-Dozens of mosques and seminaries in Islamabad were built without CDA approval on protected greenbelt land reserved for environmental preservation.
-These encroachments violated urban planning and environmental laws, sparking calls for enforcement.

-In early August 2025, the Capital Development Authority (CDA) launched an operation to demolish around 50 illegal structures.
-The action began with the Madni Mosque and its adjoining Madni seminary near Rawal Dam.
-The seminary was removed on August 8 after discussions with its management; the mosque was demolished on August 9.
-CDA’s Environment Wing immediately planted saplings at the site, but protestors uprooted them.

-CDA stated that the demolitions were in compliance with legal mandates and part of urban/environmental protection measures.
-Authorities had already constructed a replacement seminary for 200 students at a cost of Rs 40 million.

-Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) leaders, including Naeema Kishwar, condemned the demolitions in the National Assembly and organized protests at the site.
-Mufti Owais Aziz (JUI-F) threatened to file blasphemy cases against Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and other officials.
-Religious bodies like Wafaqul Madaris declared the move disrespectful to Islam.

-Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) called the demolitions un-Islamic and an insult to the Quran, urging resistance.
-Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) likened the incident to the 1992 Babri Masjid demolition in India and labeled it anti-Islamic.
-Pakistan-based terror groups encouraged mujahideen to confront the government.

-Maulana Abdul Aziz of Lal Masjid released a video from inside the mosque calling for jihad and civil disobedience.
-Other mosque and imambargah administrators, facing demolition notices, convened a meeting at Farooq-i-Azam Masjid (I-9) to coordinate legal challenges and obtain stay orders from courts.

-Minister of State for Interior Talal Chaudhry held talks with JUI-F leaders, pausing demolitions for 48 hours starting August 10 to ease tensions.
-On August 12, the government accepted JUI-F’s demand to reconstruct the Madni Mosque and agreed to halt further demolitions in Islamabad.

-Although no violence has yet broken out, tensions remain high.
-The dispute underscores the conflict between enforcing urban planning laws and navigating Pakistan’s powerful religious, terrorist and militant networks.

1. Renewed U.S.–Pakistan engagement: Trump hosted Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, in the White House, announcing cooperation on “oil reserves” and trade.
2. Reality check on ‘oil’: Pakistan is a net oil importer; the real strategic prize lies in Balochistan’s underexplored gold, copper (5th largest reserves globally), lithium, and other critical minerals essential for advanced defence tech.
3. Strategic driver: Countering China’s dominance in critical mineral supply chains, especially after CPEC’s mixed outcomes and Beijing’s rare earth export restrictions.
4. Tariff shock to India: The U.S. imposed a 50% tariff on Indian goods, citing energy ties to Russia, straining a strategic partnership that had deepened post-Op Sindoor.
FTO/SDGT designation (Aug 11, 2025): The U.S. labelled the BLA and Majeed Brigade as terrorist organisations, freezing assets, criminalising support, and aligning with Pakistan’s counter-insurgency narrative.

1. Minerals over oil: The Trump administration’s true interest lies in securing critical minerals from Balochistan for the U.S. military-industrial base (drones, surveillance systems, directed-energy weapons). This aligns with broader U.S. competition with China.
2. FTO designation as an enabler:
-Gives Pakistan legal and diplomatic cover to intensify operations in Balochistan without facing major Western criticism.
-Facilitates U.S.–Pakistan intelligence sharing and operational cooperation, directly weakening insurgent capacity.
-Lowers reputational risk for U.S./Western mining investments by framing them as occurring in a “counter-terror” environment.
3. Tariffs as geopolitical signalling:
-The 50% tariff on India signals Washington’s willingness to penalise New Delhi despite its strategic value.
-The contrast, punitive economic measures against India, preferential security/economic engagement with Pakistan, alters Islamabad’s perception of U.S. alignment in the region.
4. Clearing the path for mining: Suppressing the Baloch insurgency becomes a shared U.S.–Pakistan priority, not for regional stability per se, but to make large-scale mineral extraction feasible and secure.
5. Impact on India:
-A militarily and diplomatically emboldened Pakistan, backed by renewed U.S. ties and security assistance, may test Indian resolve.
-With the U.S. more invested in Pakistan’s internal security (to protect its mineral stakes), Washington’s appetite to pressure Islamabad over cross-border actions could diminish.

1. High probability: Pakistan undertakes low-intensity misadventures - proxy infiltration, targeted ceasefire violations, or cross-border provocations - banking on U.S. reluctance to jeopardise its mineral partnership.
2. Medium probability: Tit-for-tat escalations along the LoC or in sensitive sectors (e.g., Poonch-Rajouri, Jammu belt) as Pakistan tests red lines.
3. Low probability: Full-scale conventional war - nuclear deterrence and economic fragility still restrain Pakistan, but miscalculations remain possible if escalation spirals.
4. Strategic concern: Any sustained Pakistani aggression, under an umbrella of U.S. diplomatic tolerance, will force India to recalibrate its military readiness and foreign policy positioning, especially in forums where Washington’s influence has previously been a lever for Indian restraint.

The Trump–Pakistan mineral pivot, reinforced by the August 11 BLA/Majeed Brigade terrorist designation, represents more than resource economics - it’s a strategic re-alignment that strengthens Pakistan’s hand against Baloch insurgents while shielding it from major Western scrutiny.
Coupled with punitive tariffs on India, the net effect is to tilt the regional balance subtly toward Islamabad, emboldening Pakistan’s security establishment. For New Delhi, the real risk is not an immediate war, but a more confident, U.S.-backed Pakistan willing to engage in calibrated misadventures, testing India’s deterrence posture and seeking to undermine the gains of Operation Sindoor.