OTAS: operational thinking against the state – Telegram
OTAS: operational thinking against the state
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trying to do the impossible task of thinking strategically and tactically about revolt against the ruling order

(for academic purposes only)
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Detrimental lengthening of this loop isn’t only limited to military or police organizations. Activist or political orgs that require permission or approval beyond the implicit also lengthen their OODA loop to the point of hampering their maneuverability. Sometimes the activist loop is even more sluggish than the police who are burdened with a conventional command hierarchy. Though of course this summer proved once again a crowd in the street can get their loop pretty accelerated.
Now we’ve very briefly discussed the OODA loop we should note that understanding this thought-action circuit isn’t just about knowing yourself, which is important, but also knowing how to hinder your enemy as the following passage from DtS explains:

The meaning of ‘getting inside the OODA loop’

The wrap-up is a highly conceptual synthesis and reformulation of all of his previous arguments, ideas and themes. It includes direct reference to his earliest intuitive remarks as well as his last argument concerning the importance of shaping the opponent’s perception. Here he abandons the division into tactical, grand tactical and strategic levels but combines them. He does not refer to attrition, maneuver or moral conflict anywhere, but merges the essence of the latter two. He attempts to strip away and recombine even further than before, to arrive at the most concise formula for explaining success and failure in conflict. In a sense the wrap-up is his way of proving he has validated the assertions he made in the first section of Patterns of Conflict. On slide 12 he had asserted that ‘variety, rapidity, harmony and initiative seem to be the key qualities that permit one to shape and adapt to an ever-changing environment’. In the ‘Wrap Up’ he focuses on these four elements in particular to arrive at the most concise conceptualization of ‘The Art of Success’. According to Boyd, the message thus far is that:

• He who is willing and able to take the initiative to exploit variety, rapidity, and harmony – as basis to create as well as adapt to the more indistinct – more irregular – quicker changes of rhythm and pattern, yet shape focus and direction of effort – survives and dominates.

or contrariwise
• He who is unwilling or unable to take the initiative to exploit variety, rapidity, and harmony . . . goes under or survives to be dominated.

The Game is to:
• Create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes or imagines (Cheng/Nebenpunkte) and those he must react to (Ch’i/Schwerpunkt)

as basis to
• Penetrate adversary organism to sever his moral bonds, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and over- load his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize or otherwise subdue those mor- al-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon

thereby
•Pull adversary apart, produce paralysis, and collapse his will to resist.

The way to accomplish this, the how to, in most abstract terms is to:

• Get inside adversary observation-orienta- tion-decision-action loops (at all levels) by being more subtle, more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker – yet appear to be otherwise.

Boyd then adds a short but new discussion on the implications of these observations, in particular how they relate to variety, rapidity, harmony and initiative. In this discussion he inserts Sun Tzu’s idea of fluidity, an important theme from his essay Destruction and Creation, the element of organi- zational complexity as well as the discussion above on pattern recognition. Boyd asserts that:

• In a tactical sense, these multidimensional interactions suggest a spontaneous, syn- thetic/creative, and flowing action/coun- teraction operation, rather than a step-by- step, analytical/logical, and discrete move/ countermove game.

• in accepting this idea we must admit that increased unit complexity (with magnified mental and physical task loadings) does not enhance the spon- taneous synthetic/creative operation. Rather, it constrains the opportunity for these timely actions/counteractions.

or put in another way
• Complexity (technical, organizational, operational, etc.) causes commanders and subordinates alike to be captured by their own internal dynamics or
interactions – hence they cannot adapt to rapidly changing external (or even internal) circumstances.

• In a strategic sense, these interactions suggest we need a variety of possibilities as well as the rapidity to implement and shift among them. Why?
• Ability to simultaneously and sequentially generate many different possibilities as well as rapidly implement and shift among them permits one to repeatedly generate mismatches between events/efforts adversary observes or imagines and those he must respond to (to survive).

• Without a variety of possibilities adversary is given the opportunity to read as well as adapt to events and efforts as they unfold.

Recombining these, in particular the comment on organizational complexity, and other comments and insights (including the Clausewitzian concept of friction) related to the four elements of variety/ rapidity/harmony/initiative, Boyd shows what and how they contribute to victory by connect- ing them to the ability to adapt. He asserts that ‘Variety and rapidity allow one to magnify the adversary’s friction, hence to stretch-out his time to respond. Harmony and initiative stand and work on the opposite side by diminishing one’s own friction, hence compressing one’s own time to ex- ploit variety/rapidity in a directed way’. Altogether variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative enable one to:

“Operate inside adversary’s obser- vation-orientation-decision-ac- tion loops to enmesh adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos,... and/or fold adversary back inside himself so that he cannot cope with events/ efforts as they unfold.”

Simultaneously, so Boyd continues, ‘by repeatedly rolling-thru OODA loops while appealing to and making use of the ideas embodied in ‘Grand Strategy’ and ‘Theme for Vitality and Growth’, we can evolve and exploit variety/ rapidity/harmony/ initiative as a basis to:

“Shape or influence events so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while isolating our adversaries and undermining their resolve and drive) but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our sucesss.”
Because we know that Observation and Orientation are important we can deduce that understanding bias and the element of surprise can be crucial to shattering an enemy even if you’re the underdog.
Surprise can not only force a situation in which you enemy is materially unprepared, but also throw their communications and loops into disarray. This was seen on the ground in DC on J6 where the police comms were reported as “status totally fucked” and also on May Day 2012 in Seattle where their loops got so messed up the officer in charge of crowd control ended up going into the street in frustration and physically engaged the crowd.
This confusion in the face of the unexpected can be compounded if a force has competing centers of gravity. For an example think about the tension between the military and the local police like on J6 where back up requests called in by the Capitol Police to the US Military were refused.
Forwarded from digitalAnarchist
State-backed manipulation is rampant on social media


• Since 2016, our team at the Oxford Internet Institute has monitored the rapid global proliferation of social media manipulation campaigns, which we define as the use of digital tools to influence online public behaviour. In the past four years, social media manipulation has evolved from a niche concern to a global threat to democracy and human rights.

• Our latest report found that organised social media manipulation campaigns are now common across the world — identified in 81 countries in 2020, up from 70 countries in 2019. The map below shows the global distribution of these 81 countries, marked in dark blue.

• In our report, we focus on the use of “cyber troops”, which are teams from the government, the military or political parties which are committed to manipulating public opinion on social media. Cyber troops regularly conduct what we call “computational propaganda” campaigns.
>>>
Another aspect of this not touched on by Boyd:
To become distinct is to become targetable. If you can be picked out from amongst the people you can be targeted with repression and more easily made alien in propaganda making repression more socially viable.

Tangentially this goes for physics terrain as well. If you can be found in the landscape you can be bombarded. There’s a reason mountains and jungles are the friends of the insurgent. Deserts too, in their vastness and in the moment they ask if their dwellers, offer a smooth space where you can become the territory.
The Signal encrypted messenger being down off and on today is a reminder not to put all of your secure communication eggs in one basket. Though Signal holds a unique place balancing popularity with a trusted security ethic consider diversifying your secure communications so that if Signal goes down you have another means of more secure communication.

One example would be creating adding your contacts in a fallback network in the Zom Mobile Messenger app which is a fork of the original TextSecure encrypted messaging system that Signal is also based off of. It offers end-to-end encryption in a easy to use UI. Instead of phone numbers Zom uses emails to create and find accounts.

Or if you’re worried about service crashing for your burner at a demo using the Briar encrypted mesh net app so you can communicate directly between nearby phones.
We may be entering an era when a variety of political actors will find it more strategic to be positioned outside the government, so as to avoid being discredited with it. Now that the state can no longer mitigate the effects of capitalism, people are bound to become more and more disillusioned and rebellious. Where left parties hold state power, seeking to pacify those who remain in the streets, it will be easier for right-wing groups to present themselves as the real partisans of revolt—as they have in Venezuela, for example. The insurrections of the past decade are sure to continue, but the important question is what kind of insurrections they will be. Will they put people in touch with their own collective power, setting the stage for the final abolition of capitalism? Or will they look more like what happened in the US Capitol?

In 2015, when SYRIZA, a far left party, won Greek elections on the platform of anti-austerity, we correctly predicted that they would fail and that, in their failure, they would pave the wave for a groundswell of far right movements. Looking back at our reflections just six years ago still feels helpful for thinking through the problems we face today:

https://crimethinc.com/2015/01/28/feature-syriza-cant-save-greece-why-theres-no-electoral-exit-from-the-crisis
We are of the opinion that the policing of the break-in at the DC Capitol was indeed influenced by bias, but open sympathy in action was limited to a dozen or so officers. The real bias was in the preparation. The state was, for the most part, caught off-guard.

The threats to disrupt congress were not in fact paper tigers. The police and the feds misread the situation in part due to their bias towards MAGAist rallies. This bias, in our opinion, is not just thinking such rallies are less violent and pro-police, but also in thinking their threats were empty.

Effectively communicating, to other sympathizers willing to give it their all, intent to do something, however vague, and a time/place to do something without arousing an overwhelming repressive presence was the secret to breaching the capitol.
The other secret is there aren’t ever enough cops to control a massive enough group if the group overcomes the cop in everyone’s heads.
The police of course were also acting differently than they usually do as their fallback strategy was to abandon protecting property in order to prioritize protect the politicians et al. This is why a cop only shot someone when they breached a barricade near where House Reps were sheltering. Police of course know better than to generate monumental blowback by martyring dozens of people when they could just yield and let them in and repress them later if they don’t have enough force to hold a perimeter.
Forwarded from Tonho
“No leaders to round up, no hierarchical organisation to wield power over us in our name, no membership lists to investigate, no manifestos to denounce, no mediators to meet (and then join) the power-holding elite. No public claims are made, no symbolic lines are drawn, no press statements to be deliberately misconstrued and trivialised by journalists. No platforms or programmes which the intellectuals can hijack as their exclusive property, no flag or banner to which to pledge a crass and sectarian allegiance.”

- “Insurrectionary Anarchy: Organizing for Attack”
when_the_police_knock_on_your_door_your_rights_and_options_front.pdf
1.4 MB
If a cop or an agent knocks; best practices for those in the US.