About the alleged first defeat of the Su-57 fighter jet in the Astrakhan region.

The 🔺GUR of Ukraine claims that the defeat of the fighter jet took place on June 8, 2024 at the Akhtubinsk airfield.

What are we talking about?

Over the past 24 hours, the Ukrainian side has been citing alleged satellite images of the airplane's parking lot at the airfield. These images show that on June 7, the fifth-generation fighter jet stands on the runway without damage, and the next day craters from an explosion and characteristic burning stains appeared near it, probably from the arrival of a drone.

What data is available for analysis?

The distance from the possible launch site to the airfield in Akhtubinsk is 646 kilometers. Given that a range of 1,000 km is not a problem for modern drones, this is a realistic version.

Shortly before the reported attack on Akhtubinsk, there was an attempt to hit the airfield in Mozdok. It is highly probable that these events are connected.

How could the Su-57 have ended up in Akhtubinsk? The 929th State Flight Test Center named after V.P. Chkalov is located there. While still a prototype under the T-50 index, the fifth-generation fighter was tested there. It is not known how many machines are there, but most likely we are talking about either prototypes being tested or mock-ups for equipment development.

What's the bottom line?

The airfield site in Akhtubinsk is declared by the Ukrainian side as a military airfield, but in fact, the Chkalov Flight Center is more of a research facility. It is not known about the performance of regular combat sorties from its territory, but this does not mean that they did not take place.

If the Su-57 hit had been a strike against formation fighters, the satellite images would probably show a group of machines and ground-based airfield equipment. The photos provided by the GSD clearly show only one vehicle and some equipment, the origin of which is unclear.

Apparently, the test site is perceived by the Ukrainian side as a suitable object for a media strike (with no consequences on the battlefield), and the defense of such a facility should be approached in the same way as conventional military airfields: hangars, electronic warfare complexes and mobile firing groups.

Military Chronicle

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@Slavyangrad | Andrei 👋

Kharkov area attack

Are we looking at a trap? The first thing that comes to mind when looking at the Russian Kharkov excursion. It was obvious from the start that the assembled forces were not big enough for a genuine offensive in this area but were big enough to create a crisis, forcing Ukrainians to react and give battle, to prevent the excursion from developing into something more serious. As already parroted multiple times, UA transferred reserves, significantly weakening another sectors of the front line. What we are seeing now is an attempt to counterattack the Russian grouping, with success at Liptsy, but that is about it for now. What encourages is the methodical destruction of rear lines, especially roads and bridges, which is starting to isolate the entire operational area, leaving, also for now, just a few roads which are under the fire of artillery and/or aviation, still not under proper impact but that can change and create choke points. Practically, the geographical pocket is being formed around big UA grouping. Moreover, AFU can't afford to lose more ground here since that would create a danger for their big group in the Kupyansk area, 50.000 strong which rear will be exposed. From the other side, the big Russian group is being assembled in the border areas, with estimates ranging from 30.000-50.000 men. Now, the speculative part unfortunately coming. The new Russian group, or the main part of the group North, can go to Sumy or Chernigov regions, creating another big crisis for stretched AFU troops. As in the first scenario, it doesn't need to have ambitious goals, except provoking and giving battle, depleting Ukrainian resources even more. The second option would be supporting and enlarging the grouping fighting in the Volchansk, thus creating local superiority, which would in turn allow defeat or retreat of AFU further back, which, as told, open road to get into the rear of the Kupyansk group of Ukrainian troops. Whatever goal is chosen, it would be very unpleasant for Ukraine's high command, which is already patchworking front lines almost everywhere. Transfer of troops to new hotspots will weaken already depleted units facing Russian Army groups West, North and South. Perspective isn't good, and whatever the Russian high command decides to implement, it will have heavy consequences for AFU. Don't expect blitzkrieg type of warfare since the time of those is finished, at least on this front, because of the massive use of drones. But it doesn't need to be fast and lightning, as long as it serves the overall strategic picture which is to bleed AFU dry. An interesting summer is ahead. SMO may be finally entered in its closing stage. And, to be honest, Ukraine's resolve to hold onto every piece of land is actually a perfect thing for us. Zelensky, for political reasons, is doing us a favour.

Personal opinion. M | 😏

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