| synchronization between modifications to the p2m; and all hypercall
| parameters must first be translated through the p2m before being used.
| Trying to mix this locked-and-gated approach with PV's lock-free
| approach leads to several races and inconsistencies.
|
| An untrusted PV domain with access to a physical device can DMA into
| its own pagetables, leading to privilege escalation.
XSA-292 [4] "x86: insufficient TLB flushing when using PCID"
| Use of Process Context Identifiers (PCID) was introduced into Xen in
| order to improve performance after XSA-254 (and in particular its
| Meltdown sub-issue). This enablement implied changes to the TLB
| flushing logic. The particular case of context switch to a vCPU of a
| PCID-enabled guest left open a time window between the full TLB flush,
| and the actual address space switch, during which additional TLB
| entries (from the address space about to be switched away from) can be
| accumulated, which will not subsequently be purged.
|
| Malicious PV guests may be able to cause a host crash (Denial of
| Service) or to gain access to data pertaining to other guests.
| Privilege escalation opportunities cannot be ruled out.
|
| Additionally, vulnerable configurations are likely to be unstable even
| in the absence of an attack.
Impact on Qubes OS
===================
XSA-285 and XSA-288 do not affect Qubes OS 4.0 in its default
configuration, since they require a PV domain with a PCI device.
Moreover, in order to take advantage of XSA-285, the user would have to
assign a PCI device to a PV domain while it was running. Such an
operation is disabled in the Qubes GUI tools and discouraged in the
Qubes documentation. [5]
XSA-287 and XSA-292 affect only PV domains, which are used only for
stubdomains in the default Qubes OS 4.0 configuration. This means that
an attacker would first have to compromise a stubdomain in order to
attack Xen by exploiting these vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, since it
is possible to manually create PV domains in Qubes OS 4.0, we consider
XSA-287 and XSA-292 to affect Qubes OS 4.0.
All four of these XSAs affect Qubes OS 3.2.
Patching
=========
The specific packages that resolve the problems discussed in this
bulletin are as follows:
For Qubes OS 4.0:
- Xen packages version 4.8.5-3
For Qubes OS 3.2:
- Xen packages version 4.6.6-46
The packages are to be installed in dom0 via the Qubes VM Manager or via
the qubes-dom0-update command as follows:
For updates from the stable repository (not immediately available):
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update
For updates from the security-testing repository:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-security-testing
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
========
See the original Xen Security Advisories.
References
===========
[1] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-285.html
[2] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-287.html
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-288.html
[4] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-292.html
[5] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/assigning-devices/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
| parameters must first be translated through the p2m before being used.
| Trying to mix this locked-and-gated approach with PV's lock-free
| approach leads to several races and inconsistencies.
|
| An untrusted PV domain with access to a physical device can DMA into
| its own pagetables, leading to privilege escalation.
XSA-292 [4] "x86: insufficient TLB flushing when using PCID"
| Use of Process Context Identifiers (PCID) was introduced into Xen in
| order to improve performance after XSA-254 (and in particular its
| Meltdown sub-issue). This enablement implied changes to the TLB
| flushing logic. The particular case of context switch to a vCPU of a
| PCID-enabled guest left open a time window between the full TLB flush,
| and the actual address space switch, during which additional TLB
| entries (from the address space about to be switched away from) can be
| accumulated, which will not subsequently be purged.
|
| Malicious PV guests may be able to cause a host crash (Denial of
| Service) or to gain access to data pertaining to other guests.
| Privilege escalation opportunities cannot be ruled out.
|
| Additionally, vulnerable configurations are likely to be unstable even
| in the absence of an attack.
Impact on Qubes OS
===================
XSA-285 and XSA-288 do not affect Qubes OS 4.0 in its default
configuration, since they require a PV domain with a PCI device.
Moreover, in order to take advantage of XSA-285, the user would have to
assign a PCI device to a PV domain while it was running. Such an
operation is disabled in the Qubes GUI tools and discouraged in the
Qubes documentation. [5]
XSA-287 and XSA-292 affect only PV domains, which are used only for
stubdomains in the default Qubes OS 4.0 configuration. This means that
an attacker would first have to compromise a stubdomain in order to
attack Xen by exploiting these vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, since it
is possible to manually create PV domains in Qubes OS 4.0, we consider
XSA-287 and XSA-292 to affect Qubes OS 4.0.
All four of these XSAs affect Qubes OS 3.2.
Patching
=========
The specific packages that resolve the problems discussed in this
bulletin are as follows:
For Qubes OS 4.0:
- Xen packages version 4.8.5-3
For Qubes OS 3.2:
- Xen packages version 4.6.6-46
The packages are to be installed in dom0 via the Qubes VM Manager or via
the qubes-dom0-update command as follows:
For updates from the stable repository (not immediately available):
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update
For updates from the security-testing repository:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-security-testing
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
========
See the original Xen Security Advisories.
References
===========
[1] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-285.html
[2] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-287.html
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-288.html
[4] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-292.html
[5] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/assigning-devices/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
XSAs 284, 290, 291, 293, and 294 do not affect the security of Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/03/05/xsa-284-290-291-293-294-qubes-not-affected/
The Xen Project has published Xen Security Advisories 284, 290, 291,
293, and 294 (XSA-284, XSA-290, XSA-291, XSA-293, and XSA-294,
respectively). These XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS,
and no user action is necessary.
These XSAs have been added to the XSA Tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/):
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#284
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#290
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#291
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#293
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#294
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/03/05/xsa-284-290-291-293-294-qubes-not-affected/
The Xen Project has published Xen Security Advisories 284, 290, 291,
293, and 294 (XSA-284, XSA-290, XSA-291, XSA-293, and XSA-294,
respectively). These XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS,
and no user action is necessary.
These XSAs have been added to the XSA Tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/):
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#284
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#290
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#291
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#293
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#294
Xen Project 4.10.3 and 4.9.4 are available
https://xenproject.org/2019/02/25/xen-project-4-10-2-and-4-9-3-are-available-2/
https://xenproject.org/2019/02/25/xen-project-4-10-2-and-4-9-3-are-available-2/
Revolutionizing the Auto Industry with Open Source: EPAM’s Xen Powered Virtual Cockpit
https://xenproject.org/2019/03/12/revolutionizing-the-auto-industry-with-open-source-epams-xen-powered-virtual-cockpit/
EPAM, a global provider of software engineering and IT consulting services, is making strides in the auto industry by connecting the infotainment side of the car and the safety side...
https://xenproject.org/2019/03/12/revolutionizing-the-auto-industry-with-open-source-epams-xen-powered-virtual-cockpit/
EPAM, a global provider of software engineering and IT consulting services, is making strides in the auto industry by connecting the infotainment side of the car and the safety side...
Qubes Tor onion services will no longer be maintained
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/03/24/tor-onion-services-no-longer-maintained/
We regret to announce that the Qubes Tor onion services will no longer
be maintained due to lack of resources. This includes all Qubes onion
services, including the Qubes website onion mirror and the onion package
repos.
We would like to thank the Whonix Project for generously maintaining
these services for over a year (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/23/qubes-whonix-next-gen-tor-onion-services/). Maintaining the Tor
onion services requires labor, servers, and bandwidth. Unfortunately,
none of these resources are available to the Qubes OS or Whonix projects
in sufficient quantities to allow us to continue offering these
services.
We recommend that users who currently rely on any Qubes onion addresses
transition to the corresponding clearnet addresses immediately.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/03/24/tor-onion-services-no-longer-maintained/
We regret to announce that the Qubes Tor onion services will no longer
be maintained due to lack of resources. This includes all Qubes onion
services, including the Qubes website onion mirror and the onion package
repos.
We would like to thank the Whonix Project for generously maintaining
these services for over a year (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/23/qubes-whonix-next-gen-tor-onion-services/). Maintaining the Tor
onion services requires labor, servers, and bandwidth. Unfortunately,
none of these resources are available to the Qubes OS or Whonix projects
in sufficient quantities to allow us to continue offering these
services.
We recommend that users who currently rely on any Qubes onion addresses
transition to the corresponding clearnet addresses immediately.
Qubes OS 3.2 has reached EOL
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/03/28/qubes-3-2-has-reached-eol/
Qubes OS 3.2 has officially reached end-of-life (EOL). We strongly urge
all current Qubes 3.2 users to upgrade to Qubes 4.0 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade-to-r4.0/) immediately.
As always, the support statuses of all Qubes OS and TemplateVM versions
are available on the Supported Versions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/) page, and the latest release
is available on the Downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
Previous announcements:
Extended Support for Qubes OS 3.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/09/02/4-0-minimum-requirements-3-2-extended-support/#extended-support-for-qubes-os-32)
Qubes 4.0: The Past and the Future (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/03/28/qubes-40/#the-past-and-the-future)
Qubes 3.2 approaching EOL on 2019-03-28 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/02/20/qubes-3-2-approaching-eol)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/03/28/qubes-3-2-has-reached-eol/
Qubes OS 3.2 has officially reached end-of-life (EOL). We strongly urge
all current Qubes 3.2 users to upgrade to Qubes 4.0 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade-to-r4.0/) immediately.
As always, the support statuses of all Qubes OS and TemplateVM versions
are available on the Supported Versions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/) page, and the latest release
is available on the Downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
Previous announcements:
Extended Support for Qubes OS 3.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/09/02/4-0-minimum-requirements-3-2-extended-support/#extended-support-for-qubes-os-32)
Qubes 4.0: The Past and the Future (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/03/28/qubes-40/#the-past-and-the-future)
Qubes 3.2 approaching EOL on 2019-03-28 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/02/20/qubes-3-2-approaching-eol)
Xen Project Hypervisor 4.12 Offers Smaller Code Size and Improved Security
https://xenproject.org/2019/04/02/xen-project-hypervisor-4-12-offers-smaller-code-size-and-improved-security/
Major release makes Xen an attractive option for automotive and embedded technologies. SAN FRANCISCO – April 2, 2019 — The Xen Project, an open source hypervisor hosted at the Linux...
https://xenproject.org/2019/04/02/xen-project-hypervisor-4-12-offers-smaller-code-size-and-improved-security/
Major release makes Xen an attractive option for automotive and embedded technologies. SAN FRANCISCO – April 2, 2019 — The Xen Project, an open source hypervisor hosted at the Linux...
What’s new in Xen 4.12
https://xenproject.org/2019/04/02/whats-new-in-xen-4-12/
I am pleased to announce the release of Xen Project Hypervisor 4.12. This latest release adds impressive feature improvements around security and code size, x86 architectural renewal (one of our...
https://xenproject.org/2019/04/02/whats-new-in-xen-4-12/
I am pleased to announce the release of Xen Project Hypervisor 4.12. This latest release adds impressive feature improvements around security and code size, x86 architectural renewal (one of our...
Qubes Canary #19
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/08/canary-19/
We have published Qubes Canary #19. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will
always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View Qubes Canary #19 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-019-2019.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past canaries:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/
---===[ Qubes Canary #19 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is April 3, 2019.
2. There have been 48 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of July 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.
The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
$ date -R -u
Wed, 03 Apr 2019 15:10:59 +0000
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss
A Precarious Alliance: Patience Wears Thin with Germany's NATO Spending
Interview with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: The U.S. and President Trump 'Are 100 Percent Behind' Us
Interview with Sir David Attenborough: 'Collecting Memories Isn't the Same as Collecting Ammonites'
'I'm Just Being Me': British House Speaker Bercow on His Brexit Role
France's Golden Boy Learns How to Fight: Macron Debates His Way Out of The Yellow-Vest Crisis
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn Consider Something New on Brexit: Cooperation
Egypt’s Soap Opera Clampdown Extends el-Sisi’s Iron Grip to TV
Najib Razak, Malaysian Leader Toppled in 1MDB Scandal, Faces First Graft Trial
Saudi Arabia Giving Jamal Khashoggi’s Children Money and Real Estate
Trudeau and Liberal Party Expel 2 Ex-Ministers at Center of Storm
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml
Brunei implements stoning to death under anti-LGBT laws
Charges dropped in deadly US biker brawl
Paris transgender woman 'humiliated' at protest
Jeffree Star says $2.5m worth of his cosmetic line stolen
1MDB: Superyacht linked to financial scandal sold for $126m
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/08/canary-19/
We have published Qubes Canary #19. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will
always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View Qubes Canary #19 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-019-2019.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past canaries:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/
---===[ Qubes Canary #19 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is April 3, 2019.
2. There have been 48 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of July 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.
The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
$ date -R -u
Wed, 03 Apr 2019 15:10:59 +0000
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss
A Precarious Alliance: Patience Wears Thin with Germany's NATO Spending
Interview with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: The U.S. and President Trump 'Are 100 Percent Behind' Us
Interview with Sir David Attenborough: 'Collecting Memories Isn't the Same as Collecting Ammonites'
'I'm Just Being Me': British House Speaker Bercow on His Brexit Role
France's Golden Boy Learns How to Fight: Macron Debates His Way Out of The Yellow-Vest Crisis
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn Consider Something New on Brexit: Cooperation
Egypt’s Soap Opera Clampdown Extends el-Sisi’s Iron Grip to TV
Najib Razak, Malaysian Leader Toppled in 1MDB Scandal, Faces First Graft Trial
Saudi Arabia Giving Jamal Khashoggi’s Children Money and Real Estate
Trudeau and Liberal Party Expel 2 Ex-Ministers at Center of Storm
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml
Brunei implements stoning to death under anti-LGBT laws
Charges dropped in deadly US biker brawl
Paris transgender woman 'humiliated' at protest
Jeffree Star says $2.5m worth of his cosmetic line stolen
1MDB: Superyacht linked to financial scandal sold for $126m
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u http://feeds.reuters.com/reuters/worldnews
Italy PM denies Tria could quit over 5-Star attacks
Brexit gamble: UK's May to meet opposition leader to seek a deal
EU would begin customs controls right after no-deal Brexit
Turkey says proposed working group to ease U.S. worries over Russian S-400s
Britain scrambles jets after Russian bombers approach UK airspace
$ curl -s 'https://blockchain.info/blocks/?format=json' |\
python3 -c 'import sys, json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['\''blocks'\''][10]['\''hash'\''])'
00000000000000000010e57bfbfcbb49bdae6212789c51447316c4652bd6fcf3
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
Italy PM denies Tria could quit over 5-Star attacks
Brexit gamble: UK's May to meet opposition leader to seek a deal
EU would begin customs controls right after no-deal Brexit
Turkey says proposed working group to ease U.S. worries over Russian S-400s
Britain scrambles jets after Russian bombers approach UK airspace
$ curl -s 'https://blockchain.info/blocks/?format=json' |\
python3 -c 'import sys, json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['\''blocks'\''][10]['\''hash'\''])'
00000000000000000010e57bfbfcbb49bdae6212789c51447316c4652bd6fcf3
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
Qubes Tor onion services are available again!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/17/tor-onion-services-available-again/
We previously announced that the Qubes Tor onion services were no
longer being maintained (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/23/qubes-whonix-next-gen-tor-onion-services/) due to lack of resources.
However, Unman (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#unman) generously agreed to bring them back, and they’re now
available once again!
Here are the new onion service URLs:
Website: www.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Yum repo: yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Deb repo: deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
ISOs: iso.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Soon, you will be able to get the new, correct repo definitions just by
updating dom0 and your TemplateVMs. However, if you can’t wait, you can
edit your repository definitions by following the instructions below.
Instructions
Follow these instructions only if you wish to update dom0 and your
TemplateVMs over Tor (via sys-whonix). This is an opt-in feature. If,
instead, you wish to update over your regular network connection (aka
“clearnet”), or if you are not sure, then do not follow these
instructions.
In order to use the new onion services, you must ensure that every
line that contains an onion address uses the appropriate new address
above. We’ll go through this for dom0, Fedora templates, and Debian
templates. Whonix templates do not require any action; their onion
addresses are still the same as before. For additional information, see
Onionizing Repositories (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Onionizing_Repositories) on the Whonix wiki.
dom0
In dom0, open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-dom0.repo in a text editor.
Comment out all the baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/[...] and
metalink lines.
Uncomment all the baseurl = [...].onion lines.
Update every .onion address to
yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
#baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25
baseurl = http://yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25
#metalink = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25/repodata/repomd.xml.metalink
Open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-templates.repo in a text editor and
repeat steps 2-4.
In Qubes Global Settings, set Dom0 UpdateVM to sys-whonix.
Fedora TemplateVMs
In the TemplateVM, open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-r4.repo in a text
editor.
Comment out every line that contains yum.qubes-os.org.
Uncomment every line that contains .onion.
Update every .onion address to
yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
#baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r4.0/current/vm/fc$releasever
baseurl = http://yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r4.0/current/vm/fc$releasever
In dom0, ensure that the first non-comment line in
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy is:
$type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-whonix
Debian TemplateVMs
In the TemplateVM, open /etc/apt/sources.list.d/qubes-r4.list in a
text editor.
Comment out every line that contains deb.qubes-os.org.
Uncomment every line that contains .onion.
Update every .onion address to
deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
# Main qubes updates repository
#deb [arch=amd64] https://deb.qubes-os.org/r4.0/vm stretch main
#deb-src https://deb.qubes-os.org/r4.0/vm stretch main
# Qubes Tor updates repositories
# Main qubes updates repository
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/17/tor-onion-services-available-again/
We previously announced that the Qubes Tor onion services were no
longer being maintained (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/23/qubes-whonix-next-gen-tor-onion-services/) due to lack of resources.
However, Unman (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#unman) generously agreed to bring them back, and they’re now
available once again!
Here are the new onion service URLs:
Website: www.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Yum repo: yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Deb repo: deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
ISOs: iso.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Soon, you will be able to get the new, correct repo definitions just by
updating dom0 and your TemplateVMs. However, if you can’t wait, you can
edit your repository definitions by following the instructions below.
Instructions
Follow these instructions only if you wish to update dom0 and your
TemplateVMs over Tor (via sys-whonix). This is an opt-in feature. If,
instead, you wish to update over your regular network connection (aka
“clearnet”), or if you are not sure, then do not follow these
instructions.
In order to use the new onion services, you must ensure that every
line that contains an onion address uses the appropriate new address
above. We’ll go through this for dom0, Fedora templates, and Debian
templates. Whonix templates do not require any action; their onion
addresses are still the same as before. For additional information, see
Onionizing Repositories (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Onionizing_Repositories) on the Whonix wiki.
dom0
In dom0, open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-dom0.repo in a text editor.
Comment out all the baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/[...] and
metalink lines.
Uncomment all the baseurl = [...].onion lines.
Update every .onion address to
yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
#baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25
baseurl = http://yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25
#metalink = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25/repodata/repomd.xml.metalink
Open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-templates.repo in a text editor and
repeat steps 2-4.
In Qubes Global Settings, set Dom0 UpdateVM to sys-whonix.
Fedora TemplateVMs
In the TemplateVM, open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-r4.repo in a text
editor.
Comment out every line that contains yum.qubes-os.org.
Uncomment every line that contains .onion.
Update every .onion address to
yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
#baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r4.0/current/vm/fc$releasever
baseurl = http://yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r4.0/current/vm/fc$releasever
In dom0, ensure that the first non-comment line in
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy is:
$type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-whonix
Debian TemplateVMs
In the TemplateVM, open /etc/apt/sources.list.d/qubes-r4.list in a
text editor.
Comment out every line that contains deb.qubes-os.org.
Uncomment every line that contains .onion.
Update every .onion address to
deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
# Main qubes updates repository
#deb [arch=amd64] https://deb.qubes-os.org/r4.0/vm stretch main
#deb-src https://deb.qubes-os.org/r4.0/vm stretch main
# Qubes Tor updates repositories
# Main qubes updates repository
deb [arch=amd64] http://deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r4.0/vm stretch main
#deb-src http://deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r4.0/vm stretch main
In dom0, ensure that the first non-comment line in
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy is:
$type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-whonix
#deb-src http://deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r4.0/vm stretch main
In dom0, ensure that the first non-comment line in
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy is:
$type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-whonix
Qubes OS accepted into 2019 Google Season of Docs. Technical writers, please apply!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/30/qubes-os-accepted-into-season-of-docs/
We are pleased to announce Qubes OS has been accepted into the 2019 Google Season of Docs (https://developers.google.com/season-of-docs/) program, which aims to support technical writers in participating in free and open source projects.
If you are a technical writer, feel free to explore our Season of Docs page (https://www.qubes-os.org/gsod/) which provides an overview of potential documentation ideas we are excited about, and follow the Season of Docs process (https://developers.google.com/season-of-docs/docs/tech-writer-guide) to apply to collaborate with us!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/30/qubes-os-accepted-into-season-of-docs/
We are pleased to announce Qubes OS has been accepted into the 2019 Google Season of Docs (https://developers.google.com/season-of-docs/) program, which aims to support technical writers in participating in free and open source projects.
If you are a technical writer, feel free to explore our Season of Docs page (https://www.qubes-os.org/gsod/) which provides an overview of potential documentation ideas we are excited about, and follow the Season of Docs process (https://developers.google.com/season-of-docs/docs/tech-writer-guide) to apply to collaborate with us!
Xen Developer and Design Summit Schedule Now Live
https://xenproject.org/2019/05/09/xen-developer-and-design-summit-schedule-now-live/
Today, we are excited to unveil the Xen Project Developer and Design Summit program and speaker schedule. The Xen Project Developer and Design Summit brings together the Xen Project’s community...
https://xenproject.org/2019/05/09/xen-developer-and-design-summit-schedule-now-live/
Today, we are excited to unveil the Xen Project Developer and Design Summit program and speaker schedule. The Xen Project Developer and Design Summit brings together the Xen Project’s community...
QSB #49: Microarchitectural Data Sampling speculative side channel (XSA-297)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/15/qsb-49/
We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) #49: Microarchitectural
Data Sampling speculative side channel (XSA-297).
The text of this QSB is reproduced below.
This QSB and its accompanying signatures will always be available in
the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View QSB #49 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-049-2019.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past QSBs:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/bulletins/
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin #49 ]===---
2019-05-15
Microarchitectural Data Sampling speculative side channel (XSA-297)
Summary
========
On 2018-05-14, the Xen Security Team published Xen Security Advisory
297 (CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091 /
XSA-297) [1] with the following denoscription:
| Microarchitectural Data Sampling refers to a group of speculative
| sidechannels vulnerabilities. They consist of:
|
| * CVE-2018-12126 - MSBDS - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
| * CVE-2018-12127 - MLPDS - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
| * CVE-2018-12130 - MFBDS - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
| * CVE-2019-11091 - MDSUM - Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
|
| These issues pertain to the Load Ports, Store Buffers and Fill Buffers
| in the pipeline. The Load Ports are used to service all memory reads.
| The Store Buffers service all in-flight speculative writes (including
| IO Port writes), while the Fill Buffers service all memory writes
| which are post-retirement, and no longer speculative.
|
| Under certain circumstances, a later load which takes a fault or
| assist (an internal condition to processor e.g. setting a pagetable
| Access or Dirty bit) may be forwarded stale data from these buffers
| during speculative execution, which may then be leaked via a
| sidechannel.
|
| MDSUM (Uncacheable Memory) is a special case of the other three.
| Previously, the use of uncacheable memory was believed to be safe
| against speculative sidechannels.
|
| For more details, see:
| https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00233.html
|
| An attacker, which could include a malicious untrusted user process on
| a trusted guest, or an untrusted guest, can sample the content of
| recently-used memory operands and IO Port writes.
|
| This can include data from:
|
| * A previously executing context (process, or guest, or
| hypervisor/toolstack) at the same privilege level.
| * A higher privilege context (kernel, hypervisor, SMM) which
| interrupted the attacker's execution.
|
| Vulnerable data is that on the same physical core as the attacker.
| This includes, when hyper-threading is enabled, adjacent threads.
|
| An attacker cannot use this vulnerability to target specific data.
| An attack would likely require sampling over a period of time and the
| application of statistical methods to reconstruct interesting data.
This is yet another CPU hardware bug related to speculative execution.
Only Intel processors are affected.
Patching
=========
The Xen Project has provided patches that mitigate this issue. A CPU
microcode update is required to take advantage of them. Note that
microcode updates may not be available for older CPUs. (See the Intel
advisory linked above for details.)
The specific packages that resolve the problems discussed in this
bulletin are as follows:
For Qubes 4.0:
- Xen packages, version 4.8.5-6
- microcode_ctl 2.1-28.qubes1
- kernel-qubes-vm package, version 4.19.43-1 (optional)
The packages are to be installed in dom0 via the Qubes VM Manager or via
the qubes-dom0-update command as follows:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/15/qsb-49/
We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) #49: Microarchitectural
Data Sampling speculative side channel (XSA-297).
The text of this QSB is reproduced below.
This QSB and its accompanying signatures will always be available in
the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View QSB #49 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-049-2019.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past QSBs:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/bulletins/
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin #49 ]===---
2019-05-15
Microarchitectural Data Sampling speculative side channel (XSA-297)
Summary
========
On 2018-05-14, the Xen Security Team published Xen Security Advisory
297 (CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091 /
XSA-297) [1] with the following denoscription:
| Microarchitectural Data Sampling refers to a group of speculative
| sidechannels vulnerabilities. They consist of:
|
| * CVE-2018-12126 - MSBDS - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
| * CVE-2018-12127 - MLPDS - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
| * CVE-2018-12130 - MFBDS - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
| * CVE-2019-11091 - MDSUM - Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
|
| These issues pertain to the Load Ports, Store Buffers and Fill Buffers
| in the pipeline. The Load Ports are used to service all memory reads.
| The Store Buffers service all in-flight speculative writes (including
| IO Port writes), while the Fill Buffers service all memory writes
| which are post-retirement, and no longer speculative.
|
| Under certain circumstances, a later load which takes a fault or
| assist (an internal condition to processor e.g. setting a pagetable
| Access or Dirty bit) may be forwarded stale data from these buffers
| during speculative execution, which may then be leaked via a
| sidechannel.
|
| MDSUM (Uncacheable Memory) is a special case of the other three.
| Previously, the use of uncacheable memory was believed to be safe
| against speculative sidechannels.
|
| For more details, see:
| https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00233.html
|
| An attacker, which could include a malicious untrusted user process on
| a trusted guest, or an untrusted guest, can sample the content of
| recently-used memory operands and IO Port writes.
|
| This can include data from:
|
| * A previously executing context (process, or guest, or
| hypervisor/toolstack) at the same privilege level.
| * A higher privilege context (kernel, hypervisor, SMM) which
| interrupted the attacker's execution.
|
| Vulnerable data is that on the same physical core as the attacker.
| This includes, when hyper-threading is enabled, adjacent threads.
|
| An attacker cannot use this vulnerability to target specific data.
| An attack would likely require sampling over a period of time and the
| application of statistical methods to reconstruct interesting data.
This is yet another CPU hardware bug related to speculative execution.
Only Intel processors are affected.
Patching
=========
The Xen Project has provided patches that mitigate this issue. A CPU
microcode update is required to take advantage of them. Note that
microcode updates may not be available for older CPUs. (See the Intel
advisory linked above for details.)
The specific packages that resolve the problems discussed in this
bulletin are as follows:
For Qubes 4.0:
- Xen packages, version 4.8.5-6
- microcode_ctl 2.1-28.qubes1
- kernel-qubes-vm package, version 4.19.43-1 (optional)
The packages are to be installed in dom0 via the Qubes VM Manager or via
the qubes-dom0-update command as follows:
For updates from the stable repository (not immediately available):
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update
For updates from the security-testing repository:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-security-testing
A system restart will be required afterwards.
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
========
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
===========
[1] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-297.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update
For updates from the security-testing repository:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-security-testing
A system restart will be required afterwards.
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
========
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
===========
[1] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-297.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Fedora 28 has reached EOL
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/29/fedora-28-eol/
Fedora 28 has reached EOL (end-of-life (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life)). We strongly recommend that
all Qubes users upgrade their Fedora 28 TemplateVMs and StandaloneVMs to
Fedora 29 immediately. We provide step-by-step upgrade instructions for
upgrading from Fedora 28 to 29 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-28-to-29/). For a complete list of TemplateVM
versions supported for your specific version of Qubes, see Supported
TemplateVM Versions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#templatevms).
We also provide a fresh Fedora 29 TemplateVM package through the
official Qubes repositories, which you can install in dom0 by following
the standard installation instructions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing).
After upgrading your TemplateVMs, please remember to set all qubes that
were using the old template to use the new one. The instructions to do
this can be found in the upgrade instructions for Fedora 28 to 29 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-28-to-29/).
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in
dom0. For details, please see our Note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#note-on-dom0-and-eol).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/29/fedora-28-eol/
Fedora 28 has reached EOL (end-of-life (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life)). We strongly recommend that
all Qubes users upgrade their Fedora 28 TemplateVMs and StandaloneVMs to
Fedora 29 immediately. We provide step-by-step upgrade instructions for
upgrading from Fedora 28 to 29 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-28-to-29/). For a complete list of TemplateVM
versions supported for your specific version of Qubes, see Supported
TemplateVM Versions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#templatevms).
We also provide a fresh Fedora 29 TemplateVM package through the
official Qubes repositories, which you can install in dom0 by following
the standard installation instructions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing).
After upgrading your TemplateVMs, please remember to set all qubes that
were using the old template to use the new one. The instructions to do
this can be found in the upgrade instructions for Fedora 28 to 29 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-28-to-29/).
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in
dom0. For details, please see our Note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#note-on-dom0-and-eol).