The NovaCustom NV41 Series laptop is Qubes-certified!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/03/novacustom-nv41-series-qubes-certified/
It is our pleasure to announce that the NovaCustom NV41 Series (https://configurelaptop.eu/nv41-series/) laptop has become the fifth Qubes-certified computer (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes 4.X!
About the NovaCustom NV41 Series
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/03/novacustom-nv41-series-qubes-certified/
It is our pleasure to announce that the NovaCustom NV41 Series (https://configurelaptop.eu/nv41-series/) laptop has become the fifth Qubes-certified computer (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes 4.X!
About the NovaCustom NV41 Series
❤2
The NV41 Series (https://configurelaptop.eu/nv41-series/) is a 14-inch laptop from NovaCustom (https://configurelaptop.eu/), a European vendor known for their highly customizable, Linux-friendly laptops. This 12th Generation Intel Core (Alder Lake) laptop comes with Dasharo coreboot open-source firmware, USB-C charging, the latest Intel Xe graphics, and up to 64 GB of memory.
Qubes-certified configurations
The following configuration options are certified for Qubes OS 4.X:
Processor:
Intel Core i5-1240P processor
Intel Core i7-1260P processor
Memory (Dual Channel):
2 x 16 GB Kingston DDR4 SODIMM 3200 MHz (32 GB total)
1 x 32 GB Kingston DDR4 SODIMM 3200 MHz (32 GB total)
2 x 32 GB Kingston DDR4 SODIMM 3200 MHz (64 GB total)
M.2 storage chip:
Samsung 980 SSD (all capacities)
Samsung 980 Pro SSD (all capacities)
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth:
Intel AX-200/201 Wi-Fi module 2976 Mbps, 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6 + Bluetooth 5.2
Killer (Intel) Wireless-AX 1675x M.2 Wi-Fi module 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6E + Bluetooth 5.3
Blob-free: Qualcomm Atheros QCNFA222 Wi-Fi 802.11a/b/g/n + Bluetooth 4.0
No Wi-Fi/Bluetooth chip
Notes on Wi-Fi and Bluetooth options
When viewed in a Linux environment with lspci, the “Killer (Intel) Wireless-AX 1675x M.2 Wi-Fi module 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6E + Bluetooth 5.3” device displays the model number “AX210.” However, according to its Intel Ark entry (https://ark.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ark/products/211485/intel-killer-wifi-6e-ax1675-xw.html) (in the “Product Brief” file), they are actually the same Wi-Fi module.
Similarly, when viewed in a Linux environment with lspci, the “Blob-free: Qualcomm Atheros QCNFA222 Wi-Fi 802.11a/b/g/n + Bluetooth 4.0” device displays the model number “AR9462,” which seems to be just the Wi-Fi chip model number, whereas “QCNFA222” seems to be the model number of the whole device (which include Bluetooth). Meanwhile, the Bluetooth device presents itself as “IMC Networks Device 3487.”
The term “blob-free” is used in different ways. In practice, being “blob-free” generally does not mean that the device does not use any closed-source firmware “blobs.” Rather, it means that the device comes with firmware preinstalled so that it does not have to be loaded from the operating system. In theory, the preinstalled firmware could be open-source, but as far as we know, that is not the case with this particular Atheros Wi-Fi/Bluetooth module. (Qualcomm has published firmware source code in the past, but only for other device models, as far as we are aware.) Meanwhile, the Free Software Foundation (FSF) considers (https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-hardware-designs.en.html#boundary) unmodifiable preinstalled firmware to be part of the hardware, hence they regard such hardware as “blob-free” from a software perspective. While common usage of the term “blob-free” often follows the FSF’s interpretation, it is worthwhile for Qubes users who are concerned about closed-source firmware to understand the nuance.
Special note regarding the need for kernel-latest
Beginning with Qubes OS 4.1.2, the Qubes installer includes the kernel-latest package and allows users to select this kernel option from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. At the time of this announcement, kernel-latest is required for the NovaCustom NV41 Series to function properly. Therefore, all potential purchasers and users of this model should be aware that they will have to select a non-default option (Install Qubes OS RX using kernel-latest) from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. However, since Linux 6.1 has officially been promoted to being a long-term support (LTS) kernel, it will become the default kernel at some point, which means that the need for this non-default selection is only temporary.
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
Qubes-certified configurations
The following configuration options are certified for Qubes OS 4.X:
Processor:
Intel Core i5-1240P processor
Intel Core i7-1260P processor
Memory (Dual Channel):
2 x 16 GB Kingston DDR4 SODIMM 3200 MHz (32 GB total)
1 x 32 GB Kingston DDR4 SODIMM 3200 MHz (32 GB total)
2 x 32 GB Kingston DDR4 SODIMM 3200 MHz (64 GB total)
M.2 storage chip:
Samsung 980 SSD (all capacities)
Samsung 980 Pro SSD (all capacities)
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth:
Intel AX-200/201 Wi-Fi module 2976 Mbps, 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6 + Bluetooth 5.2
Killer (Intel) Wireless-AX 1675x M.2 Wi-Fi module 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6E + Bluetooth 5.3
Blob-free: Qualcomm Atheros QCNFA222 Wi-Fi 802.11a/b/g/n + Bluetooth 4.0
No Wi-Fi/Bluetooth chip
Notes on Wi-Fi and Bluetooth options
When viewed in a Linux environment with lspci, the “Killer (Intel) Wireless-AX 1675x M.2 Wi-Fi module 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6E + Bluetooth 5.3” device displays the model number “AX210.” However, according to its Intel Ark entry (https://ark.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ark/products/211485/intel-killer-wifi-6e-ax1675-xw.html) (in the “Product Brief” file), they are actually the same Wi-Fi module.
Similarly, when viewed in a Linux environment with lspci, the “Blob-free: Qualcomm Atheros QCNFA222 Wi-Fi 802.11a/b/g/n + Bluetooth 4.0” device displays the model number “AR9462,” which seems to be just the Wi-Fi chip model number, whereas “QCNFA222” seems to be the model number of the whole device (which include Bluetooth). Meanwhile, the Bluetooth device presents itself as “IMC Networks Device 3487.”
The term “blob-free” is used in different ways. In practice, being “blob-free” generally does not mean that the device does not use any closed-source firmware “blobs.” Rather, it means that the device comes with firmware preinstalled so that it does not have to be loaded from the operating system. In theory, the preinstalled firmware could be open-source, but as far as we know, that is not the case with this particular Atheros Wi-Fi/Bluetooth module. (Qualcomm has published firmware source code in the past, but only for other device models, as far as we are aware.) Meanwhile, the Free Software Foundation (FSF) considers (https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-hardware-designs.en.html#boundary) unmodifiable preinstalled firmware to be part of the hardware, hence they regard such hardware as “blob-free” from a software perspective. While common usage of the term “blob-free” often follows the FSF’s interpretation, it is worthwhile for Qubes users who are concerned about closed-source firmware to understand the nuance.
Special note regarding the need for kernel-latest
Beginning with Qubes OS 4.1.2, the Qubes installer includes the kernel-latest package and allows users to select this kernel option from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. At the time of this announcement, kernel-latest is required for the NovaCustom NV41 Series to function properly. Therefore, all potential purchasers and users of this model should be aware that they will have to select a non-default option (Install Qubes OS RX using kernel-latest) from the GRUB menu when booting the installer. However, since Linux 6.1 has officially been promoted to being a long-term support (LTS) kernel, it will become the default kernel at some point, which means that the need for this non-default selection is only temporary.
What is Qubes-certified hardware?
❤5👍3
Qubes-certified hardware (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of [requirements], and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
Qubes-certified computers (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/certified-hardware/#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.
❤8
1000+ Subscribers! Thank you all for being apart of this channel! We update it immediately after official Qubes Team makes an announcement. Please share and join the chat! @QubesChat.
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QSB-089: Qrexec: Memory corruption in service request handling
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/11/qsb-089/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 089: Qrexec: Memory corruption in service request handling (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Security Bulletin 089
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 089 ]===---
2023-05-11
Qrexec: Memory corruption in service request handling
User action required
---------------------
Users must install the following specific packages in order to address
the issues discussed in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- qrexec packages, version 4.1.21
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [1] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [2]
Summary
--------
Due to a bug in qrexec [3], a malicious qube can cause memory corruption
in the qrexec-daemon. The Qubes Security Team is not aware of any way to
exploit this vulnerability in an attack (not even in a denial-of-service
attack that only crashes the process). However, we cannot completely
rule out such a possibility.
Impact
-------
While we consider the successful exploitation of this vulnerability to
be very unlikely, an attacker could theoretically use it to crash the
qrexec-daemon or execute arbitrary code in dom0.
Discussion
-----------
Qubes OS features a framework known as "qrexec," which allows different
qubes to communicate with each other in a controlled manner. [3][4]
These interactions are restricted by the system's RPC policies. [5] In
particular, qrexec can be used to allow less trusted qubes to
communicate with more trusted qubes, including dom0.
Incoming RPC calls are handled by the qrexec-daemon process. Qubes OS
4.1 introduced a new qrexec message type, `MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3`, which
allows much larger requests (theoretically up to 65000 bytes, compared
to 64 bytes in earlier versions). This message type uses a
dynamically-allocated buffer for the message body based on the request
length. The code used to validate the request length has an off-by-one
error that can cause memory corruption, as described below.
First, the incoming message is validated in the
`sanitize_message_from_agent()` function:
1177 static void sanitize_message_from_agent(struct msg_header *untrusted_header)
1178 {
1179 switch (untrusted_header->type) {
...
1191 case MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3:
1192 if (protocol_version < QREXEC_PROTOCOL_V3) {
1193 LOG(ERROR, "agent sent (new) MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3 "
1194 "although it uses protocol %d", protocol_version);
1195 exit(1);
1196 }
1197 if (untrusted_header->len < sizeof(struct trigger_service_params3)) {
1198 LOG(ERROR, "agent sent invalid MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3 packet");
1199 exit(1);
1200 }
1201 if (untrusted_header->len - sizeof(struct trigger_service_params3)
1202 > MAX_SERVICE_NAME_LEN) {
1203 LOG(ERROR, "agent sent too large MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3 packet");
1204 exit(1);
1205 }
1206 break;
...
The second condition, on line 1197, verifies that the message sent by
the qrexec-agent (from a VM) is not shorter than the message header
defined in `struct trigger_service_params3`. However, it fails to
account for a mandatory NUL character at the end of the message payload
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/11/qsb-089/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 089: Qrexec: Memory corruption in service request handling (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Security Bulletin 089
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 089 ]===---
2023-05-11
Qrexec: Memory corruption in service request handling
User action required
---------------------
Users must install the following specific packages in order to address
the issues discussed in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- qrexec packages, version 4.1.21
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [1] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [2]
Summary
--------
Due to a bug in qrexec [3], a malicious qube can cause memory corruption
in the qrexec-daemon. The Qubes Security Team is not aware of any way to
exploit this vulnerability in an attack (not even in a denial-of-service
attack that only crashes the process). However, we cannot completely
rule out such a possibility.
Impact
-------
While we consider the successful exploitation of this vulnerability to
be very unlikely, an attacker could theoretically use it to crash the
qrexec-daemon or execute arbitrary code in dom0.
Discussion
-----------
Qubes OS features a framework known as "qrexec," which allows different
qubes to communicate with each other in a controlled manner. [3][4]
These interactions are restricted by the system's RPC policies. [5] In
particular, qrexec can be used to allow less trusted qubes to
communicate with more trusted qubes, including dom0.
Incoming RPC calls are handled by the qrexec-daemon process. Qubes OS
4.1 introduced a new qrexec message type, `MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3`, which
allows much larger requests (theoretically up to 65000 bytes, compared
to 64 bytes in earlier versions). This message type uses a
dynamically-allocated buffer for the message body based on the request
length. The code used to validate the request length has an off-by-one
error that can cause memory corruption, as described below.
First, the incoming message is validated in the
`sanitize_message_from_agent()` function:
1177 static void sanitize_message_from_agent(struct msg_header *untrusted_header)
1178 {
1179 switch (untrusted_header->type) {
...
1191 case MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3:
1192 if (protocol_version < QREXEC_PROTOCOL_V3) {
1193 LOG(ERROR, "agent sent (new) MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3 "
1194 "although it uses protocol %d", protocol_version);
1195 exit(1);
1196 }
1197 if (untrusted_header->len < sizeof(struct trigger_service_params3)) {
1198 LOG(ERROR, "agent sent invalid MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3 packet");
1199 exit(1);
1200 }
1201 if (untrusted_header->len - sizeof(struct trigger_service_params3)
1202 > MAX_SERVICE_NAME_LEN) {
1203 LOG(ERROR, "agent sent too large MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3 packet");
1204 exit(1);
1205 }
1206 break;
...
The second condition, on line 1197, verifies that the message sent by
the qrexec-agent (from a VM) is not shorter than the message header
defined in `struct trigger_service_params3`. However, it fails to
account for a mandatory NUL character at the end of the message payload
(the service name and its argument). Later on, the
`handle_message_from_agent()` function processes the message as follows:
1222 static void handle_message_from_agent(void)
1223 {
1224 struct msg_header hdr, untrusted_hdr;
1225 struct trigger_service_params untrusted_params, params;
1226 struct trigger_service_params3 untrusted_params3, params3;
1227 char *untrusted_service_name = NULL, *service_name = NULL;
1228 size_t service_name_len;
1229
1230 if (libvchan_recv(vchan, &untrusted_hdr, sizeof(untrusted_hdr))
1231 != sizeof(untrusted_hdr))
1232 handle_vchan_error("recv hdr");
1233 /* sanitize start */
1234 sanitize_message_from_agent(&untrusted_hdr);
1235 hdr = untrusted_hdr;
1236 /* sanitize end */
...
1241 switch (hdr.type) {
...
1262 case MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3:
1263 service_name_len = hdr.len - sizeof(untrusted_params3);
1264 untrusted_service_name = malloc(service_name_len);
1265 if (!untrusted_service_name)
1266 handle_vchan_error("malloc(service_name)");
1267
1268 if (libvchan_recv(vchan, &untrusted_params3, sizeof(untrusted_params3))
1269 != sizeof(untrusted_params3))
1270 handle_vchan_error("recv params3");
1271 if (libvchan_recv(vchan, untrusted_service_name, service_name_len)
1272 != (int)service_name_len)
1273 handle_vchan_error("recv params3(service_name)");
1274
1275 /* sanitize start */
1276 ENSURE_NULL_TERMINATED(untrusted_params3.target_domain);
1277 ENSURE_NULL_TERMINATED(untrusted_params3.request_id.ident);
1278 untrusted_service_name[service_name_len-1] = 0;
1279 sanitize_name(untrusted_params3.target_domain, "@:");
1280 sanitize_name(untrusted_params3.request_id.ident, " ");
1281 sanitize_name(untrusted_service_name, "+");
1282 params3 = untrusted_params3;
1283 service_name = untrusted_service_name;
1284 untrusted_service_name = NULL;
1285 /* sanitize end */
...
The initial call to `sanitize_message_from_agent()` is visible in line
1234. Then, the function calculates the expected service name length in
line 1263, allocates memory for it in line 1264, and receives both the
rest of the header and its payload in lines 1268-1273. Since
`sanitize_message_from_agent()` allows the `hdr.len` to be equal to
`sizeof(untrusted_params3)`, `service_name_len` can be zero. This means
that adding the terminating NUL character in line 1278 can write outside
of the allocated buffer. Furthermore, in such a case, the
`untrusted_service_name` buffer is allocated with a size of zero, and
the `sanitize_name()` call in line 1281 can write beyond the buffer too.
The `sanitize_name()` function, listed below, replaces disallowed
characters with underscores (byte 0x5f) until it finds the terminating
NUL character:
759 static void sanitize_name(char * untrusted_s_signed, char *extra_allowed_chars)
760 {
761 unsigned char * untrusted_s;
762 for (untrusted_s=(unsigned char*)untrusted_s_signed; *untrusted_s; untrusted_s++) {
763 if (*untrusted_s >= 'a' && *untrusted_s <= 'z')
764 continue;
765 if (*untrusted_s >= 'A' && *untrusted_s <= 'Z')
766 continue;
767 if (*untrusted_s >= '0' && *untrusted_s <= '9')
768 continue;
769 if (*untrusted_s == '_' ||
770 *untrusted_s == '-' ||
771 *untrusted_s == '.')
772 continue;
773 if (extra_allowed_chars && strchr(extra_allowed_chars, *untrusted_s))
774 continue;
`handle_message_from_agent()` function processes the message as follows:
1222 static void handle_message_from_agent(void)
1223 {
1224 struct msg_header hdr, untrusted_hdr;
1225 struct trigger_service_params untrusted_params, params;
1226 struct trigger_service_params3 untrusted_params3, params3;
1227 char *untrusted_service_name = NULL, *service_name = NULL;
1228 size_t service_name_len;
1229
1230 if (libvchan_recv(vchan, &untrusted_hdr, sizeof(untrusted_hdr))
1231 != sizeof(untrusted_hdr))
1232 handle_vchan_error("recv hdr");
1233 /* sanitize start */
1234 sanitize_message_from_agent(&untrusted_hdr);
1235 hdr = untrusted_hdr;
1236 /* sanitize end */
...
1241 switch (hdr.type) {
...
1262 case MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3:
1263 service_name_len = hdr.len - sizeof(untrusted_params3);
1264 untrusted_service_name = malloc(service_name_len);
1265 if (!untrusted_service_name)
1266 handle_vchan_error("malloc(service_name)");
1267
1268 if (libvchan_recv(vchan, &untrusted_params3, sizeof(untrusted_params3))
1269 != sizeof(untrusted_params3))
1270 handle_vchan_error("recv params3");
1271 if (libvchan_recv(vchan, untrusted_service_name, service_name_len)
1272 != (int)service_name_len)
1273 handle_vchan_error("recv params3(service_name)");
1274
1275 /* sanitize start */
1276 ENSURE_NULL_TERMINATED(untrusted_params3.target_domain);
1277 ENSURE_NULL_TERMINATED(untrusted_params3.request_id.ident);
1278 untrusted_service_name[service_name_len-1] = 0;
1279 sanitize_name(untrusted_params3.target_domain, "@:");
1280 sanitize_name(untrusted_params3.request_id.ident, " ");
1281 sanitize_name(untrusted_service_name, "+");
1282 params3 = untrusted_params3;
1283 service_name = untrusted_service_name;
1284 untrusted_service_name = NULL;
1285 /* sanitize end */
...
The initial call to `sanitize_message_from_agent()` is visible in line
1234. Then, the function calculates the expected service name length in
line 1263, allocates memory for it in line 1264, and receives both the
rest of the header and its payload in lines 1268-1273. Since
`sanitize_message_from_agent()` allows the `hdr.len` to be equal to
`sizeof(untrusted_params3)`, `service_name_len` can be zero. This means
that adding the terminating NUL character in line 1278 can write outside
of the allocated buffer. Furthermore, in such a case, the
`untrusted_service_name` buffer is allocated with a size of zero, and
the `sanitize_name()` call in line 1281 can write beyond the buffer too.
The `sanitize_name()` function, listed below, replaces disallowed
characters with underscores (byte 0x5f) until it finds the terminating
NUL character:
759 static void sanitize_name(char * untrusted_s_signed, char *extra_allowed_chars)
760 {
761 unsigned char * untrusted_s;
762 for (untrusted_s=(unsigned char*)untrusted_s_signed; *untrusted_s; untrusted_s++) {
763 if (*untrusted_s >= 'a' && *untrusted_s <= 'z')
764 continue;
765 if (*untrusted_s >= 'A' && *untrusted_s <= 'Z')
766 continue;
767 if (*untrusted_s >= '0' && *untrusted_s <= '9')
768 continue;
769 if (*untrusted_s == '_' ||
770 *untrusted_s == '-' ||
771 *untrusted_s == '.')
772 continue;
773 if (extra_allowed_chars && strchr(extra_allowed_chars, *untrusted_s))
774 continue;
775 *untrusted_s = '_';
776 }
777 }
This code runs in dom0. In Qubes OS 4.1, dom0 is based on Fedora 32
x86_64, which uses the GNU libc 2.31 library. In this implementation
[5], the `malloc()` call (line 1264) always allocates at least 32 bytes,
even if the requested size is 0. This means that the returned pointer is
not NULL in this case (which would be allowed by the specification for
zero-sized allocations), so the error handling in line 1266 does not
interrupt the processing. Consequently, the NUL character written in
line 1278 hits part of the malloc metadata, specifically the most
significant byte of the allocation size. Given that the size is small
(between the 32-byte `MIN_CHUNK_SIZE` and the 1024-byte
`MIN_LARGE_SIZE`), that byte is always zero already, so this write is
harmless.
The remaining concern is about the `sanitize_name()` function. For the
bug to be harmful, it must overwrite something beyond the allocated
buffer (at least 32 bytes). This means that there cannot be a zero byte
in this area. In our analysis, this is very unlikely to occur, for the
following reasons:
1. The `malloc()` call in `handle_message_from_agent()` is the one and
only call that occurs outside of startup and connection setup. No
other malloc call occurs in that process, not even an indirect one.
The connection setup allocations can be redone when the qrexec-agent
disconnects and connects again, but the points below also apply to
this reconnection sequence. (Perhaps the only exception is handling
an error message just before exit(1), but if the attacker hasn't
corrupted malloc metadata up to this point, the attacker won't have a
chance to do it after this point either.)
2. The qrexec-daemon handles only a single request at a time. At no
point are multiple buffers for `service_name` allocated in the
process at the same time. All remaining handling occurs in a separate
process (which also handles only a single request).
3. Due to how GNU libc's malloc works, if there is a small chunk
available, it will be used. It won't be split out of a bigger chunk.
And, due to point 2 above, if there was a small chunk initially, it
will get used again.
4. The allocations done during startup and reconnection leave a few
small free chunks that are interleaved with allocated areas (the
libvchan_t structure, something from libxengnttab, libxentoollog, and
a few others). These memory chunks can't be merged due to their
layout.
5. Every small allocation includes a NUL byte somewhere in the payload
before being freed. This applies to both initial areas as well as to
the buffers used for `service_name`.
Given all of these considerations, successfully exploiting this
vulnerability in an attack is very unlikely. However, due to the
complexity of the memory allocator, we cannot completely rule out such a
possibility.
Credits
--------
This issue was discovered by Demi Marie Obenour.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[3] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/
[4] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec-internals/
[5] https://sourceware.org/glibc/wiki/MallocInternals
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmRcEs8ACgkQ1lWk8hgw
4GoOyg/+MotkJUbomFgs+lxw/oMhJ9kDAoDd678OeJyKn+7SQ2RUq+LlAvoHwqoS
FUNwb/g7ZzS4oBphpvxiXK1AoV8ZX00AjKaMgPgLAkWBQyx0zY0RCyQGELwf/j4r
iL+yClcRTcQ4VuJa4hicJjnxVD5xSwqUlqKz7fNDNPiFGTTqaymnHO7ZNR0OI4sM
Alx/BvJE8a8yBC1mW+hiO8TcfE33uQMhtE1N3rr5VxAKeIyfk0dW8iPGoLYECVBS
aV6YfOBoeKwlrZPgbuUhRIbPuWnhL7tJTttda1BF9H4RuS58UVcg2MHvkgrRKMqD
qLHWFB3S/CVPboGwiTlnBoss05HRMfkLDxTBeEO1UVEF6FfGgXoS1gFMrRZyvTEp
776 }
777 }
This code runs in dom0. In Qubes OS 4.1, dom0 is based on Fedora 32
x86_64, which uses the GNU libc 2.31 library. In this implementation
[5], the `malloc()` call (line 1264) always allocates at least 32 bytes,
even if the requested size is 0. This means that the returned pointer is
not NULL in this case (which would be allowed by the specification for
zero-sized allocations), so the error handling in line 1266 does not
interrupt the processing. Consequently, the NUL character written in
line 1278 hits part of the malloc metadata, specifically the most
significant byte of the allocation size. Given that the size is small
(between the 32-byte `MIN_CHUNK_SIZE` and the 1024-byte
`MIN_LARGE_SIZE`), that byte is always zero already, so this write is
harmless.
The remaining concern is about the `sanitize_name()` function. For the
bug to be harmful, it must overwrite something beyond the allocated
buffer (at least 32 bytes). This means that there cannot be a zero byte
in this area. In our analysis, this is very unlikely to occur, for the
following reasons:
1. The `malloc()` call in `handle_message_from_agent()` is the one and
only call that occurs outside of startup and connection setup. No
other malloc call occurs in that process, not even an indirect one.
The connection setup allocations can be redone when the qrexec-agent
disconnects and connects again, but the points below also apply to
this reconnection sequence. (Perhaps the only exception is handling
an error message just before exit(1), but if the attacker hasn't
corrupted malloc metadata up to this point, the attacker won't have a
chance to do it after this point either.)
2. The qrexec-daemon handles only a single request at a time. At no
point are multiple buffers for `service_name` allocated in the
process at the same time. All remaining handling occurs in a separate
process (which also handles only a single request).
3. Due to how GNU libc's malloc works, if there is a small chunk
available, it will be used. It won't be split out of a bigger chunk.
And, due to point 2 above, if there was a small chunk initially, it
will get used again.
4. The allocations done during startup and reconnection leave a few
small free chunks that are interleaved with allocated areas (the
libvchan_t structure, something from libxengnttab, libxentoollog, and
a few others). These memory chunks can't be merged due to their
layout.
5. Every small allocation includes a NUL byte somewhere in the payload
before being freed. This applies to both initial areas as well as to
the buffers used for `service_name`.
Given all of these considerations, successfully exploiting this
vulnerability in an attack is very unlikely. However, due to the
complexity of the memory allocator, we cannot completely rule out such a
possibility.
Credits
--------
This issue was discovered by Demi Marie Obenour.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[3] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/
[4] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec-internals/
[5] https://sourceware.org/glibc/wiki/MallocInternals
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=1b+G
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=zjXb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. A list of all QSBs is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software) for Windows and Mac options.)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
qGh+iamaQG43v+exPwQG0eYcBjjSxG9CRtDcCXixt0uh5qlT31upI9XD0e2E/1AM
SG6EFdMeKs5bYMNGnq2pDCOWBscE8DRK6gfj8ZEnPxPzuZY7vP3vrRo5QbM8l4Jx
NDu+kJolEaQXYP00ofKw3wcb6Rh2v/iW6PstpntxgWRVC2wOyzmhs4puXPzGfIaj
3nqkUovrQszbKJXKhZlNOnXT/oWVUmjj0Oy6o0Xrk20/0Y5E8Lk=
=1b+G
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=zjXb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. A list of all QSBs is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software) for Windows and Mac options.)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
👍1
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more ways to obtain the QMSK.)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more details and ideas for how to do that.
Tip: Record the genuine QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more ways to obtain the QMSK.)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more details and ideas for how to do that.
Tip: Record the genuine QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
❤1
Forwarded from Qubes OS
1000+ Subscribers! Thank you all for being apart of this channel! We update it immediately after official Qubes Team makes an announcement. Please share and join the chat! @QubesChat.
🫡7
XSAs released on 2023-05-16
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/16/xsas-released-on-2023-05-16/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
Therefore, no user action is required.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-431 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-431.html)
Qubes OS 4.1 uses an unaffected version of Xen (4.14).
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/16/xsas-released-on-2023-05-16/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
Therefore, no user action is required.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-431 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-431.html)
Qubes OS 4.1 uses an unaffected version of Xen (4.14).
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
👍2
Qubes Canary 035
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/22/canary-035/
We have published Qubes Canary 035 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 035
---===[ Qubes Canary 035 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is May 22, 2023.
2. There have been 89 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of September 2023. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Mon, 22 May 2023 08:16:45 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Interview with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: "Two Percent Is the Minimum of What We Need"
Interview with Jordanian Foreign Minister Safadi: "Russia in Syria Is a Stabilizing Factor Compared To the Alternative"
Yevgeny Prigozhin's Meat Grinder: A Moment of Truth for Russia's Wagner Group in Bakhmut
The Three Worlds of Xinjiang: A Trip Through China's Uyghur Region
Operation Counterstrike: What Might the Approaching Ukrainian Offensive Achieve?
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Greece Elections: New Democracy on Track to Win Most Votes
As Russia Claims Victory in Bakhmut, Ukraine Sees Opportunity Amid Ruins
Biden Announces More Aid for Ukraine as G7 Powers Meet in Japan
Sudan’s Warring Sides Agree to Weeklong Ceasefire
Inside the Barbecue City That Is China’s Hottest Tourist Destination
Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Ukraine war: Bakhmut 'not occupied' by Russia, says defiant Zelensky
Greek election: Centre-right Mitsotakis hails big win but wants majority
Thousands mass for pro-EU rally in Moldovan capital, amid tensions with Russia
US debt ceiling: Joe Biden urges Republicans to compromise as talks resume
Watch: Green flash as meteor blazes across sky in Australia
Source: Blockchain.info
00000000000000000002fb9f59b4c425b487ade7bad8dd6862159ec3030f650f
Footnotes
----------
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/22/canary-035/
We have published Qubes Canary 035 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 035
---===[ Qubes Canary 035 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is May 22, 2023.
2. There have been 89 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of September 2023. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Mon, 22 May 2023 08:16:45 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Interview with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: "Two Percent Is the Minimum of What We Need"
Interview with Jordanian Foreign Minister Safadi: "Russia in Syria Is a Stabilizing Factor Compared To the Alternative"
Yevgeny Prigozhin's Meat Grinder: A Moment of Truth for Russia's Wagner Group in Bakhmut
The Three Worlds of Xinjiang: A Trip Through China's Uyghur Region
Operation Counterstrike: What Might the Approaching Ukrainian Offensive Achieve?
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Greece Elections: New Democracy on Track to Win Most Votes
As Russia Claims Victory in Bakhmut, Ukraine Sees Opportunity Amid Ruins
Biden Announces More Aid for Ukraine as G7 Powers Meet in Japan
Sudan’s Warring Sides Agree to Weeklong Ceasefire
Inside the Barbecue City That Is China’s Hottest Tourist Destination
Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Ukraine war: Bakhmut 'not occupied' by Russia, says defiant Zelensky
Greek election: Centre-right Mitsotakis hails big win but wants majority
Thousands mass for pro-EU rally in Moldovan capital, amid tensions with Russia
US debt ceiling: Joe Biden urges Republicans to compromise as talks resume
Watch: Green flash as meteor blazes across sky in Australia
Source: Blockchain.info
00000000000000000002fb9f59b4c425b487ade7bad8dd6862159ec3030f650f
Footnotes
----------
❤1
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=zV7L
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=kqLl
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=zV7L
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt.sig.marmarek
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=kqLl
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt.sig.simon
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?
Canaries provide an important indication about the security status of the project. If the canary is healthy, it’s a strong sign that things are running normally. However, if the canary is unhealthy, it could mean that the project or its members are being coerced in some way.
What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?
Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Every canary contains the same set of statements (sometimes along with special announcements, which are not the same in every canary). If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.
Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?
No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).
In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it, you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?
What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?
Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Every canary contains the same set of statements (sometimes along with special announcements, which are not the same in every canary). If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.
Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?
No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).
In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it, you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all canaries so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether canaries are genuine. The only way to be certain that a canary is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?
If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced. Falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software) for Windows and Mac options.)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more ways to obtain the QMSK.)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more details and ideas for how to do that.
Tip: Record the genuine QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?
If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced. Falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software) for Windows and Mac options.)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more ways to obtain the QMSK.)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more details and ideas for how to do that.
Tip: Record the genuine QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
❤1
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
❤1
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (Qubes Canary 035), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify canary-035-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-035-2023.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-035-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-035-2023.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 035 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (Qubes Canary 035), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify canary-035-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-035-2023.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-035-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-035-2023.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 035 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
❤2
Fedora 38 templates available
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/26/fedora-38-templates-available/
New Fedora 38 templates are now available! We provide fresh Fedora 38 template packages through the official Qubes repositories, which you can install in dom0 by following the standard installation instructions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing). Alternatively, we also provide step-by-step instructions for performing an in-place upgrade (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) of an existing Fedora template. After upgrading your templates, please remember to switch all qubes that were using the old template to use the new one (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching).
As a reminder, Fedora 36 has reached EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/11/fedora-36-reaches-eol-on-2023-05-16/). If you have not already done so, we strongly recommend that you upgrade (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#upgrading) all Fedora 36
templates and standalones to a supported template release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#templates) immediately.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/26/fedora-38-templates-available/
New Fedora 38 templates are now available! We provide fresh Fedora 38 template packages through the official Qubes repositories, which you can install in dom0 by following the standard installation instructions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing). Alternatively, we also provide step-by-step instructions for performing an in-place upgrade (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) of an existing Fedora template. After upgrading your templates, please remember to switch all qubes that were using the old template to use the new one (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching).
As a reminder, Fedora 36 has reached EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/11/fedora-36-reaches-eol-on-2023-05-16/). If you have not already done so, we strongly recommend that you upgrade (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#upgrading) all Fedora 36
templates and standalones to a supported template release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#templates) immediately.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
❤2👍1💩1
Qubes OS 4.2.0-rc1 is available for testing
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/06/02/qubes-os-4-2-0-rc1-available-for-testing/
We’re pleased to announce that the first release candidate (https://www.qubes-os.org/#what-is-a-release-candidate) for Qubes OS 4.2.0 is now available for testing (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/). This minor release (https://www.qubes-os.org/#what-is-a-minor-release) includes several new features and improvements over Qubes OS 4.1.0. Qubes 4.2.0-rc1 is available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.0?
Dom0 upgraded to Fedora 37
Xen updated to version 4.17
SELinux support in Fedora templates
Several GUI applications rewritten, including:
Applications Menu
Qubes Global Settings
Create New Qube
Qubes Update
Unified grub.cfg location for both UEFI and legacy boot
PipeWire support
fwupd integration for firmware updates
Optional automatic clipboard clearing
Official packages built using Qubes Builder v2
Please see the Qubes OS 4.2.0 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) for details.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes OS 4.2
As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the new Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page under the Qubes OS 4.2.0-rc1 ISO.
Testing Qubes 4.2.0-rc1
If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this release candidate, you can help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We encourage experienced users to join the testing team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190).
A full list of known bugs in Qubes 4.2.0 is available here (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+milestone%3A%22Release+4.2%22+label%3A%22T%3A+bug%22). We strongly recommend updating Qubes OS (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) immediately after installation in order to apply all available bug fixes.
Upgrading to Qubes 4.2.0-rc1
It is not yet possible to perform an in-place upgrade from Qubes 4.1 to Qubes 4.2. For this initial release candidate, a clean installation is required. An in-place upgrade tool is in development.
When is the stable release?
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/06/02/qubes-os-4-2-0-rc1-available-for-testing/
We’re pleased to announce that the first release candidate (https://www.qubes-os.org/#what-is-a-release-candidate) for Qubes OS 4.2.0 is now available for testing (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/). This minor release (https://www.qubes-os.org/#what-is-a-minor-release) includes several new features and improvements over Qubes OS 4.1.0. Qubes 4.2.0-rc1 is available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.0?
Dom0 upgraded to Fedora 37
Xen updated to version 4.17
SELinux support in Fedora templates
Several GUI applications rewritten, including:
Applications Menu
Qubes Global Settings
Create New Qube
Qubes Update
Unified grub.cfg location for both UEFI and legacy boot
PipeWire support
fwupd integration for firmware updates
Optional automatic clipboard clearing
Official packages built using Qubes Builder v2
Please see the Qubes OS 4.2.0 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) for details.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes OS 4.2
As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the new Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page under the Qubes OS 4.2.0-rc1 ISO.
Testing Qubes 4.2.0-rc1
If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this release candidate, you can help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We encourage experienced users to join the testing team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190).
A full list of known bugs in Qubes 4.2.0 is available here (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+milestone%3A%22Release+4.2%22+label%3A%22T%3A+bug%22). We strongly recommend updating Qubes OS (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) immediately after installation in order to apply all available bug fixes.
Upgrading to Qubes 4.2.0-rc1
It is not yet possible to perform an in-place upgrade from Qubes 4.1 to Qubes 4.2. For this initial release candidate, a clean installation is required. An in-place upgrade tool is in development.
When is the stable release?