BADBAZAAR and MOONSHINE: Spyware targeting Uyghur, Taiwanese and Tibetan groups and civil society actors
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/advisory-badbazaar-moonshine
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/advisory-badbazaar-moonshine
www.ncsc.gov.uk
BADBAZAAR and MOONSHINE: Spyware targeting Uyghur, Taiwanese and Tibetan groups and civil society actors
The NCSC and partners publish new information and mitigation measures for those at high risk from two spyware variants.
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BADBAZAAR and MOONSHINE: Technical analysis and mitigations
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/advisory-badbazaar-moonshine-technical-analysis-mitigations
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/advisory-badbazaar-moonshine-technical-analysis-mitigations
www.ncsc.gov.uk
BADBAZAAR and MOONSHINE: Technical analysis and mitigations
This advisory provides new and collated threat intelligence on two variants of spyware known as BADBAZAAR and MOONSHINE, and includes advice for app store operators, developers and social media companies to help keep their users safe.
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Overview of the PlayPraetor Masquerading Party Variants
https://www.ctm360.com/reports/play-masquerading-party-report
https://www.ctm360.com/reports/play-masquerading-party-report
Ctm360
Play Masquerading Party (PMP) Report | CTM360’s Analysis of Android Scam Variants
CTM360’s Play Masquerading Party (PMP) report exposes an evolution of the PlayPraetor scam, highlighting fake Play Store pages, phishing apps, and RAT variants targeting global users
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SMS Pumping: How Criminals Turn Your Messaging Service into Their Cash Machine
https://www.group-ib.com/blog/sms-pumping/
https://www.group-ib.com/blog/sms-pumping/
Group-IB
SMS Pumping: How Criminals Turn Your Messaging Service into Their Cash Machine
SMS Pumping fraud is a deceptive scheme where fraudsters manipulate SMS verification systems to inflate non-organic traffic and generate revenue at businesses’ expense. Discover how it works and ways to mitigate it.
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A Random and Simple Tip: Advanced Analysis of JNI Methods Using Frida
https://revflash.medium.com/a-random-and-simple-tip-advanced-analysis-of-jni-methods-using-frida-8b948ffcc8f5
https://revflash.medium.com/a-random-and-simple-tip-advanced-analysis-of-jni-methods-using-frida-8b948ffcc8f5
Medium
A Random and Simple Tip: Advanced Analysis of JNI Methods Using Frida
In this article, I will share a tip for those interested in performing a more detailed analysis of the behavior of native methods, with a…
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Newly Registered Domains Distributing SpyNote Malware
https://dti.domaintools.com/newly-registered-domains-distributing-spynote-malware/
https://dti.domaintools.com/newly-registered-domains-distributing-spynote-malware/
DomainTools Investigations | DTI
Newly Registered Domains Distributing SpyNote Malware - DomainTools Investigations | DTI
Deceptive websites hosted on newly registered domains are being used to deliver AndroidOS SpyNote malware. These sites mimic the Google Chrome install page on the Google Play Store.
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Android Kernel Adventures: Insights into Compilation, Customization and Application Analysis
https://revflash.medium.com/android-kernel-adventures-insights-into-compilation-customization-and-application-analysis-d20af6f2080a
https://revflash.medium.com/android-kernel-adventures-insights-into-compilation-customization-and-application-analysis-d20af6f2080a
Medium
Android Kernel Adventures: Insights into Compilation, Customization and Application Analysis
This article marks the first in a series aimed at sharing my adventures, personal notes, and insights into the Android kernel. My focus…
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Rethinking Emulation for Fu(zzi)n(g) and Profit: Near-Native Rehosting for Embedded ARM Firmware
[Presentation] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o_ckTnTQlfs
[Slides] https://github.com/binarly-io/Research_Publications/blob/main/REverse_2025/Near-Native%20Rehosting%20for%20Embedded%20ARM%20Firmware.pdf
[Presentation] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o_ckTnTQlfs
[Slides] https://github.com/binarly-io/Research_Publications/blob/main/REverse_2025/Near-Native%20Rehosting%20for%20Embedded%20ARM%20Firmware.pdf
YouTube
RE//verse 2025: Rethinking Emulation for Fu(zzi)n(g) (Lukas Seidel)
Full noscript: Rethinking Emulation for Fu(zzi)n(g) and Profit: Near-Native Rehosting for Embedded ARM Firmware
Slides: https://github.com/binarly-io/Research_Publications/blob/main/REverse_2025/Near-Native%20Rehosting%20for%20Embedded%20ARM%20Firmware.pdf
…
Slides: https://github.com/binarly-io/Research_Publications/blob/main/REverse_2025/Near-Native%20Rehosting%20for%20Embedded%20ARM%20Firmware.pdf
…
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Shibai: Trojanized version of WhatsApp that comes preinstalled on some low-cost Android phones. Altered using LSPatch, it replaces cryptocurrency addresses in messages and redirects update URLs to retain control
https://news.drweb.com/show/?lng=en&i=15002&c=5
https://news.drweb.com/show/?lng=en&i=15002&c=5
Dr.Web
Nice chatting with you: what connects cheap Android smartphones, WhatsApp and cryptocurrency theft?
Every year, cryptocurrencies become more and more common as a payment method. According to the data for 2023, in developed countries about 20% of the population has at some time used such a means of payment, and in developing countries, where the banking…
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Magisk for Mobile Pentesting: Rooting Android Devices and Building Custom Modules
Part 1: https://medium.com/@justmobilesec/magisk-for-mobile-pentesting-rooting-android-devices-and-building-custom-modules-part-i-3ca7429f1faf
Part 2: https://medium.com/@justmobilesec/magisk-for-mobile-pentesting-rooting-android-devices-and-building-custom-modules-part-ii-22badc498437
Part 1: https://medium.com/@justmobilesec/magisk-for-mobile-pentesting-rooting-android-devices-and-building-custom-modules-part-i-3ca7429f1faf
Part 2: https://medium.com/@justmobilesec/magisk-for-mobile-pentesting-rooting-android-devices-and-building-custom-modules-part-ii-22badc498437
Medium
Magisk for Mobile Pentesting: Rooting Android Devices and Building Custom Modules (Part I)
TL;DR #1: Rooting an Android device allows for system modifications, bypassing restrictions, and performing security testing. This post…
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Intercepting HTTPS Communication in Flutter: Going Full Hardcore Mode with Frida
https://sensepost.com/blog/2025/intercepting-https-communication-in-flutter-going-full-hardcore-mode-with-frida/
https://sensepost.com/blog/2025/intercepting-https-communication-in-flutter-going-full-hardcore-mode-with-frida/
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B(l)utter: Flutter Mobile Application Reverse Engineering Tool
https://github.com/worawit/blutter
https://github.com/worawit/blutter
GitHub
GitHub - worawit/blutter: Flutter Mobile Application Reverse Engineering Tool
Flutter Mobile Application Reverse Engineering Tool - worawit/blutter
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SpyMax Variant Targeting Chinese-Speaking Users
https://threatmon.io/spymax-variant-targeting-chinese-speaking-users/
https://threatmon.io/spymax-variant-targeting-chinese-speaking-users/
ThreatMon
SpyMax Variant Targeting Chinese-Speaking Users
SpyMax Variant Targeting Chinese-Speaking Users: In early 2025, our threat intelligence team analyzed a highly sophisticated Android spyware.
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Android spyware trojan targets Russian military personnel who use Alpine Quest mapping software
https://news.drweb.com/show/?i=15006&lng=en&c=5
https://news.drweb.com/show/?i=15006&lng=en&c=5
Dr.Web
Android spyware trojan targets Russian military personnel who use Alpine Quest mapping software
Doctor Web’s experts have discovered Android.Spy.1292.origin, spyware whose main target is Russian military personnel. The attackers hide this trojan inside modified Alpine Quest mapping software and distribute it in various ways, including through one of…
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Everyone knows your location: tracking myself down through in-app ads
Part 1: https://timsh.org/tracking-myself-down-through-in-app-ads/
Part 2: https://timsh.org/everyone-knows-your-location-part-2-try-it-yourself/
Plus a guide that helps to collect, analyze and visualize requests sent by a mobile device while using some app: https://github.com/tim-sha256/analyse-ad-traffic
Part 1: https://timsh.org/tracking-myself-down-through-in-app-ads/
Part 2: https://timsh.org/everyone-knows-your-location-part-2-try-it-yourself/
Plus a guide that helps to collect, analyze and visualize requests sent by a mobile device while using some app: https://github.com/tim-sha256/analyse-ad-traffic
tim.sh
Everyone knows your location
How I tracked myself down using leaked location data in the in-app ads, and what I found along the way.
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SuperCard X: exposing a Chinese-speaker MaaS for NFC Relay fraud operation
https://www.cleafy.com/cleafy-labs/supercardx-exposing-chinese-speaker-maas-for-nfc-relay-fraud-operation?s=03
https://www.cleafy.com/cleafy-labs/supercardx-exposing-chinese-speaker-maas-for-nfc-relay-fraud-operation?s=03
Cleafy
SuperCard X: exposing a Chinese-speaker MaaS for NFC Relay fraud operation | Cleafy
A new fraud campaign based on the Android malware "SuperCard X" and innovative NFC relay techniques is impacting Italian's banking. Read our latest report to learn more.
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CVE-2024-53104 proof of concept: Privilege escalation security flaw in the Android Kernel's USB Video Class driver that allows authenticated local threat actors to elevate privileges in low-complexity attacks
https://github.com/zhuowei/facedancer/blob/rawgadget2/examples/camera.py#L15
https://github.com/zhuowei/facedancer/blob/rawgadget2/examples/camera.py#L15
GitHub
facedancer/examples/camera.py at rawgadget2 · zhuowei/facedancer
Fork of https://github.com/xairy/Facedancer/tree/rawgadget with patches for testing CVE-2024-53197 - zhuowei/facedancer
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Rooting an Android Emulator for Mobile Security Testing
https://8ksec.io/rooting-an-android-emulator-for-mobile-security-testing/
https://8ksec.io/rooting-an-android-emulator-for-mobile-security-testing/
8kSec - 8kSec is a cybersecurity research & training company. We provide high-quality training & consulting services.
Rooting an Android Emulator for Mobile Security Testing - 8kSec
Introduction Rooting an Android emulator is essential for mobile app security research because it allows researchers to use powerful instrumentation and debugging tools that require root privileges. By obtaining full root (superuser) access on an AVD, you…
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Triada strikes back
https://securelist.com/triada-trojan-modules-analysis/116380/
https://securelist.com/triada-trojan-modules-analysis/116380/
Securelist
A new version of Triada spreads embedded in the firmware of Android devices
Kaspersky expert has discovered a new version of the Triada Trojan, with custom modules for Telegram, WhatsApp, TikTok, and other apps.
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AirBorne: Wormable Zero-Click Remote Code Execution (RCE) in AirPlay Protocol Puts Apple & IoT Devices at Risk
https://www.oligo.security/blog/airborne
https://www.oligo.security/blog/airborne
www.oligo.security
Airborne: Wormable Zero-Click RCE in Apple AirPlay Puts Billions of Devices at Risk | Oligo Security | Oligo Security
Oligo Security reveals AirBorne, a new set of vulnerabilities in Apple’s AirPlay protocol and SDK. Learn how zero-click RCEs, ACL bypasses, and wormable exploits could endanger Apple and IoT devices worldwide — and how to protect yourself.
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EvilNotify: Single line of code could soft-brick iPhones by sending malicious notifications (CVE-2025-24091)
https://rambo.codes/posts/2025-04-24-how-a-single-line-of-code-could-brick-your-iphone
https://rambo.codes/posts/2025-04-24-how-a-single-line-of-code-could-brick-your-iphone
Rambo Codes
How a Single Line Of Code Could Brick Your iPhone | Rambo Codes
Gui Rambo writes about his coding and reverse engineering adventures.
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