🔷 Cloud Guardrails
Tool by Lead Security Engineer of Salesforce, Kinnaird McQuade, that allows you to rapidly cherry-pick cloud security guardrails by generating Terraform files that create Azure Policy Initiatives (basically AWS SCPs but for Azure). Cherry-pick and bulk-select the security policies you want, enforce low-friction policies within minutes, and easily roll back policies that you don’t want. See Kinnaird’s great thread about it here.
https://github.com/salesforce/cloud-guardrails
#azure
Tool by Lead Security Engineer of Salesforce, Kinnaird McQuade, that allows you to rapidly cherry-pick cloud security guardrails by generating Terraform files that create Azure Policy Initiatives (basically AWS SCPs but for Azure). Cherry-pick and bulk-select the security policies you want, enforce low-friction policies within minutes, and easily roll back policies that you don’t want. See Kinnaird’s great thread about it here.
https://github.com/salesforce/cloud-guardrails
#azure
🔶 So You Inherited an AWS Account. A 30-day security guide for engineers…
A guide to help you filter through the mess, isolate the changes you need to make, and start to tame your environment by Matt Fuller, founder of CloudSploit. He proposes: get stable access, stop using the root user, update billing info, enable CloudTrail logging and monitoring, clean up IAM entities, locate exposed services, lock down your domains, find expiring certificates, untangle the web of services, and monitor and migrate.
https://medium.com/swlh/so-you-inherited-an-aws-account-e5fe6550607d
#aws
A guide to help you filter through the mess, isolate the changes you need to make, and start to tame your environment by Matt Fuller, founder of CloudSploit. He proposes: get stable access, stop using the root user, update billing info, enable CloudTrail logging and monitoring, clean up IAM entities, locate exposed services, lock down your domains, find expiring certificates, untangle the web of services, and monitor and migrate.
https://medium.com/swlh/so-you-inherited-an-aws-account-e5fe6550607d
#aws
Twitter
Matt Fuller (@matthewdfuller) | Twitter
The latest Tweets from Matt Fuller (@matthewdfuller). Founder of @CloudSploit, acq. by @AquaSecTeam. Former Infra / Sec / Manager @Adobe, @Aviary & @Mozilla intern, @RITtigers grad, @NYC resident, @NYRangers fan. New York, NY
🔶 S3 backups and other strategies for ensuring data durability through ransomware attacks
This post will discuss options for ensuring the durability of data stored on S3, through protections in place and backup strategies. The AWS backup service on AWS unfortunately does not backup S3 buckets and a lot of discussions of backups and data durability on AWS do not describe the implementation in sufficient detail, which allows a number of potential dangers. This post will show you the two best options (s3 object locks and replication policies), explains how to use these, and what to watch out for.
https://summitroute.com/blog/2021/08/03/S3_backups_and_other_strategies_for_ensuring_data_durability_through_ransomware_attacks/
#aws
This post will discuss options for ensuring the durability of data stored on S3, through protections in place and backup strategies. The AWS backup service on AWS unfortunately does not backup S3 buckets and a lot of discussions of backups and data durability on AWS do not describe the implementation in sufficient detail, which allows a number of potential dangers. This post will show you the two best options (s3 object locks and replication policies), explains how to use these, and what to watch out for.
https://summitroute.com/blog/2021/08/03/S3_backups_and_other_strategies_for_ensuring_data_durability_through_ransomware_attacks/
#aws
Summitroute
Summit Route - S3 backups and other strategies for ensuring data durability through ransomware attacks
AWS Security Consulting
🔶 Cloud Malware: Resource Injection in CloudFormation Templates
Blog focusing on a new Pacu module on cloud malware using resource injection in CloudFormation templates.
https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloud-malware-cloudformation-injection/
#aws
Blog focusing on a new Pacu module on cloud malware using resource injection in CloudFormation templates.
https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloud-malware-cloudformation-injection/
#aws
GitHub
GitHub - RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu: The AWS exploitation framework, designed for testing the security of Amazon Web Services environments.
The AWS exploitation framework, designed for testing the security of Amazon Web Services environments. - RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu
🔶 Top things to do when setting up a new Org
What you should do when setting up a new AWS Organization from scratch.
https://www.chrisfarris.com/post/aws-organizations-in-2021/
#aws
What you should do when setting up a new AWS Organization from scratch.
https://www.chrisfarris.com/post/aws-organizations-in-2021/
#aws
https://www.chrisfarris.com/
AWS Organizations - Checklist for 2021 - Chris Farris
It's 2021, time to revisit what you should do when setting up a new AWS Organization from scratch.
🔶 How to implement the principle of least privilege with CloudFormation StackSets
How to conform to the principle of least privilege while still allowing users to use CloudFormation to create the resources they need.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/how-to-implement-the-principle-of-least-privilege-with-cloudformation-stacksets/
#aws
How to conform to the principle of least privilege while still allowing users to use CloudFormation to create the resources they need.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/how-to-implement-the-principle-of-least-privilege-with-cloudformation-stacksets/
#aws
Amazon
How to implement the principle of least privilege with CloudFormation StackSets | Amazon Web Services
March 24, 2021: We’ve corrected errors in the policy statements in steps 2 and 3 of the section “To create the IAM policy document.” AWS CloudFormation is a service that lets you create a collection of related Amazon Web Services and third-party resources…
🔴 Security Log Scoping Tool
Security Log Scoping Tool is an interactive form to help customers discover, evaluate and enable their security-relevant logs across Google Cloud.
https://cloud.google.com/architecture/exporting-stackdriver-logging-for-security-and-access-analytics#evaluate_which_logs_to_export
#gcp
Security Log Scoping Tool is an interactive form to help customers discover, evaluate and enable their security-relevant logs across Google Cloud.
https://cloud.google.com/architecture/exporting-stackdriver-logging-for-security-and-access-analytics#evaluate_which_logs_to_export
#gcp
Google Cloud
Scenarios for exporting logging data: Security and access analytics | Cloud Architecture Center | Google Cloud
🔶 Building an AWS Perimeter
Whitepaper by AWS covering perimeter objectives, identity, resource, and network boundaries, preventing access to internal credentials, and cross-region requests.
https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/building_an_aws_perimeter.pdf
#aws
Whitepaper by AWS covering perimeter objectives, identity, resource, and network boundaries, preventing access to internal credentials, and cross-region requests.
https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/building_an_aws_perimeter.pdf
#aws
🔶 Expanding Secrets Infrastructure to AWS Lambda
How Square extended their datacenter-based secrets infrastructure to enable a cloud migration supporting Lambda. They added SPIFFE compatibility to their secrets infrastructure and developed a Lambda secrets syncer that Square engineers can deploy via a Terraform module.
https://developer.squareup.com/blog/expanding-secrets-infrastructure-to-aws-lambda/
#aws
How Square extended their datacenter-based secrets infrastructure to enable a cloud migration supporting Lambda. They added SPIFFE compatibility to their secrets infrastructure and developed a Lambda secrets syncer that Square engineers can deploy via a Terraform module.
https://developer.squareup.com/blog/expanding-secrets-infrastructure-to-aws-lambda/
#aws
Square Corner Blog
Expanding Secrets Infrastructure to AWS Lambda
Extending our data center to the cloud
🔶🔷🔴 Cloud Security Orienteering
A cloud and environment agnostic methodology for getting your bearings if tasked with securing a novel cloud environment.
https://engagement.cloudseclist.com/CL0/https:%2F%2Fspeakerdeck.com%2Framimac%2Fcloud-security-orienteering/1/0102017b49d91665-a615638b-8c75-4354-8b9e-7506b2f22c63-000000/rSHPkoLqfgzw0mml10F-sffbOTmikixij_N4osfUoN0=210
#aws #azure #gcp
A cloud and environment agnostic methodology for getting your bearings if tasked with securing a novel cloud environment.
https://engagement.cloudseclist.com/CL0/https:%2F%2Fspeakerdeck.com%2Framimac%2Fcloud-security-orienteering/1/0102017b49d91665-a615638b-8c75-4354-8b9e-7506b2f22c63-000000/rSHPkoLqfgzw0mml10F-sffbOTmikixij_N4osfUoN0=210
#aws #azure #gcp
🔶 Lightsail object storage concerns
Part one of a two part series that will discuss AWS’s new Lightsail object storage. The first part looks at the new Lightsail access key capability and its security issues.
https://summitroute.com/blog/2021/08/05/lightsail_object_storage_concerns-part_1/
#aws
Part one of a two part series that will discuss AWS’s new Lightsail object storage. The first part looks at the new Lightsail access key capability and its security issues.
https://summitroute.com/blog/2021/08/05/lightsail_object_storage_concerns-part_1/
#aws
Amazon
Amazon Lightsail now offers object storage for storing static content
👍1
🔶 Remediating AWS IMDSv1
An article on remediating IMDSv1 in AWS, a common server-side request forgery vector targeting lateral movement and persistence.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1X737xoQviufdxZk_l33bnpp6noOmNIYvMilQCdhtwoY/edit?usp=drivesdk
#aws
An article on remediating IMDSv1 in AWS, a common server-side request forgery vector targeting lateral movement and persistence.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1X737xoQviufdxZk_l33bnpp6noOmNIYvMilQCdhtwoY/edit?usp=drivesdk
#aws
Google Docs
Remediating AWS IMDSv1
Remediating AWS IMDSv1 Introduction Compute resources in AWS get access to AWS credentials, such as temporary instance role credentials, via the Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). The compute resources use these credentials to access other AWS-hosted services…
🔶 How to create IAM roles for deploying your AWS Serverless app
An in-depth guide to creating production-ready, least privilege IAM roles for deploying your serverless application across multiple AWS accounts.
https://serverlessfirst.com/create-iam-deployer-roles-serverless-app/
#aws
An in-depth guide to creating production-ready, least privilege IAM roles for deploying your serverless application across multiple AWS accounts.
https://serverlessfirst.com/create-iam-deployer-roles-serverless-app/
#aws
Serverless First
How to create IAM roles for deploying your AWS Serverless app | Serverless First
An in-depth guide to creating production-ready, least privilege IAM roles for deploying your serverless application across multiple AWS accounts.
🔶 An Introduction to AWS Firewall Manager
What is AWS Firewall Manger and how can it help you secure your organization?
https://scalesec.com/blog/an-introduction-to-aws-firewall-manager/
#aws
What is AWS Firewall Manger and how can it help you secure your organization?
https://scalesec.com/blog/an-introduction-to-aws-firewall-manager/
#aws
Scalesec
An Introduction to AWS Firewall Manager | ScaleSec
What AWS Firewall Manager is and how it will help you secure your organization.
🔴 Leaving Bastion Hosts Behind
Post examining GCP services like OS Login and Identity-Aware Proxy (IAP), and showing how they can be used as an alternative to bastion hosts.
https://www.netskope.com/blog/leaving-bastion-hosts-behind-part-1-gcp
#gcp
Post examining GCP services like OS Login and Identity-Aware Proxy (IAP), and showing how they can be used as an alternative to bastion hosts.
https://www.netskope.com/blog/leaving-bastion-hosts-behind-part-1-gcp
#gcp
Netskope
Leaving Bastion Hosts Behind Part 1: GCP
Introduction Any enterprise running virtual machines in the cloud needs to securely manage them, which is commonly done with Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
🔶 AWS Condition Context Keys for Reducing Risk
Post taking a closer look at the "aws:CalledVia*" and "aws:ViaAWSService" keys, and how you can use them to achieve least privilege.
https://ermetic.com/whats-new/blog/aws/aws-condition-context-keys-for-reducing-risk
#aws
Post taking a closer look at the "aws:CalledVia*" and "aws:ViaAWSService" keys, and how you can use them to achieve least privilege.
https://ermetic.com/whats-new/blog/aws/aws-condition-context-keys-for-reducing-risk
#aws
Tenable®
Secure cloud exposure with Tenable Cloud Security
Cloud security at Tenable starts with a unified CNAPP powerful enough to manage posture, secure workloads, govern identity & access management, and much more.
🔶 KONTRA's AWS Top 10
A series of free interactive security training modules that teach developers how to identify and mitigate security vulnerabilities in their AWS-hosted cloud applications.
https://application.security/free/kontra-aws-clould-top-10
#aws
A series of free interactive security training modules that teach developers how to identify and mitigate security vulnerabilities in their AWS-hosted cloud applications.
https://application.security/free/kontra-aws-clould-top-10
#aws
🔶 Inside Figma: securing internal web apps
A deep-dive into how Figma built a system for securing internal web applications that lets them require SSO authentication, enforce fine-grained authorization (via Okta groups), and support CLI tools, all using ALBs, AWS Cognito, and Okta.
https://www.figma.com/blog/inside-figma-securing-internal-web-apps/
#aws
A deep-dive into how Figma built a system for securing internal web applications that lets them require SSO authentication, enforce fine-grained authorization (via Okta groups), and support CLI tools, all using ALBs, AWS Cognito, and Okta.
https://www.figma.com/blog/inside-figma-securing-internal-web-apps/
#aws
Figma
Inside Figma: securing internal web apps | Figma Blog
A deep-dive into how we provide access to internal applications
🔷 Spoofing Azure AD sign-ins logs by imitating AD FS Hybrid Health Agent
How anyone with a local administrator access to AD FS server (or proxy), can create arbitrary sign-ins events to Azure AD sign-ins log.
https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
#azure
How anyone with a local administrator access to AD FS server (or proxy), can create arbitrary sign-ins events to Azure AD sign-ins log.
https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
#azure
O365Blog
Spoofing Azure AD sign-ins logs by imitating AD FS Hybrid Health Agent
Azure AD Connect Health is a feature that allows viewing the health of on-prem hybrid infrastructure components, including Azure AD Connect and AD FS servers.
Health information is gathered by agents installed on each on-prem hybrid server. Since March 2021…
Health information is gathered by agents installed on each on-prem hybrid server. Since March 2021…
🔶 Spice up Your Kubernetes Environment with AWS Lambda
How to securely integrate AWS Lambda with an existing Kubernetes environment without codes changes.
https://liavyona09.medium.com/spice-up-your-kubernetes-environment-with-aws-lambda-a07d81347607
#aws
How to securely integrate AWS Lambda with an existing Kubernetes environment without codes changes.
https://liavyona09.medium.com/spice-up-your-kubernetes-environment-with-aws-lambda-a07d81347607
#aws
Medium
Spice up Your Kubernetes Environment with AWS Lambda
Kubernetes is a powerful container orchestration platform for automating applications’ deployment, scaling and management. Kubernetes…
🔶 The last S3 security document that we’ll ever need, and how to use it
163 page Threat Model of S3 by TrustOnCloud’s Jonathan Rault covering:
1️⃣ Best practices (best security/effort ratio)
2️⃣ Reviewing the service depending on your application(s), and implementing the controls based on your risk tolerance
3️⃣ Onboarding for large enterprises/agencies
4️⃣ Compliance mapping to demonstrate a risk-based approach, gap analysis and formulating an action plan
https://trustoncloud.com/the-last-s3-security-document-that-well-ever-need/
#aws
163 page Threat Model of S3 by TrustOnCloud’s Jonathan Rault covering:
1️⃣ Best practices (best security/effort ratio)
2️⃣ Reviewing the service depending on your application(s), and implementing the controls based on your risk tolerance
3️⃣ Onboarding for large enterprises/agencies
4️⃣ Compliance mapping to demonstrate a risk-based approach, gap analysis and formulating an action plan
https://trustoncloud.com/the-last-s3-security-document-that-well-ever-need/
#aws
Twitter
Jonathan Rault (@jo_n_go) | Twitter
The latest Tweets from Jonathan Rault (@jo_n_go). Head of Cloud Sec at @trustoncloud. Singapore