Phenomenal post by this individual regarding potential vulnerabilities in attempting to leverage ed25519 for HD keys (not as straightforwarfd as one would imagine that it is)

https://forum.w3f.community/t/key-recovery-attack-on-bip32-ed25519/44

Key recovery attack on BIP32-Ed25519 (they deserve their fucking credit for this ; just failing to understand why they're so daft in so many other areas of blockchain...just doesn't even make sense really)

https://forum.w3f.community/t/key-recovery-attack-on-bip32-ed25519/44

libp2p TLS = https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-tls (this is the GitHub but there's no documentation that speaks on this as well ; fuck )

There's more information about TLS 1.3 for libp2p contained here = https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/tls/tls.md [had to find additional information]

Replacement / Currently used in lieu of the TLS that we were looking at above = https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-secio (secio)

More specs on the protocol can be found here = https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/secio/README.md [SECIO allows participating peers to support a subset of algorithms]

Verifiable Secret Sharing (this is interesting ; another in-depth banger) = https://www.jcraige.com/vss-forgery

Dangers Of Determinism In Threshold Signatures = https://www.jcraige.com/dangers-of-determinism-in-threshold-signatures

In-depth Post That Explains Everything That One Needs to Know About ed25519 Down to the Nucleus (gets into clamping / subgroups / all of that) = https://www.jcraige.com/an-explainer-on-ed25519-clamping

Threshold BLS Signatures (feel like we haven't gotten into blind signatures a lot lately) = https://www.jcraige.com/threshold-bls-signatures

Cryptonite (Haskell Cryptography Library) = https://hackage.haskell.org/package/cryptonite

Great link for those looking to learn more about practical applications for Quantum Cryptography = https://wizardforcel.gitbooks.io/practical-cryptography-for-developers-book/content/quantum-safe-cryptography.html

Showing all of the algorithms that Cloudflare supports for DNSSEC (not ed448 ; few if any resolvers support ed448 - algorithm448 / naturally uses shake256 as well // the parameters of that curve seem to be problematic [also the strength of ed448 could pose an issue as well given U.S. export restrictions + that of other countries]

https://community.cloudflare.com/t/support-for-ed448-dnssec-signature-algorithm/71494

Edwards' Curve Resources

There are plenty of resources out there for ed25519, but it seems that there are few resources dedicated to ed448, so this list will make a concerted

1. IETF Outline / Guidance for ed448 Deployment (as well as ed25519)

2. Async SSH (allows for ed448 to be used ; this is not enabled with OpenSSH to the best of my knowledge) = https://asyncssh.readthedocs.io/en/stable/#interactive-input

3. https://github.com/otrv4/otrv4/blob/master/otrv4.md

4. BIP 32 With ed25519 = https://cardano.org/assets/Ed25519_BIP.pdf

4a. BIP32 with ed25519 keys ; GUI interface included here = https://superdarkbit.github.io/nano-bip32-ed25519/ (should look closely at the spec to ensure that these keys are being generated in a secure manner here ; there is nuance in the generation hierarchical deterministic key wallets when using Edwards' curves vs. secg curves)

Source = http://cryptowiki.net/index.php?noscript=The_Double_Ratchet_Algorithm

(Double Ratchet Encryption Algorithm) <—- this is what Signal uses (and why people claim that Signal is so super secure

Original technique borrowed from 'off the record' encryption (Moxie has stated as much)

Blake3 Specs = https://github.com/BLAKE3-team/BLAKE3-specs/blob/master/blake3.pdf

GitHub link is to the repo with Blake3.

Bao Function (part of Blake3); this allows you to take a 'slice' of a file that's already been encoded with Blake3 and determine whether the full file itself has been encoded with Blake3

HC-256 Design Specifications = https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/092.pdf

Lurch - Brings OMEMO Encryption (double ratcheting) to libpurple

https://github.com/hardenedvault/lurch

Two Interesting E-mail Lists

Both located at moderncrypto.org

Schnorr Claims to Have Destroyed the RSA Cryptosystem

Seriously - https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/232.pdf

The final sentence in the Abstract is, "This destroys the RSA cryptosystem"

This is profound if true. I'm obviously not qualified to audit Schnorr's work, but we can rest assured that peers in cryptography academia are pouring over this paper as we speak.

The paper is a legitimate eprint and various professionals have contacted Schnorr to confirm that he indeed is the true publisher of the paper (and that this isn't a hoax / someone looking to rile up bullshit).

'

Initial Reception From Various Individuals

Truthfully, the reception has been extremely skeptical with most requesting Schnorr to provide concrete proofs showing RSA being broken in practice.

This feels reasonable.

We'll have to see how this one evolves over the next day or so.

To claim that he has broken RSA is profound, if true. This is an obviously well-known cryptographer that has earned respect for his contributions in the field of cryptography.

So one would assume that he values his credibility and name as much as you would expect from someone of his stature. To make the claim that the "RSA cryptosystem is destroyed" is a ludicrous statement to make if he truly has no proofs.

I'm going to optimistically assume that Schnorr has additional information / proofs / breakdowns to rebut.

If not, then I'm sure there will be a response paper published in a few days, at most. This is extremely interesting as a spectator to be honest

Picnic Signature Specification (optimized) = https://github.com/IAIK/Picnic