A few points on what Joel Davis and Imperium Press said regarding France and geopolitical decisions.
Russia and America have been at war for at least eight years – 30 with the new Russia, and at least 70 with the old Russia. 200 according to Tocqueville.
This alone makes China a lesser player. Add nuclear weapons to the equation and they drop even further. This aspect cannot be underestimated, yet it does not factor at all into most discussions. Russia too has to factor in a first strike by America, or the fact that it is already existentially on the line of defeat.
Given Schmitt's elements of world order after WWII - anti-colonialism, cosmic spatial appropriation, and industrial aid - China should be understood as a sort of lynchpin, or gordian knot. Industrialising China offers two strategic opportunities: limiting world industrial power to a single zone, a zone which can also act as potential alliance or incursion point.
All this considered, China does not represent a true enemy, which is why the conflict remains an economic and industrial one whereas the conflict with Russia has been real for nearly a century – in cold war, revolutionary war, mixed warfare, and even limited hot war. The question of the East is an extension of American doctrine following the Monroe Doctrine's completion in WWII. It is also a residue of the conflict with communism, China is not the central focus of conflict, but a result.
This does not mean China is irrelevant, only that potential power is accidental. If China realises power it will be due to it being thrust upon them, much as it was for the Americans.
Of course, it would be a mistake to discount China. A billion people and total mobilisation potential threatens a whole other front for America and an unbinding of the world war.
Roughly speaking, the conditions of economic diplomacy may follow that of the explosion of nations into the UN as a response to the eternal Soviet veto. There will be a revolution in industrial order, particularly against aid and any subterfuge which comes with trade in the Western economic zones.
How much leverage does France really have here? I doubt both their potential and will for sovereignty apart from America. Most likely is maintaining relations with China for the benefit of America, or simply self-interest due to austerity and attrition pressure. The West simply does not have the capacity for total mobilisation, and their economic desperation, or capitulation to China, is increasing because of its self-destructive choices, and multiple defeats at the hand of Russia.
The defeats in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the First Ukraine Conflict cannot be overstated. It is to the extent that America's incursion against Russia is partly an act of desperation and also to not allow defeat to set in. The populace must also forget the images of mass retreat from democratic expansion and the neutralisation of non-democratic states. To some extent this is a war of equalisation.
Russia played a significant part in at least two of these conflicts, and its decisions are seen by most of the world as the graveyard of the American Empire – or at the very least its control of international order through the UN. The legal justification of revolutionary war has ended, and the extent to which Russia can establish a new order is the real.test of this war.
Russia is fighting for a new international order of law; America is fighting for its spatial order, which has suffered potentially mortal wounds. The conditions for victory are, in a sense, limited yet limitless for America. Particularly this is true to the extent that the war is a spatial conflict tending towards territorial gains. To return to neutralising power, to the maintainer of world order, is a much higher demand, and cannot be read in the classical terms which determine the commonplace interpretation of war. Here we see a simple reason for the extreme claims of Ukraine victory apart from propaganda, which should not have an effect anywhere close to what we are seeing.
Russia and America have been at war for at least eight years – 30 with the new Russia, and at least 70 with the old Russia. 200 according to Tocqueville.
This alone makes China a lesser player. Add nuclear weapons to the equation and they drop even further. This aspect cannot be underestimated, yet it does not factor at all into most discussions. Russia too has to factor in a first strike by America, or the fact that it is already existentially on the line of defeat.
Given Schmitt's elements of world order after WWII - anti-colonialism, cosmic spatial appropriation, and industrial aid - China should be understood as a sort of lynchpin, or gordian knot. Industrialising China offers two strategic opportunities: limiting world industrial power to a single zone, a zone which can also act as potential alliance or incursion point.
All this considered, China does not represent a true enemy, which is why the conflict remains an economic and industrial one whereas the conflict with Russia has been real for nearly a century – in cold war, revolutionary war, mixed warfare, and even limited hot war. The question of the East is an extension of American doctrine following the Monroe Doctrine's completion in WWII. It is also a residue of the conflict with communism, China is not the central focus of conflict, but a result.
This does not mean China is irrelevant, only that potential power is accidental. If China realises power it will be due to it being thrust upon them, much as it was for the Americans.
Of course, it would be a mistake to discount China. A billion people and total mobilisation potential threatens a whole other front for America and an unbinding of the world war.
Roughly speaking, the conditions of economic diplomacy may follow that of the explosion of nations into the UN as a response to the eternal Soviet veto. There will be a revolution in industrial order, particularly against aid and any subterfuge which comes with trade in the Western economic zones.
How much leverage does France really have here? I doubt both their potential and will for sovereignty apart from America. Most likely is maintaining relations with China for the benefit of America, or simply self-interest due to austerity and attrition pressure. The West simply does not have the capacity for total mobilisation, and their economic desperation, or capitulation to China, is increasing because of its self-destructive choices, and multiple defeats at the hand of Russia.
The defeats in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the First Ukraine Conflict cannot be overstated. It is to the extent that America's incursion against Russia is partly an act of desperation and also to not allow defeat to set in. The populace must also forget the images of mass retreat from democratic expansion and the neutralisation of non-democratic states. To some extent this is a war of equalisation.
Russia played a significant part in at least two of these conflicts, and its decisions are seen by most of the world as the graveyard of the American Empire – or at the very least its control of international order through the UN. The legal justification of revolutionary war has ended, and the extent to which Russia can establish a new order is the real.test of this war.
Russia is fighting for a new international order of law; America is fighting for its spatial order, which has suffered potentially mortal wounds. The conditions for victory are, in a sense, limited yet limitless for America. Particularly this is true to the extent that the war is a spatial conflict tending towards territorial gains. To return to neutralising power, to the maintainer of world order, is a much higher demand, and cannot be read in the classical terms which determine the commonplace interpretation of war. Here we see a simple reason for the extreme claims of Ukraine victory apart from propaganda, which should not have an effect anywhere close to what we are seeing.
Russia's stated aims are also unacceptable to the West and any classical or American revolutionary conception of war. Demilitarisation, denazification, true neutrality, re-establishment of treaties are its limited aims while security of its national and Eastern Space, freedom from liberalisation, and dissolution of the American spaces are its greater aims.
For America, as already stated, the limited aims are a zone of neutralisation, to be used as an extension of its nuclear defense systems and other weapons installations – militarisation and a staging ground for incursions. Overall, it must limit the extent of the defeat on the world stage, secure itself against total collapse, and reestablish itself as world hegemon. The series of conflicts over the last thirty years intended to finalise the world order, that is the absolute aim which should never leave our minds.
Even a victory in Ukraine would only be a small step towards the greater aims, perhaps not equal to its losses over the last decade. This is why Russia can play the game it wants, to appear weak – time is on its side, whereas the West exists in an internal state of attrition. The law of modern war is that the international order can be determined in the smallest spaces, that an absolute conflict of annihilation is at the same time limited to the most minor territories. That this is shifting indicates a turn in the spatial conflict and the laws of war.
https://news.1rj.ru/str/ImperiumPressOfficial/1644
For America, as already stated, the limited aims are a zone of neutralisation, to be used as an extension of its nuclear defense systems and other weapons installations – militarisation and a staging ground for incursions. Overall, it must limit the extent of the defeat on the world stage, secure itself against total collapse, and reestablish itself as world hegemon. The series of conflicts over the last thirty years intended to finalise the world order, that is the absolute aim which should never leave our minds.
Even a victory in Ukraine would only be a small step towards the greater aims, perhaps not equal to its losses over the last decade. This is why Russia can play the game it wants, to appear weak – time is on its side, whereas the West exists in an internal state of attrition. The law of modern war is that the international order can be determined in the smallest spaces, that an absolute conflict of annihilation is at the same time limited to the most minor territories. That this is shifting indicates a turn in the spatial conflict and the laws of war.
https://news.1rj.ru/str/ImperiumPressOfficial/1644
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Imperium Press
I've seen quite a few people interpreting these statements from Macron through the basic frame of "he's a globalist," but I think to understand his motivations you need to think geostrategically. Globalism is a project dependent upon leveraging American unipolarity…
^Imperium Press reposted this. Check it out.
https://news.1rj.ru/str/ImperiumPressOfficial/1646
https://news.1rj.ru/str/ImperiumPressOfficial/1646
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Imperium Press
A few points on what Joel Davis and Imperium Press said regarding France and geopolitical decisions.
Russia and America have been at war for at least eight years – 30 with the new Russia, and at least 70 with the old Russia. 200 according to Tocqueville.…
Russia and America have been at war for at least eight years – 30 with the new Russia, and at least 70 with the old Russia. 200 according to Tocqueville.…
Forwarded from Der Schattige Wald 🇬🇱
"The term bipolar comes across as almost too neutral confronted with the hostile tension like that of world dualism, because polarity is a concept coming from the natural sciences, and political enmity between humans signifies something other than a chemical or physical polarity."
~ Carl Schmitt
~ Carl Schmitt
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Foxconn confirms ‘violence’ at China iPhone factory
China fanaticism underestimates the extent that unrest could change the situation.
China fanaticism underestimates the extent that unrest could change the situation.
Forwarded from Intel Slava
🇹🇷🇸🇾🇺🇲 A huge fire in the Al-Omar oil field in Syria (north of Deir ez-Zor) after the attacks of the Turkish army. Turkey is actually directly destroying the oil infrastructure of the "Kurdish autonomy", which was exploited by the United States, exporting oil through border crossings to the border with Iraq in Iraqi Kurdistan. In fact, Turkey is striking not only at the Kurds, but also at American interests in Syria related to the robbery of Syrian oil.
"If pacifist hostility toward war were so strong as to drive pacifists into a war against nonpacifists, in a war against war, that would prove that pacifism truly possesses political energy because it is sufficiently strong to group men according to friend and enemy. If, in fact, the will to abolish war is so strong that it no longer shuns war, then it has become a political motive, i.e., it affirms, even if only as an extreme possibility, war and even the reason for war. Presently this appears to be a peculiar way of justifying wars. The war is then considered to constitute the absolute last war of humanity. Such a war is necessarily unusually intense and inhuman because, by transcending the limits of the political framework, it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed. In other words, he is an enemy who no longer must be compelled to retreat into his borders only."
~ Carl Schmitt
~ Carl Schmitt
Forwarded from Lance's Legion: Taberna
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Ukraine's Kherson Campaign - Lessons & Implications of the Southern counterattack
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While much of the narrative around the early stages of Russia's 2022 invasion…
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While much of the narrative around the early stages of Russia's 2022 invasion…
Nomos of War
"If pacifist hostility toward war were so strong as to drive pacifists into a war against nonpacifists, in a war against war, that would prove that pacifism truly possesses political energy because it is sufficiently strong to group men according to friend…
"In other words, he is an enemy who no longer must be compelled to retreat into his borders only."
This is absolutely critical in understanding why this war is not about territory. For America the Russians are a criminal element, not an enemy - the whole of their territory must be neutralised. Capture of the Donbass, even Crimea and retreat into formal Russian territory would not be enough. This is why peace talks do not even pretend to be serious.
So too are the Ukrainians a non-human and titanic force. A resolution to the war would only amount to having to create another reason for its return in another place, and the building up of another gigantic force.
If the Russians are fighting on another ground of law, and against the liberal order, then they cannot fight in terms of criminality and a war of elimination. Neutralisation cannot be the principle, instead there must be a distinct separation between Ukraine as a territory and the gigantic military force of the world that has accumulated there.
If this truly is the method employed by Russia then we are in an entirely new age of warfare and international law.
This is absolutely critical in understanding why this war is not about territory. For America the Russians are a criminal element, not an enemy - the whole of their territory must be neutralised. Capture of the Donbass, even Crimea and retreat into formal Russian territory would not be enough. This is why peace talks do not even pretend to be serious.
So too are the Ukrainians a non-human and titanic force. A resolution to the war would only amount to having to create another reason for its return in another place, and the building up of another gigantic force.
If the Russians are fighting on another ground of law, and against the liberal order, then they cannot fight in terms of criminality and a war of elimination. Neutralisation cannot be the principle, instead there must be a distinct separation between Ukraine as a territory and the gigantic military force of the world that has accumulated there.
If this truly is the method employed by Russia then we are in an entirely new age of warfare and international law.
Forwarded from caseus
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Pretty extreme headline, but he always has an interesting perspective at least.
https://youtu.be/dfgF4x7TCmM
https://youtu.be/dfgF4x7TCmM
Forwarded from Intel Slava
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🇩🇪🇺🇸At the US Consulate General in Leipzig, a protest was held by local residents with the slogan "Americans, go home"
Forwarded from Lazarus Symposium
“Today, we also see the proliferation of non-state actors (non- governmental organisations, private and multinational foundations, financial interests, lobbyists, etc.) in all the domains of international life. This evolution has redefined the relationships between the public and the private spheres, and between the civilian and military sectors. Whereas soldiers become more and more ‘technicians’ or ‘civilians in uniform,’ we simultaneously see an accelerated privatisation of all that relates to security (or to preventing insecurity). The privatisation of war does not result merely from the fact that, in many theatres of operation, the belligerents are civilians who have taken up arms, or from the fact that certain criminal organisations now have recourse to veritable private armies, as is the case with drug-traffickers."
- Alain de Benoit, Carl Schmitt Today
- Alain de Benoit, Carl Schmitt Today