Qubes Canary #19
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/08/canary-19/
We have published Qubes Canary #19. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will
always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View Qubes Canary #19 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-019-2019.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past canaries:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/
---===[ Qubes Canary #19 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is April 3, 2019.
2. There have been 48 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of July 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.
The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
$ date -R -u
Wed, 03 Apr 2019 15:10:59 +0000
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss
A Precarious Alliance: Patience Wears Thin with Germany's NATO Spending
Interview with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: The U.S. and President Trump 'Are 100 Percent Behind' Us
Interview with Sir David Attenborough: 'Collecting Memories Isn't the Same as Collecting Ammonites'
'I'm Just Being Me': British House Speaker Bercow on His Brexit Role
France's Golden Boy Learns How to Fight: Macron Debates His Way Out of The Yellow-Vest Crisis
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn Consider Something New on Brexit: Cooperation
Egypt’s Soap Opera Clampdown Extends el-Sisi’s Iron Grip to TV
Najib Razak, Malaysian Leader Toppled in 1MDB Scandal, Faces First Graft Trial
Saudi Arabia Giving Jamal Khashoggi’s Children Money and Real Estate
Trudeau and Liberal Party Expel 2 Ex-Ministers at Center of Storm
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml
Brunei implements stoning to death under anti-LGBT laws
Charges dropped in deadly US biker brawl
Paris transgender woman 'humiliated' at protest
Jeffree Star says $2.5m worth of his cosmetic line stolen
1MDB: Superyacht linked to financial scandal sold for $126m
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/08/canary-19/
We have published Qubes Canary #19. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will
always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View Qubes Canary #19 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-019-2019.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past canaries:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/
---===[ Qubes Canary #19 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is April 3, 2019.
2. There have been 48 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of July 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.
The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
$ date -R -u
Wed, 03 Apr 2019 15:10:59 +0000
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss
A Precarious Alliance: Patience Wears Thin with Germany's NATO Spending
Interview with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: The U.S. and President Trump 'Are 100 Percent Behind' Us
Interview with Sir David Attenborough: 'Collecting Memories Isn't the Same as Collecting Ammonites'
'I'm Just Being Me': British House Speaker Bercow on His Brexit Role
France's Golden Boy Learns How to Fight: Macron Debates His Way Out of The Yellow-Vest Crisis
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn Consider Something New on Brexit: Cooperation
Egypt’s Soap Opera Clampdown Extends el-Sisi’s Iron Grip to TV
Najib Razak, Malaysian Leader Toppled in 1MDB Scandal, Faces First Graft Trial
Saudi Arabia Giving Jamal Khashoggi’s Children Money and Real Estate
Trudeau and Liberal Party Expel 2 Ex-Ministers at Center of Storm
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml
Brunei implements stoning to death under anti-LGBT laws
Charges dropped in deadly US biker brawl
Paris transgender woman 'humiliated' at protest
Jeffree Star says $2.5m worth of his cosmetic line stolen
1MDB: Superyacht linked to financial scandal sold for $126m
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u http://feeds.reuters.com/reuters/worldnews
Italy PM denies Tria could quit over 5-Star attacks
Brexit gamble: UK's May to meet opposition leader to seek a deal
EU would begin customs controls right after no-deal Brexit
Turkey says proposed working group to ease U.S. worries over Russian S-400s
Britain scrambles jets after Russian bombers approach UK airspace
$ curl -s 'https://blockchain.info/blocks/?format=json' |\
python3 -c 'import sys, json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['\''blocks'\''][10]['\''hash'\''])'
00000000000000000010e57bfbfcbb49bdae6212789c51447316c4652bd6fcf3
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
Italy PM denies Tria could quit over 5-Star attacks
Brexit gamble: UK's May to meet opposition leader to seek a deal
EU would begin customs controls right after no-deal Brexit
Turkey says proposed working group to ease U.S. worries over Russian S-400s
Britain scrambles jets after Russian bombers approach UK airspace
$ curl -s 'https://blockchain.info/blocks/?format=json' |\
python3 -c 'import sys, json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['\''blocks'\''][10]['\''hash'\''])'
00000000000000000010e57bfbfcbb49bdae6212789c51447316c4652bd6fcf3
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
Qubes Tor onion services are available again!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/17/tor-onion-services-available-again/
We previously announced that the Qubes Tor onion services were no
longer being maintained (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/23/qubes-whonix-next-gen-tor-onion-services/) due to lack of resources.
However, Unman (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#unman) generously agreed to bring them back, and they’re now
available once again!
Here are the new onion service URLs:
Website: www.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Yum repo: yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Deb repo: deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
ISOs: iso.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Soon, you will be able to get the new, correct repo definitions just by
updating dom0 and your TemplateVMs. However, if you can’t wait, you can
edit your repository definitions by following the instructions below.
Instructions
Follow these instructions only if you wish to update dom0 and your
TemplateVMs over Tor (via sys-whonix). This is an opt-in feature. If,
instead, you wish to update over your regular network connection (aka
“clearnet”), or if you are not sure, then do not follow these
instructions.
In order to use the new onion services, you must ensure that every
line that contains an onion address uses the appropriate new address
above. We’ll go through this for dom0, Fedora templates, and Debian
templates. Whonix templates do not require any action; their onion
addresses are still the same as before. For additional information, see
Onionizing Repositories (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Onionizing_Repositories) on the Whonix wiki.
dom0
In dom0, open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-dom0.repo in a text editor.
Comment out all the baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/[...] and
metalink lines.
Uncomment all the baseurl = [...].onion lines.
Update every .onion address to
yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
#baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25
baseurl = http://yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25
#metalink = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25/repodata/repomd.xml.metalink
Open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-templates.repo in a text editor and
repeat steps 2-4.
In Qubes Global Settings, set Dom0 UpdateVM to sys-whonix.
Fedora TemplateVMs
In the TemplateVM, open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-r4.repo in a text
editor.
Comment out every line that contains yum.qubes-os.org.
Uncomment every line that contains .onion.
Update every .onion address to
yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
#baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r4.0/current/vm/fc$releasever
baseurl = http://yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r4.0/current/vm/fc$releasever
In dom0, ensure that the first non-comment line in
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy is:
$type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-whonix
Debian TemplateVMs
In the TemplateVM, open /etc/apt/sources.list.d/qubes-r4.list in a
text editor.
Comment out every line that contains deb.qubes-os.org.
Uncomment every line that contains .onion.
Update every .onion address to
deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
# Main qubes updates repository
#deb [arch=amd64] https://deb.qubes-os.org/r4.0/vm stretch main
#deb-src https://deb.qubes-os.org/r4.0/vm stretch main
# Qubes Tor updates repositories
# Main qubes updates repository
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/17/tor-onion-services-available-again/
We previously announced that the Qubes Tor onion services were no
longer being maintained (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/23/qubes-whonix-next-gen-tor-onion-services/) due to lack of resources.
However, Unman (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#unman) generously agreed to bring them back, and they’re now
available once again!
Here are the new onion service URLs:
Website: www.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Yum repo: yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Deb repo: deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
ISOs: iso.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion
Soon, you will be able to get the new, correct repo definitions just by
updating dom0 and your TemplateVMs. However, if you can’t wait, you can
edit your repository definitions by following the instructions below.
Instructions
Follow these instructions only if you wish to update dom0 and your
TemplateVMs over Tor (via sys-whonix). This is an opt-in feature. If,
instead, you wish to update over your regular network connection (aka
“clearnet”), or if you are not sure, then do not follow these
instructions.
In order to use the new onion services, you must ensure that every
line that contains an onion address uses the appropriate new address
above. We’ll go through this for dom0, Fedora templates, and Debian
templates. Whonix templates do not require any action; their onion
addresses are still the same as before. For additional information, see
Onionizing Repositories (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Onionizing_Repositories) on the Whonix wiki.
dom0
In dom0, open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-dom0.repo in a text editor.
Comment out all the baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/[...] and
metalink lines.
Uncomment all the baseurl = [...].onion lines.
Update every .onion address to
yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
#baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25
baseurl = http://yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25
#metalink = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r$releasever/current/dom0/fc25/repodata/repomd.xml.metalink
Open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-templates.repo in a text editor and
repeat steps 2-4.
In Qubes Global Settings, set Dom0 UpdateVM to sys-whonix.
Fedora TemplateVMs
In the TemplateVM, open /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-r4.repo in a text
editor.
Comment out every line that contains yum.qubes-os.org.
Uncomment every line that contains .onion.
Update every .onion address to
yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
#baseurl = https://yum.qubes-os.org/r4.0/current/vm/fc$releasever
baseurl = http://yum.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r4.0/current/vm/fc$releasever
In dom0, ensure that the first non-comment line in
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy is:
$type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-whonix
Debian TemplateVMs
In the TemplateVM, open /etc/apt/sources.list.d/qubes-r4.list in a
text editor.
Comment out every line that contains deb.qubes-os.org.
Uncomment every line that contains .onion.
Update every .onion address to
deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion.
The affected lines should look like this:
# Main qubes updates repository
#deb [arch=amd64] https://deb.qubes-os.org/r4.0/vm stretch main
#deb-src https://deb.qubes-os.org/r4.0/vm stretch main
# Qubes Tor updates repositories
# Main qubes updates repository
deb [arch=amd64] http://deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r4.0/vm stretch main
#deb-src http://deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r4.0/vm stretch main
In dom0, ensure that the first non-comment line in
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy is:
$type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-whonix
#deb-src http://deb.qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion/r4.0/vm stretch main
In dom0, ensure that the first non-comment line in
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy is:
$type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-whonix
Qubes OS accepted into 2019 Google Season of Docs. Technical writers, please apply!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/30/qubes-os-accepted-into-season-of-docs/
We are pleased to announce Qubes OS has been accepted into the 2019 Google Season of Docs (https://developers.google.com/season-of-docs/) program, which aims to support technical writers in participating in free and open source projects.
If you are a technical writer, feel free to explore our Season of Docs page (https://www.qubes-os.org/gsod/) which provides an overview of potential documentation ideas we are excited about, and follow the Season of Docs process (https://developers.google.com/season-of-docs/docs/tech-writer-guide) to apply to collaborate with us!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/30/qubes-os-accepted-into-season-of-docs/
We are pleased to announce Qubes OS has been accepted into the 2019 Google Season of Docs (https://developers.google.com/season-of-docs/) program, which aims to support technical writers in participating in free and open source projects.
If you are a technical writer, feel free to explore our Season of Docs page (https://www.qubes-os.org/gsod/) which provides an overview of potential documentation ideas we are excited about, and follow the Season of Docs process (https://developers.google.com/season-of-docs/docs/tech-writer-guide) to apply to collaborate with us!
Xen Developer and Design Summit Schedule Now Live
https://xenproject.org/2019/05/09/xen-developer-and-design-summit-schedule-now-live/
Today, we are excited to unveil the Xen Project Developer and Design Summit program and speaker schedule. The Xen Project Developer and Design Summit brings together the Xen Project’s community...
https://xenproject.org/2019/05/09/xen-developer-and-design-summit-schedule-now-live/
Today, we are excited to unveil the Xen Project Developer and Design Summit program and speaker schedule. The Xen Project Developer and Design Summit brings together the Xen Project’s community...
QSB #49: Microarchitectural Data Sampling speculative side channel (XSA-297)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/15/qsb-49/
We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) #49: Microarchitectural
Data Sampling speculative side channel (XSA-297).
The text of this QSB is reproduced below.
This QSB and its accompanying signatures will always be available in
the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View QSB #49 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-049-2019.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past QSBs:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/bulletins/
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin #49 ]===---
2019-05-15
Microarchitectural Data Sampling speculative side channel (XSA-297)
Summary
========
On 2018-05-14, the Xen Security Team published Xen Security Advisory
297 (CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091 /
XSA-297) [1] with the following denoscription:
| Microarchitectural Data Sampling refers to a group of speculative
| sidechannels vulnerabilities. They consist of:
|
| * CVE-2018-12126 - MSBDS - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
| * CVE-2018-12127 - MLPDS - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
| * CVE-2018-12130 - MFBDS - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
| * CVE-2019-11091 - MDSUM - Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
|
| These issues pertain to the Load Ports, Store Buffers and Fill Buffers
| in the pipeline. The Load Ports are used to service all memory reads.
| The Store Buffers service all in-flight speculative writes (including
| IO Port writes), while the Fill Buffers service all memory writes
| which are post-retirement, and no longer speculative.
|
| Under certain circumstances, a later load which takes a fault or
| assist (an internal condition to processor e.g. setting a pagetable
| Access or Dirty bit) may be forwarded stale data from these buffers
| during speculative execution, which may then be leaked via a
| sidechannel.
|
| MDSUM (Uncacheable Memory) is a special case of the other three.
| Previously, the use of uncacheable memory was believed to be safe
| against speculative sidechannels.
|
| For more details, see:
| https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00233.html
|
| An attacker, which could include a malicious untrusted user process on
| a trusted guest, or an untrusted guest, can sample the content of
| recently-used memory operands and IO Port writes.
|
| This can include data from:
|
| * A previously executing context (process, or guest, or
| hypervisor/toolstack) at the same privilege level.
| * A higher privilege context (kernel, hypervisor, SMM) which
| interrupted the attacker's execution.
|
| Vulnerable data is that on the same physical core as the attacker.
| This includes, when hyper-threading is enabled, adjacent threads.
|
| An attacker cannot use this vulnerability to target specific data.
| An attack would likely require sampling over a period of time and the
| application of statistical methods to reconstruct interesting data.
This is yet another CPU hardware bug related to speculative execution.
Only Intel processors are affected.
Patching
=========
The Xen Project has provided patches that mitigate this issue. A CPU
microcode update is required to take advantage of them. Note that
microcode updates may not be available for older CPUs. (See the Intel
advisory linked above for details.)
The specific packages that resolve the problems discussed in this
bulletin are as follows:
For Qubes 4.0:
- Xen packages, version 4.8.5-6
- microcode_ctl 2.1-28.qubes1
- kernel-qubes-vm package, version 4.19.43-1 (optional)
The packages are to be installed in dom0 via the Qubes VM Manager or via
the qubes-dom0-update command as follows:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/15/qsb-49/
We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) #49: Microarchitectural
Data Sampling speculative side channel (XSA-297).
The text of this QSB is reproduced below.
This QSB and its accompanying signatures will always be available in
the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View QSB #49 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-049-2019.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past QSBs:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/bulletins/
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin #49 ]===---
2019-05-15
Microarchitectural Data Sampling speculative side channel (XSA-297)
Summary
========
On 2018-05-14, the Xen Security Team published Xen Security Advisory
297 (CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091 /
XSA-297) [1] with the following denoscription:
| Microarchitectural Data Sampling refers to a group of speculative
| sidechannels vulnerabilities. They consist of:
|
| * CVE-2018-12126 - MSBDS - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
| * CVE-2018-12127 - MLPDS - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
| * CVE-2018-12130 - MFBDS - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
| * CVE-2019-11091 - MDSUM - Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
|
| These issues pertain to the Load Ports, Store Buffers and Fill Buffers
| in the pipeline. The Load Ports are used to service all memory reads.
| The Store Buffers service all in-flight speculative writes (including
| IO Port writes), while the Fill Buffers service all memory writes
| which are post-retirement, and no longer speculative.
|
| Under certain circumstances, a later load which takes a fault or
| assist (an internal condition to processor e.g. setting a pagetable
| Access or Dirty bit) may be forwarded stale data from these buffers
| during speculative execution, which may then be leaked via a
| sidechannel.
|
| MDSUM (Uncacheable Memory) is a special case of the other three.
| Previously, the use of uncacheable memory was believed to be safe
| against speculative sidechannels.
|
| For more details, see:
| https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00233.html
|
| An attacker, which could include a malicious untrusted user process on
| a trusted guest, or an untrusted guest, can sample the content of
| recently-used memory operands and IO Port writes.
|
| This can include data from:
|
| * A previously executing context (process, or guest, or
| hypervisor/toolstack) at the same privilege level.
| * A higher privilege context (kernel, hypervisor, SMM) which
| interrupted the attacker's execution.
|
| Vulnerable data is that on the same physical core as the attacker.
| This includes, when hyper-threading is enabled, adjacent threads.
|
| An attacker cannot use this vulnerability to target specific data.
| An attack would likely require sampling over a period of time and the
| application of statistical methods to reconstruct interesting data.
This is yet another CPU hardware bug related to speculative execution.
Only Intel processors are affected.
Patching
=========
The Xen Project has provided patches that mitigate this issue. A CPU
microcode update is required to take advantage of them. Note that
microcode updates may not be available for older CPUs. (See the Intel
advisory linked above for details.)
The specific packages that resolve the problems discussed in this
bulletin are as follows:
For Qubes 4.0:
- Xen packages, version 4.8.5-6
- microcode_ctl 2.1-28.qubes1
- kernel-qubes-vm package, version 4.19.43-1 (optional)
The packages are to be installed in dom0 via the Qubes VM Manager or via
the qubes-dom0-update command as follows:
For updates from the stable repository (not immediately available):
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update
For updates from the security-testing repository:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-security-testing
A system restart will be required afterwards.
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
========
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
===========
[1] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-297.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update
For updates from the security-testing repository:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-security-testing
A system restart will be required afterwards.
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
========
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
===========
[1] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-297.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Fedora 28 has reached EOL
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/29/fedora-28-eol/
Fedora 28 has reached EOL (end-of-life (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life)). We strongly recommend that
all Qubes users upgrade their Fedora 28 TemplateVMs and StandaloneVMs to
Fedora 29 immediately. We provide step-by-step upgrade instructions for
upgrading from Fedora 28 to 29 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-28-to-29/). For a complete list of TemplateVM
versions supported for your specific version of Qubes, see Supported
TemplateVM Versions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#templatevms).
We also provide a fresh Fedora 29 TemplateVM package through the
official Qubes repositories, which you can install in dom0 by following
the standard installation instructions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing).
After upgrading your TemplateVMs, please remember to set all qubes that
were using the old template to use the new one. The instructions to do
this can be found in the upgrade instructions for Fedora 28 to 29 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-28-to-29/).
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in
dom0. For details, please see our Note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#note-on-dom0-and-eol).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/29/fedora-28-eol/
Fedora 28 has reached EOL (end-of-life (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life)). We strongly recommend that
all Qubes users upgrade their Fedora 28 TemplateVMs and StandaloneVMs to
Fedora 29 immediately. We provide step-by-step upgrade instructions for
upgrading from Fedora 28 to 29 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-28-to-29/). For a complete list of TemplateVM
versions supported for your specific version of Qubes, see Supported
TemplateVM Versions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#templatevms).
We also provide a fresh Fedora 29 TemplateVM package through the
official Qubes repositories, which you can install in dom0 by following
the standard installation instructions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing).
After upgrading your TemplateVMs, please remember to set all qubes that
were using the old template to use the new one. The instructions to do
this can be found in the upgrade instructions for Fedora 28 to 29 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-28-to-29/).
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in
dom0. For details, please see our Note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#note-on-dom0-and-eol).
Fedora 30 TemplateVM available
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/30/fedora-30-template-available/
A new Fedora 30 TemplateVM is now available. We
previously announced that Fedora 28 reached EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/29/fedora-28-eol/) and encouraged users
to upgrade to Fedora 29. Fedora 29 is still supported by the Fedora
Project, so users may now choose either Fedora 29 or 30 (or both)
depending on their needs and preferences. Instructions are available
for upgrading from Fedora 29 to 30 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-29-to-30/). We also provide fresh Fedora 30
TemplateVM packages through the official Qubes repositories, which you
can get with the following commands (in dom0).
Standard Fedora 30 TemplateVM:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-30
Minimal (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora-minimal/) Fedora 30 TemplateVM:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-30-minimal
After upgrading to a Fedora 30 TemplateVM, please remember to set all
qubes that were using the old template to use the new one. This can be
done in dom0 either with the Qubes Template Manager (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#how-to-switch-templates) or with the
qvm-prefs command-line tool.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/30/fedora-30-template-available/
A new Fedora 30 TemplateVM is now available. We
previously announced that Fedora 28 reached EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/29/fedora-28-eol/) and encouraged users
to upgrade to Fedora 29. Fedora 29 is still supported by the Fedora
Project, so users may now choose either Fedora 29 or 30 (or both)
depending on their needs and preferences. Instructions are available
for upgrading from Fedora 29 to 30 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade-29-to-30/). We also provide fresh Fedora 30
TemplateVM packages through the official Qubes repositories, which you
can get with the following commands (in dom0).
Standard Fedora 30 TemplateVM:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-30
Minimal (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora-minimal/) Fedora 30 TemplateVM:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-30-minimal
After upgrading to a Fedora 30 TemplateVM, please remember to set all
qubes that were using the old template to use the new one. This can be
done in dom0 either with the Qubes Template Manager (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#how-to-switch-templates) or with the
qvm-prefs command-line tool.
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki to speak at Xen Developer and Design Summit 2019
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/06/27/marek-marczykowski-gorecki-xen-summit-2019/
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki) will be speaking at this year’s Xen
Developer and Design Summit (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/events/xensummit-2019/). The summit will take place July 9–11 in
Chicago, Illinois. Marek’s presentation is noscriptd, “A Journey to Mirage
OS as Xen PVH.” Here is the denoscription from the Xen summit schedule (https://xensummit19.sched.com/event/PFW3/a-journey-to-mirage-os-as-xen-pvh-marek-marczykowski-gorecki-invisible-things-lab):
Marek will present difficulties faced during converting Mirage OS Xen
build from old PV-only Mini-OS fork, to recent Unikraft with addition
of PVH support. This talk will focus mostly on the latter part -
adding PVH support to Unikraft, its current state and future work.
There will be also a little of context how is that useful for Qubes
OS.
Please see the Xen summit schedule (https://xensummit19.sched.com/event/PFW3/a-journey-to-mirage-os-as-xen-pvh-marek-marczykowski-gorecki-invisible-things-lab) for further session details.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/06/27/marek-marczykowski-gorecki-xen-summit-2019/
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki) will be speaking at this year’s Xen
Developer and Design Summit (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/events/xensummit-2019/). The summit will take place July 9–11 in
Chicago, Illinois. Marek’s presentation is noscriptd, “A Journey to Mirage
OS as Xen PVH.” Here is the denoscription from the Xen summit schedule (https://xensummit19.sched.com/event/PFW3/a-journey-to-mirage-os-as-xen-pvh-marek-marczykowski-gorecki-invisible-things-lab):
Marek will present difficulties faced during converting Mirage OS Xen
build from old PV-only Mini-OS fork, to recent Unikraft with addition
of PVH support. This talk will focus mostly on the latter part -
adding PVH support to Unikraft, its current state and future work.
There will be also a little of context how is that useful for Qubes
OS.
Please see the Xen summit schedule (https://xensummit19.sched.com/event/PFW3/a-journey-to-mirage-os-as-xen-pvh-marek-marczykowski-gorecki-invisible-things-lab) for further session details.
Whonix 15 has been released
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/01/whonix-15-has-been-released/
The Whonix Project (https://www.whonix.org/) announced the release of Whonix 15 (https://forums.whonix.org/t/whonix-15-has-been-released/7616) today.
Project lead Patrick Schleizer (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#patrick-schleizer) wrote:
After approximately one year of development, the Whonix Project is proud to announce the release of Whonix 15.
Whonix 15 is based on the Debian buster (Debian 10) distribution. This means users have access to many new software packages in concert with existing packages, such as a modern branch of GNuPG, and more.
For a list of major new features and further details, please see the official announcement (https://forums.whonix.org/t/whonix-15-has-been-released/7616).
Please note that, according to the Whonix Support Schedule (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/About#Support_Schedule), Whonix 14 will reach end-of-life (EOL) in one month.
Therefore, all current Whonix users are urged to upgrade from Whonix 14 to Whonix 15 (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Upgrading_Whonix_14_to_Whonix_15) within the next month.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/01/whonix-15-has-been-released/
The Whonix Project (https://www.whonix.org/) announced the release of Whonix 15 (https://forums.whonix.org/t/whonix-15-has-been-released/7616) today.
Project lead Patrick Schleizer (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#patrick-schleizer) wrote:
After approximately one year of development, the Whonix Project is proud to announce the release of Whonix 15.
Whonix 15 is based on the Debian buster (Debian 10) distribution. This means users have access to many new software packages in concert with existing packages, such as a modern branch of GNuPG, and more.
For a list of major new features and further details, please see the official announcement (https://forums.whonix.org/t/whonix-15-has-been-released/7616).
Please note that, according to the Whonix Support Schedule (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/About#Support_Schedule), Whonix 14 will reach end-of-life (EOL) in one month.
Therefore, all current Whonix users are urged to upgrade from Whonix 14 to Whonix 15 (https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Upgrading_Whonix_14_to_Whonix_15) within the next month.
Qubes Canary #20
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/04/canary-20/
We have published Qubes Canary #20. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will
always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View Qubes Canary #20 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-020-2019.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past canaries:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/
---===[ Qubes Canary #20 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is July 3, 2019.
2. There have been 49 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of October 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.
The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
$ date -R -u
Wed, 03 Jul 2019 23:32:11 +0000
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss
No Way Back: Why Most Syrian Refugees Want to Stay in Germany
Lifelong Refugees: Ethiopia Is the Ultimate Destination for Many Fleeing Home
Former Secretary of Defense Panetta on Iran: 'You Can Create Chaos, but You'd Better Have a Plan'
'Hell Is Coming': What Lies Ahead for Europe's Climate
Amores Perros: The Paco-Addicted Youth of Buenos Aires
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
Rouhani Says Iran Will Begin Enriching Uranium at Higher Level in Days
As Protests Rock Hong Kong, Xi Jinping’s View of History Shows He Will Dig In
Airstrike Kills Dozens of Migrants at Detention Center in Tripoli
Rahul Gandhi Resigns as Leader of India’s Congress Party
Ethiopian-Israelis Protest for 3rd Day After Fatal Police Shooting
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml
Stromboli: One dead as volcano erupts on Italian island
Wolf Pack ruling: New Spain sex attack trial reignites rape law debate
Boeing gives $100m to help 737 Max crash families
Manslaughter charges dropped against shot pregnant mum
Warehouse fire destroys 40,000 barrels of bourbon
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u http://feeds.reuters.com/reuters/worldnews
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/04/canary-20/
We have published Qubes Canary #20. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will
always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View Qubes Canary #20 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-020-2019.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past canaries:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/
---===[ Qubes Canary #20 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is July 3, 2019.
2. There have been 49 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of October 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.
The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
$ date -R -u
Wed, 03 Jul 2019 23:32:11 +0000
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss
No Way Back: Why Most Syrian Refugees Want to Stay in Germany
Lifelong Refugees: Ethiopia Is the Ultimate Destination for Many Fleeing Home
Former Secretary of Defense Panetta on Iran: 'You Can Create Chaos, but You'd Better Have a Plan'
'Hell Is Coming': What Lies Ahead for Europe's Climate
Amores Perros: The Paco-Addicted Youth of Buenos Aires
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
Rouhani Says Iran Will Begin Enriching Uranium at Higher Level in Days
As Protests Rock Hong Kong, Xi Jinping’s View of History Shows He Will Dig In
Airstrike Kills Dozens of Migrants at Detention Center in Tripoli
Rahul Gandhi Resigns as Leader of India’s Congress Party
Ethiopian-Israelis Protest for 3rd Day After Fatal Police Shooting
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml
Stromboli: One dead as volcano erupts on Italian island
Wolf Pack ruling: New Spain sex attack trial reignites rape law debate
Boeing gives $100m to help 737 Max crash families
Manslaughter charges dropped against shot pregnant mum
Warehouse fire destroys 40,000 barrels of bourbon
$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{noscript}' -u http://feeds.reuters.com/reuters/worldnews
Frustration of surviving pricey Hong Kong stirs protest anger
26 dead in fishing boat accident off Honduran coast
Putin to meet pope in shadow of Ukraine crisis
Boeing makes $100 million pledge for 737 MAX crash-related support
At least 44 die as air strike hits Libya migrant detention center: U.N.
$ curl -s 'https://blockchain.info/blocks/?format=json' |\
python3 -c 'import sys, json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['\''blocks'\''][10]['\''hash'\''])'
0000000000000000001afc39b5099b6b7f60700f44e82f44e0010099ce3519a0
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
26 dead in fishing boat accident off Honduran coast
Putin to meet pope in shadow of Ukraine crisis
Boeing makes $100 million pledge for 737 MAX crash-related support
At least 44 die as air strike hits Libya migrant detention center: U.N.
$ curl -s 'https://blockchain.info/blocks/?format=json' |\
python3 -c 'import sys, json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['\''blocks'\''][10]['\''hash'\''])'
0000000000000000001afc39b5099b6b7f60700f44e82f44e0010099ce3519a0
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
Qubes OS 4.0.2-rc1 has been released!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/09/qubes-4-0-2-rc1/
We’re pleased to announce the first release candidate for Qubes 4.0.2!
Features:
All 4.0 dom0 updates to date
Fedora 30 TemplateVM
Debian 10 TemplateVM
Whonix 15 Gateway and Workstation TemplateVMs
Linux kernel 4.19 by default
Qubes 4.0.2-rc1 is available on the Downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What is a point release?
A point release does not designate a separate, new version of Qubes OS.
Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this
case, 4.0) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. Installing
Qubes 4.0 and fully updating it results in the same system as installing
Qubes 4.0.2.
What should I do?
If you installed Qubes 4.0 or 4.0.1 and have fully updated (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/updating-qubes-os/), then
your system is already equivalent to a Qubes 4.0.2 installation. No
further action is required.
Regardless of your current OS, if you wish to install (or reinstall)
Qubes 4.0 for any reason, then the 4.0.2 ISO makes this more convenient
and secure, since it bundles all Qubes 4.0 updates to date.
Release candidate planning
If no major issues are discovered in 4.0.2-rc1, we expect the stable
release of 4.0.2 to follow in a few weeks. As usual, you can help by
reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/reporting-bugs/).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/09/qubes-4-0-2-rc1/
We’re pleased to announce the first release candidate for Qubes 4.0.2!
Features:
All 4.0 dom0 updates to date
Fedora 30 TemplateVM
Debian 10 TemplateVM
Whonix 15 Gateway and Workstation TemplateVMs
Linux kernel 4.19 by default
Qubes 4.0.2-rc1 is available on the Downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What is a point release?
A point release does not designate a separate, new version of Qubes OS.
Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this
case, 4.0) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. Installing
Qubes 4.0 and fully updating it results in the same system as installing
Qubes 4.0.2.
What should I do?
If you installed Qubes 4.0 or 4.0.1 and have fully updated (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/updating-qubes-os/), then
your system is already equivalent to a Qubes 4.0.2 installation. No
further action is required.
Regardless of your current OS, if you wish to install (or reinstall)
Qubes 4.0 for any reason, then the 4.0.2 ISO makes this more convenient
and secure, since it bundles all Qubes 4.0 updates to date.
Release candidate planning
If no major issues are discovered in 4.0.2-rc1, we expect the stable
release of 4.0.2 to follow in a few weeks. As usual, you can help by
reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/reporting-bugs/).
XSA-300 does not affect the security of Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/09/xsa-300-qubes-not-affected/
The Xen Project has published Xen Security Advisory 300 (XSA-300).
This XSA does not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user
action is necessary.
This XSA has been added to the XSA Tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/):
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#300
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/09/xsa-300-qubes-not-affected/
The Xen Project has published Xen Security Advisory 300 (XSA-300).
This XSA does not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user
action is necessary.
This XSA has been added to the XSA Tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/):
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#300
Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230 Laptop meets and exceeds Qubes 4.0 hardware certification
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/18/insurgo-privacybeast-qubes-certification/
We are very pleased to announce that the Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230 (https://insurgo.ca/produit/qubesos-certified-privacybeast_x230-reasonably-secured-laptop/) has
passed Qubes 4.0 Hardware Certification and is now a Qubes-certified
Laptop (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-laptops)!
What is Qubes Certified Hardware?
Qubes Certified Hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the
Qubes developers as compatible with Qubes OS. Beginning with Qubes 4.0,
in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous
set of requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements), and the vendor must commit to offering customers
the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS
version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified Laptops (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-laptops), in particular, are regularly tested
by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’
features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to
ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes Hardware Certification
certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported
by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any
manufacturing or shipping processes, nor can we control whether physical
hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to
the user. (However, see below for information about how the Insurgo
team mitigates this risk.)
About the Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230 Laptop
The Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230 (https://insurgo.ca/produit/qubesos-certified-privacybeast_x230-reasonably-secured-laptop/) is a custom refurbished ThinkPad X230 (https://www.thinkwiki.org/wiki/Category:X230)
that not only meets all Qubes Hardware Certification requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements)
but also exceeds them thanks to its unique configuration, including:
Coreboot (https://www.coreboot.org/) initialization for the x230 is binary-blob-free, including
native graphic initialization. Built with the
Heads (https://github.com/osresearch/heads/) payload, it delivers an Anti Evil Maid (AEM) (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/anti-evil-maid/)-like solution
built into the firmware. (Even though our requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements) provide an
exception for CPU-vendor-provided blobs for silicon and memory
initialization, Insurgo exceeds our requirements by insisting that
these be absent from its machines.)
Intel ME (https://libreboot.org/faq.html#intelme) is neutered through the AltMeDisable bit, while all
modules other than ROMP and BUP, which are required to initialize
main CPU, have been deleted (https://github.com/osresearch/heads-wiki/blob/master/Clean-the-ME-firmware.md#how-to-disabledeactive-most-of-it).
A re-ownership process that allows it to ship pre-installed with
Qubes OS, including full-disk encryption already in place, but
where the final disk encryption key is regenerated only when the
machine is first powered on by the user, so that the OEM doesn’t
know it.
Heads (https://github.com/osresearch/heads/) provisioned pre-delivery to protect against malicious
interdiction (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interdiction).
How to get one
Please visit the Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230 (https://insurgo.ca/produit/qubesos-certified-privacybeast_x230-reasonably-secured-laptop/) on the Insurgo website (https://insurgo.ca/)
for more information.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks go to:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/18/insurgo-privacybeast-qubes-certification/
We are very pleased to announce that the Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230 (https://insurgo.ca/produit/qubesos-certified-privacybeast_x230-reasonably-secured-laptop/) has
passed Qubes 4.0 Hardware Certification and is now a Qubes-certified
Laptop (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-laptops)!
What is Qubes Certified Hardware?
Qubes Certified Hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the
Qubes developers as compatible with Qubes OS. Beginning with Qubes 4.0,
in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous
set of requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements), and the vendor must commit to offering customers
the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS
version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified Laptops (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-laptops), in particular, are regularly tested
by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’
features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to
ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes Hardware Certification
certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported
by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any
manufacturing or shipping processes, nor can we control whether physical
hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to
the user. (However, see below for information about how the Insurgo
team mitigates this risk.)
About the Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230 Laptop
The Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230 (https://insurgo.ca/produit/qubesos-certified-privacybeast_x230-reasonably-secured-laptop/) is a custom refurbished ThinkPad X230 (https://www.thinkwiki.org/wiki/Category:X230)
that not only meets all Qubes Hardware Certification requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements)
but also exceeds them thanks to its unique configuration, including:
Coreboot (https://www.coreboot.org/) initialization for the x230 is binary-blob-free, including
native graphic initialization. Built with the
Heads (https://github.com/osresearch/heads/) payload, it delivers an Anti Evil Maid (AEM) (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/anti-evil-maid/)-like solution
built into the firmware. (Even though our requirements (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements) provide an
exception for CPU-vendor-provided blobs for silicon and memory
initialization, Insurgo exceeds our requirements by insisting that
these be absent from its machines.)
Intel ME (https://libreboot.org/faq.html#intelme) is neutered through the AltMeDisable bit, while all
modules other than ROMP and BUP, which are required to initialize
main CPU, have been deleted (https://github.com/osresearch/heads-wiki/blob/master/Clean-the-ME-firmware.md#how-to-disabledeactive-most-of-it).
A re-ownership process that allows it to ship pre-installed with
Qubes OS, including full-disk encryption already in place, but
where the final disk encryption key is regenerated only when the
machine is first powered on by the user, so that the OEM doesn’t
know it.
Heads (https://github.com/osresearch/heads/) provisioned pre-delivery to protect against malicious
interdiction (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interdiction).
How to get one
Please visit the Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230 (https://insurgo.ca/produit/qubesos-certified-privacybeast_x230-reasonably-secured-laptop/) on the Insurgo website (https://insurgo.ca/)
for more information.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks go to:
Thierry Laurion (https://www.linkedin.com/in/thierry-laurion-40b4128/), Director of Insurgo, Technologies Libres (Open
Technologies), for spearheading this effort and making Heads+Qubes
laptops more broadly accessible
Trammell Hudson (https://trmm.net/About), for creating Heads (https://github.com/osresearch/heads/)
Purism (https://puri.sm/), for greatly improving the UX of Heads (https://github.com/osresearch/heads/), including the GUI
menu, and for adding Nitrokey (https://www.nitrokey.com/) and Librem Key (https://puri.sm/posts/introducing-the-librem-key/) support
Technologies), for spearheading this effort and making Heads+Qubes
laptops more broadly accessible
Trammell Hudson (https://trmm.net/About), for creating Heads (https://github.com/osresearch/heads/)
Purism (https://puri.sm/), for greatly improving the UX of Heads (https://github.com/osresearch/heads/), including the GUI
menu, and for adding Nitrokey (https://www.nitrokey.com/) and Librem Key (https://puri.sm/posts/introducing-the-librem-key/) support