Шкала боли Шмидта — поэтико-феноменологическое описание боли от укусов насекомых. (atlasobscura.com)

«Tarantula Hawk. Blinding, fierce, shockingly electric. A running hair dryer has been dropped into your bubble bath. A bolt out of the heavens. Lie down and scream.

Bullet Ant. Pure, intense, brilliant pain. Like walking over flaming charcoal with a 3-inch nail embedded in your heel.

Fierce Black Polybia Wasp. A ritual gone wrong, satanic. The gas lamp in the old church explodes in your face when you light it.»

«A basic assumption of phenomenological psychiatry is that no mental illness can be described or treated without a thorough analysis of subjective experience. Phenomenological denoscriptions of psychopathological disturbances remain the irreplaceable reference point of all empirical studies. Psychopathological disturbances cannot, for example, be reduced to subpersonal, biological symptoms. German and French phenomenological psychopathology even questions the legitimacy of the term “symptom” with respect to psychiatric disorders (Tellenbach 1968; Tatossian 1979; Kraus 1991). The term “symptom” in a medical context has a specific semiotic status: it is a sign referring to an occurring process that is not immediately visible or accessible. It implies an inferential process: we can infer the objective existence of a disease in terms of a pathological dysfunction to which we have no direct access from the manifestations of several symptoms. According to Tellenbach, psychopathological appearances are sensu stricto not symptoms (Tellenbach 1968). They do not refer to anything else. The feeling of a lack of feeling cannot be conceived as a symptom of depression; it is rather a primal manifestation of the disturbance, that is, an essential characteristic (Merkmal) of the phenomenon as such. The fundamental categorical distinction between symptoms and characteristics should not be overlooked in the psychiatric context since it reveals an implicit reductionism.»

— Stefano Micali. Hubertus Tellenbach
(in G. Stanghellini et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology)

«Phenomenology argues that the objective view—what Merleau-Ponty calls, in his 1945 Phenomenology of Perception, “the view from nowhere [la vue de nulle part]” (Merleau-Ponty 2012)—is achieved only by abstracting from the original first-person stance with which humans engage with the world.

Phenomenology, then, offers an important corrective, analyzing and describing the structure of consciousness, intentionality, and embodied being-in-the-world in a way which does not lose sight of the first-person perspective, that is, subjectivity both singular and plural (Husserl speaks of the “we-world [Wir-Welt]”). For phenomenology, human beings are embodied, intentional meaning-makers, acting and suffering in a surrounding world (the “life-world”), and their subjective slant on matters is not just an annoying inconvenience for the objectivist sciences. Rather, it has to be acknowledged as the very medium of human existence and as the necessary condition for objectivity to be possible. This means phenomenology essentially involves understanding intentionality, the fact that all our lived experiences are about something, have some kind of significance, which is linked to a whole nexus or web of motivations and other intentional implications.»

— Dermot Moran. The Phenomenological Approach
(in G. Stanghellini et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology)

«“Introspection” and “phenomenology” refer to the two most prominent scientific or philosophical programs or traditions—or sets of programs or traditions—to study subjectivity: to describe, from within, the “what-it-is-like” of human consciousness or experience. The relationship between the approaches falling under these rubrics is exceptionally difficult to define, however.

[…]

They range from the claim that the relevant methods can be complementary or even overlapping to the point of equivalence, to the insistence, by Edmund Husserl and some of his followers, that to describe phenomenology as a form of introspection is “preposterous” (Zahavi 2011: 16). There is, in fact, a strong tradition within phenomenology (summarized later) of criticizing introspection or introspectionism, and seeking to define phenomenology in a way that would sharply dissociate it from the supposed weaknesses or errors of introspection.

[…]

(A second) key criticism is the claim that introspectionists fail to transcend a misleading subject/object distinction that contradicts the object- or world-directed nature of actual subjective life. The very term “introspection,” it is said, implies a deplorable “Cartesianism”: the assumption that subjectivity is some sort of inward or inner object or quasi-object (“intro…”) that could be inspected (“…spection”) at a kind of remove (Zahavi 2011). It is noted that Husserl, by contrast, followed Brentano in considering consciousness to be fundamentally “intentional” or object-directed. This means that the subjectivity to which one returns in phenomenological reduction (the Latin “reducere” means to withdraw or lead back to) must not be conceived as a “mysterious inner world” or “state of consciousness” to be grasped through “a very peculiar kind of act—‘inner perception’ or introspection” (Merleau-Ponty 1945: 58). Rather, it is a veritable streaming-outward that we simply are, and that is simply inconceivable (and indescribable) apart from the objects toward which it aims.»

— Louis Sass and Adam Fishman. Introspection, Phenomenology, and Psychopathology
(in G. Stanghellini et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology)

«Merleau-Ponty brings the intentionality and transcendental insights together in these lapidary lines on subjectivity: “The interior and the exterior are inseparable. The world is entirely on the inside, and I am entirely outside of myself ” (1945: 469). This is more or less what Husserl meant when he spoke, in his Cartesian Meditations, of “transcendence [a going beyond] within immanence” (Moran and Cohen 2012: 162). Phenomenology, he might have said, is not a matter of looking at the within; rather, it is a matter of looking at the world from within—but, of course, with a heightened awareness of precisely this from-ness.»

— Louis Sass and Adam Fishman. Introspection, Phenomenology, and Psychopathology
(in G. Stanghellini et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology)

Статья о винникотовской ненависти матери к младенцу и гегелевской диалектике раба и господина.

«My son’s eyes would seek my face, and light up when they saw it. But was it me he was seeing? It takes a few months for a baby to develop the ability to distinguish objects from background, to tell apart the furniture from the wall, the animals from the sky. Emotionally that takes much longer: he couldn’t see the edges of me at all. I filled his field of vision so entirely it rendered me invisible. Parents form a kind of background to our emotional lives, like non-playable characters in a computer game: present, instrumental, but not fully inhabited from the inside.

[…]

…grappling with the loneliness of parenthood, I saw a version of the dynamic [Hegel’s master-slave dialectic] in my relationship with my children. One of the peculiarities of a relationship with a baby is that it is a relationship devoid of recognition. Both mother and child need to develop the capacity to recognize the other. But doing so is a developmental achievement, and one that involves risk on both sides, risks it can be tempting to subsume by treating the other as an extension of ourselves.

Newborns naturally “mouth” their hands when hungry, sucking on them and rubbing them over their mouths. In the very early days of his life, I struggled to prise my baby’s hands away from his mouth long enough to insert my breast in their place. The onanistic pleasure of his own fat fingers was guaranteed. What I could offer, though ultimately more sustaining, came at the price of a moment of vertigo, sitting with an absence and trusting that another body would fill it, an experience of vulnerability to another’s fickle willingness to satisfy his hunger. Safer for him to understand me instead, as far as possible, as an extension of his own self, to try to ignore the ways in which I was not under his control.

[…]

And good-enough parenting requires a reciprocal refusal to be consumed by your children, to avoid succumbing either to the urge to make the other unreal, or the temptation of allowing them to make you so. For a child to recognize their parent’s independent existence might be just as hard as it is for a parent to recognize their children’s. Perhaps it is harder. There’s a whole genre of children’s book in which a baby animal of some kind seeks to locate or identify their mother. It’s an appealing primal quest. But there are hardly any books depicting a child seeking to get to know one’s mother.»

— Jessie Munton. Slaves to Love: The mother-child dialectic

Heinrich Campendonk. Eidechse (1919)

«One can see the phenomenological proposal as occupying a middle position between two opposing views. According to the first view, the self is some kind of unchanging soul substance that is distinct from and ontologically independent of the worldly objects and conscious episodes it is directed at and the subject of. According to the second view, there is nothing to consciousness apart from a manifold or bundle of changing experiences. There are experiences and perceptions, but no experiencer or perceiver. A third option is available, however, the moment one realizes that an understanding of what it means to be a self calls for an examination of the structure of experience, and vice versa. Thus, the experiential self is not a separately existing entity, it is not something that exists independently of, in separation from or in opposition to the stream of consciousness, but neither is it simply reducible to a specific experience or (sub-)set of experiences; nor is it for that matter a mere social construct that evolves through time. Rather, and to repeat, the (minimal or experiential) self can be identified with the ubiquitous first-person character of the experiential phenomena (Zahavi 2014). The experiential self is consequently, and very importantly, not some experiential object. It is not as if there is a self-object in addition to all the other objects in one’s experiential field. Rather the claim is that all of these objects, when experienced, are given in a distinctly first-person way. In short, if we want to “locate” the experiential self, we shouldn’t look at what is being experienced, but at how it is being experienced.»

— Dan Zahavi. Self
(in G. Stanghellini et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology)

подарили, хвастаюсь

«Over the course of human history, there have been two revolutions in what we think meaning is. One, the “modernist revolution” started four hundred years ago and came to its conclusion a bit more than a hundred years ago. The second, which I’ll call the “constructivist revolution” is just beginning, or maybe is just in our future. […]

Adults today must understand the modernist revolution if they hope to make sense of their lives and deal with the conflicts that adults today face. Adults today must understand the constructivist revolution to get a grip on the most complex conflicts in the world today. »

— Nadia Rodinskaya. Intellectual History in Brief