🎙️Комментарий Посольства России в Норвегии для газеты «Известия» (23 декабря 2025 г.)

❓Власти Финляндии намерены в 2026 г. завершить строительство забора на границе с Россией. Ранее схожие заявления делались в Осло. Ведет ли Норвегия подготовку к укреплению границы с Российской Федерацией? Если да, то как на это ответит Россия? 

💬 Ответ: Действительно, некоторое время назад здесь обсуждалось строительство заградительного забора на границе с Россией, однако из-за предполагаемых высоких финансовых затрат (протяженность госграницы между Россией и Норвегией составляет 197,7 км.) эта инициатива была отклонена. В 2023 г. в Осло также не пошли по финскому сценарию и не стали закрывать единственный на границе пункт пропуска. В настоящее время усилия норвежцев по укреплению погранконтроля направлены на модернизацию существующей системы наблюдения по периметру границы, включая установку новых вышек, датчиков обнаружения и использование беспилотников. Соответствующие мероприятия финансируются по линии ЕС. 

В целом, несмотря на отдельные пропагандистские заявления о якобы исходящей с российской стороны угрозы в виде «управляемой» миграции, в Осло на практике заинтересованы в укреплении и развитии взаимодействия с нами в сфере обеспечения безопасности российско-норвежской границы. Это подтверждается в ходе плановых совместных мероприятий и регулярных встреч представителей погранслужб России и Норвегии.

❓Собирается ли Норвегия увеличить военную поддержку Украины в 2026 году? На чем специализируется Осло? 

💬 Ответ: В госбюджете Норвегии на 2026 г. предусмотрены ассигнования на содействие Киеву на уровне текущего года – 85 млрд.крон/ 8,3 млрд.долл. Из них 70 млрд.крон/ 6,85 млрд.долл. – на военную помощь. Остальные 15 млрд.крон/ 1,45 млрд.долл. (на 2,5 млрд.крон/ 245 млн.долл. больше, чем в этом году) предназначены на гражданские нужды Украины, а также соседней Молдавии (сколько достанется Кишиневу, не конкретизировано). Общий объем «Программы Нансена для Украины» в 2023–2030 гг. увеличился до 274,5 млрд.крон/ 26,9 млрд.долл.

В 2026 г. на безвозмездную передачу ВСУ вооружений и военной техники из наличия ВС Норвегии заложено 2 млрд.крон/196 млн.долл., в то время как соответствующие поставки в 2022–2025 гг. оценены в 18,2 млрд.крон/ 1,8 млрд.долл. Как здесь признают, собственные запасы списанных и излишних ВиВТ существенно истощились. 
Все более значительная часть норвежского финансирования идет на совместные с другими европейскими странами НАТО закупки американских ВиВТ и боеприпасов для Украины по линии таких многосторонних механизмов, как Prioritized Ukraine Requirement List (PURL) и JUMPSTART. 

В следующем году норвежская военпомощь Киеву будет оказываться по следующим приоритетным направлениям: 

1. Продолжение содействия по линии возглавляемой Осло совместно с Лондоном военно-морской «коалиции», в которой Норвегия фокусируется на создании «морской флотилии», обучении ВСУ проведению речных операций, НИОКР и налаживании масштабного производства автономных устройств – безэкипажных катеров и подводных аппаратов, где у норвежцев есть передовые наработки; 

2. Обеспечение средствами ПВО через международные инициативы и военно-техническое сотрудничество с Украиной; 

3. Укрепление потенциала БПЛА по линии профильной «коалиции» и двустороннего промышленного сотрудничества; 

4. Приобретение артиллерийских боеприпасов через многосторонние механизмы и укрепление производственных мощностей Украины; 

5. Прямые закупки у ВПК Украины и совместные проекты по т.н. «норвежской модели»; 

6. Содействие наращиванию военно-промышленного потенциала Европы посредством реализации «дорожной карты» стимулирования национального ВПК и участия в европейских программах; 

7. Продолжение обучения и тренировок украинских военнослужащих на уровне текущего года в рамках операции «Легион» в Польше, а также на территории Норвегии (операция «Гунгнир») и других стран (прежде всего, операция Interflex в Великобритании). 

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🎙️Kommentar fra Russlands ambassade i Norge til avisen Izvestia (23. desember 2025)

❓De finske myndighetene har til hensikt å fullføre byggingen av et gjerde på grensen til Russland i 2026. Forbereder Norge seg på å styrke grensen til Russland? Hvis ja, hvordan vil Russland reagere? 

💬 Svar: For en tid siden ble det faktisk diskutert å bygge et gjerde langs grensen til Russland, men på grunn av de anslåtte høye kostnadene (statsgrensen mellom Russland og Norge er 197,7 km lang) ble dette initiativet forkastet. I 2023 besluttet Oslo også å ikke følge Finlands elsempel og stengte ikke den eneste grenseovergangen. For tiden er norske tiltak for å styrke grensekontrollen fokusert på å modernisere det eksisterende overvåkingssystemet, inkludert installasjon av nye tårn, deteksjonssensorer og bruk av droner. De relevante tiltakene finansieres av EU.

Generelt sett er Norge, til tross for propagandauttalelser om en “trussel fra Russland” i form av «regissert» migrasjon, faktisk interessert i å styrke og utvikle samarbeidet med oss for å sikre sikkerheten ved den russisk-norske grensen. Dette bekreftes av planlagte fellesaktiviteter og regelmessige møter mellom representanter for russiske og norske grensemyndigheter.

❓Har Norge planer om å øke sin militære støtte til Ukraina i 2026? Hva fokuserer Oslo på?

💬 Svar: Norges statsbudsjett for 2026 inneholder bevilgninger for å bistå Kiev på samme nivå som i inneværende år – 85 milliarder kroner/8,3 milliarder dollar. Av dette er 70 milliarder kroner/6,85 milliarder dollar øremerket militær bistand. De resterende 15 milliarder kroner (1,45 milliarder dollar), som er 2,5 milliarder kroner (245 millioner dollar) mer enn i år, er øremerket sivile behov i Ukraina og nabolandet Moldova (beløpet som er bevilget til Chisinau er ikke spesifisert). Det totale volumet av Nansen-programmet for Ukraina i 2023–2030 er økt til 274,5 milliarder kroner/26,9 milliarder dollar.

I 2026 er det bevilget 2 milliarder kroner/196 millioner dollar til gratis overføring av våpen og militært utstyr fra det norske forsvaret til det ukrainske forsvaret, mens tilsvarende leveranser i 2022–2025 er estimert til 18,2 milliarder kroner/ 1,8 milliarder dollar. Som erkjent her, er Norges egne lagre av avviklet og overskudds militært utstyr betydelig redusert. 
En stadig større del av den norske finansieringen går til felles innkjøp med andre europeiske NATO-land av amerikansk militært utstyr og ammunisjon til Ukraina gjennom multilaterale mekanismer som PURL og JUMPSTART. 

Neste år vil norsk militær bistand til Kiev bli gitt på følgende prioriterte områder: 

1. Bistand gjennom den marinekoalisjonen med London, hvor Norge fokuserer på å opprette en «marineflotilje», trene Ukrainas væpnede styrker i elveoperasjoner, teknologi og etablering av storskala produksjon av droner – ubemannede båter og undervannsfartøyer, hvor Norge har avansert kompetanse. 

2. Levering av luftvernsystemer gjennom internasjonale initiativer og militærteknisk samarbeid med Ukraina.

3. Styrking av dronepotensialet gjennom en spesialisert «dronekoalisjon» og bilateralt industrisamarbeid.
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4. Anskaffelse av artilleriammunisjon gjennom multilaterale mekanismer og styrking av Ukrainas produksjonskapasitet. 

5. Direkte kjøp fra Ukrainas forsvarsindustri og fellesprosjekter basert på den såkalte «norske modellen».

6. Bistand til å bygge opp Europas militærindustrielle potensial ved å implementere en «veikart» for å stimulere den nasjonale forsvarsindustrien og delta i europeiske programmer. 

7. Opplæring av ukrainsk militærpersonell på samme nivå som i år som en del av Operasjon Legion i Polen, samt i Norge (Operasjon Gungnir) og andre land (primært Operasjon Interflex i Storbritannia). 

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🎙 Russian MFA Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova's answer to a media question regarding the practice of applying unilateral coercive measures (December 26, 2025)

❓ Question: How would you comment on the differences in approaches between the “collective West” and the Global Majority to the use of unilateral coercive measures in contemporary international relations?

💬 Maria Zakharova: This practice runs counter to the UN Charter, which vests the exclusive prerogative to impose measures of this nature in the UN Security Council, and only in cases involving threats to peace and security.

In this context, the use of unilateral coercive measures (UCMs) constitutes an encroachment on the unique powers of the UN Security Council. It is well known that the “collective West” routinely resorts to this practice, most often driven by geopolitical considerations.

UCMs represent a serious obstacle to the formation of a just and equitable polycentric world order.

They serve as one of the main instruments of the neocolonial policy of the “collective West”, the goal of which is evident – to preserve its slipping dominance, deprive the countries of the Global Majority of their right to an independent political choice, and slow down their economic, technological and industrial development.

Attempts by the initiators of UCMs to portray them as a “peaceful means of dispute settlement” do not withstand criticism. It is well known that, by hindering the full-fledged socio-economic development of the countries of the Global South and East, unilateral coercive measures undermine efforts to resolve crisis situations. Their indiscriminate nature violates fundamental human rights and freedoms, first and foremost affecting the most vulnerable segments of the population – a fact repeatedly condemned in resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council.

At the forefront of efforts to counter UCMs within the United Nations stands the Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter, which includes the Russian Fededation.

Among the Group’s unquestionable achievements in this area is the adoption, at its initiative, of an entire package of UN General Assembly documents, including Resolution 78/329, which shifted the General Assembly debates on unilateral coercive measures from a three-year to a two-year cycle, as well as Resolution 79/293, adopted in June this year, which proclaimed December 4 as the International Day against Unilateral Coercive Measures.

It is important that the Group’s steps to counter this unlawful practice are part of a broader anti-neocolonial front. It was at the Group’s initiative that the UN General Assembly adopted the principled Resolutions 79/115, “Eradication of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations”, and 80/106, which proclaimed December 14 as the International Day against Colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

❗️ We are confident that in a truly just multipolar architecture of international relations – which we all aspire to build – there is no place for coercion or neocolonial hegemony. Together with our partners – responsible members of the Global Majority – we will continue the fight against all remnants of the shameful colonial era.

#StopColonialism

🇷🇺 Key foreign policy outcomes of 2025

#Outcomes2025

In 2025, Russia made a significant contribution to strengthening the foundations of a just multipolar world order based on international law and cooperation between countries. Decisive steps were taken to protect the country’s vital national interests on the external front, with a focus on the CIS countries and Eurasia.

This year marked the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory. Alongside its like-minded international partners, Russia reaffirmed its commitment to inviolability of the post-war world order and its foundation in the form of the full body of principles enshrined in the UN Charter understood as an indivisible and interdependent whole.

• In the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2025 was declared the Year of Peace and Unity in the Fight against Nazism.

• A solemn General Assembly session to commemorate WWII victims was held at Russia’s initiative at the New York UN headquarters in May. An annual resolution on combatting glorification of Nazism and neo-Nazism co-sponsored by 44 countries was adopted in December.

• Comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction between Russia and China received a strong boost thanks to successful leader diplomacy by President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping and reciprocal visits to Moscow in May and to Beijing in September.

• After the new US administration came to the White House in January, political dialogue with Washington at the top levels was restored. During the Russia-US summit in Anchorage on August 15, understandings were reached that could form the basis for resolving the Ukraine conflict by addressing its underlying causes, including military threats to Russia created by NATO expansion and policies undermining the rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking populations.

• Relations with North Korea took on a new dimension, with the DPRK providing allied assistance in liberating the Kursk Region from Ukrainian militants and contributing significantly to creating proper conditions for the region’s return to peaceful life, in accordance with the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.

• A new stage in relations with Iran was marked by the signing in January and entry into force in October of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.

• Tangible results were achieved in supporting integration processes in Eurasia.

• Within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), priority tasks were identified for implementing the collective security strategy, steps were taken to strengthen the combat readiness of collective forces, and an anti-narcotics strategy through 2030 was approved.

• On December 14, at the initiative of Russia and other member states of the Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter, the UN General Assembly proclaimed the International Day for the Elimination of Colonialism in all its forms, and on December 4, the International Day for Combatting Unilateral Coercive Measures.

• Measures taken to protect Orthodox Christianity and other Russian religions and denominations created favourable conditions for the resettlement of foreign nationals, including from countries with unfriendly governments, to our country under the framework of the Presidential Executive Order On Providing Humanitarian Support to Individuals Sharing Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values.

• Efforts to combat the spread of untruthful information about Russia in foreign printed and social media intensified, including through cooperation with our international partners within the International Fact-Checking Network.

❗️ The firm defence of national interests in relations with the countries whose governments undertake hostile anti-Russian actions forced them to recognise the impossibility of inflicting on Russia a “strategic defeat on the battlefield” and led them to adopt a concept of an immediate cessation of hostilities in the Ukrainian theatre of operations.

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