Yes, Israel is able to do "self terrorism" too

This is the consequence of not respecting rules.

22 years later? They still don't respect rules!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/IsraelInnocent
https://news.1rj.ru/str/IsraelWarRights
https://news.1rj.ru/str/PalestinaGenocide

Even related to animals!!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/IsraelPollution/151
https://news.1rj.ru/str/IsraelPollution/215
https://news.1rj.ru/str/IsraelPollution/225
https://news.1rj.ru/str/EcocideTelegram
https://news.1rj.ru/str/MissionEcocide
etc.

They will never learn ....

Backup by @TerrorismTelegram
A @grttme project - Other backups: https://swiy.co/tgme

Tg La7 - Edizione delle ore 13.30 del 23/07/2011

Backup by @TerrorismTelegram
A @grttme project - Other backups: https://swiy.co/tgme

El Parlamento Europeo señala a Rusia como Estado promotor del terrorismo

Backup by @TerrorismTelegram
A @grttme project - Other backups: https://swiy.co/tgme

Norway - an organisational disaster

One thing we agree with Breivik 2000%! and other foreigners in Norway too ...
Norway is too "good" and liberal ... which is not ok at all, like we said in the past
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/359
but then it still depends what you mean with "liberal" ... at the end even in Norway human rights are still missing and other things are not perfect ...

22. juli plasserte Anders Behring Breivik uhindret sin bil lastet med en bombe på 950 kilo helt inntil hovedblokken i regjeringskvartalet. To måneder etterpå er det ingenting som hindrer kjøretøy fra å passere og stanse bare en armlengdes avstand fra Stortinget.

On 22 July, Anders Behring Breivik unhindered placed his car loaded with a 950 kilogram bomb right up to the main block in the government quarter. Two months later, there is nothing to prevent vehicles from passing and stopping just an arm's length away from the Storting.

VG har undersøkt tilstanden i Beredskaps-Norge. Manglene er omfattende, både når det gjelder organisering, utstyr og trening.

VG has investigated the situation in Beredskaps-Norge. The shortcomings are extensive, both in terms of organisation, equipment and training.

Vi nærmer oss en kritisk grense. Innen få år må politikerne ta stilling til om de skal ha denne strukturen eller krympe Sivilforsvaret ytterligere, sier Jon A. Lea, sjef for Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap, som er ansvarlig for driften av Sivilforsvaret, til VG.

We are approaching a critical limit. Within a few years, the politicians will have to decide whether they should have this structure or shrink the Civil Defense further, says Jon A. Lea, head of the Directorate for Community Security and Preparedness, which is responsible for the operation of the Civil Defence, to VG.

Politihelikopteret i Oslo kan bare fly 900 timer i året, eller 2,5 timer om dagen. 22. juli var hele mannskapet på ferie.

The police helicopter in Oslo can only fly 900 hours a year, or 2.5 hours a day. On 22 July, the entire crew was on holiday.

Norway - an organisational disaster Part 2

Part 1 https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598

Forsvarets 720-skvadron, som var knyttet opp til Forsvarets spesialkommando, er skviset til beinet som følge av helikoptrene som er utplassert i Afghanistan.

The Norwegian Armed Forces' 720 squadron, which was linked to the Norwegian Armed Forces' special command, has been squeezed to the bone as a result of the helicopters deployed in Afghanistan.

Samarbeidet mellom politi og forsvar er tungrodd. Fra politiet ber om bistand, må henvendelsen gjennom fire ledd - og så tilbake igjen, før man får et svar.

Cooperation between the police and the defense is difficult. From the time the police ask for assistance, the inquiry must go through four sections - and then back again, before you get an answer.

- Norges eneste politihelikopter har fløyet drøye 300 timer hittil i år, og har hatt «nedetid» på over 60 prosent. Halvparten av tiden på bakken skyldes personellmangel, som følge av ubesatte stillinger, permisjoner, sykdom, kurs, pålagt fri og ferie.

Norway's only police helicopter has flown just over 300 hours so far this year, and has had "downtime" of over 60 per cent. Half of the time on the ground is due to personnel shortages, as a result of unfilled positions, leave, illness, courses, required time off and holidays.

Kravet til størrelsen på utrykningsenheten i landets 27 politidistrikter er bare åtte mann. Det er tilfeldig når de er på jobb. Det finnes ingen bakvaktordning. Utrykningsenheten er spesialtrent på skarpe oppdrag.

The requirement for the size of the emergency unit in the country's 27 police districts is only eight men. It is random when they are at work. There is no rearguard system. The emergency unit is specially trained for sharp missions.

Bemanning: Fagforeningene i politiet har lenge hevdet at antall operative politifolk er redusert de siste årene. Politiets Fellesforbund mener at mangelen på synlig politi er blitt et stort problem.

Norway - an organisational disaster Part 3

Part 1 https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598

Staffing: The police unions have long claimed that the number of operational police officers has been reduced in recent years. The Norwegian Police Federation believes that the lack of visible police has become a major problem.

Båtberedskap: Bare 13 av 27 politibåter landet rundt, er operative.

Fredag 22. juli tok det over en time før det ble sendt ut riksalarm, og det tok to timer og 40 minutter før Kripos beordret grensene stengt.

Boat readiness: Only 13 out of 27 police boats around the country are operational.

On Friday 22 July, it took over an hour before the national alert was sent out, and it took two hours and 40 minutes before Kripos ordered the borders closed.

Sivilforsvaret har lenge vært prioritert av justissektoren, men fortsatt mangler styrken kjøretøy, uniformer, tepper og telt.- Bilparken består av mange veteranbiler, som de ansatte nekter å bruke.- I 2009 avslo Justisdepartementet å finansiere NARRE, databasen med oversikt over alle tilgjengelige redningsressurser. De 12 millionene prosjektet kostet skulle i stedet gå til Sivilforsvaret.

Civil defense has long been a priority for the justice sector, but the force still lacks vehicles, uniforms, blankets and tents. - The car park consists of many vintage cars, which the employees refuse to use. - In 2009, the Ministry of Justice refused to fund NARRE, the database with an overview of all available rescue resources . The 12 million the project cost was instead to go to the Civil Defense.

Et felles Nødnett for alle redningsetatene skulle være på plass i 2007. Nå, fire år etter, er systemet bare innført rundt Oslofjorden.

A joint emergency network for all rescue agencies was supposed to be in place in 2007. Now, four years later, the system has only been introduced around the Oslofjord.

Norway - an organisational disaster Part 4

Det er lange og tidkrevende kommandolinjer mellom politi og forsvar. Politiets anmodning om bistand fra Forsvaret må gjennom en kommandokjede fra politimesteren via Politidirektoratet, Justisdepartementet, Forsvarsdepartementet, Forsvarets Operative Hovedkvarter og til rett avdeling - for så å gå samme kronglete vei tilbake.

There are long and time-consuming lines of command between the police and defence. The police's request for assistance from the Armed Forces must go through a chain of command from the Chief of Police via the Police Directorate, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces' Operational Headquarters and to the right department - and then go back the same tortuous path.

Det finnes ingen beredskap eller bakvaktordning for helikopter og transportfly i Forsvaret utenom normal arbeidstid.

There is no emergency response or rear-guard arrangement for helicopters and transport aircraft in the Armed Forces outside of normal working hours.

22. juli tok det flere timer før Slottet og Stortinget ble sikret mot nye angrep.

On 22 July, it took several hours before the Palace and the Storting were secured against new attacks.

Heimevernets spesialavdeling ble nedlagt i 2010. Avdelingen hadde opprinnelig et spesielt ansvar for objektsikring i tilfelle terroranslag.

The Home Guard's special department was closed in 2010. The department originally had a special responsibility for object security in the event of a terrorist attack.

Det er krav om at alle landets brannmannskaper skal være sertifisert innen juli 2012. Fortsatt mangler 4000 brannfolk denne sertifiseringen, og tidsfristen vil sprekke.

There is a requirement that all of the country's fire crews must be certified by July 2012. 4,000 firefighters still lack this certification, and the deadline will lapse.

Mange av datasystemene politiet bruker er gått ut på dato og fungerer dårlig. Flere av politiets datasystemer «snakker ikke med hverandre».

Norway - an organisational disaster Part 5

Mange av datasystemene politiet bruker er gått ut på dato og fungerer dårlig. Flere av politiets datasystemer «snakker ikke med hverandre».

Many of the computer systems used by the police are out of date and work poorly. Several of the police's computer systems "don't talk to each other".

Det er begrenset antall nødlinjer inn til politiets operasjonssentraler. I Hønefoss kunne politiet bare svare på to samtaler til nødnummeret samtidig.

There is a limited number of emergency lines to the police operation centres. In Hønefoss, the police could only answer two calls to the emergency number at the same time.

Regjeringen varslet ønsket om felles nødnummer 112 og felles nødsentraler allerede i 2008, men har fortsatt ikke vedtatt. dette formelt.

The government announced its desire for a joint emergency number 112 and joint emergency centers already in 2008, but has still not adopted it. this formally https://perma.cc/6EJC-UCBA

Ogsa Asker og Bærum politidistrikt mottok et økt antall 112-anrop 22/7. Sju anrop ble besvart mellom 17 og 18, mens sju forble ubesvart i samme tidsrom. 78 prosent av de i alt 46 anrop distriktet mottok etter kl. 13.00, ble besvart.

Asker and Bærum police district also received an increased number of 112 calls on 22/7. Seven calls were answered between 17 and 18, while seven remained unanswered during the same period. 78 percent of the total of 46 calls the district received after 13.00, was answered.

I alt ble det registrert 780 anrop til 112 mellom kl. 13.00 og 23.00, hvorav 554 ble besvart (71 prosent).
Selv om tallet er høyt, er det lavt sammenlignet med det man har sett ved terrorhendelser i andre større byer. I Madrid registrerte man om lag 22 000 innkommende nødanrop de første 16 timene etter bombeeksplosjonen i 2004.

A total of 780 calls to 112 were registered between 13.00 and 23.00, of which 554 were answered (71 per cent).
Although the number is high, it is low compared to what has been seen in other major terrorist incidents

Norway - an organisational disaster Part 6

Part 1 https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598

OPD har kapasitet til a ha ndtere 60 samtidige nødanrop i en felles kø, og det er derfor i hoved- sak antall operatører ved operasjonssentralen som er begrensende for om den nødstilte fa r svar eller ikke.

The OPD has the capacity to handle 60 simultaneous emergency calls in a common queue, and it is therefore mainly the number of operators at the operations center that is limiting as to whether the person in emergency receives an answer or not.

Komiteen vil påpeke at det har kommet frem at politiet sviktet på mange områder den 22. juli 2011 https://perma.cc/398H-BTW2

The committee would like to point out that it has emerged that the police failed in many areas on 22 July 2011.

Komiteens flertall, medlemmene fra Fremskrittspartiet, Høyre, Kristelig Folkeparti og Venstre, viser til atinformasjonen som regjeringen ga i noen sentrale tilfeller var divergerende med 22. juli-kommisjonens funn

The majority of the committee, the members from the Progressive Party, the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Liberal Party, point to the fact that the information that the government gave in some key cases was divergent with the 22 July commission's findings

Det gjelder avgjørende spørsmål om myndighetenes håndtering av angrepet, som tilgangen på båter ved Utøya, politihelikopteret, riksalarm og innkalling av ekstra mannskaper, der det gjennomgående ble skapt et inntrykk av at justissektoren hadde gjort en bedre innsats enn det kommisjonen fant var tilfellet.

It concerns crucial questions about the authorities' handling of the attack, such as the access to boats at Utøya, the police helicopter, the national alarm and the calling in of extra crews, where the impression was consistently created that the justice sector had made a better effort than what the commission found to be the case.

Norway - an organisational disaster Part 7

Part 1 https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598

Breivik forklarer at han får opptattsignaler 2-3 ganger hos politiet når han ringer for å overgi seg. Massemorderen ringte to ganger fra Utøya: Først klokken 18, så klokken 18.26.

Breivik explains that he gets busy signals 2-3 times from the police when he calls to surrender. The mass murderer called twice from Utøya: First at 6pm, then at 6.26pm https://perma.cc/3WD6-V79E

Politiet bekrefter dermed deler av forklaringen til Breivik, som har sagt i avhør at han ringte nødnummeret 112 til politiet ti ganger under massakren på Utøya for å si at han ville overgi seg.

The police thus confirm parts of Breivik's explanation, who has said in questioning that he called the emergency number 112 to the police ten times during the massacre on Utøya to say he wanted to surrender https://perma.cc/V5MK-BLF5

Lydloggene viser at Breivik to ganger kom fram til nødtelefonen for å varsle at han hadde «utført oppdraget» og var villig til å overgi seg.

The audio logs show that Breivik came to the emergency phone twice to announce that he had "accomplished the mission" and was willing to surrender.

🥷 Breivik: Kan du, kan du overføre meg til operasjonsleder for Delta?

🚔 Politiet: Ja, du du snakker for så vidt meg en som, med en som på en måte har overordnet ansva

Breivik: Ok, bare finn ut det du skal, og så ringer du på denne telefonen her, ikke sant.

Politiet: Hm, men hvilket telefonnummer..?

Breivik: Kjempefint, hei.

Politiet: Jeg har ikke det telefonnummeret! Hallo!

🥷 Breivik: Can you, can you transfer me to operations manager for Delta? 👍

🚔 The police: Yes, as far as I'm concerned, you're talking to someone who, in a way, has overall responsibility

Breivik: Okay, just figure out what you're going to do, and then you call this phone here, right. 🧠💡

Police: Hm, but which phone number..? 🤦‍♂️ ... WTF ... Police not able to see the number ...

Breivik: Great, hello.

Police: I don't have that phone number! Hello!

Norway - an organisational disaster Part 8

Part 1 https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598

Dette er en følge av at utbyggingsomra dene i første byggetrinn følger politidistrikt og ikke AMK- omra der. Utøya ligger i nordre Buskerud, der Nødnett ikke er utbygd. I dette omra det benyt­
ter hjemmehørende ressurser fra helsetjenesten og de andre nødetatene egne etatsvise analoge sambandsnett. Ambulansetjenesten som opererer i grenseomra det, har utstyr og kompetanse til a kommunisere over begge radionettene. Mange av ressursene som kom for a bista i hendelsen, benyt­ tet Nødnett som hovedsamband, mens andre var i det analoge helseradionettet. Nødnett hadde bare

This is a consequence of the fact that the development areas in the first construction stage follow police districts and not AMK areas. Utøya is located in northern Buskerud, where Nødnett has not been developed. In this area use
ter resident resources from the health service and the other emergency services own agency-wise analogue communication networks. The ambulance service that operates in the border area has the equipment and expertise to communicate over both radio networks. Many of the resources that came to assist in the incident used Nødnett as the main connection, while others were in the analogue health radio network.

Så la meg derfor redegjøre for den aktiviteten som er registrert forut for dette: Allerede kl. 16.20 varslet Forsvarets operative hovedkvarter luftvingen på Rygge om å skaffe oversikt over tilgjengelige helikoptre og mannskap. Fra kl. 16.36 ble innkalling av mannskaper iverksatt. Forsvaret har loggført at Politiets beredskapstropp tok kontakt med Bell-skvadronen på Rygge ca. kl. 16.50 for å få tilbakemelding på hva som kunne forventes av luftstøttekapasitet. På dette tidspunkt var ingen helikoptre klargjort, men det ble opplyst at de ville bli gjort tilgjengelige for politiet så raskt som mulig. Bell-helikoptre tok av fra Rygge kl. 18.57, 19.18 og 19.37.

Norway - an organisational disaster Part 9

So let me explain the activity that was registered before this: Already at At 16.20, the Norwegian Armed Forces' operational headquarters notified the air wing at Rygge to obtain an overview of available helicopters and crew. Starting at. At 16.36, crews were called in. The Norwegian Defense Forces have logged that the Police's emergency response team contacted the Bell squadron at Rygge approx. at 16.50 to get feedback on what could be expected from air support capacity. At this time, no helicopters were ready, but it was stated that they would be made available to the police as soon as possible. Bell helicopters took off from Rygge at 18.57, 19.18 and 19.37.

Det ble presisert i brev til Justisdepartementet i september 2009 at beredskapen på Rygge ville bli avviklet, og at Forsvaret ikke lenger hadde helikoptre som til enhver tid ville være klare innenfor en gitt beredskapstid. Det ble samtidig understreket at enhver anmodning om helikopterstøtte vil bli behandlet på vanlig måte, men vil være avhengig av den til enhver tids- og stedsmessige tilgjengelige kapasitet https://perma.cc/NLS6-Y8AS

It was specified in a letter to the Ministry of Justice in September 2009 that the readiness at Rygge would be discontinued, and that the Norwegian Armed Forces no longer had helicopters that would be ready at all times within a given readiness time. It was also emphasized that any request for helicopter support will be dealt with in the usual way, but will be dependent on the available capacity at any given time and place.

Komiteen viser til at de første meldingene om ugjerningene på Utøya kom til politiet kl. 17.24 den 22. juli. Skipperen på MS Thorbjørn ringte AMK-sentralen i Buskerud rett etter at han hadde vært vitne til de første drapene, og ble derfra koblet opp mot politiets operasjonssentral i Hønefoss. Ett minutt senere mottok operasjonssentralen de første telefonene fra ungdommer på Utøya.

Norway - an organisational disaster Part 10 Final

Part 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598

De fleste innringerne fortalte at en mann i politiuniform gikk omkring på øya og skjøt og at det var mange skadde og drepte.

The committee points out that the first reports about the misdeeds on Utøya came to the police at 17.24 on 22 July. The skipper of MS Thorbjørn called the AMK central in Buskerud right after he had witnessed the first murders, and was connected from there to the police operations center in Hønefoss. One minute later, the operations center received the first calls from young people on Utøya. Most of the callers said that a man in a police uniform was walking around the island shooting and that there were many injured and killed.

Komiteen har merket seg at 22. juli-kommisjonen konkluderte med at politiet kunne ha ankommet Utøya raskere, og dermed trolig spart liv https://perma.cc/4E3K-4KVV

The committee has noted that the 22 July commission concluded that the police could have arrived on Utøya sooner, and thus probably saved lives.
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/589

På grunn av stor pågang ved operasjonssentralen i Nordre Buskerud politidistrikt fikk ikke Beredskapstroppen kontakt med operasjonssentralen på telefon.

Due to heavy traffic at the operations center in the Nordre Buskerud police district, the emergency response team was unable to contact the operations center by telephone.

The committee points out that the lack of clarity between the Emergency Squad and Nordre Buskerud police district officials was not solely due to the fact that the emergency network had not been developed in Nordre Buskerud.

Our final comment about these 10 posts in the next post https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/608

What we should learn from "Norway - an organisational disaster"

Go to post 1: https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/598

So in conclusion, like we always say, we should focus always on POSITIVE THINGS! and there are tons of positive things in such massacre!

We already said the rescue "was shitty"
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/491
and now you see why ... Well, we can understand that too, since the situation is not so easy and it's the fault of many people ...

So again the goal is not to say "it was shit", but to make clear for other countries, that they don't need to do such shit error again!

We continue to see disorganisation even in 2023! where important government videos are private / not accessible, webpages not available, communication is bad, etc.

This is a reason why even our projects are limited in the effectivity ... if already the government doesn't offer such things. Yes, there are apps ... but ...

So again we really hope that
a) our governments don't repeat same errors! and this is just part of what Norway wrote ... there are tons of pages ...
b) people should take responsibility! and not take excuses
c) better communication and checking that all things really work, even on your webpages!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/DefenceTelegram/445
https://news.1rj.ru/str/WarningAlertTelegram/11
etc.
d) implementing laws that every people need to be controlled
https://news.1rj.ru/str/LawsTelegram/38
e) don't be so open, trusting everyone! Like we said in post 1. This behaviour is just a 🔪
f) don't act just with money in mind or "well, nothing happened until now, so we don't need such things!"

Even in Switzerland there is this shitty believe ...

Initiative against F-35A fighter jets gathers enough support https://perma.cc/77DK-2KHX

Swiss parliament approves purchase of F-35 jets from US https://perma.cc/6SFC-4Q99

Where people don't understand that such things are huge important! and Utøya showed why too!

Ok to not waste money a go go with military, but basic things are needed!

🇦🇹 Austria is under attack!
☮️ 🇨🇭🇦🇹 Neutral countries are under attack!!!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorDeutschland/20

🇦🇹 under attack from ☪️
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorDeutschland/20
🇨🇭 under attack from 🇵🇸
https://news.1rj.ru/str/HamasTerroristTelegram/33

Who helped in 🇦🇹? Yes, 🕌!!!!!
So stop discriminating people!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/MuslimTerrorists
Because the shame of our planet are all people discriminating 🇷🇺, 🇵🇸, 🇮🇱, 🕌, 🏴, 🫒, 🏳️‍🌈, etc!
Thinking to be better than other, when the reality is that such people are "the terrorists" (even just verbal terrorists!)! not the other one ...

We are one planet! There is no 😇 or 😈. Even your most 😇 does crimes, since no one on this planet is fully 100% innocent! Remember, even watching without doing is a crime!
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/387
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/389
https://news.1rj.ru/str/TerrorismTelegram/390
https://news.1rj.ru/str/MissionEcocide/5

The Federal Intelligence Service FIS – Serving to maintain freedom and security to our country

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😢 Utøya 2011 Terror attack | Collection

Backup by @TerrorismTelegram
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Anders Behring Breivik 2.0
https://news.1rj.ru/str/CrimesTelegram/16

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