"Good Muslims": Secular, moderate, or pro-Western Muslims who "prove their credentials" by denouncing "bad" ones, supporting U.S. wars (e.g., against terrorism), and aligning with American values.

They are the "loyal" ones cleared of suspicion, but only if they actively oppose the "bad" and affirm a non-threatening cultural identity.

"Bad Muslims": Those associated with political Islam, terrorism, or anti-Western dissent. They are portrayed as inherently violent, fanatical, or "pre-modern," embodying a cultural essence that explains acts like 9/11.

Examples include al-Qaeda militants or Islamists seen as products of "Islamic terrorism" rather than geopolitical fallout (e.g., U.S.-backed Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet invasion turning into "blowback").

⁠⁠"As long as the West continues to explain its violence as a strategic necessity and Muslim violence as cultural pathology, the cycle of misunderstanding will persist. As long as you justify what you're doing, "Oh, we have to do, we have to bomb Iran, we have to bomb this, we have to bomb that." Whatever they do, "Oh, because those guys are crazed radicals," there's never going to be a solution.

Terrorism is a modern response; it's not medieval. It's not from the Quran. It's a modern response to modern forms of power and inequality.

Therefore, our response must also be modern and not medieval. We cannot go back and bomb them to smithereens as if that's going to solve the problems.

The U.S. spent billions arming/training Afghan fighters against the Soviets (1979-89), framing them as "freedom fighters."

Post-withdrawal abandonment led to chaos, birthing groups like al-Qaeda from the same networks.

"Radical Islam... was born in the Cold War. It was raised in Washington and Islamabad, not in Mecca and Medina."

⁠⁠The term jihad in the '80s was a positive term. The term mujahideen was a positive term. Ronald Reagan invited the Afghan mujahideen to the White House.

There's a famous picture, and Ronald Reagan says, "These are Afghan mujahideen. These are the equivalent of the freedom fighters of America, the founding fathers of America."

The term jihad and mujahid in the '80s was praised by the CIA and America.

The State Department funneled in the '80s $3 billion [to the] Afghan group, the same core group that would eventually become al-Qaeda.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. chose to fight communism via the teachings of the Quran. They used the Quran for propaganda, for religious purposes, and they thought this was going to help fight communism.

"We created a Frankenstein. Then when it turned against us, we ended up calling it a monster."