Forwarded from Донецкое агентство новостей
⚡️ВСУ прицельно били по центру Донецка в новогоднюю ночь
Прилеты зафиксированы в самом центре столицы Республики, в том числе на главной площади города возле памятнику Ленину, где люди традиционно встречают Новый год.
По последним данным, убиты четыре человека, ранены 13. Также сообщалось, что в числе погибших и раненых есть журналисты.
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Прилеты зафиксированы в самом центре столицы Республики, в том числе на главной площади города возле памятнику Ленину, где люди традиционно встречают Новый год.
По последним данным, убиты четыре человека, ранены 13. Также сообщалось, что в числе погибших и раненых есть журналисты.
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Forwarded from Readovka
❗️Журналист погиб в центре Донецка при обстреле со стороны ВСУ, еще один ранен — оперативные службы ДНР
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Forwarded from Sputnik International
❗️ The death toll from Ukraine’s strike on Donetsk rises to 4 people, 13 others injured, head of the Donetsk People's Republic Denis Pushilin said.
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Forwarded from /CIG/ Telegram | Counter Intelligence Global (FRANCISCVS)
⚓️ 🇺🇸 🇾🇪 The U.S. Navy is Unprepared for a Prolonged War with Yemen pt1
🔶️ Tiny Yemen has surprised the West with its tenacity and ferocity in attacking ships trying to ferry containers and fuel to Israel.
🔶️ Before explaining the risks, you must understand that the U.S. Navy is configured currently as a “Forward-Based Navy” and is not an “Expeditionary Navy.” Anthony Cowden, writing for the Center for International Maritime Security in September, examined this issue in his article, REBALANCE THE FLEET TOWARD BEING A TRULY EXPEDITIONARY NAVY.
🔶️ Due to the unique geographical position of the U.S., the Navy has the luxury of defending the nation’s interests “over there.” Since World War II, it developed and maintained a navy that was able to project power overseas; to reconstitute its combat power while still at sea or at least far from national shores; and continuously maintain proximity to competitors. This expeditionary character minimized the dependence of the fleet on shore-based and homeland-based infrastructure to sustain operations, allowing the fleet to be more logistically self-sufficient at sea.
🔶️ However, late in the Cold War, the U.S. Navy started to diminish its expeditionary capability, and became more reliant on allied and friendly bases. A key development was subtle but consequential – the vertical launch system (VLS) for the surface fleet’s primary anti-air, anti-submarine, and land-attack weapons. While a very capable system, reloading VLS at sea was problematic and soon abandoned. While an aircraft carrier can be rearmed at sea, surface warships cannot, which constrains the ability of carrier strike groups to sustain forward operations without taking frequent trips back to fixed infrastructure. The Navy is revisiting the issue of reloading VLS at sea, and those efforts should be reinforced.
🔶️ The next step the Navy took away from an expeditionary capability was in the 1990s, when it decommissioned most of the submarine tenders (AS), all of the repair ships (AR), and destroyer tenders (AD), and moved away from Sailor-manned Shore Intermediate Maintenance Centers (SIMA). Not only did this eliminate the ability to conduct intermediate maintenance “over there,” but it destroyed the progression of apprentice-to-journeyman-to-master technician that made the U.S. Navy Sailor one of the premier maintenance resources in the military world. Combat search and rescue, salvage, and battle damage repair are other areas in which the U.S. Navy no longer has sufficient capability for sustaining expeditionary operations.
🔶️ Each U.S. destroyer carries an estimated 90 missiles (perhaps a few more). Their primary mission is to protect the U.S. aircraft carrier they are shielding. What happens when Yemen fires 100 drones/rockets/missiles at a U.S. carrier? The U.S. destroyer, or multiple destroyers will fire their missiles to defeat the threat. Great. Mission accomplished! Only one little problem, as described in the preceding quote — the U.S. Navy got rid of the ship tenders, i.e. those vessels capable of resupplying destroyers with new missiles to replace the expended rounds. In order to reload, that destroyer must sail to the nearest friendly port where the U.S. has stockpiled missiles for resupply.
🔶️ If the destroyer must sail away then the U.S. carrier must follow. It cannot just sit out in the ocean without its defensive screen of ships. The staying power of a U.S. fleet in a combat zone, like Yemen, is a function of how many missiles the Yemenis fire at the U.S. ships.
https://sonar21.com/the-u-s-navy-is-unprepared-for-a-prolonged-war-with-yemen/
🔶️ Tiny Yemen has surprised the West with its tenacity and ferocity in attacking ships trying to ferry containers and fuel to Israel.
🔶️ Before explaining the risks, you must understand that the U.S. Navy is configured currently as a “Forward-Based Navy” and is not an “Expeditionary Navy.” Anthony Cowden, writing for the Center for International Maritime Security in September, examined this issue in his article, REBALANCE THE FLEET TOWARD BEING A TRULY EXPEDITIONARY NAVY.
🔶️ Due to the unique geographical position of the U.S., the Navy has the luxury of defending the nation’s interests “over there.” Since World War II, it developed and maintained a navy that was able to project power overseas; to reconstitute its combat power while still at sea or at least far from national shores; and continuously maintain proximity to competitors. This expeditionary character minimized the dependence of the fleet on shore-based and homeland-based infrastructure to sustain operations, allowing the fleet to be more logistically self-sufficient at sea.
🔶️ However, late in the Cold War, the U.S. Navy started to diminish its expeditionary capability, and became more reliant on allied and friendly bases. A key development was subtle but consequential – the vertical launch system (VLS) for the surface fleet’s primary anti-air, anti-submarine, and land-attack weapons. While a very capable system, reloading VLS at sea was problematic and soon abandoned. While an aircraft carrier can be rearmed at sea, surface warships cannot, which constrains the ability of carrier strike groups to sustain forward operations without taking frequent trips back to fixed infrastructure. The Navy is revisiting the issue of reloading VLS at sea, and those efforts should be reinforced.
🔶️ The next step the Navy took away from an expeditionary capability was in the 1990s, when it decommissioned most of the submarine tenders (AS), all of the repair ships (AR), and destroyer tenders (AD), and moved away from Sailor-manned Shore Intermediate Maintenance Centers (SIMA). Not only did this eliminate the ability to conduct intermediate maintenance “over there,” but it destroyed the progression of apprentice-to-journeyman-to-master technician that made the U.S. Navy Sailor one of the premier maintenance resources in the military world. Combat search and rescue, salvage, and battle damage repair are other areas in which the U.S. Navy no longer has sufficient capability for sustaining expeditionary operations.
🔶️ Each U.S. destroyer carries an estimated 90 missiles (perhaps a few more). Their primary mission is to protect the U.S. aircraft carrier they are shielding. What happens when Yemen fires 100 drones/rockets/missiles at a U.S. carrier? The U.S. destroyer, or multiple destroyers will fire their missiles to defeat the threat. Great. Mission accomplished! Only one little problem, as described in the preceding quote — the U.S. Navy got rid of the ship tenders, i.e. those vessels capable of resupplying destroyers with new missiles to replace the expended rounds. In order to reload, that destroyer must sail to the nearest friendly port where the U.S. has stockpiled missiles for resupply.
🔶️ If the destroyer must sail away then the U.S. carrier must follow. It cannot just sit out in the ocean without its defensive screen of ships. The staying power of a U.S. fleet in a combat zone, like Yemen, is a function of how many missiles the Yemenis fire at the U.S. ships.
https://sonar21.com/the-u-s-navy-is-unprepared-for-a-prolonged-war-with-yemen/
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Forwarded from /CIG/ Telegram | Counter Intelligence Global (FRANCISCVS)
⚓️ 🇺🇸 🇾🇪 The U.S. Navy is Unprepared for a Prolonged War with Yemen pt2
🔶️ Each of the Aegis missiles, as I noted in my previous post, cost at least $500,000 dollars. A retired U.S. DOD official told me today that the actual cost is $2 million dollars. If Yemen opts to use drone swarms to saturate the battle space around a carrier, then the United States will firing very expensive missiles to destroy relatively inexpensive drones. This brings up another critical vulnerability — the U.S. only has a limited supply of these air defense missiles and does not have the industrial capability in place and operating to produce new ones rapidly to make up the deficit.
🔶️ Then there is the problem of finding the mobile missile platforms in Yemen. Remember the problems the United States had in Iraq in 1991 trying to find and destroy SCUD missile launch systems? While ISR systems are better today, there is still no guarantee of being able to locate and destroy in a timely manner. The Yemenis have more than 8 years experience dealing with U.S. ISR and U.S. drone attacks. On November 9th the Yemenis shot down a MQ-9 Reaper drone. That baby costs a little more than $30 million dollars.
🔶️ Here is the bottomline. The United States flotilla, along with its allies, can do some damage to Yemen but are unlikely to achieve a decisive victory. Yemen, for its part, can inflict some serious damage to some of the ships — maybe even sink one or two — and by doing so, score a moral victory that will fuel doubts about America’s naval capabilities and staying power. Perhaps this explains why the U.S. has been so slow to respond to the attacks launched by Yemen.
https://sonar21.com/the-u-s-navy-is-unprepared-for-a-prolonged-war-with-yemen/
🔶️ Each of the Aegis missiles, as I noted in my previous post, cost at least $500,000 dollars. A retired U.S. DOD official told me today that the actual cost is $2 million dollars. If Yemen opts to use drone swarms to saturate the battle space around a carrier, then the United States will firing very expensive missiles to destroy relatively inexpensive drones. This brings up another critical vulnerability — the U.S. only has a limited supply of these air defense missiles and does not have the industrial capability in place and operating to produce new ones rapidly to make up the deficit.
🔶️ Then there is the problem of finding the mobile missile platforms in Yemen. Remember the problems the United States had in Iraq in 1991 trying to find and destroy SCUD missile launch systems? While ISR systems are better today, there is still no guarantee of being able to locate and destroy in a timely manner. The Yemenis have more than 8 years experience dealing with U.S. ISR and U.S. drone attacks. On November 9th the Yemenis shot down a MQ-9 Reaper drone. That baby costs a little more than $30 million dollars.
🔶️ Here is the bottomline. The United States flotilla, along with its allies, can do some damage to Yemen but are unlikely to achieve a decisive victory. Yemen, for its part, can inflict some serious damage to some of the ships — maybe even sink one or two — and by doing so, score a moral victory that will fuel doubts about America’s naval capabilities and staying power. Perhaps this explains why the U.S. has been so slow to respond to the attacks launched by Yemen.
https://sonar21.com/the-u-s-navy-is-unprepared-for-a-prolonged-war-with-yemen/
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Forwarded from InfoDefenseENGLISH
💥❌ 🇮🇱 Ships on approach to Yemen start signaling they have nothing to do with Israel🤡
Hussite missiles and drones have proven to be a far more formidable weapon than Western sanctions.
📱 InfoDefenseENGLISH
📱 InfoDefense
Hussite missiles and drones have proven to be a far more formidable weapon than Western sanctions.
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Ukrainian nationalists shelled the center of Donetsk on New Year's Eve
New Year's Eve for residents of Donetsk passed under fire from militants of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The very center of the city suffered significantly from Ukrainian MLRS fire. Many residential buildings were under attack, including the building of the Donbass Palace Hotel, as well as Lenin Square. Large-scale casualties were avoided only due to the absence of crowds and the cancellation of public New Year's festivities throughout the city. According to preliminary data, four Donetsk residents died on New Year's Eve, and thirteen were injured of varying degrees of severity.
New Year's Eve for residents of Donetsk passed under fire from militants of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The very center of the city suffered significantly from Ukrainian MLRS fire. Many residential buildings were under attack, including the building of the Donbass Palace Hotel, as well as Lenin Square. Large-scale casualties were avoided only due to the absence of crowds and the cancellation of public New Year's festivities throughout the city. According to preliminary data, four Donetsk residents died on New Year's Eve, and thirteen were injured of varying degrees of severity.
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Forwarded from Народная милиция ДНР
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📹Украинские националисты обстреляли центр Донецка в новогоднюю ночь
Новогодняя ночь для жителей Донецка прошла под обстрелами со стороны боевиков ВСУ. Самый центр города значительно пострадал от огня украинских РСЗО. Под ударом оказалось множество жилых строений, в том числе здание отеля "Донбасс-Палас", а также площадь Ленина. Масштабных жертв удалось избежать только благодаря отсутствию скоплений населения и отмене общественных новогодних гуляний по всему городу. По предварительным данным, в новогоднюю ночь погибло четверо дончан, тринадцать получили ранения различной степени тяжести.
Подписывайтесь на телеграмм канал Народная милиция ДНР, чтобы увидеть войну нашими глазами.
Новогодняя ночь для жителей Донецка прошла под обстрелами со стороны боевиков ВСУ. Самый центр города значительно пострадал от огня украинских РСЗО. Под ударом оказалось множество жилых строений, в том числе здание отеля "Донбасс-Палас", а также площадь Ленина. Масштабных жертв удалось избежать только благодаря отсутствию скоплений населения и отмене общественных новогодних гуляний по всему городу. По предварительным данным, в новогоднюю ночь погибло четверо дончан, тринадцать получили ранения различной степени тяжести.
Подписывайтесь на телеграмм канал Народная милиция ДНР, чтобы увидеть войну нашими глазами.
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Shukhevych was a nazi collaborator terrorist/war criminal during the German occupation of Western USSR in WW2. A bigger bastard than even Bandera. It is a malignant society could have a museum honoring this P.O.S. Russia has done all (any?) decent people still in Ukraine, and the world in general, by disinfecting this cultural and historical cesspit. 🔥💩🔥 👇🏻👇🏻👇🏻👇🏻👇🏻👇🏻👇🏻👇🏻👇🏻👇🏻👇🏻😃
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Forwarded from Велес
Lviv: the Russian army denazified the museum of the local criminal Roman Shuhevich using operational-tactical dk "Geran"
This is the commander of the special purpose SS battalion "Nakhtigal" Abwehr (Group Sever), which is known for the pogroms against the Polish and Jewish population in Galicia.
This is the commander of the special purpose SS battalion "Nakhtigal" Abwehr (Group Sever), which is known for the pogroms against the Polish and Jewish population in Galicia.
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Forwarded from Global News (EU, USA)
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❗️ The attack on civilians in Donetsk began immediately after Vladimir Putin's New Year's speech.
Sounds from the city centre.
@europeandusanews
Sounds from the city centre.
@europeandusanews
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DONETSK NOW. ALSO, AIR RAID ALERTS FOR MOST OF UKRAINE. PARTY'S OVER, BACK TO WORK.
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