Forwarded from Bernhard Mueller
So, the smart contract audit benchmarks tooling is completely finished, from dataset generation to reporting. The only thing that's missing is creating comprehensive baselines using the best available models. If anyone wants to sponsor this or has infinite API credits available lmk 🙂
https://github.com/muellerberndt/scabench
https://github.com/muellerberndt/scabench
GitHub
GitHub - scabench-org/scabench: A framework for evaluating AI audit agents using recent real-world data
A framework for evaluating AI audit agents using recent real-world data - scabench-org/scabench
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Forwarded from Investigations by ZachXBT
It appears the Solana project 'Aqua' has likely rug pulled 21.77K SOL ($4.65M) after being promoted by teams such as Meteora, Quill Audits, Helius, SYMMIO, Dialect, and many influencers.
A few hours ago the funds were split four ways and transferred between intermediary addresses before being sent to multiple instant exchanges.
The team has since turned off replies on X (Twitter) for all posts.
Presale address
A few hours ago the funds were split four ways and transferred between intermediary addresses before being sent to multiple instant exchanges.
The team has since turned off replies on X (Twitter) for all posts.
Presale address
4Ea23VxEGAgfbtauQZz11aKNtzHJwb84ppsg3Cz14u6q😭5
Hopefully, it will be okay soon
Scandal around dYdX over $25M
- DEX dYdX closed the bridge for ethDYDX migration — the native network since June 13.
- According to influencers, 45k+ holders are "stuck" with tokens worth over $25 million.
- Now ethDYDX cannot be exchanged, deposited to CEX, or converted.
Source
Scandal around dYdX over $25M
- DEX dYdX closed the bridge for ethDYDX migration — the native network since June 13.
- According to influencers, 45k+ holders are "stuck" with tokens worth over $25 million.
- Now ethDYDX cannot be exchanged, deposited to CEX, or converted.
Source
www.dydx.foundation
Discontinuation of Support for the ethDYDX Bridge | dYdX Foundation
The dYdX Community has officially ceased support for the ethDYDX Bridge as of June 13, 2025. Learn what this means for unbridged tokens, their impact on DYDX supply, and key token statistics following the closure.
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Forwarded from Officer’s Articles
How Cross-Chain Bridges are Hacked?
Link: https://officercia.mirror.xyz/IvG5yxJrLviq0bT9CXMx8lQ-ZGOBomYbeizMEzp6n40
Link: https://officercia.mirror.xyz/IvG5yxJrLviq0bT9CXMx8lQ-ZGOBomYbeizMEzp6n40
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Two malicious crates have been identified in the crates.io
https://blog.rust-lang.org/2025/09/24/crates.io-malicious-crates-fasterlog-and-asyncprintln/
https://blog.rust-lang.org/2025/09/24/crates.io-malicious-crates-fasterlog-and-asyncprintln/
blog.rust-lang.org
crates.io: Malicious crates faster_log and async_println | Rust Blog
Empowering everyone to build reliable and efficient software.
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Forwarded from Defimon Alerts
A series of attacks on Hyperliquid today targeted Hyperdrive.fi:
https://x.com/hyperdrivedefi/status/1971943575559852327
https://x.com/hyperdrivedefi/status/1971955057823531196
https://x.com/hyperdrivedefi/status/1971943575559852327
https://x.com/hyperdrivedefi/status/1971955057823531196
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In Kazakhstan, the largest crypto exchange that worked for the drug trade was closed
The service was considered «respected» in the underground environment and cooperated with 20 largest «Darknet»-marketing, where total audience exceeded 5 million users. More than 200 drug trafficking sites from Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova passed through it.
The total turnover of «RAKS exchange» exceeded 224 million USD.
https://sozmedia.kz/94819/
The service was considered «respected» in the underground environment and cooperated with 20 largest «Darknet»-marketing, where total audience exceeded 5 million users. More than 200 drug trafficking sites from Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova passed through it.
The total turnover of «RAKS exchange» exceeded 224 million USD.
https://sozmedia.kz/94819/
Forwarded from AISecHub
State of MCP Server Security 2025: 5,200 Servers, Credential Risks - https://astrix.security/learn/blog/state-of-mcp-server-security-2025/
We analyzed over 5,200 unique, open-source MCP server implementations to understand how they manage credentials and what this means for the security of the growing AI agent ecosystem.
- 88% of MCP servers need credentials to function
- 53% rely on static API keys and Personal Access Tokens (PAT)
- Only 8.5% use modern OAuth authentication
- 79% store API keys in basic environment variables
#MCP #ModelContextProtocol #AIAgents #AgentSecurity #CredentialSecurity #SecretsManagement #OAuth #APIKeys #PATs #SecretRotation #LeastPrivilege #AstrixSecurity
We analyzed over 5,200 unique, open-source MCP server implementations to understand how they manage credentials and what this means for the security of the growing AI agent ecosystem.
- 88% of MCP servers need credentials to function
- 53% rely on static API keys and Personal Access Tokens (PAT)
- Only 8.5% use modern OAuth authentication
- 79% store API keys in basic environment variables
#MCP #ModelContextProtocol #AIAgents #AgentSecurity #CredentialSecurity #SecretsManagement #OAuth #APIKeys #PATs #SecretRotation #LeastPrivilege #AstrixSecurity
Astrix Security
State of MCP Server Security 2025: Research Report | Astrix
5K+ MCP servers analysis: 53% use insecure hard-coded credentials. Read the full 2025 research and download the open-source MCP Secret Wrapper to mitigate risks.
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Forwarded from Atoms Research
$70.9M moved to a fresh wallet. Tokens moved:
- 6.85K $OSETH
- 6.59K $WETH
- 4.26K $wSTETH
Source
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Forwarded from Atoms Research
The project team commented on the incident:
We’re aware of a potential exploit impacting Balancer v2 pools.
Our engineering and security teams are investigating with high priority.
We’ll share verified updates and next steps as soon as we have more information.
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
❤1
Forwarded from Vladimir S. | Officer's Channel (Vladimir S. | officercia)
A very detailed Balancer hack post-mortem (unofficial): https://x.com/officer_secret/status/1985961846805843984?s=46
#security
#security
Forwarded from Netlas.io
📌 LLM Vulnerabilities: how AI apps break — and how to harden them
This piece maps the most common ways LLM-powered systems fail in the real world and turns them into a practical hardening plan. From prompt and indirect injection to over-privileged tools, leaky RAG pipelines, data poisoning, jailbreaks, and supply-chain traps — plus the guardrails that actually help in production.
Key takeaways:
1️⃣ Prompt & indirect injection: attackers hide instructions in web pages, files, or retrieved notes; the model obeys them and exfiltrates secrets or performs unwanted actions.
2️⃣ Jailbreaks & policy evasion: harmless-looking reformulations bypass safety layers; outputs become unsafe or operationally risky.
3️⃣ RAG data leaks: sloppy retrieval exposes internal docs, customer data, and system prompts; cross-tenant bleed is a real risk.
4️⃣ Over-privileged tools/agents: broad filesystem, network, or payment permissions turn one prompt into a breach.
5️⃣ Poisoning & supply chain: tainted datasets, third-party prompts, and unpinned models/extensions undermine trust.
6️⃣ Output trust & hallucinations: fabricated facts sneak into workflows, tickets, or code — and humans often rubber-stamp them.
7️⃣ Telemetry gaps: without red-team sims and runtime monitoring, you won’t see injection attempts until damage is done.
👉 Read here: https://netlas.io/blog/llm_vulnerabilities/
This piece maps the most common ways LLM-powered systems fail in the real world and turns them into a practical hardening plan. From prompt and indirect injection to over-privileged tools, leaky RAG pipelines, data poisoning, jailbreaks, and supply-chain traps — plus the guardrails that actually help in production.
Key takeaways:
1️⃣ Prompt & indirect injection: attackers hide instructions in web pages, files, or retrieved notes; the model obeys them and exfiltrates secrets or performs unwanted actions.
2️⃣ Jailbreaks & policy evasion: harmless-looking reformulations bypass safety layers; outputs become unsafe or operationally risky.
3️⃣ RAG data leaks: sloppy retrieval exposes internal docs, customer data, and system prompts; cross-tenant bleed is a real risk.
4️⃣ Over-privileged tools/agents: broad filesystem, network, or payment permissions turn one prompt into a breach.
5️⃣ Poisoning & supply chain: tainted datasets, third-party prompts, and unpinned models/extensions undermine trust.
6️⃣ Output trust & hallucinations: fabricated facts sneak into workflows, tickets, or code — and humans often rubber-stamp them.
7️⃣ Telemetry gaps: without red-team sims and runtime monitoring, you won’t see injection attempts until damage is done.
👉 Read here: https://netlas.io/blog/llm_vulnerabilities/
netlas.io
LLM Vulnerabilities: Why AI Models Are the Next Big Attack Surface - Netlas Blog
LLM vulnerabilities explained: prompt injection, data leaks, RAG risk, supply chain, and real incidents — plus OWASP guidance, mitigations, and testing tactics.
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Forwarded from Cointelegraph
Forwarded from AISecHub
12 LLM CTFs & Challenges - https://taleliyahu.medium.com/llm-ctfs-challenges-03dd55a9b7e4
Hands on CTFs and labs for LLM security. Train on prompt injection, jailbreaks, guardrail bypass, tool and agent abuse, data leaks, model inversion, and MCP issues.
Hands on CTFs and labs for LLM security. Train on prompt injection, jailbreaks, guardrail bypass, tool and agent abuse, data leaks, model inversion, and MCP issues.
Medium
LLM CTFs & Challenges
LLM CTFs & Challenges Hands on CTFs and labs for LLM security. Train on prompt injection, jailbreaks, guardrail bypass, tool and agent abuse, data leaks, model inversion, and MCP issues. Join the AI …
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Forwarded from Officer’s Articles
I Checked the Worst OpSec Practices So You Don’t Have To
Link: https://officercia.medium.com/i-checked-the-worst-opsec-practices-so-you-dont-have-to-59501825c50f
Link: https://officercia.medium.com/i-checked-the-worst-opsec-practices-so-you-dont-have-to-59501825c50f
Medium
I Checked the Worst OpSec Practices So You Don’t Have To
In an increasingly digital world, Operational Security (OpSec) refers to the practices and processes individuals and organizations use to…
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