QSB-104: GUI-related security bugs
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/07/30/qsb-104/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 104: GUI-related security bugs (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 104
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 104 ]===---
2024-07-30
GUI-related security bugs
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
This QSB concerns two separate GUI-related bugs with potential security
implications:
1. If the keyboard auto-repeat feature is enabled in a qube, as it is in
the default templates (due to an error), it can generate unexpected
key presses. In particular, if the user attempts to select either the
"Copy to other qube..." or "Move to other qube..." context menu
option on a file in the qube's graphical file manager using the Enter
key (rather than clicking on it with the mouse cursor), the keyboard
auto-repeat feature can cause the selected file to be opened in that
qube.
2. The Xfce taskbar in dom0 incorrectly handles application icons, which
can result in some application icons being the wrong color.
Impact
-------
The impact of the first bug depends on the user's habits. If the user
intends to copy a file to another qube before opening it, this bug could
result in that file being opened in the wrong qube, potentially
compromising it. For example, if the user receives a file via email,
saves it in the email qube, then attempts to copy it to another qube,
this bug could result in the file being opened in the email qube.
An attacker who manages to compromise a qube or an application running
inside of a qube could attempt to exploit the second bug in order to
make an application icon from that qube appear in dom0's Xfce taskbar
with a color different from that qube's true color label. For example,
an attacker who controls an application in a qube with the yellow color
label could cause that application's icon to have the color green in the
taskbar in an attempt to deceive or confuse the user. This bug affects
only application icon colors in dom0's Xfce taskbar. It does not affect
other window decorations (i.e., window borders, noscript bars, or icons in
noscript bars), nor does it affect icons that appear when switching between
windows with Alt + Tab.
Affected systems
-----------------
The first bug affects both Qubes OS 4.1 and 4.2. The only qubes that are
affected are those in which some program enables the keyboard
auto-repeat feature. The default templates automatically start the
program xfsettingsd, which in turn enables the keyboard auto-repeat
feature. Templates that do not have such a program installed (such as
minimal templates, by default) are not affected.
The second bug affects only Qubes OS 4.2 when using the Xfce desktop
environment, which is the default desktop environment.
Discussion
-----------
The first bug can occur if, and only if, the keyboard auto-repeat
feature is enabled in a qube. (When gui-agent starts, it disables
auto-repeat, but other programs, such as xfsettings in the default
templates, can re-enable it.) By design, qubes do not "see" all keyboard
events. Instead, each qube sees only the keyboard events that are sent
when a window belonging to that qube is in focus. Therefore, if all of a
qube's windows lose focus while a key is being pressed, it may appear to
the qube that the key was pressed for much longer than it actually was.
In particular, the qube may "believe" that the key is being pressed
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/07/30/qsb-104/
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 104: GUI-related security bugs (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.
Qubes Security Bulletin 104
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 104 ]===---
2024-07-30
GUI-related security bugs
User action
------------
Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.
Summary
--------
This QSB concerns two separate GUI-related bugs with potential security
implications:
1. If the keyboard auto-repeat feature is enabled in a qube, as it is in
the default templates (due to an error), it can generate unexpected
key presses. In particular, if the user attempts to select either the
"Copy to other qube..." or "Move to other qube..." context menu
option on a file in the qube's graphical file manager using the Enter
key (rather than clicking on it with the mouse cursor), the keyboard
auto-repeat feature can cause the selected file to be opened in that
qube.
2. The Xfce taskbar in dom0 incorrectly handles application icons, which
can result in some application icons being the wrong color.
Impact
-------
The impact of the first bug depends on the user's habits. If the user
intends to copy a file to another qube before opening it, this bug could
result in that file being opened in the wrong qube, potentially
compromising it. For example, if the user receives a file via email,
saves it in the email qube, then attempts to copy it to another qube,
this bug could result in the file being opened in the email qube.
An attacker who manages to compromise a qube or an application running
inside of a qube could attempt to exploit the second bug in order to
make an application icon from that qube appear in dom0's Xfce taskbar
with a color different from that qube's true color label. For example,
an attacker who controls an application in a qube with the yellow color
label could cause that application's icon to have the color green in the
taskbar in an attempt to deceive or confuse the user. This bug affects
only application icon colors in dom0's Xfce taskbar. It does not affect
other window decorations (i.e., window borders, noscript bars, or icons in
noscript bars), nor does it affect icons that appear when switching between
windows with Alt + Tab.
Affected systems
-----------------
The first bug affects both Qubes OS 4.1 and 4.2. The only qubes that are
affected are those in which some program enables the keyboard
auto-repeat feature. The default templates automatically start the
program xfsettingsd, which in turn enables the keyboard auto-repeat
feature. Templates that do not have such a program installed (such as
minimal templates, by default) are not affected.
The second bug affects only Qubes OS 4.2 when using the Xfce desktop
environment, which is the default desktop environment.
Discussion
-----------
The first bug can occur if, and only if, the keyboard auto-repeat
feature is enabled in a qube. (When gui-agent starts, it disables
auto-repeat, but other programs, such as xfsettings in the default
templates, can re-enable it.) By design, qubes do not "see" all keyboard
events. Instead, each qube sees only the keyboard events that are sent
when a window belonging to that qube is in focus. Therefore, if all of a
qube's windows lose focus while a key is being pressed, it may appear to
the qube that the key was pressed for much longer than it actually was.
In particular, the qube may "believe" that the key is being pressed
❤1
until a window belonging to that qube regains focus and the key is
released.
Normally, the auto-repeat feature starts generating repeated key press
events after the initial auto-repeat delay has passed. While none of the
qube's windows are in focus, such events are ignored. However, if one of
the qube's windows regains focus while a key is in the pressed state,
the auto-repeat feature in that qube will continue generating repeated
key press events without waiting for the initial auto-repeat delay,
since from its point of view the key was being pressed the whole time.
In this particular case, when the user selects either the "Copy to other
qube..." or "Move to other qube..." option, focus switches to the qrexec
prompt in dom0, and the Enter key may appear to the qube to be pressed
the whole time while the user interacts with the qrexec prompt. When the
dom0 prompt window closes, focus returns to the qube's file manager
window. At this point, the qube believes that the Enter key has been
pressed for a long time, so the auto-repeat feature generates repeated
Enter key press events, which in turn cause the file manager to open the
file normally.
What ought to happen instead is that only dom0 should generate key
repeat events, because only dom0 knows how long a key has actually been
pressed. Meanwhile, the qube should see just one key press event and
(possibly much later) one key release event, and this is exactly what
happens when the auto-repeat feature is disabled in the qube. The qube
would still perceive a long key press while none of its windows have
focus. However, when one of the qube's windows regains focus, there
would not be any repeated key press events, and the qube would get the
current key state. (Note: One might consider sending a synthetic "key
release" event for any key that is still being pressed when an
application loses focus, but that would cause extra key presses to be
delivered when the application regains focus.)
The second bug is caused by the libwnck3 library (which is used by
Xfce's "Window Buttons" widget) interpreting icons incorrectly. Each
window icon is stored in a `_NET_WM_ICON` window property in an ARGB
format. The upstream version of the library correctly converts this ARGB
format into RGBA, then loads it into a `GdkPixbuf` object, which is
later used by the taskbar. However, the Fedora package has extra patches
that add support for HiDPI scaling, which changes `GdkPixbuf` to
`cairo_surface_t`. The latter has native support for the
`CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32` format, so the manual conversion was removed.
The problem is that `ARGB` and `CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32` have subtle
differences related to transparency. The latter assumes that color
channels are pre-multiplied by the alpha channel, [3] but this isn't the
case in `ARGB`. An attacker could attempt to exploit this vulnerability
in order to manipulate color channels after the icon has been colored in
accordance with the qube's color label, completely changing the icon's
color in some cases.
Specifically, by adjusting the alpha channel, it may be possible to wrap
high color values into low ones. For example, a pixel with the values
R=255, G=250, B=0, and A=254 should appear as yellow. However, due to
the pre-multiplied format, the alpha channel determines the valid range
for color channels. In this case, setting A=254 results in a valid range
of 0-254 for the R, G, and B color channels. Since R=255 is outside of
this range, the red channel would wrap to zero, resulting in a green
pixel. This bug has been present in Fedora's libwnck3 package since
Fedora 34. [4]
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in templates:
- qubes-gui-agent version 4.1.34
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0 and templates:
- qubes-gui-agent version 4.2.17 (all templates)
- libwnck3 version 43.0-9 (Fedora templates and dom0)
released.
Normally, the auto-repeat feature starts generating repeated key press
events after the initial auto-repeat delay has passed. While none of the
qube's windows are in focus, such events are ignored. However, if one of
the qube's windows regains focus while a key is in the pressed state,
the auto-repeat feature in that qube will continue generating repeated
key press events without waiting for the initial auto-repeat delay,
since from its point of view the key was being pressed the whole time.
In this particular case, when the user selects either the "Copy to other
qube..." or "Move to other qube..." option, focus switches to the qrexec
prompt in dom0, and the Enter key may appear to the qube to be pressed
the whole time while the user interacts with the qrexec prompt. When the
dom0 prompt window closes, focus returns to the qube's file manager
window. At this point, the qube believes that the Enter key has been
pressed for a long time, so the auto-repeat feature generates repeated
Enter key press events, which in turn cause the file manager to open the
file normally.
What ought to happen instead is that only dom0 should generate key
repeat events, because only dom0 knows how long a key has actually been
pressed. Meanwhile, the qube should see just one key press event and
(possibly much later) one key release event, and this is exactly what
happens when the auto-repeat feature is disabled in the qube. The qube
would still perceive a long key press while none of its windows have
focus. However, when one of the qube's windows regains focus, there
would not be any repeated key press events, and the qube would get the
current key state. (Note: One might consider sending a synthetic "key
release" event for any key that is still being pressed when an
application loses focus, but that would cause extra key presses to be
delivered when the application regains focus.)
The second bug is caused by the libwnck3 library (which is used by
Xfce's "Window Buttons" widget) interpreting icons incorrectly. Each
window icon is stored in a `_NET_WM_ICON` window property in an ARGB
format. The upstream version of the library correctly converts this ARGB
format into RGBA, then loads it into a `GdkPixbuf` object, which is
later used by the taskbar. However, the Fedora package has extra patches
that add support for HiDPI scaling, which changes `GdkPixbuf` to
`cairo_surface_t`. The latter has native support for the
`CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32` format, so the manual conversion was removed.
The problem is that `ARGB` and `CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32` have subtle
differences related to transparency. The latter assumes that color
channels are pre-multiplied by the alpha channel, [3] but this isn't the
case in `ARGB`. An attacker could attempt to exploit this vulnerability
in order to manipulate color channels after the icon has been colored in
accordance with the qube's color label, completely changing the icon's
color in some cases.
Specifically, by adjusting the alpha channel, it may be possible to wrap
high color values into low ones. For example, a pixel with the values
R=255, G=250, B=0, and A=254 should appear as yellow. However, due to
the pre-multiplied format, the alpha channel determines the valid range
for color channels. In this case, setting A=254 results in a valid range
of 0-254 for the R, G, and B color channels. Since R=255 is outside of
this range, the red channel would wrap to zero, resulting in a green
pixel. This bug has been present in Fedora's libwnck3 package since
Fedora 34. [4]
Patching
---------
The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in templates:
- qubes-gui-agent version 4.1.34
For Qubes 4.2, in dom0 and templates:
- qubes-gui-agent version 4.2.17 (all templates)
- libwnck3 version 43.0-9 (Fedora templates and dom0)
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
User session and all qubes must be restarted afterward in order for
the updates to take effect.
Credits
--------
The first bug was reported by Maurice Kayser.
The second bug was reported by Kamil Aronowski.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://www.cairographics.org/manual/cairo-Image-Surfaces.html
[4] https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/libwnck3/c/96db18a8fe30eafb7bd3da04d18901723482f97b?branch=f34
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-104-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
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Source: qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
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Source: qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]
User session and all qubes must be restarted afterward in order for
the updates to take effect.
Credits
--------
The first bug was reported by Maurice Kayser.
The second bug was reported by Kamil Aronowski.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://www.cairographics.org/manual/cairo-Image-Surfaces.html
[4] https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/libwnck3/c/96db18a8fe30eafb7bd3da04d18901723482f97b?branch=f34
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: qsb-104-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
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Source: qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
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Source: qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/87d4ea855d7401ff569d54682c71b6d2717661d6/QSBs/qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.
What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-104), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-104-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-104-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-104 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-104), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-104-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-104-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-104-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-104 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
Extended security support for Qubes OS 4.1 has ended
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/), extended security support for Qubes OS 4.1 has ended as of yesterday, 2024-07-31. Qubes 4.1 will no longer receive updates of any kind, including security updates. We strongly recommend that any remaining Qubes 4.1 users upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/) immediately.
Recommended actions
If you’re already using Qubes 4.2, then you don’t have to do anything. This announcement doesn’t affect you.
If you’re still using Qubes 4.1, then you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately. There are two ways to do this:
Perform a clean reinstallation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) using the latest stable Qubes OS 4.2.2 ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/).
Perform an in-place upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/#in-place-upgrade).
Both of these options are covered in further detail in the Qubes 4.1 to 4.2 upgrade guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/). In either case, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand. If you need help, please consult our help and support (https://www.qubes-os.org/support/) page.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/), extended security support for Qubes OS 4.1 has ended as of yesterday, 2024-07-31. Qubes 4.1 will no longer receive updates of any kind, including security updates. We strongly recommend that any remaining Qubes 4.1 users upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/) immediately.
Recommended actions
If you’re already using Qubes 4.2, then you don’t have to do anything. This announcement doesn’t affect you.
If you’re still using Qubes 4.1, then you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately. There are two ways to do this:
Perform a clean reinstallation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) using the latest stable Qubes OS 4.2.2 ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/).
Perform an in-place upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/#in-place-upgrade).
Both of these options are covered in further detail in the Qubes 4.1 to 4.2 upgrade guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/). In either case, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand. If you need help, please consult our help and support (https://www.qubes-os.org/support/) page.
Qubes OS Summit 2024: Last call for proposals
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/05/qubes-os-summit-2024-last-call-for-proposals/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/03/13/qubes-os-summit-2024/), this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024) will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. If you would like to submit a proposal, the call for participation (CFP) (https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2024/cfp) closes on 2024-08-07 at 23:59 CEST (UTC+2).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/05/qubes-os-summit-2024-last-call-for-proposals/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/03/13/qubes-os-summit-2024/), this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024) will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. If you would like to submit a proposal, the call for participation (CFP) (https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2024/cfp) closes on 2024-08-07 at 23:59 CEST (UTC+2).
Qubes OS Summit 2024: Tickets now available!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/11/qubes-os-summit-2024-tickets-now-available/
You can now get free tickets (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/#tickets) to attend this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024), which will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. Tickets are available for both virtual and on-site attendance. Physical seating is limited, so on-site tickets will be granted on a first-come, first-served basis. (However, please note that failing to attend after obtaining an on-site ticket may prevent you from obtaining other on-site tickets for future events, so please refrain from obtaining an on-site ticket unless you’re serious about joining us in person!)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/11/qubes-os-summit-2024-tickets-now-available/
You can now get free tickets (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/#tickets) to attend this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024), which will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. Tickets are available for both virtual and on-site attendance. Physical seating is limited, so on-site tickets will be granted on a first-come, first-served basis. (However, please note that failing to attend after obtaining an on-site ticket may prevent you from obtaining other on-site tickets for future events, so please refrain from obtaining an on-site ticket unless you’re serious about joining us in person!)
XSAs released on 2024-08-13
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/14/xsas-released-on-2024-08-13/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-460 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-460.html)
Qubes OS does not hot plug/unplug PCI devices.
XSA-461 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-461.html)
The practical impact with the devices Qubes OS uses for passthrough is limited to denial of service only.
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/14/xsas-released-on-2024-08-13/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-460 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-460.html)
Qubes OS does not hot plug/unplug PCI devices.
XSA-461 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-461.html)
The practical impact with the devices Qubes OS uses for passthrough is limited to denial of service only.
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
Telegram CEO Pavel Durov was just arrested at an airport in France after his private jet landed. He was arrested for unjust reasons which shows how corrupt the courts are in France.
Please protest peacefully. Make paper airplanes and throw them in the protests to show your support for Durov! We need everyone to participate. GO!
#FreeDurov
Please protest peacefully. Make paper airplanes and throw them in the protests to show your support for Durov! We need everyone to participate. GO!
#FreeDurov
Telegram
Pavel Durov
Founder of Telegram.
🔥6👍1
Forwarded from Telegram News
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Telegram
Pavel Durov
All large social media apps are easy targets for criticism due to the content they host. I can’t recall any major social platform whose moderation has been consistently praised by traditional media.
The media coverage of Meta's moderation efforts has been…
The media coverage of Meta's moderation efforts has been…
👍5
Forwarded from Pavel Durov (Paul Du Rove)
❤️ Thanks everyone for your support and love!
Last month I got interviewed by police for 4 days after arriving in Paris. I was told I may be personally responsible for other people’s illegal use of Telegram, because the French authorities didn’t receive responses from Telegram.
This was surprising for several reasons:
1. Telegram has an official representative in the EU that accepts and replies to EU requests. Its email address has been publicly available for anyone in the EU who googles “Telegram EU address for law enforcement”.
2. The French authorities had numerous ways to reach me to request assistance. As a French citizen, I was a frequent guest at the French consulate in Dubai. A while ago, when asked, I personally helped them establish a hotline with Telegram to deal with the threat of terrorism in France.
3. If a country is unhappy with an internet service, the established practice is to start a legal action against the service itself. Using laws from the pre-smartphone era to charge a CEO with crimes committed by third parties on the platform he manages is a misguided approach. Building technology is hard enough as it is. No innovator will ever build new tools if they know they can be personally held responsible for potential abuse of those tools.
Establishing the right balance between privacy and security is not easy. You have to reconcile privacy laws with law enforcement requirements, and local laws with EU laws. You have to take into account technological limitations. As a platform, you want your processes to be consistent globally, while also ensuring they are not abused in countries with weak rule of law. We’ve been committed to engaging with regulators to find the right balance. Yes, we stand by our principles: our experience is shaped by our mission to protect our users in authoritarian regimes. But we’ve always been open to dialogue.
Sometimes we can’t agree with a country’s regulator on the right balance between privacy and security. In those cases, we are ready to leave that country. We've done it many times. When Russia demanded we hand over “encryption keys” to enable surveillance, we refused — and Telegram got banned in Russia. When Iran demanded we block channels of peaceful protesters, we refused — and Telegram got banned in Iran. We are prepared to leave markets that aren’t compatible with our principles, because we are not doing this for money. We are driven by the intention to bring good and defend the basic rights of people, particularly in places where these rights are violated.
All of that does not mean Telegram is perfect. Even the fact that authorities could be confused by where to send requests is something that we should improve. But the claims in some media that Telegram is some sort of anarchic paradise are absolutely untrue. We take down millions of harmful posts and channels every day. We publish daily transparency reports (like this or this ). We have direct hotlines with NGOs to process urgent moderation requests faster.
However, we hear voices saying that it’s not enough. Telegram’s abrupt increase in user count to 950M caused growing pains that made it easier for criminals to abuse our platform. That’s why I made it my personal goal to ensure we significantly improve things in this regard. We’ve already started that process internally, and I will share more details on our progress with you very soon.
I hope that the events of August will result in making Telegram — and the social networking industry as a whole — safer and stronger. Thanks again for your love and memes 🙏
Last month I got interviewed by police for 4 days after arriving in Paris. I was told I may be personally responsible for other people’s illegal use of Telegram, because the French authorities didn’t receive responses from Telegram.
This was surprising for several reasons:
1. Telegram has an official representative in the EU that accepts and replies to EU requests. Its email address has been publicly available for anyone in the EU who googles “Telegram EU address for law enforcement”.
2. The French authorities had numerous ways to reach me to request assistance. As a French citizen, I was a frequent guest at the French consulate in Dubai. A while ago, when asked, I personally helped them establish a hotline with Telegram to deal with the threat of terrorism in France.
3. If a country is unhappy with an internet service, the established practice is to start a legal action against the service itself. Using laws from the pre-smartphone era to charge a CEO with crimes committed by third parties on the platform he manages is a misguided approach. Building technology is hard enough as it is. No innovator will ever build new tools if they know they can be personally held responsible for potential abuse of those tools.
Establishing the right balance between privacy and security is not easy. You have to reconcile privacy laws with law enforcement requirements, and local laws with EU laws. You have to take into account technological limitations. As a platform, you want your processes to be consistent globally, while also ensuring they are not abused in countries with weak rule of law. We’ve been committed to engaging with regulators to find the right balance. Yes, we stand by our principles: our experience is shaped by our mission to protect our users in authoritarian regimes. But we’ve always been open to dialogue.
Sometimes we can’t agree with a country’s regulator on the right balance between privacy and security. In those cases, we are ready to leave that country. We've done it many times. When Russia demanded we hand over “encryption keys” to enable surveillance, we refused — and Telegram got banned in Russia. When Iran demanded we block channels of peaceful protesters, we refused — and Telegram got banned in Iran. We are prepared to leave markets that aren’t compatible with our principles, because we are not doing this for money. We are driven by the intention to bring good and defend the basic rights of people, particularly in places where these rights are violated.
All of that does not mean Telegram is perfect. Even the fact that authorities could be confused by where to send requests is something that we should improve. But the claims in some media that Telegram is some sort of anarchic paradise are absolutely untrue. We take down millions of harmful posts and channels every day. We publish daily transparency reports (like this or this ). We have direct hotlines with NGOs to process urgent moderation requests faster.
However, we hear voices saying that it’s not enough. Telegram’s abrupt increase in user count to 950M caused growing pains that made it easier for criminals to abuse our platform. That’s why I made it my personal goal to ensure we significantly improve things in this regard. We’ve already started that process internally, and I will share more details on our progress with you very soon.
I hope that the events of August will result in making Telegram — and the social networking industry as a whole — safer and stronger. Thanks again for your love and memes 🙏
👍3
Qubes Canary 040
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/07/canary-040/
We have published Qubes Canary 040 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 040
---===[ Qubes Canary 040 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is September 06, 2024.
2. There have been 104 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of December 2024. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Fri, 06 Sep 2024 03:19:20 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Rmaych: A Christian Town Trapped between Hezbollah and Israel
DER SPIEGEL's Coverage of Donald Trump: We Have Failed to Tame the Media Monster
Interview with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz: "Pithy Sayings Are Not Part of My Approach to Politics"
War in Sudan: Soup Kitchens Fight against Looming Famine
Warsaw's Palace of Culture: From a Symbol of Oppression to a Symbol of Subversion
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Anti-Polio Campaign in Gaza Enters New Phase, Hours After Deadly Strike
Woman in France Testifies Against Husband Accused of Bringing Men to Rape Her
Boko Haram Kills at Least 170 Villagers in Nigeria Attack
German Police Shoot Gunman Dead Near Israeli Consulate in Munich
Pope Finds Fervent Fans Among Indonesia’s Transgender Community
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
‘Our future is over’: Forced to flee by a year of war
Father of suspect in Georgia school shooting arrested
Hunter Biden makes last-minute guilty plea in tax case
Telegram CEO Durov says his arrest 'misguided'
'Running for her family' - Olympian mourned after vicious attack
Source: Blockchain.info
000000000000000000016d3095d652dbcfd3f4323c3472470b2e0d6f0866774b
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/07/canary-040/
We have published Qubes Canary 040 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 040
---===[ Qubes Canary 040 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is September 06, 2024.
2. There have been 104 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of December 2024. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Fri, 06 Sep 2024 03:19:20 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Rmaych: A Christian Town Trapped between Hezbollah and Israel
DER SPIEGEL's Coverage of Donald Trump: We Have Failed to Tame the Media Monster
Interview with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz: "Pithy Sayings Are Not Part of My Approach to Politics"
War in Sudan: Soup Kitchens Fight against Looming Famine
Warsaw's Palace of Culture: From a Symbol of Oppression to a Symbol of Subversion
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Anti-Polio Campaign in Gaza Enters New Phase, Hours After Deadly Strike
Woman in France Testifies Against Husband Accused of Bringing Men to Rape Her
Boko Haram Kills at Least 170 Villagers in Nigeria Attack
German Police Shoot Gunman Dead Near Israeli Consulate in Munich
Pope Finds Fervent Fans Among Indonesia’s Transgender Community
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
‘Our future is over’: Forced to flee by a year of war
Father of suspect in Georgia school shooting arrested
Hunter Biden makes last-minute guilty plea in tax case
Telegram CEO Durov says his arrest 'misguided'
'Running for her family' - Olympian mourned after vicious attack
Source: Blockchain.info
000000000000000000016d3095d652dbcfd3f4323c3472470b2e0d6f0866774b
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
👍1
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: canary-040-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmbbcV8ACgkQ1lWk8hgw
4Grqjw/+MOTIwNnZkO1oIsx6Qhq9ZeaCzG60q+k9sVy30gRIbAJtVY+rXlKdQiz8
cLq571iZk0SVkm7lH5aQpLKDu1gUNRbQyC+7xzdkvWpqGAVKbdhB2nUCv4yb5yyi
Wgf7zge3yqe2qVCkEowSVptWTKVepGKeQwH01LujmerpgaDv+RhNSEcA0PUVtsNG
vvviiXwBqUkrCFe2M5vsTVOTUd1T2vQscIg/sYDFVY1fv4MQy0KzTMcqYNWDiw1H
Ke+AJksfUccL1FBXFYtxhBrS4fPqGyb41lXF+ue8k8ixKc0dhGdLtAfOhYZF9RNu
7/OZtMlUKrSasrzaBOQRUQ08gG3Gcav4OD0GqAmvJMGdHRj3SuSBAhAuizXt3vkm
Vd2QKtUZ30jJ2OXDhwqm1x6PLXZHBymEvlaRhaIGOeHFKi3kX6izT0uB6uirOWnM
lBXtBnWMQSKbhD3o1EfL5LRolBEjhmyuT9HDruSIecc4vy6dH5tSdj2vptbk8M3Q
b8vO1pX63A7vyEgsaaELSH+SOznFxSxkNW0NiuIeWAS3zs1j4Cd8dY91LFGvUfSb
LMjD6pI/vkvBxfRq2dt2HIAGKz9P3BohVPY4wprRyukxw37W7r2MF08qenA0G3YP
bfF9ocjAe3sqzw1zm79doMGII5U7G15AQgeowXuVqd3B7yn1pHY=
=PSOA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-040-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmbcJoEACgkQSsGN4REu
FJA/PQ//acXenduLRFrCy43B7o9ThtPDuO++fJUCE8bbiamY5pbkyTIFnADkVago
3ToeWVhNvoQYtx0YmGCj4dHfUGIWgOP2CDD6QqSTBMzFxc3EBlw+icHnSf0TXqQV
IhTZ9VGAWnqmiE3VVnBMWOF+W+Lojq6UIzcR6OsKPR6PpqPfEXZxROSunuua1VCx
Shu7/bWESQjjwUtwFMb8FNuSczIJVU7Nn7E24t55yCWWJGFIPsyPkfircmez00kx
gmy7273Gu6OrknPqLSGQ0dewG8qnAeLBvr7kyz/BDzTOyp9Gpmw+cPhwv/FtYcHo
jnvSFD+Tyog+CgR7+u8cYyntfwcidnmfl2FoR9WQiSnzirXbwQXsInJJKm8TCgm9
84CsVfKQujT4W26H71GIxfpAS9+fplM9dD4soBJGsjlYrpRzuQz9569LyAz52qDE
Yzq519pd0LiSnIIY2tgNR6jZw8q0Ud+ORdxUQ2m7I/JH/VMuoszv9VGUUCPOj8Ib
WqfNxQrBwg/wFjfepw/KnbTnXB1NF64tiAYV73sddSE1jGPKTYhrApeako5UDZjv
YPVIZ4wF552wAQbDODQeu3xeRnXen1A+cnHetzNTULyLrzwDQ7O14v+wX2jvPXAH
9pDaUJVLM3OQiFr3Yq8gQLhSJyRSTu1LzE3SenZqTceuvQTmyqA=
=nnrv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-040-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: canary-040-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=PSOA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-040-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=nnrv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-040-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?
Canaries provide an important indication about the security status of the project. If the canary is healthy, it’s a strong sign that things are running normally. However, if the canary is unhealthy, it could mean that the project or its members are being coerced in some way.
What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?
Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Every canary contains the same set of statements (sometimes along with special announcements, which are not the same in every canary). If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.
Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?
No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).
In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it, you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?
What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?
Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Every canary contains the same set of statements (sometimes along with special announcements, which are not the same in every canary). If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.
Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?
No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).
In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it, you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all canaries so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether canaries are genuine. The only way to be certain that a canary is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?
If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced. Falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?
If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced. Falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.