Unegoistic acts are impossible; “unegoistic instinct” sounds to my ears like “wooden iron”. I wanted someone to make an attempt to prove the possibility of such acts: that they exist is of course believed by the people and those who are like them — like those who call motherly love or love in general something un-egoistic.

Incidentally, it is a historical error that peoples have always interpreted the moral values of “good” and “evil” as “un-egoistic” and “egoistic”.

Rather, good and evil as “commanded” [geboten] and “forbidden” [verboten] — “in accordance with or contrary to custom” — is much older and more general.

That the insight into the origin of moral value judgments does not yet give a critique and determination of their value — just as a quality is not explained by knowledge of the quantitative conditions under which it arises.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente (1884) (26[224])

The problem of freedom and non-freedom of will belongs in the courts of philosophy — for me there is no will. That belief in the will [Willen] is necessary in order to “will” [wollen] — is nonsense.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente (1884) (26[254])

I believe I have guessed [erraten] something from the soul of the highest man — perhaps everyone who guesses him will perish, but whoever has seen him must help to make him possible [ermöglichen].

Basic idea: we must take the future as decisive [maßgebend] for all our value judgements — and not look behind us for the laws of our actions!

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente (1884) (26[256])

Misunderstandings on a grand scale, e.g., ascetism as a means of self-preservation for wild, overly excitable natures. La Trappe as a “penitentiary” to which one condemns oneself (understandable, especially among the French, like Christianity in the hot air of southern European Hellenization). Puritanism has as its background the conviction of one's own thoroughgoing meanness, of the omnipresent “inner cattle” (ego) — and the gloomy dry pride of the Puritan Englishman wants everyone to think as badly of his “inner human” as he thinks of himself!

The customs and ways of life have been conceived as proven means of preservation — therein first misunderstanding and superficiality. Second misunderstanding: they are now supposed to be the only means.

Piety — consciousness of a higher connection between all experiences

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente (1884) (26[261])

The idea that the consequences of actions already contain reward and punishment — this idea of immanent justice is fundamentally wrong. Moreover, it contradicts the idea of an “order of salvation” in the experiences and consequences: according to which bad things of all kinds are to be understood as special favors from a God who wants our best. — Why suffering should follow an evil deed is in itself incomprehensible: in practice it even amounts to saying that an evil deed should be followed by an evil deed. — That one who is different from us must have it bad is an idea of defense, an emergency defense of the ruling caste, a means of breeding, — but nothing particularly “noble”. — All sorts of such ideas about “immanent justice”, “order of salvation”, balancing “transcendent justice” are now going around in everyone's head — they contribute to the chaos of the modern soul.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente (1884) (26[279])

The sensualism and hedonism of the last century is the best inheritance this century has made: behind a hundred clauses and fine mummery.

Hedonism = pleasure as a principle.

Pleasure as a yardstick was actually found among the Utilitarians (Comfort-English).

Pleasure as regulative principle (not actually found) among the Schopenhauerians

von Hartmann, a superficial lateral thinker, who distorts pessimism through teleology and wants to turn it into a philosophy of comfort (in this he approaches the English).

What follows pessimism is the doctrine of the meaninglessness of existence

that pleasure and pain have no meaning, that hedonism cannot be a principle

This in the next century.

Doctrine of the great weariness.

What for? Nothing is worthwhile!

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente (1884) (26[326])

The faith in the Truth.

The excess and pathological nature of much of what used to be called the “will to truth”.

Philosophers have warned against the senses and the deception of the senses with terrible seriousness. The deep antagonism between the philosophers and the friends of deception, the artists, runs through Greek philosophy: “Plato against Homer” — is the slogan of the philosophers!

But no one has understood the flip side, the unsuitability of truth for life and the conditionality of life through perspective illusion. — It is one of the most dangerous exaggerations to want knowledge not in the service of life, but in itself, at any price: like the lustful man following his instincts, in itself, without the control of the salutary other instincts, if it is not a stupidity, –––

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente (1884) (26[334])

“I see more inclination to greatness in the feelings of the Russian nihilists than in those of the English utilitarians.”

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente (1884) (26[335])

To ridicule the school of “objectivists” and “positivists”. They want to get around the value judgments and only discover and present the facts. But look at Taine, for example: in the background he has preferences: for the strong expressive types, for example, and also for the epicures more than for the puritans.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente (1884) (26[348])

I am not interested

1) in the national state, as something ephemeral in relation to the overall democratic movement.

2) for the workers' question, because the worker himself is only an intermediate act.

3) for the differences of religion and philosophy, because in the main they are one, namely about good and evil — where I [have my] doubts.

4) for the ways of thinking which do not hold on to the body and the senses, and the earth

5) not for the l'art pour l'art, the objective, etc.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente (1884) (26[352])

Henceforth, I shall be known as Dionysos

I am also Kali (the powerful bahujan goddess),
and I am also the Kali of "Kali Yuga" (the age in which Brahmanism is destroyed – forever)...


I'll destroy Kalki – and, with it, Vishnu will be no more... next I'll obliterate Brahma

Brahmanism will be history (although one full of lies)…

Ⓐnarchy will prevail...

No caste, no gender, no hierarchy, no private property, no state...

The Dionysian / Kali age starts from now...!

Let this be clear,
our Kali Yuga is here...
so let the oppressors fear,
for the end of their rule is near

"Kalki" will be – obliterated,
The great age of Kali accelerated,
Brahmanical Patriarchy incinerated,
Capitalism & Statism pulverated,
all the oppressed liberated

Let the Dwijas know afore,
the Asatya Yuga they adore,
– or rather are desperate for,
– nah, it will return no more!
It is Kali Yuga forevermore!

No more Vishnu, no more Manu,
all inventions of the brah-manu.
No more karma, no more dharma,
both are just brahmanical drama.

We are, each of us, Asura Kali, –
the grandchildren of Mahabali, –
the reincarnations of goddess Kali,
the powerful bahujan goddess
even Brahmins couldn't suppress,
– or tame or domesticate,
– but merely appropriate…

We, Kali's and Kala's, are here to end,
once and forever, this "white facade"
that calls itself Hindutva or Hinduism,
which is just a mask for Brahmanism

Rejoice, celebrate the Age of Kali,
with toddy, or wine, and beef,
or whatever makes you jolly;
it is here, the era of no grief…
– also known as Begumpura

I. CRITIQUE OF RELIGION

All the beauty and sublimity we have bestowed upon real and imaginary things I will reclaim as the property and product of man: as his fairest apology. Man as poet, as thinker, as God, as love, as power: with what regal liberality he has lavished gifts upon things so as to impoverish himself and make himself feel wretched! His most unselfish act hitherto has been to admire and worship and to know how to conceal from himself that it was he who created what he admired.—

— Friedrich Nietzsche,
The Will to Power (Bk. II)

1. Genesis of Religions

On the origin of religion. — In the same way as today the uneducated man believes that anger is the cause of his being angry, spirit the cause of his thinking, soul the cause of his feeling – in short, just as there is still thoughtlessly posited a mass of psychological entities that are supposed to be causes – so, at a yet more naive stage, man explained precisely the same phenomena with the aid of psychological personal entities. Those conditions that seemed to him strange, thrilling, overwhelming, he interpreted as obsession and enchantment by the power of a person. (Thus the Christian, the most naive and backward species of man today, traces hope, repose, the feeling of “redemption,” back to psychological inspiration by God: to him, as an essentially suffering and disturbed type, the feeling of happiness, resignation and repose naturally seems strange and in need of explanation.) Among intelligent, strong, and vigorous races it is mainly the epileptic who inspires the conviction that a strange power is here at work; but every related condition of subjection, e.g., that of the inspired man, of the poet, of the great criminal, of passions such as love and revenge, also leads to the invention of extra-human powers. A condition is made concrete in a person, and when it overtakes us is thought to be effected by that person. In other words: In the psychological concept of God, a condition, in order to appear as effect, is personified as cause.

The psychological logic is this: When a man is suddenly and overwhelmingly suffused with the feeling of power – and this is what happens with all great affects – it raises in him a doubt about his own person: he does not dare to think himself the cause of this astonishing feeling – and so he posits a stronger person, a divinity, to account for it.

In summa: the origin of religion lies in extreme feelings of power which, because they are strange, take men by surprise: and like a sick man who, feeling one of his limbs uncommonly heavy, comes to the conclusion another man is lying on top of him, the naive homo religiosus divides himself into several persons. Religion is a case of “altération de la personalité.” A sort of feeling of fear and terror at oneself— But also a feeling of extraordinary happiness and exaltation— Among the sick the feeling of health is sufficient to inspire belief in God, in the nearness of God.

— Friedrich Nietzsche,
The Will to Power (135)

Rudimentary psychology of the religious man: — All changes are effects; all effects are effects of will ( – the concept “nature,” “law of nature” is lacking); all effects suppose an agent. Rudimentary psychology: one is a cause oneself only when one knows that one has performed an act of will.

Result: when man experiences the conditions of power, the imputation is that he is not their cause, that he is not responsible for them: they come without being willed, consequently we are not their author: the will that is not free (i.e., the consciousness that we have been changed without having willed it) needs an external will.

Consequence: man has not dared to credit himself with all his strong and surprising impulses – he has conceived them as “passive,” as “suffered,” as things imposed upon him: religion is the product of a doubt concerning the unity of the person, an altération of the personality: in so far as everything great and strong in man has been conceived as superhuman and external, man has belittled himself – he has separated the two sides of himself, one very paltry and weak, one very strong and astonishing, into two spheres, and called the former “man,” the latter “God.”

He has continued to think in this way; in the period of the moral idiosyncrasy he did not interpret his exalted and sublime moral states as “willed,” as “work” of the person. The Christian too divides his person into a mean and weak fiction which he calls man, and another which he calls God (redeemer, savior)—

Religion has debased the concept “man”; its ultimate consequence is that everything good, great, true is superhuman and bestowed only through an act of grace—

— Friedrich Nietzsche,
The Will to Power (136)

One way of raising man from the abasement produced by the subtraction of exalted and strong states as foreign conditions was the family theory. These exalted and strong states could at least be interpreted as the influence of our ancestors; we belonged together, in solidarity; we grow greater in our own eyes when we act according to a norm known to us.

Attempt by noble families to square religion with the feeling of their own worth. Poets and seers do the same: they feel proud, honored, and chosen for such an association – they attach great importance to not being considered at all as individuals, but merely as mouthpieces (Homer).

Step by step man takes possession of his exalted and proud states, he takes possession of his acts and works. Formerly one believed one was doing oneself an honor by denying responsibility for one’s highest acts and attributing them to – God. Absence of free will counted as that which imparted a higher value to an action: a god was conceived as its author.

— Friedrich Nietzsche,
The Will to Power (137)

Priests are the actors of something superhuman which they have to make easily perceptible, whether it be in the nature of ideals, gods, or saviors: in this they find their calling, for this their instincts serve them; to make everything as believable as possible they have to go as far as possible in posturing and posing; the shrewdness of their actor’s art must above all aim at giving them a good conscience, by means of which alone is it possible to carry true conviction.

— Friedrich Nietzsche,
The Will to Power (138)

The priest wants to have it understood that he counts as the highest type of man, that he rules – even over those who wield power – that he is indispensable, unassailable – that he is the strongest power in the community, absolutely not to be replaced or undervalued.

Means*: he alone possesses knowledge; he alone possesses virtue; he alone has sovereign lordship over himself; he alone is in a certain sense God and goes back to the divinity; he alone is the intermediary between God and other people; the divinity punishes every opposition to, every thought directed against a priest.

Means: truth exists. There is only one way of attaining it: to become a priest. Everything good in society, in nature, in tradition, is to be traced back to the wisdom of the priests. The holy book is their work. The whole of nature is only a fulfillment of the dogmas contained in it. There is no other source of the good than the priests. Every other kind of excellence is of a different order from that of the priest; e.g., that of the warrior.

Consequence: if the priest is to be the highest type, then the degrees which lead to his virtues must constitute the degrees of value among men. Study, emancipation from the senses, the nonactive, the impassible, absence of affects, the solemn; antithesis: the lowest order of man.

The priest has taught one kind of morality: in order that he shall be considered the highest type of man. He conceives an antithetical type: the chandala. To make these contemptible by every means provides a foil to the order of castes. – The priest’s extreme fear of sensuality is also conditioned by the insight that this is the most serious threat to the order of castes (that is, to order in general)— Every “more liberal tendency” in puncto puncti throws the marriage laws overboard—

* Mittel, i.e., means in the sense of instrument/methods

— Friedrich Nietzsche,
The Will to Power (139)