Reversing Firmware Encryption with IDA Pro Hanwha WiseNet Security Camera
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WP7kIfmVFpY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WP7kIfmVFpY
YouTube
Reversing Firmware Encryption with IDA Pro - Hanwha WiseNet Security Camera
Thanks to Hex-Rays for collaborating on this video: Where Reverse Engineering Meets Precision
Hex-Rays Discount Code: MATT50
To activate your 50% product discount, click "Get a quote" in the web shop (under "Order & Pay), or email sales@hex-rays.com. Make…
Hex-Rays Discount Code: MATT50
To activate your 50% product discount, click "Get a quote" in the web shop (under "Order & Pay), or email sales@hex-rays.com. Make…
❤1
بخش اول بافر اورفلو
تا حالا فکر کردید یک ورودی ساده چطور میتونه یک برنامه رو از کار بندازه
هدف آشنایی با مفهوم بافر و اورفلو هست
تئوری ساده استک و بافر:
بافر یعنی محلی در حافظه که برای نگهداری داده ها مثل رشته ها یا آرایه ها اختصاص داده میشه اگر ورودی بیشتر از فضای اختصاص یافته باشه داده های مجاور بازنویسی میشن
در برنامه های ساده معمولا بافر روی استک قرار می گیرد و کنار اون آدرس بازگشت تابع و متغیرهای دیگر قرار دارن وقتی بافر بازنویسی میشه ممکنه آدرس بازگشت تغییر کنه یا برنامه کرش کنه
مثال بدون جزئیات exploit:
تصور کنید تابعی هست که یک آرایه شونزده بایتی داره و کاربر به جای شونزده بایت شصت و چهار بایت می فرسته بخشی از حافظه که بیرون از آرایه است بازنویسی میشه و باعث رفتار غیرمنتظره میشه این رفتار ممکنه تنها کرش باشه یا در شرایط خاص بتونه باعث اجرای کد بشه
Part 1 Buffer Overflow
Have you ever wondered how a simple input can crash a program ?
The goal is to familiarize yourself with the concept of buffer and overflow
Simple theory of stack and buffer :
A buffer is a place in memory that is allocated to store data such as strings or arrays. If the input exceeds the allocated space, the adjacent data is overwritten.
In simple programs, the buffer is usually placed on the stack, and next to it are the function's return address and other variables. When the buffer is overwritten, the return address may change or the program may crash.
Example without exploit details :
Imagine a function that has a sixteen-byte array and the user sends sixty-four bytes instead of sixteen bytes. A part of the memory that is outside the array is overwritten, causing unexpected behavior. This behavior may only be a crash, or in special circumstances, it may cause code execution.
@reverseengine
❤2
Reversing the TNT team macOS crack library
https://reverse.put.as/2025/03/13/cracking-the-crackers/
@reverseengine
https://reverse.put.as/2025/03/13/cracking-the-crackers/
@reverseengine
Reverse Engineering
Cracking the Crackers
A few weeks ago, Copycat sent me an email asking if I knew anything about the TNT warez group macOS cracks. They were worried that the cracks could be used to leverage malware since TNT is (?) Russia based. Cyber war is real and this could be an interesting…
❤1
Bringing Metal to a crypto backdoor fight! Exploiting the GPU and the 90s crypto wars to crack the APT Down code signing keys
https://reverse.put.as/2025/08/24/rc4bruteforce/
@reverseengine
https://reverse.put.as/2025/08/24/rc4bruteforce/
@reverseengine
Reverse Engineering
Bringing Metal to a crypto backdoor fight! Exploiting the GPU and the 90s crypto wars to crack the APT Down code signing keys
The APT Down leak contained four code signing certificates and the passphrase only for the most recent one. Since the passphrase was found on the usual rockyou.txt wordlist, I was curious to see if the remaining three could be cracked using the same wordlist.…
🔥3❤1
ANALYZING WINPMEM DRIVER VULNERABILITIES
https://static.ernw.de/whitepaper/ERNW_White_Paper_73-Analyzing_WinpMem_Driver_Vulnerabilities_1.0_signed.pdf
@reverseengine
https://static.ernw.de/whitepaper/ERNW_White_Paper_73-Analyzing_WinpMem_Driver_Vulnerabilities_1.0_signed.pdf
@reverseengine
❤1
Deciphering Ransomware in Virtual Machines
UEFI Reverse Engineering, Vulnerability Discovery, and Exploit Development: Part 0
Malware Analysis - ConfuserEx 2 Deobfuscation with Python and dnlib, BBTok Loader
Identifying Human-operated Ransomware through Windows Event Logs
APT-C-00 (OceanLotus) Dual Loader and Homologous VMP Loader
poc for CVE-2024-45383
Collection of Docker honeypot logs from 2021 - 2024
@reverseengine
UEFI Reverse Engineering, Vulnerability Discovery, and Exploit Development: Part 0
Malware Analysis - ConfuserEx 2 Deobfuscation with Python and dnlib, BBTok Loader
Identifying Human-operated Ransomware through Windows Event Logs
APT-C-00 (OceanLotus) Dual Loader and Homologous VMP Loader
poc for CVE-2024-45383
Collection of Docker honeypot logs from 2021 - 2024
@reverseengine
❤1
Malware Analysis
1Datzbro RAT:
https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/datzbro-rat-hiding-behind-senior-travel-scams
2 Detecting DLL hijacking with ML: real-world cases
https://securelist.com/detecting-dll-hijacking-with-machine-learning-in-kaspersky-siem/117567
3 Mustang Panda Publoader:
https://0x0d4y.blog/mustang-panda-employ-publoader-through-claimloader-yes-another-dll-side-loading-technique-delivery-via-phishing
4 FunkSec’s FunkLocker:
How AI Is Powering the Next Wave of Ransomware
https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/funklocker-malware-analysis
5 Zoom and WebSocket Credential Theft:
https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2025/10/look-mom-hr-application-look-mom-no-job
@reverseengine
1Datzbro RAT:
https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/datzbro-rat-hiding-behind-senior-travel-scams
2 Detecting DLL hijacking with ML: real-world cases
https://securelist.com/detecting-dll-hijacking-with-machine-learning-in-kaspersky-siem/117567
3 Mustang Panda Publoader:
https://0x0d4y.blog/mustang-panda-employ-publoader-through-claimloader-yes-another-dll-side-loading-technique-delivery-via-phishing
4 FunkSec’s FunkLocker:
How AI Is Powering the Next Wave of Ransomware
https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/funklocker-malware-analysis
5 Zoom and WebSocket Credential Theft:
https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2025/10/look-mom-hr-application-look-mom-no-job
@reverseengine
ThreatFabric
Datzbro: RAT Hiding Behind Senior Travel Scams
In this research article by ThreatFabric, we expose Datzbro: a new RAT that hides behind senior travel scams.
❤1
CreateProcessAsPPL
This is a utility for running processes with Protected Process Light (PPL) protection, enabling bypass of EDR/AV solution defensive mechanisms. It leverages legitimate Windows clipup.exe functionality from System32 to create protected processes that can overwrite antivirus service executable files.
Source:
https://github.com/2x7EQ13/CreateProcessAsPPL
Research:
https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/08/countering-edrs-with-backing-of-ppl-protection.html
@reverseengine
This is a utility for running processes with Protected Process Light (PPL) protection, enabling bypass of EDR/AV solution defensive mechanisms. It leverages legitimate Windows clipup.exe functionality from System32 to create protected processes that can overwrite antivirus service executable files.
Source:
https://github.com/2x7EQ13/CreateProcessAsPPL
Research:
https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/08/countering-edrs-with-backing-of-ppl-protection.html
@reverseengine
GitHub
GitHub - TwoSevenOneT/CreateProcessAsPPL: This is the loader that supports running a program with Protected Process Light (PPL)…
This is the loader that supports running a program with Protected Process Light (PPL) protection functionality. - TwoSevenOneT/CreateProcessAsPPL
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تفاوت مهم رجیستر های RSP & RBP
RSP Stack Pointer
همیشه به بالای استک Top of Stack اشاره میکنه
هر push / pop یا call / ret مستقیم این رجیستر رو تغییر میده
دائما در حال تغییره
RBP Base Pointer - Frame Pointer
یک آدرس ثابت در کل عمر تابع
برای دسترسی به آرگومان ها و متغیرهای محلی استفاده میشه
اول تابع با push rbp / mov rbp, rsp ست میشه و در اخر آزاد میشه
Important Difference Between RSP & RBP Registers
RSP Stack Pointer
Always points to the top of the stack
Every push / pop or call / ret directly changes this register
Constantly changing
RBP Base Pointer - Frame Pointer
A fixed address throughout the life of the function
Used to access arguments and local variables
First set by push rbp / mov rbp, rsp and finally freed
@reverseengine
RSP Stack Pointer
همیشه به بالای استک Top of Stack اشاره میکنه
هر push / pop یا call / ret مستقیم این رجیستر رو تغییر میده
دائما در حال تغییره
RBP Base Pointer - Frame Pointer
یک آدرس ثابت در کل عمر تابع
برای دسترسی به آرگومان ها و متغیرهای محلی استفاده میشه
اول تابع با push rbp / mov rbp, rsp ست میشه و در اخر آزاد میشه
Important Difference Between RSP & RBP Registers
RSP Stack Pointer
Always points to the top of the stack
Every push / pop or call / ret directly changes this register
Constantly changing
RBP Base Pointer - Frame Pointer
A fixed address throughout the life of the function
Used to access arguments and local variables
First set by push rbp / mov rbp, rsp and finally freed
@reverseengine
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Function Prologue (شروع تابع)
وقتی یک تابع کال میشه اولین چیزی که CPU میبینه اینه:
چرا این کارها انجام میشه؟
Function Prologue (Function Start)
When a function is called, the first thing the CPU sees is:
Why are these things done?
@reverseengine
وقتی یک تابع کال میشه اولین چیزی که CPU میبینه اینه:
push rbp ; قبلی RBP ذخیره
mov rbp, rsp ;تنظیم فریم جدید روی استک
sub rsp, 0x20 ; رزرو فضا برای متغیرهای محلی (اختیاری)
چرا این کارها انجام میشه؟
push rbp نگه داشتن فریم قبلی (فریم والد)
mov rbp, rsp ساخت فریم جدید برای تابع
sub rsp, X ایجاد فضای خالی برای متغیرهای لوکال
Function Prologue (Function Start)
When a function is called, the first thing the CPU sees is:
push rbp ; store previous RBP
mov rbp, rsp ; set new frame on stack
sub rsp, 0x20 ; reserve space for local variables (optional)
Why are these things done?
push rbp keep previous frame (parent frame)
mov rbp, rsp create new frame for function
sub rsp, X create free space for local variables
@reverseengine
👍3❤1
Roadmap Zero Day Hunter
پیش نیازها و پایه یادگیری عمیق زبان C و C پلاس پلاس درک ساختار حافظه stack و heap و calling conventions پروژه های ساده C برای نشان دادن فهم در گیت هاب خروجی ریپوی گیت هاب با چند پروژه کوچک
فاز 1 سیستم عامل و حافظه درک virtual memory syscalls context switch تحلیل نمونه باگ حافظه به صورت تئوری و writeup خروجی writeup از یک bug حافظه
فاز 2 مهندسی معکوس باینری خواندن disassembly دنبال کردن control flow و data flow تهیه پنج آنالیز باینری با flowchart و root cause خروجی پنج writeup آنالیز در گیت هاب
فاز 3 فازینگ هوشمندانه انتخاب هدف های باارزش parsers codecs archive handlers protocol implementations نوشتن harness برای API یا parser و اجرای coverage guided fuzzing پیدا کردن یک تا سه crash reproducible و ثبت triage اولیه خروجی fuzz harness و لیست crashes با توضیح مختصر
فاز 4 triage و تحلیل کرش تعریف uniqueness stability exploitability برای هر crash کاهش testcase به minimal repro و پیدا کردن root cause با backtrace و data flow خروجی triage writeup با suggested mitigation
فاز 5 درک مدافعات و نظریه exploit یادگیری ASLR DEP NX stack canaries CFI sandboxing memory tagging به صورت نظری مقایسه اثر هر mitigation بر احتمال exploit شدن خروجی مستند مقایسه mitigations برای پورتفولیو
فاز 6 تعیین هدف و نقشه حمله خواندن تاریخچه CVE های هدف و pattern یابی اشتباهات مکرر تهیه attack surface map با entry points data flow و prioritized vectors خروجی attack surface doc برای یک پروژه یا کتابخانه
فاز 7 fuzzing پیشرفته و instrumentation طراحی harness های پیچیده برای درگیر کردن deep states integration fuzzing و در صورت نیاز آشنایی با symbolic execution برای مسیرهای سخت خروجی کمپین fuzzing پیشرفته با coverage report
prerequisites and fundamentals
Deep C and C plus plus knowledge
Understanding stack heap and calling conventions
Small C projects on GitHub to demonstrate understanding
Deliverable a GitHub repo with simple C projects
Phase 1 operating systems and memory
Understand virtual memory syscalls and context switch
Analyze a sample memory bug conceptually and write a report
Deliverable a writeup explaining a memory bug
Phase 2 binary reverse engineering
Read disassembly follow control flow and data flow
Produce five binary analysis writeups with flowcharts and root cause
Deliverable five analysis writeups in GitHub
Phase 3 smart fuzzing
Target high value components parsers codecs archive handlers protocol implementations
Write harnesses for APIs or parsers and run coverage guided fuzzing
Find one to three reproducible crashes and perform initial triage
Deliverable fuzz harness and crash list with brief notes
Phase 4 crash triage and analysis
Define uniqueness stability and exploitability for each crash
Minimize testcase to a minimal repro and find root cause using backtrace and data flow
Deliverable triage writeup with suggested mitigation
Phase 5 mitigation theory and exploit understanding
Learn ASLR DEP NX stack canaries CFI sandboxing memory tagging in theory
Compare effects of mitigations on exploitability
Deliverable a mitigations comparison document for portfolio
Phase 6 target selection and attack surface mapping
Study project CVE history and common bug patterns
Create an attack surface map with entry points data flow and prioritized vectors
Deliverable an attack surface document for a chosen project or library
Phase 7 advanced fuzzing and instrumentation
Design complex harnesses to reach deep states
Use integration fuzzing and consider symbolic execution for hard paths
Deliverable an advanced fuzzing campaign with coverage results
References:
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix
https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/
Google Project Zero disclosure policy:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/vulnerability-disclosure-policy.html
AFLplusplus official:
https://aflplus.plus/
AFLplusplus GitHub:
https://github.com/AFLplusplus/AFLplusplus
AddressSanitizer Clang docs:
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html
AddressSanitizer LLVM releases docs:
https://releases.llvm.org/11.0.0/tools/clang/docs/AddressSanitizer.html
@reverseengine
پیش نیازها و پایه یادگیری عمیق زبان C و C پلاس پلاس درک ساختار حافظه stack و heap و calling conventions پروژه های ساده C برای نشان دادن فهم در گیت هاب خروجی ریپوی گیت هاب با چند پروژه کوچک
فاز 1 سیستم عامل و حافظه درک virtual memory syscalls context switch تحلیل نمونه باگ حافظه به صورت تئوری و writeup خروجی writeup از یک bug حافظه
فاز 2 مهندسی معکوس باینری خواندن disassembly دنبال کردن control flow و data flow تهیه پنج آنالیز باینری با flowchart و root cause خروجی پنج writeup آنالیز در گیت هاب
فاز 3 فازینگ هوشمندانه انتخاب هدف های باارزش parsers codecs archive handlers protocol implementations نوشتن harness برای API یا parser و اجرای coverage guided fuzzing پیدا کردن یک تا سه crash reproducible و ثبت triage اولیه خروجی fuzz harness و لیست crashes با توضیح مختصر
فاز 4 triage و تحلیل کرش تعریف uniqueness stability exploitability برای هر crash کاهش testcase به minimal repro و پیدا کردن root cause با backtrace و data flow خروجی triage writeup با suggested mitigation
فاز 5 درک مدافعات و نظریه exploit یادگیری ASLR DEP NX stack canaries CFI sandboxing memory tagging به صورت نظری مقایسه اثر هر mitigation بر احتمال exploit شدن خروجی مستند مقایسه mitigations برای پورتفولیو
فاز 6 تعیین هدف و نقشه حمله خواندن تاریخچه CVE های هدف و pattern یابی اشتباهات مکرر تهیه attack surface map با entry points data flow و prioritized vectors خروجی attack surface doc برای یک پروژه یا کتابخانه
فاز 7 fuzzing پیشرفته و instrumentation طراحی harness های پیچیده برای درگیر کردن deep states integration fuzzing و در صورت نیاز آشنایی با symbolic execution برای مسیرهای سخت خروجی کمپین fuzzing پیشرفته با coverage report
prerequisites and fundamentals
Deep C and C plus plus knowledge
Understanding stack heap and calling conventions
Small C projects on GitHub to demonstrate understanding
Deliverable a GitHub repo with simple C projects
Phase 1 operating systems and memory
Understand virtual memory syscalls and context switch
Analyze a sample memory bug conceptually and write a report
Deliverable a writeup explaining a memory bug
Phase 2 binary reverse engineering
Read disassembly follow control flow and data flow
Produce five binary analysis writeups with flowcharts and root cause
Deliverable five analysis writeups in GitHub
Phase 3 smart fuzzing
Target high value components parsers codecs archive handlers protocol implementations
Write harnesses for APIs or parsers and run coverage guided fuzzing
Find one to three reproducible crashes and perform initial triage
Deliverable fuzz harness and crash list with brief notes
Phase 4 crash triage and analysis
Define uniqueness stability and exploitability for each crash
Minimize testcase to a minimal repro and find root cause using backtrace and data flow
Deliverable triage writeup with suggested mitigation
Phase 5 mitigation theory and exploit understanding
Learn ASLR DEP NX stack canaries CFI sandboxing memory tagging in theory
Compare effects of mitigations on exploitability
Deliverable a mitigations comparison document for portfolio
Phase 6 target selection and attack surface mapping
Study project CVE history and common bug patterns
Create an attack surface map with entry points data flow and prioritized vectors
Deliverable an attack surface document for a chosen project or library
Phase 7 advanced fuzzing and instrumentation
Design complex harnesses to reach deep states
Use integration fuzzing and consider symbolic execution for hard paths
Deliverable an advanced fuzzing campaign with coverage results
References:
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix
https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/
Google Project Zero disclosure policy:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/vulnerability-disclosure-policy.html
AFLplusplus official:
https://aflplus.plus/
AFLplusplus GitHub:
https://github.com/AFLplusplus/AFLplusplus
AddressSanitizer Clang docs:
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html
AddressSanitizer LLVM releases docs:
https://releases.llvm.org/11.0.0/tools/clang/docs/AddressSanitizer.html
@reverseengine
🔥4❤1
Ghidra releases:
https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/releases
ROP Emporium challenges:
https://ropemporium.com/
National Vulnerability Database NVD:
https://nvd.nist.gov/
CVE official:
https://www.cve.org/
HackerOne disclosure guidelines:
https://www.hackerone.com/terms/disclosure-guidelines
HackerOne coordinated disclosure docs:
https://docs.hackerone.com/en/articles/9829406-coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure
CERT guide to coordinated vulnerability disclosure:
https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/documents/1945/2017_003_001_503340.pdf
Project Zero 2025 policy update:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2025/07/reporting-transparency.html
AFL background and resources:
https://aflplus.plus/ and https://github.com/AFLplusplus/AFLplusplus
@reverseengine
https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/releases
ROP Emporium challenges:
https://ropemporium.com/
National Vulnerability Database NVD:
https://nvd.nist.gov/
CVE official:
https://www.cve.org/
HackerOne disclosure guidelines:
https://www.hackerone.com/terms/disclosure-guidelines
HackerOne coordinated disclosure docs:
https://docs.hackerone.com/en/articles/9829406-coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure
CERT guide to coordinated vulnerability disclosure:
https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/documents/1945/2017_003_001_503340.pdf
Project Zero 2025 policy update:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2025/07/reporting-transparency.html
AFL background and resources:
https://aflplus.plus/ and https://github.com/AFLplusplus/AFLplusplus
@reverseengine
GitHub
Releases · NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra
Ghidra is a software reverse engineering (SRE) framework - NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra
👍3❤1
Ransomware Attack Update for the 9th of October 2025
https://darkwebinformer.com/ransomware-attack-update-for-the-9th-of-october-2025/
@reverseengine
https://darkwebinformer.com/ransomware-attack-update-for-the-9th-of-october-2025/
@reverseengine
Dark Web Informer - Cyber Threat Intelligence
Ransomware Attack Update for the 9th of October 2025
❤2
Threat Attack Daily 9th of October 2025
https://darkwebinformer.com/threat-attack-daily-9th-of-october-2025/
@reverseengine
https://darkwebinformer.com/threat-attack-daily-9th-of-october-2025/
@reverseengine
Dark Web Informer - Cyber Threat Intelligence
Threat Attack Daily - 9th of October 2025
❤2
Forwarded from NSEs
FREE reverse engineering module now available!
Learn assembly fundamentals - perfect for beginners.
• Hands-on debugging with real examples
• Web based: no downloads, installs, or VMs
Start reversing here 👇
https://www.aceresponder.com/learn/rem-intro
Learn assembly fundamentals - perfect for beginners.
• Hands-on debugging with real examples
• Web based: no downloads, installs, or VMs
Start reversing here 👇
https://www.aceresponder.com/learn/rem-intro
Aceresponder
Reverse Engineering and Malware Analysis Intro
A free introduction to reverse engineering malware with an emphasis on interpreting assembly language.
❤8👏2
🔴 معرفی پروژه ی RE-Architect
این پروژه یک پلتفرم خودکار و پیشرفته برای مهندسی معکوس هستش و دارای ویژگی های مانند:
- فایلهای باینری رو میتونه دیکامپایل و تحلیل کنه.
- خلاصه ای از رفتار توابع رو با استفاده از مدلهای یادگیری زبان در میاره.
- ساختار داده های پیچیده رو شناسایی و بازسازی میکنه.
- نمایش گرافیکی قابل پیکربندی داره.
- از دیکامپایلرهای IDA Pro , Ghidra و Binary Ninja پشتیبانی میکنه.
- قابل اجرا روی Windows، Linux، و macOS هستش.
- امکان ایجاد کد Test Harness رو داره. ( قابلیتی که میتونیم یک تابع رو بدون اجرای کل برنامه، تست کنیم. معمولا در مباحث فازینگ کاربرد داره).
- در پایتون توسعه داده شده.
🔴 Introducing the RE-Architect project
This project is an automated and advanced reverse engineering platform and has features such as:
- Can decompile and analyze binary files.
- Summarizes the behavior of functions using language learning models.
- Recognizes and reconstructs complex data structures.
- Has a configurable graphical display.
- Supports IDA Pro, Ghidra, and Binary Ninja decompilers.
- Runs on Windows, Linux, and macOS.
- Has the ability to create Test Harness code. (A feature that allows us to test a function without running the entire program. Usually used in fuzzing topics).
- Developed in Python.
#مهندسی_معکوس
#ReverseEngineering #REArchitect
🆔 @onhex_ir
➡️ ALL Link
این پروژه یک پلتفرم خودکار و پیشرفته برای مهندسی معکوس هستش و دارای ویژگی های مانند:
- فایلهای باینری رو میتونه دیکامپایل و تحلیل کنه.
- خلاصه ای از رفتار توابع رو با استفاده از مدلهای یادگیری زبان در میاره.
- ساختار داده های پیچیده رو شناسایی و بازسازی میکنه.
- نمایش گرافیکی قابل پیکربندی داره.
- از دیکامپایلرهای IDA Pro , Ghidra و Binary Ninja پشتیبانی میکنه.
- قابل اجرا روی Windows، Linux، و macOS هستش.
- امکان ایجاد کد Test Harness رو داره. ( قابلیتی که میتونیم یک تابع رو بدون اجرای کل برنامه، تست کنیم. معمولا در مباحث فازینگ کاربرد داره).
- در پایتون توسعه داده شده.
🔴 Introducing the RE-Architect project
This project is an automated and advanced reverse engineering platform and has features such as:
- Can decompile and analyze binary files.
- Summarizes the behavior of functions using language learning models.
- Recognizes and reconstructs complex data structures.
- Has a configurable graphical display.
- Supports IDA Pro, Ghidra, and Binary Ninja decompilers.
- Runs on Windows, Linux, and macOS.
- Has the ability to create Test Harness code. (A feature that allows us to test a function without running the entire program. Usually used in fuzzing topics).
- Developed in Python.
#مهندسی_معکوس
#ReverseEngineering #REArchitect
🆔 @onhex_ir
➡️ ALL Link
GitHub
GitHub - pandaadir05/re-architect: Advanced reverse engineering platform combining traditional static analysis with AI-powered…
Advanced reverse engineering platform combining traditional static analysis with AI-powered insights. Supports multiple decompilers (Ghidra, IDA Pro, Binary Ninja), automated function analysis, and...
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Linux Rootkit Malware
https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/deep-dive-into-a-linux-rootkit-malware?utm_source=chatgpt.com
@reverseengine
#rootkit
#linux
https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/deep-dive-into-a-linux-rootkit-malware?utm_source=chatgpt.com
@reverseengine
#rootkit
#linux
Fortinet Blog
Deep Dive Into a Linux Rootkit Malware
An in-depth analysis of how a remote attacker deployed a rootkit and a user-space binary file by executing a shell noscript.…
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