Extended security support for Qubes OS 4.1 has ended
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/), extended security support for Qubes OS 4.1 has ended as of yesterday, 2024-07-31. Qubes 4.1 will no longer receive updates of any kind, including security updates. We strongly recommend that any remaining Qubes 4.1 users upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/) immediately.
Recommended actions
If you’re already using Qubes 4.2, then you don’t have to do anything. This announcement doesn’t affect you.
If you’re still using Qubes 4.1, then you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately. There are two ways to do this:
Perform a clean reinstallation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) using the latest stable Qubes OS 4.2.2 ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/).
Perform an in-place upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/#in-place-upgrade).
Both of these options are covered in further detail in the Qubes 4.1 to 4.2 upgrade guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/). In either case, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand. If you need help, please consult our help and support (https://www.qubes-os.org/support/) page.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/), extended security support for Qubes OS 4.1 has ended as of yesterday, 2024-07-31. Qubes 4.1 will no longer receive updates of any kind, including security updates. We strongly recommend that any remaining Qubes 4.1 users upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/) immediately.
Recommended actions
If you’re already using Qubes 4.2, then you don’t have to do anything. This announcement doesn’t affect you.
If you’re still using Qubes 4.1, then you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately. There are two ways to do this:
Perform a clean reinstallation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) using the latest stable Qubes OS 4.2.2 ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/).
Perform an in-place upgrade to Qubes 4.2 (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/#in-place-upgrade).
Both of these options are covered in further detail in the Qubes 4.1 to 4.2 upgrade guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/). In either case, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand. If you need help, please consult our help and support (https://www.qubes-os.org/support/) page.
Qubes OS Summit 2024: Last call for proposals
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/05/qubes-os-summit-2024-last-call-for-proposals/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/03/13/qubes-os-summit-2024/), this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024) will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. If you would like to submit a proposal, the call for participation (CFP) (https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2024/cfp) closes on 2024-08-07 at 23:59 CEST (UTC+2).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/05/qubes-os-summit-2024-last-call-for-proposals/
As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/03/13/qubes-os-summit-2024/), this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024) will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. If you would like to submit a proposal, the call for participation (CFP) (https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2024/cfp) closes on 2024-08-07 at 23:59 CEST (UTC+2).
Qubes OS Summit 2024: Tickets now available!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/11/qubes-os-summit-2024-tickets-now-available/
You can now get free tickets (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/#tickets) to attend this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024), which will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. Tickets are available for both virtual and on-site attendance. Physical seating is limited, so on-site tickets will be granted on a first-come, first-served basis. (However, please note that failing to attend after obtaining an on-site ticket may prevent you from obtaining other on-site tickets for future events, so please refrain from obtaining an on-site ticket unless you’re serious about joining us in person!)
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/11/qubes-os-summit-2024-tickets-now-available/
You can now get free tickets (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024/#tickets) to attend this year’s Qubes OS Summit (https://vpub.dasharo.com/e/16/qubes-os-summit-2024), which will be held from September 20 to 22 in Berlin, Germany. Tickets are available for both virtual and on-site attendance. Physical seating is limited, so on-site tickets will be granted on a first-come, first-served basis. (However, please note that failing to attend after obtaining an on-site ticket may prevent you from obtaining other on-site tickets for future events, so please refrain from obtaining an on-site ticket unless you’re serious about joining us in person!)
XSAs released on 2024-08-13
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/14/xsas-released-on-2024-08-13/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-460 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-460.html)
Qubes OS does not hot plug/unplug PCI devices.
XSA-461 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-461.html)
The practical impact with the devices Qubes OS uses for passthrough is limited to denial of service only.
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/14/xsas-released-on-2024-08-13/
The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.
XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:
(none)
XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS
The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:
XSA-460 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-460.html)
Qubes OS does not hot plug/unplug PCI devices.
XSA-461 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-461.html)
The practical impact with the devices Qubes OS uses for passthrough is limited to denial of service only.
About this announcement
Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
Telegram CEO Pavel Durov was just arrested at an airport in France after his private jet landed. He was arrested for unjust reasons which shows how corrupt the courts are in France.
Please protest peacefully. Make paper airplanes and throw them in the protests to show your support for Durov! We need everyone to participate. GO!
#FreeDurov
Please protest peacefully. Make paper airplanes and throw them in the protests to show your support for Durov! We need everyone to participate. GO!
#FreeDurov
Telegram
Pavel Durov
Founder of Telegram.
🔥6👍1
Forwarded from Telegram News
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Telegram
Pavel Durov
All large social media apps are easy targets for criticism due to the content they host. I can’t recall any major social platform whose moderation has been consistently praised by traditional media.
The media coverage of Meta's moderation efforts has been…
The media coverage of Meta's moderation efforts has been…
👍5
Forwarded from Pavel Durov (Paul Du Rove)
❤️ Thanks everyone for your support and love!
Last month I got interviewed by police for 4 days after arriving in Paris. I was told I may be personally responsible for other people’s illegal use of Telegram, because the French authorities didn’t receive responses from Telegram.
This was surprising for several reasons:
1. Telegram has an official representative in the EU that accepts and replies to EU requests. Its email address has been publicly available for anyone in the EU who googles “Telegram EU address for law enforcement”.
2. The French authorities had numerous ways to reach me to request assistance. As a French citizen, I was a frequent guest at the French consulate in Dubai. A while ago, when asked, I personally helped them establish a hotline with Telegram to deal with the threat of terrorism in France.
3. If a country is unhappy with an internet service, the established practice is to start a legal action against the service itself. Using laws from the pre-smartphone era to charge a CEO with crimes committed by third parties on the platform he manages is a misguided approach. Building technology is hard enough as it is. No innovator will ever build new tools if they know they can be personally held responsible for potential abuse of those tools.
Establishing the right balance between privacy and security is not easy. You have to reconcile privacy laws with law enforcement requirements, and local laws with EU laws. You have to take into account technological limitations. As a platform, you want your processes to be consistent globally, while also ensuring they are not abused in countries with weak rule of law. We’ve been committed to engaging with regulators to find the right balance. Yes, we stand by our principles: our experience is shaped by our mission to protect our users in authoritarian regimes. But we’ve always been open to dialogue.
Sometimes we can’t agree with a country’s regulator on the right balance between privacy and security. In those cases, we are ready to leave that country. We've done it many times. When Russia demanded we hand over “encryption keys” to enable surveillance, we refused — and Telegram got banned in Russia. When Iran demanded we block channels of peaceful protesters, we refused — and Telegram got banned in Iran. We are prepared to leave markets that aren’t compatible with our principles, because we are not doing this for money. We are driven by the intention to bring good and defend the basic rights of people, particularly in places where these rights are violated.
All of that does not mean Telegram is perfect. Even the fact that authorities could be confused by where to send requests is something that we should improve. But the claims in some media that Telegram is some sort of anarchic paradise are absolutely untrue. We take down millions of harmful posts and channels every day. We publish daily transparency reports (like this or this ). We have direct hotlines with NGOs to process urgent moderation requests faster.
However, we hear voices saying that it’s not enough. Telegram’s abrupt increase in user count to 950M caused growing pains that made it easier for criminals to abuse our platform. That’s why I made it my personal goal to ensure we significantly improve things in this regard. We’ve already started that process internally, and I will share more details on our progress with you very soon.
I hope that the events of August will result in making Telegram — and the social networking industry as a whole — safer and stronger. Thanks again for your love and memes 🙏
Last month I got interviewed by police for 4 days after arriving in Paris. I was told I may be personally responsible for other people’s illegal use of Telegram, because the French authorities didn’t receive responses from Telegram.
This was surprising for several reasons:
1. Telegram has an official representative in the EU that accepts and replies to EU requests. Its email address has been publicly available for anyone in the EU who googles “Telegram EU address for law enforcement”.
2. The French authorities had numerous ways to reach me to request assistance. As a French citizen, I was a frequent guest at the French consulate in Dubai. A while ago, when asked, I personally helped them establish a hotline with Telegram to deal with the threat of terrorism in France.
3. If a country is unhappy with an internet service, the established practice is to start a legal action against the service itself. Using laws from the pre-smartphone era to charge a CEO with crimes committed by third parties on the platform he manages is a misguided approach. Building technology is hard enough as it is. No innovator will ever build new tools if they know they can be personally held responsible for potential abuse of those tools.
Establishing the right balance between privacy and security is not easy. You have to reconcile privacy laws with law enforcement requirements, and local laws with EU laws. You have to take into account technological limitations. As a platform, you want your processes to be consistent globally, while also ensuring they are not abused in countries with weak rule of law. We’ve been committed to engaging with regulators to find the right balance. Yes, we stand by our principles: our experience is shaped by our mission to protect our users in authoritarian regimes. But we’ve always been open to dialogue.
Sometimes we can’t agree with a country’s regulator on the right balance between privacy and security. In those cases, we are ready to leave that country. We've done it many times. When Russia demanded we hand over “encryption keys” to enable surveillance, we refused — and Telegram got banned in Russia. When Iran demanded we block channels of peaceful protesters, we refused — and Telegram got banned in Iran. We are prepared to leave markets that aren’t compatible with our principles, because we are not doing this for money. We are driven by the intention to bring good and defend the basic rights of people, particularly in places where these rights are violated.
All of that does not mean Telegram is perfect. Even the fact that authorities could be confused by where to send requests is something that we should improve. But the claims in some media that Telegram is some sort of anarchic paradise are absolutely untrue. We take down millions of harmful posts and channels every day. We publish daily transparency reports (like this or this ). We have direct hotlines with NGOs to process urgent moderation requests faster.
However, we hear voices saying that it’s not enough. Telegram’s abrupt increase in user count to 950M caused growing pains that made it easier for criminals to abuse our platform. That’s why I made it my personal goal to ensure we significantly improve things in this regard. We’ve already started that process internally, and I will share more details on our progress with you very soon.
I hope that the events of August will result in making Telegram — and the social networking industry as a whole — safer and stronger. Thanks again for your love and memes 🙏
👍3
Qubes Canary 040
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/07/canary-040/
We have published Qubes Canary 040 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 040
---===[ Qubes Canary 040 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is September 06, 2024.
2. There have been 104 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of December 2024. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Fri, 06 Sep 2024 03:19:20 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Rmaych: A Christian Town Trapped between Hezbollah and Israel
DER SPIEGEL's Coverage of Donald Trump: We Have Failed to Tame the Media Monster
Interview with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz: "Pithy Sayings Are Not Part of My Approach to Politics"
War in Sudan: Soup Kitchens Fight against Looming Famine
Warsaw's Palace of Culture: From a Symbol of Oppression to a Symbol of Subversion
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Anti-Polio Campaign in Gaza Enters New Phase, Hours After Deadly Strike
Woman in France Testifies Against Husband Accused of Bringing Men to Rape Her
Boko Haram Kills at Least 170 Villagers in Nigeria Attack
German Police Shoot Gunman Dead Near Israeli Consulate in Munich
Pope Finds Fervent Fans Among Indonesia’s Transgender Community
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
‘Our future is over’: Forced to flee by a year of war
Father of suspect in Georgia school shooting arrested
Hunter Biden makes last-minute guilty plea in tax case
Telegram CEO Durov says his arrest 'misguided'
'Running for her family' - Olympian mourned after vicious attack
Source: Blockchain.info
000000000000000000016d3095d652dbcfd3f4323c3472470b2e0d6f0866774b
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/07/canary-040/
We have published Qubes Canary 040 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.
Qubes Canary 040
---===[ Qubes Canary 040 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is September 06, 2024.
2. There have been 104 Qubes security bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of December 2024. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.
The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Fri, 06 Sep 2024 03:19:20 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Rmaych: A Christian Town Trapped between Hezbollah and Israel
DER SPIEGEL's Coverage of Donald Trump: We Have Failed to Tame the Media Monster
Interview with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz: "Pithy Sayings Are Not Part of My Approach to Politics"
War in Sudan: Soup Kitchens Fight against Looming Famine
Warsaw's Palace of Culture: From a Symbol of Oppression to a Symbol of Subversion
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Anti-Polio Campaign in Gaza Enters New Phase, Hours After Deadly Strike
Woman in France Testifies Against Husband Accused of Bringing Men to Rape Her
Boko Haram Kills at Least 170 Villagers in Nigeria Attack
German Police Shoot Gunman Dead Near Israeli Consulate in Munich
Pope Finds Fervent Fans Among Indonesia’s Transgender Community
Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
‘Our future is over’: Forced to flee by a year of war
Father of suspect in Georgia school shooting arrested
Hunter Biden makes last-minute guilty plea in tax case
Telegram CEO Durov says his arrest 'misguided'
'Running for her family' - Olympian mourned after vicious attack
Source: Blockchain.info
000000000000000000016d3095d652dbcfd3f4323c3472470b2e0d6f0866774b
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
👍1
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: canary-040-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=PSOA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-040-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=nnrv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-040-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
Source: canary-040-2024.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=PSOA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-040-2024.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt.sig.marmarek)
Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=nnrv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Source: canary-040-2024.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/9a163fdc4bfb44c6f89580131e68b4d426e0e2a0/canaries/canary-040-2024.txt.sig.simon)
What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.
What is a Qubes canary?
A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/).
The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)
Why should I care about canaries?
Canaries provide an important indication about the security status of the project. If the canary is healthy, it’s a strong sign that things are running normally. However, if the canary is unhealthy, it could mean that the project or its members are being coerced in some way.
What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?
Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Every canary contains the same set of statements (sometimes along with special announcements, which are not the same in every canary). If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.
Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?
No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).
In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it, you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?
What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?
Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Every canary contains the same set of statements (sometimes along with special announcements, which are not the same in every canary). If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.
Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?
No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:
Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).
In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it, you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.
What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?
A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all canaries so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether canaries are genuine. The only way to be certain that a canary is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?
If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced. Falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?
If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced. Falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.
How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)
Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)
View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.
Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (Qubes Canary 040), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify canary-040-2024.txt.sig.marmarek canary-040-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-040-2024.txt.sig.simon canary-040-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 040 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.
Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (Qubes Canary 040), the commands are:
$ gpg --verify canary-040-2024.txt.sig.marmarek canary-040-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-040-2024.txt.sig.simon canary-040-2024.txt
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 040 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/10/qubes-os-4-2-3-rc1-available-for-testing/
We’re pleased to announce that the first release candidate (RC) for Qubes OS 4.2.3 is now available for testing. This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.3?
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed+reason%3Acompleted+closed%3A2024-03-26..2024-09-09+-label%3A%22R%3A+cannot+reproduce%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+declined%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+duplicate%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+not+applicable%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+self-closed%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+upstream+issue%22).
When is the stable release?
That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this RC and their severity. As explained in our release schedule (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/#release-schedule) documentation, our usual process after issuing a new RC is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. If warranted, we then issue a new RC that includes the fixes and repeat the process. We continue this iterative procedure until we’re left with an RC that’s good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many RCs will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this as testing progresses.
Testing Qubes 4.2.3-rc1
If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this new RC, you can help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We encourage experienced users to join the testing team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190). The best way to test Qubes 4.2.3-rc1 is by performing a clean installation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) with the new ISO. We strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
As an alternative to a clean installation, there is also the option of performing an in-place upgrade without reinstalling. However, since Qubes 4.2.3 is simply Qubes 4.2 inclusive of all updates to date, this amounts to simply using a fully-updated 4.2 installation. In a sense, then, all current 4.2 users who are keeping up with updates are already testing 4.2.3-rc1, but this testing is only partial, since it does not cover things like the installation procedure.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
We’re pleased to announce that the first release candidate (RC) for Qubes OS 4.2.3 is now available for testing. This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.3?
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed+reason%3Acompleted+closed%3A2024-03-26..2024-09-09+-label%3A%22R%3A+cannot+reproduce%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+declined%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+duplicate%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+not+applicable%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+self-closed%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+upstream+issue%22).
When is the stable release?
That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this RC and their severity. As explained in our release schedule (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/#release-schedule) documentation, our usual process after issuing a new RC is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. If warranted, we then issue a new RC that includes the fixes and repeat the process. We continue this iterative procedure until we’re left with an RC that’s good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many RCs will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this as testing progresses.
Testing Qubes 4.2.3-rc1
If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this new RC, you can help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We encourage experienced users to join the testing team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190). The best way to test Qubes 4.2.3-rc1 is by performing a clean installation (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/) with the new ISO. We strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
As an alternative to a clean installation, there is also the option of performing an in-place upgrade without reinstalling. However, since Qubes 4.2.3 is simply Qubes 4.2 inclusive of all updates to date, this amounts to simply using a fully-updated 4.2 installation. In a sense, then, all current 4.2 users who are keeping up with updates are already testing 4.2.3-rc1, but this testing is only partial, since it does not cover things like the installation procedure.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What is a release candidate?
A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. RCs are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) and the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) in our documentation.
What is a patch release?
The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.2) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing the initial Qubes 4.2.0 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.2.3. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.
As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys) the Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/) as well as on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What is a release candidate?
A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. RCs are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) and the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) in our documentation.
What is a patch release?
The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.2) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing the initial Qubes 4.2.0 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.2.3. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.
Fedora 39 approaching end-of-life
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/13/fedora-39-approaching-end-of-life/
Fedora 39 is currently scheduled (https://fedorapeople.org/groups/schedule/f-39/f-39-key-tasks.html) to reach end-of-life (EOL) (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life) on 2024-11-12 (approximately two months from now). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol).
There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/13/fedora-39-approaching-end-of-life/
Fedora 39 is currently scheduled (https://fedorapeople.org/groups/schedule/f-39/f-39-key-tasks.html) to reach end-of-life (EOL) (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life) on 2024-11-12 (approximately two months from now). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol).
There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:
Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing) This option may be simpler for less experienced users. After you install the new template, redo all desired template modifications and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching). You may want to write down the modifications you make to your templates so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/in-place-upgrade/) This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.
Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol)).
👍2
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/09/17/qubes-os-4-2-3-has-been-released/
We’re pleased to announce the stable release of Qubes OS 4.2.3! This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.3?
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed+reason%3Acompleted+closed%3A2024-03-26..2024-09-09+-label%3A%22R%3A+cannot+reproduce%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+declined%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+duplicate%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+not+applicable%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+self-closed%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+upstream+issue%22).
How to get Qubes 4.2.3
You have a couple different options, depending on your situation:
If you’d like to install Qubes OS for the first time or perform a clean reinstallation on an existing system, there’s never been a better time to do so! Simply download (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) the Qubes 4.2.3 ISO and follow our installation guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/).
If you’re currently on Qubes 4.2 (including 4.2.0, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3-rc1), update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) (which includes upgrading any EOL templates (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol) you might have) in order to make your system essentially equivalent to the stable Qubes 4.2.3 release. No reinstallation or other special action is required.
Please note that Qubes 4.1 has reached end-of-life (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/) and extended security support for Qubes 4.1 has ended (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/). If you’re still on Qubes 4.1 or an earlier release, you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/).
In all cases, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder for those upgrading from Qubes 4.1 and earlier, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).
We’re pleased to announce the stable release of Qubes OS 4.2.3! This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.
What’s new in Qubes 4.2.3?
All security updates to date
All bug fixes to date
For more information about the changes included in this version, see the Qubes OS 4.2 release notes (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.2/release-notes/) and the full list of issues completed since the previous stable release (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed+reason%3Acompleted+closed%3A2024-03-26..2024-09-09+-label%3A%22R%3A+cannot+reproduce%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+declined%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+duplicate%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+not+applicable%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+self-closed%22+-label%3A%22R%3A+upstream+issue%22).
How to get Qubes 4.2.3
You have a couple different options, depending on your situation:
If you’d like to install Qubes OS for the first time or perform a clean reinstallation on an existing system, there’s never been a better time to do so! Simply download (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) the Qubes 4.2.3 ISO and follow our installation guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/).
If you’re currently on Qubes 4.2 (including 4.2.0, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3-rc1), update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) (which includes upgrading any EOL templates (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/#upgrading-to-avoid-eol) you might have) in order to make your system essentially equivalent to the stable Qubes 4.2.3 release. No reinstallation or other special action is required.
Please note that Qubes 4.1 has reached end-of-life (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/06/18/qubes-os-4-1-has-reached-end-of-life-extended-security-support-continues-until-2024-07-31/) and extended security support for Qubes 4.1 has ended (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/08/01/extended-security-support-for-qubes-os-4-1-has-ended/). If you’re still on Qubes 4.1 or an earlier release, you should upgrade to Qubes 4.2 immediately (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.2/).
In all cases, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) beforehand.
Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2
As a reminder for those upgrading from Qubes 4.1 and earlier, we published the following special announcement in Qubes Canary 032 (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/) on 2022-09-14:
We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.
As always, we encourage you to authenticate (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-and-authenticate) this canary by verifying its PGP signatures (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/). Specific instructions are also included in the canary announcement (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/09/14/canary-032/).