XSAs released on 2024-07-16
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/07/16/xsas-released-on-2024-07-16/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
XSA-458 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-458.html)
See QSB-103 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/07/16/qsb-103/)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-459 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-459.html)
Qubes OS does not use Xapi.
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/07/16/xsas-released-on-2024-07-16/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
XSA-458 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-458.html)
See QSB-103 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/07/16/qsb-103/)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-459 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-459.html)
Qubes OS does not use Xapi.
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
QSB-103: Double unlock in x86 guest IRQ handling (XSA-458)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/07/16/qsb-103/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 103: Double unlock in x86 guest IRQ handling (XSA-458) (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/ed99cb4cce212ed24c785dcb040173e16da8a010/QSBs/qsb-103-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 103
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 103 ]===---
2024-07-16
Double unlock in x86 guest IRQ handling (XSA-458)
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
On 2024-07-16, the Xen Project published XSA-458, "double unlock in x86
guest IRQ handling" [3]:
| An optional feature of PCI MSI called "Multiple Message" allows a
| device to use multiple consecutive interrupt vectors. Unlike for
| MSI-X, the setting up of these consecutive vectors needs to happen all
| in one go. In this handling an error path could be taken in different
| situations, with or without a particular lock held. This error path
| wrongly releases the lock even when it is not currently held.
Impact
-------
An attacker who compromises a qube with an attached PCI device that has
multi-vector MSI capability (e.g., sys-net or sys-usb in the default
Qubes OS configuration) can attempt to exploit this vulnerability in
order to compromise Qubes OS.
Affected systems
-----------------
Both Qubes OS 4.1 and 4.2 are affected.
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.14.6-10
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.4-4
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
--------
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-458.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-103-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/ed99cb4cce212ed24c785dcb040173e16da8a010/QSBs/qsb-103-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmaWVqUACgkQ1lWk8hgw
4GpsVRAAl7tx8Ur4I658gDws+17f3JC9pNCk5Fzo2OFCc49gAxtcuvIiMcjYrgji
YLqtOIvTI5VjizJvtelfP3xcNQT3eGmg9uknvAHBnfcjLEUgU1mnk4R2+mmSfjvn
Im9pJK2kUdJsVi38oTUY7DepIsg/ExM4GLZj9JK2s6CQX5xCUFOaJemp3Vyt4d4t
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2uHLPhiZQ6TC6PMBxv63W4DxKsK/hub/DZhpCFJrHGSVUKNrueQTh0mlfH4lJLnp
GZ3M6haJL9vLXGJp/erhhp/lZn/4Ho1EYrLJ4JM8kINnw5/Le9iSC555GPNkyqU2
x4kvkpFU6Ab4heKSijnM2L8sb3aP3NcrsBE3dSLxFuIOvpdIuQLIUz1ILH/AaMuK
JdbNMpiZGUtPV7xrHWf7di/sUmwOzCxfSpl8dLO1+tyoVCkBdAVs/UO4D2n6V3Tu
e/9ob6DP9Qj/FiD8O44qO326SGzxEIiDOHA9FX4qK090CxYAkJCG6UDLgk7eJWyB
FMlDC5X0XDXAclKDkPYkNQNCn0i1yQK0jQFz/d+JeuOJBBqsWs4=
=fupv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/07/16/qsb-103/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 103: Double unlock in x86 guest IRQ handling (XSA-458) (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/ed99cb4cce212ed24c785dcb040173e16da8a010/QSBs/qsb-103-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 103
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 103 ]===---
2024-07-16
Double unlock in x86 guest IRQ handling (XSA-458)
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
On 2024-07-16, the Xen Project published XSA-458, "double unlock in x86
guest IRQ handling" [3]:
| An optional feature of PCI MSI called "Multiple Message" allows a
| device to use multiple consecutive interrupt vectors. Unlike for
| MSI-X, the setting up of these consecutive vectors needs to happen all
| in one go. In this handling an error path could be taken in different
| situations, with or without a particular lock held. This error path
| wrongly releases the lock even when it is not currently held.
Impact
-------
An attacker who compromises a qube with an attached PCI device that has
multi-vector MSI capability (e.g., sys-net or sys-usb in the default
Qubes OS configuration) can attempt to exploit this vulnerability in
order to compromise Qubes OS.
Affected systems
-----------------
Both Qubes OS 4.1 and 4.2 are affected.
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.14.6-10
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.4-4
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.
If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.
Credits
--------
See the original Xen Security Advisory.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-458.html
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-103-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/ed99cb4cce212ed24c785dcb040173e16da8a010/QSBs/qsb-103-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=fupv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-103-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/ed99cb4cce212ed24c785dcb040173e16da8a010/QSBs/qsb-103-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=ARv2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-103-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/ed99cb4cce212ed24c785dcb040173e16da8a010/QSBs/qsb-103-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmaWRBMACgkQSsGN4REu
FJDU0w//adiXcXjwXcL19qA53FUAZNbxnuQaV2W7pVBqVQwMj32aQRXb0TzWLzRP
cJtGHG3l4Ft1YCd7+m8cVXD3H5onb0ScyYkyNPdIZWLdA3uWEjWq2/9POHnVh4Ly
RU4BKFwnZuA3WPpMSnskgfJO/F6nIvNI12aOULDN+zxOUm8HJvigdbVOVi8hSshd
KTeox2GsoEmF++/LT9nMmuQp/pL5Tki1czmYZaEIk4muaV9Omb4bbY7Dxkya8R76
2zrbykR4tdWFUbMJhYepGiVilyU8JUd0FmbjZVVStxUJ9LhrI9n7VmEJlxpeULFg
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J0AU0eGrXRd6rCl4XlbKgZw6SOOkHSgTv2yXW1Z0wezTz+70nLvsWRJfEvUrN1tD
1KuP61xjHcAIV8/sIPEbPGAN7S3SMkdrubjK9OygPGXwycnuzPoujifFsINAyDNO
n5rpAPBK1L77rlBxaSG0ITicIZ650fDfl9pbHJ1UNdWAxYuys2r7d4nwcg9cY6zg
WAN6PIPV6y4bK1tFpO+mzcWFCXZ2PiqTJvPYZcuv4Ok4/PEdTLtjIdRl6RiG/fLY
anQB494vrm39hMQWZJeYu60JQFBM7ObFf+yPgF3TQSu64GEkYUg=
=ARv2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-103-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/ed99cb4cce212ed24c785dcb040173e16da8a010/QSBs/qsb-103-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
👍1
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-103), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-103-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-103-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-103-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-103-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-103 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-103), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-103-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-103-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-103-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-103-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-103 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
QSB-104: GUI-related security bugs
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/07/30/qsb-104/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 104: GUI-related security bugs (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 104
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 104 ]===---
2024-07-30
GUI-related security bugs
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
This QSB concerns two separate GUI-related bugs with potential security
implications:
1. If the keyboard auto-repeat feature is enabled in a qube, as it is in
the default templates (due to an error), it can generate unexpected
key presses. In particular, if the user attempts to select either the
"Copy to other qube..." or "Move to other qube..." context menu
option on a file in the qube's graphical file manager using the Enter
key (rather than clicking on it with the mouse cursor), the keyboard
auto-repeat feature can cause the selected file to be opened in that
qube.
2. The Xfce taskbar in dom0 incorrectly handles application icons, which
can result in some application icons being the wrong color.
Impact
-------
The impact of the first bug depends on the user's habits. If the user
intends to copy a file to another qube before opening it, this bug could
result in that file being opened in the wrong qube, potentially
compromising it. For example, if the user receives a file via email,
saves it in the email qube, then attempts to copy it to another qube,
this bug could result in the file being opened in the email qube.
An attacker who manages to compromise a qube or an application running
inside of a qube could attempt to exploit the second bug in order to
make an application icon from that qube appear in dom0's Xfce taskbar
with a color different from that qube's true color label. For example,
an attacker who controls an application in a qube with the yellow color
label could cause that application's icon to have the color green in the
taskbar in an attempt to deceive or confuse the user. This bug affects
only application icon colors in dom0's Xfce taskbar. It does not affect
other window decorations (i.e., window borders, noscript bars, or icons in
noscript bars), nor does it affect icons that appear when switching between
windows with Alt + Tab.
Affected systems
-----------------
The first bug affects both Qubes OS 4.1 and 4.2. The only qubes that are
affected are those in which some program enables the keyboard
auto-repeat feature. The default templates automatically start the
program xfsettingsd, which in turn enables the keyboard auto-repeat
feature. Templates that do not have such a program installed (such as
minimal templates, by default) are not affected.
The second bug affects only Qubes OS 4.2 when using the Xfce desktop
environment, which is the default desktop environment.
Discussion
-----------
The first bug can occur if, and only if, the keyboard auto-repeat
feature is enabled in a qube. (When gui-agent starts, it disables
auto-repeat, but other programs, such as xfsettings in the default
templates, can re-enable it.) By design, qubes do not "see" all keyboard
events. Instead, each qube sees only the keyboard events that are sent
when a window belonging to that qube is in focus. Therefore, if all of a
qube's windows lose focus while a key is being pressed, it may appear to
the qube that the key was pressed for much longer than it actually was.
In particular, the qube may "believe" that the key is being pressed
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/07/30/qsb-104/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 104: GUI-related security bugs (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 104
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 104 ]===---
2024-07-30
GUI-related security bugs
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
This QSB concerns two separate GUI-related bugs with potential security
implications:
1. If the keyboard auto-repeat feature is enabled in a qube, as it is in
the default templates (due to an error), it can generate unexpected
key presses. In particular, if the user attempts to select either the
"Copy to other qube..." or "Move to other qube..." context menu
option on a file in the qube's graphical file manager using the Enter
key (rather than clicking on it with the mouse cursor), the keyboard
auto-repeat feature can cause the selected file to be opened in that
qube.
2. The Xfce taskbar in dom0 incorrectly handles application icons, which
can result in some application icons being the wrong color.
Impact
-------
The impact of the first bug depends on the user's habits. If the user
intends to copy a file to another qube before opening it, this bug could
result in that file being opened in the wrong qube, potentially
compromising it. For example, if the user receives a file via email,
saves it in the email qube, then attempts to copy it to another qube,
this bug could result in the file being opened in the email qube.
An attacker who manages to compromise a qube or an application running
inside of a qube could attempt to exploit the second bug in order to
make an application icon from that qube appear in dom0's Xfce taskbar
with a color different from that qube's true color label. For example,
an attacker who controls an application in a qube with the yellow color
label could cause that application's icon to have the color green in the
taskbar in an attempt to deceive or confuse the user. This bug affects
only application icon colors in dom0's Xfce taskbar. It does not affect
other window decorations (i.e., window borders, noscript bars, or icons in
noscript bars), nor does it affect icons that appear when switching between
windows with Alt + Tab.
Affected systems
-----------------
The first bug affects both Qubes OS 4.1 and 4.2. The only qubes that are
affected are those in which some program enables the keyboard
auto-repeat feature. The default templates automatically start the
program xfsettingsd, which in turn enables the keyboard auto-repeat
feature. Templates that do not have such a program installed (such as
minimal templates, by default) are not affected.
The second bug affects only Qubes OS 4.2 when using the Xfce desktop
environment, which is the default desktop environment.
Discussion
-----------
The first bug can occur if, and only if, the keyboard auto-repeat
feature is enabled in a qube. (When gui-agent starts, it disables
auto-repeat, but other programs, such as xfsettings in the default
templates, can re-enable it.) By design, qubes do not "see" all keyboard
events. Instead, each qube sees only the keyboard events that are sent
when a window belonging to that qube is in focus. Therefore, if all of a
qube's windows lose focus while a key is being pressed, it may appear to
the qube that the key was pressed for much longer than it actually was.
In particular, the qube may "believe" that the key is being pressed
❤1
until a window belonging to that qube regains focus and the key is
released.
Normally, the auto-repeat feature starts generating repeated key press
events after the initial auto-repeat delay has passed. While none of the
qube's windows are in focus, such events are ignored. However, if one of
the qube's windows regains focus while a key is in the pressed state,
the auto-repeat feature in that qube will continue generating repeated
key press events without waiting for the initial auto-repeat delay,
since from its point of view the key was being pressed the whole time.
In this particular case, when the user selects either the "Copy to other
qube..." or "Move to other qube..." option, focus switches to the qrexec
prompt in dom0, and the Enter key may appear to the qube to be pressed
the whole time while the user interacts with the qrexec prompt. When the
dom0 prompt window closes, focus returns to the qube's file manager
window. At this point, the qube believes that the Enter key has been
pressed for a long time, so the auto-repeat feature generates repeated
Enter key press events, which in turn cause the file manager to open the
file normally.
What ought to happen instead is that only dom0 should generate key
repeat events, because only dom0 knows how long a key has actually been
pressed. Meanwhile, the qube should see just one key press event and
(possibly much later) one key release event, and this is exactly what
happens when the auto-repeat feature is disabled in the qube. The qube
would still perceive a long key press while none of its windows have
focus. However, when one of the qube's windows regains focus, there
would not be any repeated key press events, and the qube would get the
current key state. (Note: One might consider sending a synthetic "key
release" event for any key that is still being pressed when an
application loses focus, but that would cause extra key presses to be
delivered when the application regains focus.)
The second bug is caused by the libwnck3 library (which is used by
Xfce's "Window Buttons" widget) interpreting icons incorrectly. Each
window icon is stored in a `_NET_WM_ICON` window property in an ARGB
format. The upstream version of the library correctly converts this ARGB
format into RGBA, then loads it into a `GdkPixbuf` object, which is
later used by the taskbar. However, the Fedora package has extra patches
that add support for HiDPI scaling, which changes `GdkPixbuf` to
`cairo_surface_t`. The latter has native support for the
`CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32` format, so the manual conversion was removed.
The problem is that `ARGB` and `CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32` have subtle
differences related to transparency. The latter assumes that color
channels are pre-multiplied by the alpha channel, [3] but this isn't the
case in `ARGB`. An attacker could attempt to exploit this vulnerability
in order to manipulate color channels after the icon has been colored in
accordance with the qube's color label, completely changing the icon's
color in some cases.
Specifically, by adjusting the alpha channel, it may be possible to wrap
high color values into low ones. For example, a pixel with the values
R=255, G=250, B=0, and A=254 should appear as yellow. However, due to
the pre-multiplied format, the alpha channel determines the valid range
for color channels. In this case, setting A=254 results in a valid range
of 0-254 for the R, G, and B color channels. Since R=255 is outside of
this range, the red channel would wrap to zero, resulting in a green
pixel. This bug has been present in Fedora's libwnck3 package since
Fedora 34. [4]
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in templates:
- qubes-gui-agent version 4.1.34
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0 and templates:
- qubes-gui-agent version 4.2.17 (all templates)
- libwnck3 version 43.0-9 (Fedora templates and dom0)
released.
Normally, the auto-repeat feature starts generating repeated key press
events after the initial auto-repeat delay has passed. While none of the
qube's windows are in focus, such events are ignored. However, if one of
the qube's windows regains focus while a key is in the pressed state,
the auto-repeat feature in that qube will continue generating repeated
key press events without waiting for the initial auto-repeat delay,
since from its point of view the key was being pressed the whole time.
In this particular case, when the user selects either the "Copy to other
qube..." or "Move to other qube..." option, focus switches to the qrexec
prompt in dom0, and the Enter key may appear to the qube to be pressed
the whole time while the user interacts with the qrexec prompt. When the
dom0 prompt window closes, focus returns to the qube's file manager
window. At this point, the qube believes that the Enter key has been
pressed for a long time, so the auto-repeat feature generates repeated
Enter key press events, which in turn cause the file manager to open the
file normally.
What ought to happen instead is that only dom0 should generate key
repeat events, because only dom0 knows how long a key has actually been
pressed. Meanwhile, the qube should see just one key press event and
(possibly much later) one key release event, and this is exactly what
happens when the auto-repeat feature is disabled in the qube. The qube
would still perceive a long key press while none of its windows have
focus. However, when one of the qube's windows regains focus, there
would not be any repeated key press events, and the qube would get the
current key state. (Note: One might consider sending a synthetic "key
release" event for any key that is still being pressed when an
application loses focus, but that would cause extra key presses to be
delivered when the application regains focus.)
The second bug is caused by the libwnck3 library (which is used by
Xfce's "Window Buttons" widget) interpreting icons incorrectly. Each
window icon is stored in a `_NET_WM_ICON` window property in an ARGB
format. The upstream version of the library correctly converts this ARGB
format into RGBA, then loads it into a `GdkPixbuf` object, which is
later used by the taskbar. However, the Fedora package has extra patches
that add support for HiDPI scaling, which changes `GdkPixbuf` to
`cairo_surface_t`. The latter has native support for the
`CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32` format, so the manual conversion was removed.
The problem is that `ARGB` and `CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32` have subtle
differences related to transparency. The latter assumes that color
channels are pre-multiplied by the alpha channel, [3] but this isn't the
case in `ARGB`. An attacker could attempt to exploit this vulnerability
in order to manipulate color channels after the icon has been colored in
accordance with the qube's color label, completely changing the icon's
color in some cases.
Specifically, by adjusting the alpha channel, it may be possible to wrap
high color values into low ones. For example, a pixel with the values
R=255, G=250, B=0, and A=254 should appear as yellow. However, due to
the pre-multiplied format, the alpha channel determines the valid range
for color channels. In this case, setting A=254 results in a valid range
of 0-254 for the R, G, and B color channels. Since R=255 is outside of
this range, the red channel would wrap to zero, resulting in a green
pixel. This bug has been present in Fedora's libwnck3 package since
Fedora 34. [4]
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in templates:
- qubes-gui-agent version 4.1.34
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0 and templates:
- qubes-gui-agent version 4.2.17 (all templates)
- libwnck3 version 43.0-9 (Fedora templates and dom0)
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
User session and all qubes must be restarted afterward in order for
the updates to take effect.
Credits
--------
The first bug was reported by Maurice Kayser.
The second bug was reported by Kamil Aronowski.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://www.cairographics.org/manual/cairo-Image-Surfaces.html
[4] https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/libwnck3/c/96db18a8fe30eafb7bd3da04d18901723482f97b?branch=f34
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-104-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=n/G9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmapPDwACgkQSsGN4REu
FJDqChAAmCO7kd4OWIrT4XIK79YNxZES7XiHVDefAvpseKZDJs5O+fK/iR/ahFrP
VsFmzilwS17XvEo72LecqSNP/A3x9emOFqVgdBpcZwNM4HdG4sJMISNZJg+H4R75
GPtUZ6asKDPi9kKiRBVwLSyH8uL+PH7DBRKjDqK8RyU/tsgJJOh9yAY1iw+QSEzn
WETgn3JlzpKmc45zuwc5+yhjvY+eowfQdCMXipJgFTDE21lfqaOl2gTHPqtZwVo+
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K6uqk9ZPQiGIWgaMnOhYYkwF3gJr9MeWyMLs052HJOYPCsllLjnmj7jw7DCXWanQ
Ii2q1cLn8WAZfosuKUZkW0LN+bSGBcyozEvrRLKqxZ0gEJNx3piS7EyAtykVm5Em
2dp47d82QBD8LgV8768D0XOwLFY5jA+Cuznr3ERwaxWroTdXx/sSqLhUxlCyoQ9x
UXjgwY8+6HfadJWAIGVsyX9vx6wSnJkijTI4NB4xVV+NHtWNXDA=
=RDsV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
User session and all qubes must be restarted afterward in order for
the updates to take effect.
Credits
--------
The first bug was reported by Maurice Kayser.
The second bug was reported by Kamil Aronowski.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://www.cairographics.org/manual/cairo-Image-Surfaces.html
[4] https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/libwnck3/c/96db18a8fe30eafb7bd3da04d18901723482f97b?branch=f34
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-104-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=n/G9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmapPDwACgkQSsGN4REu
FJDqChAAmCO7kd4OWIrT4XIK79YNxZES7XiHVDefAvpseKZDJs5O+fK/iR/ahFrP
VsFmzilwS17XvEo72LecqSNP/A3x9emOFqVgdBpcZwNM4HdG4sJMISNZJg+H4R75
GPtUZ6asKDPi9kKiRBVwLSyH8uL+PH7DBRKjDqK8RyU/tsgJJOh9yAY1iw+QSEzn
WETgn3JlzpKmc45zuwc5+yhjvY+eowfQdCMXipJgFTDE21lfqaOl2gTHPqtZwVo+
7wbhQdoYLLqOXrk8w+85XZk1nygKa1iVUwBLBwnhQvUp9jeYnGGVz6gQdmzXp0iR
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FvXx27VAiDzqu8n7wgxwqzYL7nZCGnV8mD5+24ihHuOZLZ6NMsOMW7eglm9qdgDI
K6uqk9ZPQiGIWgaMnOhYYkwF3gJr9MeWyMLs052HJOYPCsllLjnmj7jw7DCXWanQ
Ii2q1cLn8WAZfosuKUZkW0LN+bSGBcyozEvrRLKqxZ0gEJNx3piS7EyAtykVm5Em
2dp47d82QBD8LgV8768D0XOwLFY5jA+Cuznr3ERwaxWroTdXx/sSqLhUxlCyoQ9x
UXjgwY8+6HfadJWAIGVsyX9vx6wSnJkijTI4NB4xVV+NHtWNXDA=
=RDsV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-104), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-104-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-104-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-104 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-104), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-104-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-104-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-104 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
Extended security support for Qubes OS 4.1 has ended
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/), extended security support for Qubes OS 4.1 has ended as of yesterday, 2024-07-31. Qubes 4.1 will no longer receive updates of any kind, including security updates. We strongly recommend that any remaining Qubes 4.1 users upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/) immediately.
Recommended actions
If you’re already using Qubes 4.2, then you don’t have to do anything. This announcement doesn’t affect you.
If you’re still using Qubes 4.1, then you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately. There are two ways to do this:
Perform a clean reinstallation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) using the latest stable Qubes OS 4.2.2 ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/).
Perform an in-place upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/#in-place-upgrade).
Both of these options are covered in further detail in the Qubes 4.1 to 4.2 upgrade guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/). In either case, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand. If you need help, please consult our help and support (https://www.qubes-os.org/support/) page.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/), extended security support for Qubes OS 4.1 has ended as of yesterday, 2024-07-31. Qubes 4.1 will no longer receive updates of any kind, including security updates. We strongly recommend that any remaining Qubes 4.1 users upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/) immediately.
Recommended actions
If you’re already using Qubes 4.2, then you don’t have to do anything. This announcement doesn’t affect you.
If you’re still using Qubes 4.1, then you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately. There are two ways to do this:
Perform a clean reinstallation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) using the latest stable Qubes OS 4.2.2 ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/).
Perform an in-place upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/#in-place-upgrade).
Both of these options are covered in further detail in the Qubes 4.1 to 4.2 upgrade guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/). In either case, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand. If you need help, please consult our help and support (https://www.qubes-os.org/support/) page.
Qubes OS Summit 2024: Last call for proposals
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/05/qubes-os-summit-2024-last-call-for-proposals/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/03/13/qubes-os-summit-2024/), this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024) will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. If you would like to submit a proposal, the call for participation (CFP) (https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2024/cfp) closes on 2024-08-07 at 23:59 CEST (UTC+2).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/05/qubes-os-summit-2024-last-call-for-proposals/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/03/13/qubes-os-summit-2024/), this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024) will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. If you would like to submit a proposal, the call for participation (CFP) (https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2024/cfp) closes on 2024-08-07 at 23:59 CEST (UTC+2).
Qubes OS Summit 2024: Tickets now available!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/11/qubes-os-summit-2024-tickets-now-available/
You can now get free tickets (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/#tickets) to attend this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024), which will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. Tickets are available for both virtual and on-site attendance. Physical seating is limited, so on-site tickets will be granted on a first-come, first-served basis. (However, please note that failing to attend after obtaining an on-site ticket may prevent you from obtaining other on-site tickets for future events, so please refrain from obtaining an on-site ticket unless you’re serious about joining us in person!)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/11/qubes-os-summit-2024-tickets-now-available/
You can now get free tickets (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/#tickets) to attend this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024), which will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. Tickets are available for both virtual and on-site attendance. Physical seating is limited, so on-site tickets will be granted on a first-come, first-served basis. (However, please note that failing to attend after obtaining an on-site ticket may prevent you from obtaining other on-site tickets for future events, so please refrain from obtaining an on-site ticket unless you’re serious about joining us in person!)
XSAs released on 2024-08-13
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/14/xsas-released-on-2024-08-13/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-460 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-460.html)
Qubes OS does not hot plug/unplug PCI devices.
XSA-461 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-461.html)
The practical impact with the devices Qubes OS uses for passthrough is limited to denial of service only.
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/14/xsas-released-on-2024-08-13/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-460 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-460.html)
Qubes OS does not hot plug/unplug PCI devices.
XSA-461 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-461.html)
The practical impact with the devices Qubes OS uses for passthrough is limited to denial of service only.
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
Telegram CEO Pavel Durov was just arrested at an airport in France after his private jet landed. He was arrested for unjust reasons which shows how corrupt the courts are in France.
Please protest peacefully. Make paper airplanes and throw them in the protests to show your support for Durov! We need everyone to participate. GO!
#FreeDurov
Please protest peacefully. Make paper airplanes and throw them in the protests to show your support for Durov! We need everyone to participate. GO!
#FreeDurov
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Pavel Durov
Founder of Telegram.
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Pavel Durov
All large social media apps are easy targets for criticism due to the content they host. I can’t recall any major social platform whose moderation has been consistently praised by traditional media.
The media coverage of Meta's moderation efforts has been…
The media coverage of Meta's moderation efforts has been…
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