gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u



Verify signed Git tags.

$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100

Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]


The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.


Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt

1000+ Subscribers! Thank you all for being apart of this channel! We update it immediately after official Qubes Team makes an announcement. Please share and join the chat! @QubesChat.

XSAs released on 2023-05-16
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/16/xsas-released-on-2023-05-16/

The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
Therefore, no user action is required.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


(none)


XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


XSA-431 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-431.html)

Qubes OS 4.1 uses an unaffected version of Xen (4.14).




About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

Qubes Canary 035
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/22/canary-035/

We have published Qubes Canary 035 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.

Qubes Canary 035


---===[ Qubes Canary 035 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is May 22, 2023.

2. There have been 89 Qubes security bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of September 2023. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.


Special announcements
----------------------

None.


Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.

The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.


Proof of freshness
-------------------

Mon, 22 May 2023 08:16:45 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Interview with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: "Two Percent Is the Minimum of What We Need"
Interview with Jordanian Foreign Minister Safadi: "Russia in Syria Is a Stabilizing Factor Compared To the Alternative"
Yevgeny Prigozhin's Meat Grinder: A Moment of Truth for Russia's Wagner Group in Bakhmut
The Three Worlds of Xinjiang: A Trip Through China's Uyghur Region
Operation Counterstrike: What Might the Approaching Ukrainian Offensive Achieve?

Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Greece Elections: New Democracy on Track to Win Most Votes
As Russia Claims Victory in Bakhmut, Ukraine Sees Opportunity Amid Ruins
Biden Announces More Aid for Ukraine as G7 Powers Meet in Japan
Sudan’s Warring Sides Agree to Weeklong Ceasefire
Inside the Barbecue City That Is China’s Hottest Tourist Destination

Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Ukraine war: Bakhmut 'not occupied' by Russia, says defiant Zelensky
Greek election: Centre-right Mitsotakis hails big win but wants majority
Thousands mass for pro-EU rally in Moldovan capital, amid tensions with Russia
US debt ceiling: Joe Biden urges Republicans to compromise as talks resume
Watch: Green flash as meteor blazes across sky in Australia

Source: Blockchain.info
00000000000000000002fb9f59b4c425b487ade7bad8dd6862159ec3030f650f


Footnotes
----------

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=zV7L
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=kqLl
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/canaries/canary-035-2023.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.

What is a Qubes canary?

A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).

The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)

Why should I care about canaries?

Canaries provide an important indication about the security status of the project. If the canary is healthy, it’s a strong sign that things are running normally. However, if the canary is unhealthy, it could mean that the project or its members are being coerced in some way.

What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?

Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:


Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Every canary contains the same set of statements (sometimes along with special announcements, which are not the same in every canary). If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.


Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?

No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:


Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).


In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it, you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?

A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all canaries so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether canaries are genuine. The only way to be certain that a canary is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?

If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced. Falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software) for Windows and Mac options.)



Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1


(See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more ways to obtain the QMSK.)


View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.


pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494



Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more details and ideas for how to do that.

Tip: Record the genuine QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.


Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys

(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)

1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu

Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y

pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.

gpg> q



Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.



Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)

$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u



Verify signed Git tags.

$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit

tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100

Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]


The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.


Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]


Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.



For this announcement (Qubes Canary 035), the commands are:

$ gpg --verify canary-035-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-035-2023.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-035-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-035-2023.txt


You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 035 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

Fedora 38 templates available
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/26/fedora-38-templates-available/

New Fedora 38 templates are now available! We provide fresh Fedora 38 template packages through the official Qubes repositories, which you can install in dom0 by following the standard installation instructions (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing). Alternatively, we also provide step-by-step instructions for performing an in-place upgrade (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) of an existing Fedora template. After upgrading your templates, please remember to switch all qubes that were using the old template to use the new one (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching).

As a reminder, Fedora 36 has reached EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/11/fedora-36-reaches-eol-on-2023-05-16/). If you have not already done so, we strongly recommend that you upgrade (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#upgrading) all Fedora 36
templates and standalones to a supported template release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#templates) immediately.

Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).

Qubes OS 4.2.0-rc1 is available for testing
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/06/02/qubes-os-4-2-0-rc1-available-for-testing/

We’re pleased to announce that the first release candidate (https://www.qubes-os.org/#what-is-a-release-candidate) for Qubes OS 4.2.0 is now available for testing (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/). This minor release (https://www.qubes-os.org/#what-is-a-minor-release) includes several new features and improvements over Qubes OS 4.1.0. Qubes 4.2.0-rc1 is available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.

What’s new in Qubes 4.2.0?


Dom0 upgraded to Fedora 37
Xen updated to version 4.17
SELinux support in Fedora templates
Several GUI applications rewritten, including:

Applications Menu
Qubes Global Settings
Create New Qube
Qubes Update


Unified grub.cfg location for both UEFI and legacy boot
PipeWire support
fwupd integration for firmware updates
Optional automatic clipboard clearing
Official packages built using Qubes Builder v2


Please see the Qubes OS 4.2.0 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) for details.

Reminder: new signing key for Qubes OS 4.2

As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:


We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.


As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).

As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the new Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page under the Qubes OS 4.2.0-rc1 ISO.

Testing Qubes 4.2.0-rc1

If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this release candidate, you can help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We encourage experienced users to join the testing team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190).

A full list of known bugs in Qubes 4.2.0 is available here (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+milestone%3A%22Release+4.2%22+label%3A%22T%3A+bug%22). We strongly recommend updating Qubes OS (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) immediately after installation in order to apply all available bug fixes.

Upgrading to Qubes 4.2.0-rc1

It is not yet possible to perform an in-place upgrade from Qubes 4.1 to Qubes 4.2. For this initial release candidate, a clean installation is required. An in-place upgrade tool is in development.

When is the stable release?

That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this release candidate and their severity. As explained in our release schedule (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/#release-schedule) documentation, our usual process after issuing a new release candidate is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. This usually takes around five weeks, depending on the bugs discovered. If warranted, we then issue a new release candidate that includes the fixes and repeat the whole process again. We continue this iterative procedure until we’re left with a release candidate that’s good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many release candidates will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this with each successive release candidate, which we’ll share in this section in future release candidate announcements.

In the case of Qubes 4.2.0 specifically, we already know that there will be a second release candidate (in order to test the in-place upgrade procedure, if nothing else). As mentioned above, we expect to announce that second release candidate in approximately five weeks. The results of that second release candidate will determine whether a third one is required.

What is a release candidate?

A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. Release candidates are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) and the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) in our documentation.

What is a minor release?

The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, releases that increment the second value are known as “minor releases.” Minor releases generally include new features, improvements, and bug fixes that are backward-compatible with earlier versions of the same major release. See our supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases and our version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation for more information about how Qubes OS releases are versioned.

XSAs released on 2023-07-24
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/07/24/xsas-released-on-2023-07-24/

The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
Therefore, user action is required.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


XSA-433 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-433.html)

See QSB-090 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/07/24/qsb-090/) for details.




XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


(none)


About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

QSB-090: Zenbleed (CVE-2023-20593, XSA-433)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/07/24/qsb-090/

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 090: Zenbleed (CVE-2023-20593, XSA-433) (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-090-2023.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.

Qubes Security Bulletin 090


---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 090 ]===---

2023-07-24

Zenbleed (CVE-2023-20593, XSA-433)

User action required
---------------------

Users must install the following specific packages in order to address
the issues discussed in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- linux-firmware 20230625-146
- Xen packages 4.14.5-21

For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- linux-firmware 20230625-147
- Xen packages 4.17.1-3

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [1] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [2]

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen and initramfs binaries.

Summary
--------

On 2023-07-24, the Xen Project published XSA-433, "x86/AMD: Zenbleed"
[3]:
| Researchers at Google have discovered Zenbleed, a hardware bug causing
| corruption of the vector registers.
|
| When a VZEROUPPER instruction is discarded as part of a bad transient
| execution path, its effect on internal tracking are not unwound
| correctly. This manifests as the wrong micro-architectural state
| becoming architectural, and corrupting the vector registers.
|
| Note: While this malfunction is related to speculative execution, this
| is not a speculative sidechannel vulnerability.
|
| The corruption is not random. It happens to be stale values from the
| physical vector register file, a structure competitively shared between
| sibling threads. Therefore, an attacker can directly access data from
| the sibling thread, or from a more privileged context.
|
| For more details, see:
| https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7008.html
|
| https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-v6wh-rxpg-cmm8


Impact
-------

As explained in XSA-433, this vulnerability is specific to the AMD Zen 2
microarchitecture, and AMD does not believe that other
microarchitectures are affected. Exploiting this vulnerability would
allow an attacker to read data from different contexts on the same core.
Examples of such data include key material, ciphertext and plaintext
from AES-NI operations, and the contents of REP-MOVS instructions, which
are commonly used to implement `memcpy()`.

In order to exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must be capable of
executing code at any privilege level in any qube, e.g., JavaScript in a
web browser. Moreover, the code to reliably exploit this vulnerability
is publicly available. Accordingly, there is a high risk of this
vulnerability being exploited in practice.

Credits
--------

Tavis Ormandy of Google Project Zero.

References
-----------

[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-433.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-090-2023.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmS/KlsACgkQ1lWk8hgw
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=xznI
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-090-2023.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=CVsz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-090-2023.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. A list of all QSBs is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software) for Windows and Mac options.)



Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1


(See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more ways to obtain the QMSK.)


View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.


pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494



Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. See here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key) for more details and ideas for how to do that.

Tip: Record the genuine QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.


Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)

1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu

Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y

pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.

gpg> q



Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.

Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)

$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u



Verify signed Git tags.

$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100

Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]


The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.


Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST

gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]


Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.



For this announcement (QSB-090), the commands are:

$ gpg --verify qsb-090-2023.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-090-2023.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-090-2023.txt.sig.simon qsb-090-2023.txt


You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-090 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

QSB-091: Windows PV drivers potentially compromised
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/07/27/qsb-091/

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 091: Windows PV drivers potentially compromised (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-091-2023.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.

Qubes Security Bulletin 091


---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 091 ]===---

2023-07-26

Windows PV drivers potentially compromised

User action required
---------------------

At the time of writing, no fix is available, so no user action is
required. However, users may wish to consider discontinuing the use of
Qubes Windows Tools (QWT) in security-sensitive Windows qubes until a
fix is available. Users with especially high security requirements may
wish to consider recreating existing Windows qubes without QWT or
replacing existing Windows qubes with qubes running a different
operating system.

Summary
--------

On 2023-07-24, the Xen Project published "Xen Security Notice 1:
winpvdrvbuild.xenproject.org potentially compromised" [1], which states:

| Software running on the Xen Project hosted subdomain
| winpvdrvbuild.xenproject.org is outdated and vulnerable to several
| CVEs. Some of the reported issues include remote code execution. The
| affected host was running the Jenkins build system for the Windows PV
| Drivers subproject.

| Since the list of CVEs reported include remote code execution we no
| longer have confidence that binaries previously available at:
|
| https://xenbits.xen.org/pvdrivers/win/
|
| are trustworthy. This includes binaries signed with Xen Project's EV
| key that is cross-signed by Microsoft.

Qubes Windows Tools includes the Xen Project's Windows PV Drivers.

Impact
-------

If the Xen Project's Windows PV Drivers were compromised at build time,
all Windows qubes that have Qubes Windows Tools (QWT) installed may also
be compromised. If the drivers were not compromised at build time, then
there is no known vulnerability.

Dom0 is not affected, even though the `qubes-windows-tools` package is
installed in dom0, since neither the dom0 package build process nor dom0
itself interprets these driver files. Rather, the purpose of this
package is merely to make the driver files available to the Windows
qubes in which QWT are installed.

Discussion
-----------

We decided to use the Xen Project's official Windows PV Driver binaries
in Qubes Windows Tools (QWT) (rather than building our own binaries from
source) because the Xen Project's official binaries are signed by a
special key that Windows accepts by default, which avoids the need to
enable test-signing mode in Windows when installing the drivers. (We
have no such key.) We used this approach for all versions of QWT
released for Qubes 4.0 (driver version 8.2.1, May 2017), Qubes 4.1
(driver version 8.2.2, April 2019), and Qubes 4.2 (same as Qubes 4.1).

While we have no way to know whether driver versions 8.2.1 or 8.2.2 have
actually been compromised, it is worth noting that if the binaries were
not compromised at build time, they could not have been tampered with
after that time, since they were stored on another system and signed
with a timestamped signature proving they were not modified afterward.

At the time of writing, the Xen Project has not published replacement
binaries signed by a Microsoft-approved key. The process for doing this
has changed since the last version of Windows PV Drivers was released,
and we have no information as to whether or when new signed binaries
will be available. [2]

In order to avoid similar problems in the future, we are working on a
more permanent solution regarding the need for signed PV drivers in QWT.
In the meantime, we will replace the `qubes-windows-tools` package with

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-091-2023.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=JLOr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-091-2023.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=SZ6e
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-091-2023.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. A list of all QSBs is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?