorryTelegram/23
Otherwise every criminal could just say "sorry" and we fixed issues! Let we remember that Norway failed in so many things ... some things we still need to write ....
Let we remember even the topic abortion ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/HumanRightAbuse/40
https://news.1rj.ru/str/BreivikSex/6
Ok, let we go back to Germany ...
As you can see, both Germany and Norway had an EPIC fail about phone support, where Germany learned anything from Norway.
Ist nach Kenntnis der Bunderegierung bei der Polizei in Hanau mittler- weile ein Überleitungssystem für Notrufe eingerichtet worden, und wenn nein, warum nicht?
Hierzu liegen der Bundesregierung keine Erkenntnisse vor.
Welche Erkenntnisse hat die Bundesregierung bezüglich des Umstandes, dass der Täter nach Beginn seines Anschlags sehr lange Zeit, scheinbar unbehelligt, durch die Stadt laufen und fahren und weitere Taten ausüben konnte, ohne dass die Polizei ihn daran hinderte, und das, obwohl die Polizeiwache nur wenige hundert Meter vom ersten Tatort entfernt lag?
Die Bundesregierung nimmt keine Bewertung landespolizeilicher Einsatzmaßnahmen vor (wie die meisten Antworten)
Bundesregierung macht also einfach nichts ...
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
Eskil Pedersen is a former politician for the Labor Party who was LEADER of Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AUF) from 2010 to 2014 https://perma.cc/SXR4-L8NC
It is impossible to go back ... DIMISSIONS? Taking responsibility? Obviously nope! Like no one in Norway took responsibility for the disaster they did before, during and after the attack!
WHICH IS A SHAME!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/HumanRightsChecklist/128
Because yes, from one side we need to learn ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/LearnWithNorway
but we need to take responsibility, not just "i'm sorry" ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/SoSorryTelegram/23
Otherwise every criminal could just say "sorry" and we fixed issues! Let we remember that Norway failed in so many things ... some things we still need to write ....
Let we remember even the topic abortion ...
https://news.1rj.ru/str/HumanRightAbuse/40
https://news.1rj.ru/str/BreivikSex/6
Ok, let we go back to Germany ...
As you can see, both Germany and Norway had an EPIC fail about phone support, where Germany learned anything from Norway.
Ist nach Kenntnis der Bunderegierung bei der Polizei in Hanau mittler- weile ein Überleitungssystem für Notrufe eingerichtet worden, und wenn nein, warum nicht?
Hierzu liegen der Bundesregierung keine Erkenntnisse vor.
Welche Erkenntnisse hat die Bundesregierung bezüglich des Umstandes, dass der Täter nach Beginn seines Anschlags sehr lange Zeit, scheinbar unbehelligt, durch die Stadt laufen und fahren und weitere Taten ausüben konnte, ohne dass die Polizei ihn daran hinderte, und das, obwohl die Polizeiwache nur wenige hundert Meter vom ersten Tatort entfernt lag?
Die Bundesregierung nimmt keine Bewertung landespolizeilicher Einsatzmaßnahmen vor (wie die meisten Antworten)
Bundesregierung macht also einfach nichts ...
Norway and Germany - an organisational disaster Part 15
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
Part 11 https://news.1rj.ru/str/HanauBreivik/25
Bei einem optimalen Gesprächsverlauf hätte Vili-Viorel Păun von der weiteren Verfolgung abgesehen und vermutlich überlebt. Abschließend lässt sich diese Frage durch den Ausschuss nicht mit hinreichender Wahrscheinlichkeit beantworten.
Der Untersuchungsausschuss stellt weiter fest, dass selbst wenn Vili- Viorel Păun den Notruf erreicht hätte, der Anschlag am zweiten Tatort nicht hätte verhindert werden können.
—> Doesn't matter if the second attack would not be fixed, because maybe 2020 the situation was so, in 2025 the situation is different by having same issues! no matter which country! Exactly like it happened in Norway!!!!
Ob es bei den drei Anrufversuchen von Vili-Viorel Păun zu einem Verbindungsaufbau kam, konnte nicht abschließend geklärt werden. Ebenso konnte nicht festgestellt werden, in welcher Funkzelle das Signal des Mobiltelefons von Vili-Viorel Păun einging.
Ob Vili-Viorel Păun bei seinen Anrufversuchen ein Freizeichen, ein Besetztzeichen oder Stille hörte, konnte ebenfalls nicht geklärt werden. Die Dauer der Anwahlversuche von Vili-Viorel Păun hätte auch bei einem eingerichteten Notrufüberlauf nicht dazu geführt, dass seine Anrufe weitergeleitet worden wären.
Der Notrufüberlauf greift nach einer Wartezeit von 60Sekunden. Diese erreichte Vili-Viorel Păun bei keinem seiner Versuche. Der längste Anrufversuch von Vili-Viorel Păun betrug 39 Sekunden.
Der Grundsatz „Ein Notruf muss immer funktionieren“ muss ausnahmslos und überall in Hessen gewährt werden.
Für außergewöhnliche Situationen, wie es das Anschlagsgeschehen in Hanau am 19. Februar 2020 darstellte, muss weiterhin eine Notfall-Strategie festgelegt werden, um eine Unterbesetzung eines Notrufs auf einzelnen Polizeistation künftig zu vermeiden.
Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors/25
Part 11 https://news.1rj.ru/str/HanauBreivik/25
Bei einem optimalen Gesprächsverlauf hätte Vili-Viorel Păun von der weiteren Verfolgung abgesehen und vermutlich überlebt. Abschließend lässt sich diese Frage durch den Ausschuss nicht mit hinreichender Wahrscheinlichkeit beantworten.
Der Untersuchungsausschuss stellt weiter fest, dass selbst wenn Vili- Viorel Păun den Notruf erreicht hätte, der Anschlag am zweiten Tatort nicht hätte verhindert werden können.
—> Doesn't matter if the second attack would not be fixed, because maybe 2020 the situation was so, in 2025 the situation is different by having same issues! no matter which country! Exactly like it happened in Norway!!!!
Ob es bei den drei Anrufversuchen von Vili-Viorel Păun zu einem Verbindungsaufbau kam, konnte nicht abschließend geklärt werden. Ebenso konnte nicht festgestellt werden, in welcher Funkzelle das Signal des Mobiltelefons von Vili-Viorel Păun einging.
Ob Vili-Viorel Păun bei seinen Anrufversuchen ein Freizeichen, ein Besetztzeichen oder Stille hörte, konnte ebenfalls nicht geklärt werden. Die Dauer der Anwahlversuche von Vili-Viorel Păun hätte auch bei einem eingerichteten Notrufüberlauf nicht dazu geführt, dass seine Anrufe weitergeleitet worden wären.
Der Notrufüberlauf greift nach einer Wartezeit von 60Sekunden. Diese erreichte Vili-Viorel Păun bei keinem seiner Versuche. Der längste Anrufversuch von Vili-Viorel Păun betrug 39 Sekunden.
Der Grundsatz „Ein Notruf muss immer funktionieren“ muss ausnahmslos und überall in Hessen gewährt werden.
Für außergewöhnliche Situationen, wie es das Anschlagsgeschehen in Hanau am 19. Februar 2020 darstellte, muss weiterhin eine Notfall-Strategie festgelegt werden, um eine Unterbesetzung eines Notrufs auf einzelnen Polizeistation künftig zu vermeiden.
NEVER EVER FORGET SUCH WORDS!
Because you cannot say "we are not ready", "we never imagined that", "it's not possible this happens here"!
If you think in such way YOU HAVE UNDERSTAND ANYTHING ABOUT TERRORISM! and you learned ANYTHING from the past
https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors
https://news.1rj.ru/str/HanauBreivik
https://news.1rj.ru/str/LearnWithNorway
exactly like Israel!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/IsraelFestival/647
Because you cannot say "we are not ready", "we never imagined that", "it's not possible this happens here"!
If you think in such way YOU HAVE UNDERSTAND ANYTHING ABOUT TERRORISM! and you learned ANYTHING from the past
https://news.1rj.ru/str/NorwayErrors
https://news.1rj.ru/str/HanauBreivik
https://news.1rj.ru/str/LearnWithNorway
exactly like Israel!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/IsraelFestival/647