«One final example will illustrate the reach of this stubborn metaphysical discreteness. This is the familiar, though rather fatalist, view that even if there is a world “out there,” it is a world “lost beyond a veil of words.” All is text or writing, it is said—or at least that is all we have access to. Even if there is a transcendent world, in other words, enjoying a pure noumenal existence, it must remain forever beyond our phenomenal grasp. “We cannot know it because our only connection to reality is through our words and thoughts. There is no such thing as contact with the world in pure, unregistered form.”

There is much that is right in this argument, especially the claim that we have no conscious access to the world independent of historical, cultural, and personal interpretation. But from the fact that we have no access independent of such interpretation, it does not follow that we have no access to it at all, or that the access we have is entirely determined by those interpretive schemes. That conclusion would only follow if, as in the other cases, a background discreteness were presumed: an assumption that the two realms, of mind and/or language, on the one hand, and the pure noumenal world, on the other, were wholly and irretrievably severed.»

— Brian Cantwell Smith. The Third Day: Putting the World Together, Keeping the World Apart

👏👏👏

«it cannot be legitimately separated into two independent parts: the part we do, and the part the world does. The point is that we neither impose nor discover the texture of the world; we participate in it. And yet this participation is not fusion. We neither dissolve into our surroundings, nor do we create them, nor are we ripped entirely out of them. We pull apart somewhat—to varying extents, at varying times, for varying purposes.»

— Brian Cantwell Smith. The Third Day: Putting the World Together, Keeping the World Apart

«Основу душевных расстройств, согласно Хайнроту [1773–1843], составляет «утрата себя вследствие себялюбия», в таком же состоянии находится и современное общество.»

— Ольга Власова. Феноменологическая психиатрия и экзистенциальный анализ

Немец, XIX век, а вы говорите “культура нарциссизма”.

«The direction of personal fulfillment, in this social context, shifted dramatically toward “selfish behavior, in which satisfaction in life chiefly meant serving one’s own needs and pleasures and not other people or social or religious or other external ideals. Thus arose what Tom Wolfe called the “me” generation, a special manifestation of what Philip Rieff had named “the age of psychological man” (1961a). Herbert Hendin (1975), Peter Marin (1975), and Christopher Lasch (1978) respectively named the era more acidly “the age of sensation,” “the new narcissism,” and the “culture of narcissism.»

— Perry London. The Modes And Morals Of Psychotherapy

— Я чувствую какие-то чувства, помогите!
— Чем же я вам помогу, у меня самого их вон сколько

G. Stanghellini et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology

собираюсь прочесть, возможно целиком. К сожалению тут 1125 страниц, так что желаю себе успехов и доброго здоровья

«[Bion’s belief in the special status of psychoanalytic practice] He believed in it with the fervent intensity of a mystic who has seen the light. For him psychoanalysis as he conceived of it was the path to truth. Bion violently disliked anything that did not approach his ascetic ideal of bearing uncertainty and being capable of emptying one's mind. He interpreted much of what patients said as evidence of destructive evacuation of pain and attempts to destroy the analyst's analytic ability. This must have turned him into a fairly difficult analyst. In his seminars he time and again says that it is surprising if patients come to analysis, since they do not truly want it, since they do not want pain, and they do not want truth (Bion, 1987).

He was not particularly concerned with the fact that most people who turn to psychotherapeutic help seek neither a spiritual search for purity of thought nor cleansing of themselves through the experience of pain. He seemed to be oblivious to the fact that there might be something legitimate in the patient's bewilderment at entering a strange kind of ritual instead of a more cooperative, commonsensically intuitive enterprise.»

— Carlo Strenger. Hedgehogs, Foxes, and Critical Pluralism: The Clinician's Yearning for Unified Conceptions

хорошо бы

«Critical pluralism is different from eclecticism in one central respect. Eclecticism assumes that psychotherapy is, or should be, a collection of techniques that should be adapted to patients and symptomatic pictures. It assumes that the professionalism of a therapist is a function of his or her command of some of the existing techniques and the ability to use them appropriately. In some respect eclecticism takes psychotherapy to be a discipline that should be similar to medicine: in the same way as the medical practitioner uses tools, medications, and procedures, the psychotherapist uses techniques.

Critical pluralism assumes that techniques are somewhat incidental in psychotherapy. It assumes that no therapy can be done without having some ideals of accomplished individuality. These ideals—often cast as conceptions of mature personality— guide the therapist's understanding of the patient's problems and the nature of the process the therapist must undergo in order to come closer to the ideal of accomplished individuality.»

— Carlo Strenger. Hedgehogs, Foxes, and Critical Pluralism: The Clinician's Yearning for Unified Conceptions

статья отличная, перечитывал уже много раз, и перечитаю снова через пару месяцев. что-то в ней все время вовремя находится. большая редкость.

«The term nibbāna/nirvāṇa is chosen carefully, and is often misunderstood by Western consumers of Buddhist literature. It is essentially a negative term, and figures in an elaborate fire-based metaphor (Gombrich 2009). […]

When Buddhists think about the human being analytically it is in terms of five skandhas, or piles of phenomena. […]

The term khanda (Pali for skandha) refers originally to a very specific kind of pile—a pile of firewood on a funeral pyre. Skandhas, therefore, are conceived as burning, and as being consumed. And this is an important soteriological metaphor. In the Fire Sutta (Additapairyaya-sutta), Siddhartha Gautama is represented as saying that our life is led as though we are on fire. We are burned by dukkha, consumed by forces out of our control, and we are being depleted all the time by those forces. Nibānna is also a term with a very specific core meaning—the extinction of a flame, as in blowing out a candle or a lamp. Nibānna, or nirvāṇa, then, is not a positive attainment or state of being. Nor is it a state of complete non-being, of annihilation. Instead it is the state of no longer being driven, consumed and tormented (however unconsciously) by dukkha.»

— Jay L. Garfield. Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy

— Donald S. Lopez Jr. The Story of Buddhism

хотя с огнем в буддизме бывало и наоборот

Уже несколько лет собирюсь прочитать “The Enigma of Health” Гадамера, теперь точно пора.

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«The fundamental task of being a human being is self-understanding in the world, in which the self is thrown into the variety of languages that cannot be reduced to one language. To understand oneself in the world means understanding the self and the other. To understand the other, one needs to listen to the other with a strong conviction that the other might be right. To help a human being find itself at home in this complex world can be seen as a genuine goal of a phenomenological hermeneutics of medicine and, in fact, medicine itself. The task of medicine is to help uncover the phenomenon of being a human being in the adequacy of one’s own vocation without a premature pressure to solve all the difficult problems that the self experiences. If medicine wishes to be an art of healing, it must be a dialogical science, an art of healing that assists in finding one’s own way to live one’s life. […]

Suffering discloses something essential about our way of being-in-the-world and cannot be reduced to a medical problem in need of being controlled or overcome.»

— Andrzej Wiercinski. Gadamer
(in G. Stanghellini et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology)