⋯ In their communication, Kuwait also told Lebanon that the US is willing to “provide guarantees” that they will receive “all of their demands” in the maritime dispute.

Lapid and Netanyahu will face off again in the November elections.

Polls indicate that the elections might unseat Lapid in favor of the Netanyahu’s Likud party, leading to a shift in policy, according to local Israeli media.

🇱🇧 However, the report by Al-Akhbar highlights that Hezbollah did not welcome the proposal, and that they would not wait longer than announced, reiterating that the resistance is ready to take military action.

Israelis reported 135 property damages, including 57 buildings, 28 of them in Ashkelon and 19 in Sderot, according to preliminary data by the Compensation and Property Tax Fund.

69 cars were damaged, including 34 in Ashkelon, 20 in Sderot, 15 in others.

Damage to agriculture and farming equipment is unreported yet, as access to those open areas is still restricted.

The number is expected to be in several hundred claims of damage to crops and equipment.

The National Security Liaison Officer (Fatah) in Ain Al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp, Saeed Al-Asous, was subjected to an assassination attempt.

He is in a very critical condition.

Al-Asous is confirmed dead.

He was shot by a masked gunman to the head.

A large fire broke out near Kibbutz Shnir in the Upper Galilee, near Kiryat Shmona.

The fire was not brought under control yet.

Head of IDF's southern command, Eliezer Toledano: “I hope those across the border understand the message, and if not, we will have to repeat it.”

Toledano is repeating the statement issued by the Israeli PM and MoD, threatening Hezbullah and Iran of a pre-emptive operation.

⋯ However, that show of force by IDF is laughable to Hezbullah's military command.

The shift of the IDF doctrine over the years is worth reading: from ground-force oriented military ops (up to 2000) to high reliance on the airforce (2006), then a joint coordinated air–ground doctrine (2008-2014), and back to relying on the airforce (2019, 2021, 2022).

IDF understands that a ground battle in Gaza is futile, due to its cost and because Gaza's factions are deeply rooted. The success in occupying it, similar to the era before 2005, is not possible. The only objective in Gaza is to keep it idle.

⋯ The Israeli security establishment concluded over the years that it is best to work on orienting Gaza towards a non-confrontational policy: economic incentives and jobs for Gazan locals, are meant to kill the Palestinian spirit.

PIJ has a different policy than Hamas. The latter moved away from continuous resistance to fighting only when necessary (similarly to Hezbullah after South Lebanon was liberated).

PIJ believes that we should keep on fighting, continue the resistance acts, and keep up with the spirit (e.g. it is against allowing Gazans to work in Israel). This is why PIJ was the center of Israel's military actions, 2019 and 2022 as prime examples, while Israel's wars with Hamas were led by what the situation forced them to, like in 2021.

⋯ In fact, IDF sees Gaza as a secondary front (a cause of annoyance, but not an existential threat). It can be handled without a ground battle to end it.

Israel's #1 front is Lebanon. Unlike Gaza, Hezbullah is not under siege, is rich, has access to the world's military resources, has more fighters, suitable geography and relevant experience. It is capable of firing military-grade rockets in one day totalling what Gaza fired in a week.

⋯ The only downside, Hezbullah doesn't have manpower.

I, and I'm a nobody whose opinion is worthless, don't think Hezbullah's manpower can materialize into a 100,000 fighting power.

And in the light of this, Hezbullah will never have enough men to hold ground inside Israel

⋯ That's why the liberation can materialize, if the Egyptian or Jordanian armies commit to the war. Unlikely, today.

Israel's ability to survive is based on one thing: the well being of the IDF.

Gaza's most important role in the future is assisting Hezbullah to achieve what is very possible: damaging the IDF. Gaza will play an important role in causing chaos in IDF's decision making and commitment of resources. In brief, while Hezbullah can saturate the Iron Dome alone, Gaza could force the IDF to spread the effort of the AD on two opposite directions.