🔶 Granted now mitigates device auth phishing in AWS IAM Identity Center

A new browser extension for Granted which makes authenticating to AWS IAM Identity Center faster and more secure.

https://www.commonfate.io/blog/granted-mitigates-aws-phishing

#aws

🔶 Turning AWS Documentation into Gold: AI-Assisted Security Research

This article goes over how to use embeddings in AWS Bedrock, scraping AWS documentation, leveraging ripgrep for fast searches on local disk, and some interesting security research along the way.

https://www.securityrunners.io/post/ai-assisted-security-research

#aws

🔶 Breaching the Data Perimeter: CloudTrail as a mechanism for Data Exfiltration

A - now fixed - AWS vulnerability that would have enabled potentially undetectable data exfiltration from even the most locked down of AWS accounts by leveraging the audit trail itself to stealthily leak data.

https://tracebit.com/blog/breaching-the-data-perimeter-cloudtrail-as-a-mechanism-for-data-exfiltration

#aws

🔶 CloudShell slip-up: command-line access to underlying AWS infrastructure

Incident Overview: During a cloud security training session, a delegate encountered an unexpected AWS account identity while using CloudShell.

https://medium.com/@paulschwarzenberger/cloudshell-slip-up-command-line-access-to-underlying-aws-infrastructure-ae77a0858088

#aws

🔶 Perfecting Ransomware on AWS - Using "keys to the kingdom" to change the locks

This article discusses the shift from traditional data dumping in compromised AWS accounts to utilizing AWS KMS features for ransomware attacks.

https://medium.com/@harsh8v/redefining-ransomware-attacks-on-aws-using-aws-kms-xks-dea668633802

#aws

🔶 Security Logging in Cloud Environments - AWS

Author has refreshed article which covers how to design a state of the art multi-account security logging platform in AWS: removed stale links and legacy advice on MFA delete, added API Gateway access logs, and added a "Tracking Misconfigurations" section.

https://blog.marcolancini.it/2021/blog-security-logging-cloud-environments-aws/

#aws

🔶 AWS IAM Policy Condition Operators Explained

There are 27 basic condition operators you can use in an AWS IAM policy. Then you can add "ForAllValues" or "ForAnyValue" to the beginning and "IfExists" to the end of almost all of them.

https://iam.cloudcopilot.io/resources/operators

#aws

🔶 How to build a Security Guardians program to distribute security ownership

Post outlining the steps to follow to build your own Security Guardians program for your organization.

https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/how-to-build-your-own-security-guardians-program/

(Use VPN to open from Russia)

#aws

🔶 How to use interface VPC endpoints to meet your security objectives

Four security objectives that VPC endpoints help you achieve.

https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/how-to-use-interface-vpc-endpoints-to-meet-your-security-objectives/

(Use VPN to open from Russia)

#aws

🔶 How to use the Amazon Detective API to investigate GuardDuty security findings and enrich data in Security Hub

How to integrate Amazon Detective with AWS Security Hub, giving you better visibility into threat indicators and investigative data directly from Security Hub, which provides you with a centralized view of your overall security posture across your AWS accounts.

https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/how-to-use-the-amazon-detective-api-to-investigate-guardduty-security-findings-and-enrich-data-in-security-hub/

(Use VPN to open from Russia)

#aws

🔶 AWS CDK Risk: Exploiting a Missing S3 Bucket Allowed Account Takeover

The impact of this issue could, in certain scenarios, allow an attacker to gain administrative access to a target AWS account, resulting in a full account takeover.

https://www.aquasec.com/blog/aws-cdk-risk-exploiting-a-missing-s3-bucket-allowed-account-takeover/

#aws

🔴 Exploring Google Cloud Default Service Accounts: Deep Dive and Real-World Adoption Trends

This post offers a deep dive into Google Cloud's default service accounts, explaining their functionality, risks, and real-world adoption trends.

https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/google-cloud-default-service-accounts/

#gcp

🔶 Breaking free from the chains of fate - Bypassing AWSCompromisedKeyQuarantineV2 Policy

The article explores how threat actors manage to work around the limitations of the quarantine policy (AWSCompromisedKeyQuarantineV2) that is applied to identities whose credentials are leaked.

https://permiso.io/blog/introducing-detention-dodger

#aws

🔶 EMERALDWHALE: 15k Cloud Credentials Stolen in Operation Targeting Exposed Git Config Files

This campaign used multiple private tools that abused multiple misconfigured web services, allowing attackers to steal credentials, clone private repositories, and extract cloud credentials from their source code. Credentials for over 10,000 private repositories were collected during the operation.

https://sysdig.com/blog/emeraldwhale/

(Use VPN to open from Russia)

#aws

🔶 I bought us-east-1.com: A Look at Security, DNS Traffic, and Protecting AWS Users

When people think about the term «us-east-1», they often think of AWS's very data center region that powers countless businesses worldwide. But what if someone registered the us-east-1.com domain?

https://dev.to/aws-builders/i-bought-us-east-1com-a-look-at-security-dns-traffic-and-protecting-aws-users-15ng

#aws

🔶 Building an AppRunner on EC2 with Cloudflare Zero Trust Access

How to automate the deployment of a private AppRunner instance on AWS that hosts multiple internal apps securely behind Cloudflare's zero-trust access controls.

https://blog.marcolancini.it/2024/blog-building-apprunner-ec2-cloudflare-zero-trust-access/

#aws

🔶 How Attackers Can Abuse IAM Roles Anywhere for Persistent AWS Access

The process involves using API actions like CreateTrustAnchor and CreateProfile to facilitate the exploitation.

https://medium.com/@adan.alvarez/how-attackers-can-abuse-iam-roles-anywhere-for-persistent-aws-access-b3ced6935dca

(Use VPN to open from Russia)

#aws

🔴 Filling up the DagBag: Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud Composer

An attacker that has write access to the Cloud Composer environment's dedicated bucket can gain command execution in the Composer environment.

https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/cloud-pentesting/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-composer/

#gcp

🔶 Implement effective data authorization mechanisms to secure your data used in generative AI applications

Post walking through the risks associated with using sensitive data as part of fine-tuning for FMs, retrieval augmented generation (RAG), AI agents, and tooling with generative AI workloads.

https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/implement-effective-data-authorization-mechanisms-to-secure-your-data-used-in-generative-ai-applications/

(Use VPN to open from Russia)

#aws