Weekly Highlights 29.09.25 - 05.09.25
📌Turkish military reinforcements
Turkish military deployed helicopters, air defenses and SYHK (armored vehicle-launched bridge systems, used to cross rivers) in the Kuweires Airbase, located about 10 kilometers west of the SDF-controlled town of Deir Hafer, which is the westernmost town that the SDF controls in the Aleppo province. The same source indicates that Turkish military also deployed reinforcements to the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)-controlled towns of Gire Spi and Serekaniye. Such reinforcements can be seen as a way to pressure SDF to accept the integration conditions of the transitional goverment before the end of the year, the deadline agreed in the March 10th agreements.
📌Clashes in Tishrin and drone strike in tabqa
Armed groups affiliated with the Damascus government carried out heavy shelling on Tishrin Dam and its surroundings using tanks, other heavy weapons and drones. The shelling targeted heavy wepons positions of SDF, hitting some facilities of the Tishrin dam and damaging also civilian buildings of surrounding villages. SDF responded to the attacks with heavy weapons, no casualties reported. Days later, on Sunday, a drone striked SDF positions in the river crossing of Tabqa.
📌Partial parliamentary elections in Syria
Syria held its first parliamentary elections since the fall of al-Assad’s regime. The voting excluded the regions of Suwayda and the areas run by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, and the 19 assigned seats to those regions are expected to remain vacant. Around 6,000 voters from regional electoral bodies were expected to participate, with 1,570 candidates running for office.
📌Syrian defense officials visit Moscow
An official delegation of defense official of Damascus government visited Moscow, amid an increased number of high-level meetings between Syrian and Russian defense officials in the past month. Such increase may suggest a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations.
📌Precision strikes of US in Idlib
The international coalition conducted at least two precision strikes on Idlib, targeting high rank salafist militant affiliated with al-Qaeda. In one of them they allegedly killed former Ansar al Islam leader Abu Darda Kurdi.
📌ISIS attacks on SDF
In its weekly publication al-Nabaa, an ISIS-affiliated outlet, the group announced responsibility for several attacks on SDF, claiming to have killed 11 SDF fighters, wounded 5 others, and destroyed 2 vehicles. They claim that most of their attacks targeted areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to “affirm the steadfastness” of those held in Hol Camp.
📌Turkish military reinforcements
Turkish military deployed helicopters, air defenses and SYHK (armored vehicle-launched bridge systems, used to cross rivers) in the Kuweires Airbase, located about 10 kilometers west of the SDF-controlled town of Deir Hafer, which is the westernmost town that the SDF controls in the Aleppo province. The same source indicates that Turkish military also deployed reinforcements to the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)-controlled towns of Gire Spi and Serekaniye. Such reinforcements can be seen as a way to pressure SDF to accept the integration conditions of the transitional goverment before the end of the year, the deadline agreed in the March 10th agreements.
📌Clashes in Tishrin and drone strike in tabqa
Armed groups affiliated with the Damascus government carried out heavy shelling on Tishrin Dam and its surroundings using tanks, other heavy weapons and drones. The shelling targeted heavy wepons positions of SDF, hitting some facilities of the Tishrin dam and damaging also civilian buildings of surrounding villages. SDF responded to the attacks with heavy weapons, no casualties reported. Days later, on Sunday, a drone striked SDF positions in the river crossing of Tabqa.
📌Partial parliamentary elections in Syria
Syria held its first parliamentary elections since the fall of al-Assad’s regime. The voting excluded the regions of Suwayda and the areas run by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, and the 19 assigned seats to those regions are expected to remain vacant. Around 6,000 voters from regional electoral bodies were expected to participate, with 1,570 candidates running for office.
📌Syrian defense officials visit Moscow
An official delegation of defense official of Damascus government visited Moscow, amid an increased number of high-level meetings between Syrian and Russian defense officials in the past month. Such increase may suggest a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations.
📌Precision strikes of US in Idlib
The international coalition conducted at least two precision strikes on Idlib, targeting high rank salafist militant affiliated with al-Qaeda. In one of them they allegedly killed former Ansar al Islam leader Abu Darda Kurdi.
📌ISIS attacks on SDF
In its weekly publication al-Nabaa, an ISIS-affiliated outlet, the group announced responsibility for several attacks on SDF, claiming to have killed 11 SDF fighters, wounded 5 others, and destroyed 2 vehicles. They claim that most of their attacks targeted areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to “affirm the steadfastness” of those held in Hol Camp.
❤3👍1
Weekly Highlights 13.10.25 - 19.10.25
SDF integration into the new Syrian army
On October 14 and 15, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) officials confirmed the integration of SDF into the new Syrian army, comprising three divisions and several independent brigades located in northeastern Syria (NES). SDF counterterrorism brigades will be deployed all over Syria. The Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) will also form a brigade in the new army. Disagreements between Syrian government and SDF officials persist regarding the YPJ's role in the new structure. On October 7, Mazloum Abdi and Al-Sharaa reached a "preliminary agreement" on military integration, though specifics remain unannounced. An “initial timeline” have been set for this integration by the end of 2025, but it was emphasized that it is not a definitive timeline.
SDF - Syrian government forces joint force to fight ISIS
Mazloum Abdi announced ongoing discussions with Damascus and Washington to establish a joint military force against ISIS. He described this initiative as part of a broader strategy to combat terrorism across Syria.
The commander of the SDF stated, “Washington proposed the creation of a joint force between us and Damascus to fight ISIS, and we have accepted.” He emphasized that the SDF aims to make the fight against ISIS “a comprehensive, nationwide effort.”
Abdi also mentioned that upcoming meetings between SDF and Syrian transitional government military committees will take place in Damascus to discuss coordination mechanisms.
Discussions Turkey - Syrian governement to expand Adana Agreement
On October 17, a Turkish officials stated that discussions are underway to expand the 1998 Adana Agreement, which currently permits Turkey to target Kurdish fighters up to five kilometers into Syrian territory, raising the limit to 30 kilometers. Turkey is seeking an agreement with the Syrian government to allow its forces to target SDF fighters deep within Syria and potentially set the stage for future military operations against the SDF.
Expanding the agreement would facilitate Turkey's operations within the 30-kilometer zone. While it has conducted strikes deeper than this limit in the past, a revised Adana Agreement would support ground pursuits and help mitigate friction with the new Syrian government.
It remains uncertain whether the Syrian government will agree to these terms, as it could jeopardize recent Kurdish cooperation.
Meeting Al Sharaa - Putin
Al-Sharaa met with Vladimir Putin on October 15. Sharaa expressed a desire to “redefine” the Syrian-Russian relationship, emphasizing Russia's “significant role” in advancing Syria's political goals. Putin indicated his support for new initiatives, particularly in Syria's energy sector reconstruction.
The Russia-Syria relationship, evolving since the regime's fall, now consists of mutually beneficial arrangements. Russia retains military presence at three bases in Syria, and has used economic support to secure its position under Sharaa’s government.
The Syrian government likely seeks military cooperation to gain insights for building a new army, although direct arms supplies from Russia are unlikely due to ongoing needs in Ukraine. Syria also needs economic support to address resource shortages, with Russia providing oil and wheat while discussing future involvement in infrastructure restoration. Furthermore, Syrian officials are likely working to secure Russia's commitment to stop supporting members of the Assad regime to enhance their legitimacy and advocate for accountability. Engaging Russia may also serve to counterbalance Israel's presence in southern Syria, with considerations for redeploying Russian military police in the area.
SDF integration into the new Syrian army
On October 14 and 15, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) officials confirmed the integration of SDF into the new Syrian army, comprising three divisions and several independent brigades located in northeastern Syria (NES). SDF counterterrorism brigades will be deployed all over Syria. The Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) will also form a brigade in the new army. Disagreements between Syrian government and SDF officials persist regarding the YPJ's role in the new structure. On October 7, Mazloum Abdi and Al-Sharaa reached a "preliminary agreement" on military integration, though specifics remain unannounced. An “initial timeline” have been set for this integration by the end of 2025, but it was emphasized that it is not a definitive timeline.
SDF - Syrian government forces joint force to fight ISIS
Mazloum Abdi announced ongoing discussions with Damascus and Washington to establish a joint military force against ISIS. He described this initiative as part of a broader strategy to combat terrorism across Syria.
The commander of the SDF stated, “Washington proposed the creation of a joint force between us and Damascus to fight ISIS, and we have accepted.” He emphasized that the SDF aims to make the fight against ISIS “a comprehensive, nationwide effort.”
Abdi also mentioned that upcoming meetings between SDF and Syrian transitional government military committees will take place in Damascus to discuss coordination mechanisms.
Discussions Turkey - Syrian governement to expand Adana Agreement
On October 17, a Turkish officials stated that discussions are underway to expand the 1998 Adana Agreement, which currently permits Turkey to target Kurdish fighters up to five kilometers into Syrian territory, raising the limit to 30 kilometers. Turkey is seeking an agreement with the Syrian government to allow its forces to target SDF fighters deep within Syria and potentially set the stage for future military operations against the SDF.
Expanding the agreement would facilitate Turkey's operations within the 30-kilometer zone. While it has conducted strikes deeper than this limit in the past, a revised Adana Agreement would support ground pursuits and help mitigate friction with the new Syrian government.
It remains uncertain whether the Syrian government will agree to these terms, as it could jeopardize recent Kurdish cooperation.
Meeting Al Sharaa - Putin
Al-Sharaa met with Vladimir Putin on October 15. Sharaa expressed a desire to “redefine” the Syrian-Russian relationship, emphasizing Russia's “significant role” in advancing Syria's political goals. Putin indicated his support for new initiatives, particularly in Syria's energy sector reconstruction.
The Russia-Syria relationship, evolving since the regime's fall, now consists of mutually beneficial arrangements. Russia retains military presence at three bases in Syria, and has used economic support to secure its position under Sharaa’s government.
The Syrian government likely seeks military cooperation to gain insights for building a new army, although direct arms supplies from Russia are unlikely due to ongoing needs in Ukraine. Syria also needs economic support to address resource shortages, with Russia providing oil and wheat while discussing future involvement in infrastructure restoration. Furthermore, Syrian officials are likely working to secure Russia's commitment to stop supporting members of the Assad regime to enhance their legitimacy and advocate for accountability. Engaging Russia may also serve to counterbalance Israel's presence in southern Syria, with considerations for redeploying Russian military police in the area.
❤2
Evaluation
A few months ago, we took a break from sharing our analysis of the situation in order to formulate a better understanding of what was happening. Now we are returning with our assessment, because current events require to share some analysis.
The process of integration of different parts of Syrian politics and society is entering a more active stage. This is partly because the deadline of the March agreements is approaching: end of December 2025. On the other hand, we want to draw attention to the understanding of integration referred to by the Apoist movement, especially in the frame of dissolution of the PPK: comrades talk about integration as opposed to assimilation. This means coexisting with the Syrian government without losing autonomy and insisting on democratic changes in the state system. This is the basis for the actions of the Autonomous Administration today. However, democratic reforms are not the main strategy, but rather one of the tactical demands. The strategy of the revolutionary movement in Syria should be assessed based on almost 14 years of revolution in north-eastern Syria: leadership of a mass women's movement, a politicised society with experience of revolutionary people's war, communalist ideology, coexistence of peoples and cultures, communes, councils and the strongest political and social proposals in the entire region.
Active preparations are now underway on the ground for an escalation of the war. It is difficult to say which side this escalation will come from — Turkey, Jolani government, Israel — but forces are preparing regardless. Even with the progress made in integration, the danger from the new Syrian regime remains. We can see what is happening in the name of the Syrian state in the south of the country. The question is in the balance of power: at the moment, the regime's military power is inferior to that of the SDF, so the regime has to engage in dialogue with North-East Syria as an autonomous region. This alliance is primarily beneficial to Jolani, but for the peoples of NES, the settlement of the situation will mean a more stable situation, both militarily and economically. Now the question of revolution can be raised for the whole of Syria, not just the north-east. It is likely that this expansion will happen through in the work of political parties and grassroot organizing playing a key role in this process.
No one has any illusions about Jolani's presidency. He is still an al-Nusra fighter, the same jihadist who beheaded people, but who put on the mask of a ‘civilised politician’ after seizing power. The existence of a revolutionary project in the reality of the state means pragmatism in the face of contradictions and taking difficult decisions, such as interaction with the Syrian government. Unfortunately, this reality is quite different from our often idealised notions of revolution. The position of the Apoist movement can be criticised as reformist, but so far their proposal for solving the problems in the Middle East is the only one that takes into account the reality of the peoples in this region, coming from them themselves, and not from delusional Western politicians (we all remember Trump's proposal on Palestine).
Changes in the dynamics between the Syrian government and the SDF contribute to the balance of power in the Middle East as a whole, exacerbating some already conflictual relationships and strengthening positions in other cases. By integrating with Syria, the SDF is distancing itself from the potential alliance that Israel had hoped for. This integration could also open the possibility for protection from further attacks and incursions by Turkey, which is building diplomatic relations with the Syrian government. The could also be a step towards pushing Turkey out of the occupied territories.
A few months ago, we took a break from sharing our analysis of the situation in order to formulate a better understanding of what was happening. Now we are returning with our assessment, because current events require to share some analysis.
The process of integration of different parts of Syrian politics and society is entering a more active stage. This is partly because the deadline of the March agreements is approaching: end of December 2025. On the other hand, we want to draw attention to the understanding of integration referred to by the Apoist movement, especially in the frame of dissolution of the PPK: comrades talk about integration as opposed to assimilation. This means coexisting with the Syrian government without losing autonomy and insisting on democratic changes in the state system. This is the basis for the actions of the Autonomous Administration today. However, democratic reforms are not the main strategy, but rather one of the tactical demands. The strategy of the revolutionary movement in Syria should be assessed based on almost 14 years of revolution in north-eastern Syria: leadership of a mass women's movement, a politicised society with experience of revolutionary people's war, communalist ideology, coexistence of peoples and cultures, communes, councils and the strongest political and social proposals in the entire region.
Active preparations are now underway on the ground for an escalation of the war. It is difficult to say which side this escalation will come from — Turkey, Jolani government, Israel — but forces are preparing regardless. Even with the progress made in integration, the danger from the new Syrian regime remains. We can see what is happening in the name of the Syrian state in the south of the country. The question is in the balance of power: at the moment, the regime's military power is inferior to that of the SDF, so the regime has to engage in dialogue with North-East Syria as an autonomous region. This alliance is primarily beneficial to Jolani, but for the peoples of NES, the settlement of the situation will mean a more stable situation, both militarily and economically. Now the question of revolution can be raised for the whole of Syria, not just the north-east. It is likely that this expansion will happen through in the work of political parties and grassroot organizing playing a key role in this process.
No one has any illusions about Jolani's presidency. He is still an al-Nusra fighter, the same jihadist who beheaded people, but who put on the mask of a ‘civilised politician’ after seizing power. The existence of a revolutionary project in the reality of the state means pragmatism in the face of contradictions and taking difficult decisions, such as interaction with the Syrian government. Unfortunately, this reality is quite different from our often idealised notions of revolution. The position of the Apoist movement can be criticised as reformist, but so far their proposal for solving the problems in the Middle East is the only one that takes into account the reality of the peoples in this region, coming from them themselves, and not from delusional Western politicians (we all remember Trump's proposal on Palestine).
Changes in the dynamics between the Syrian government and the SDF contribute to the balance of power in the Middle East as a whole, exacerbating some already conflictual relationships and strengthening positions in other cases. By integrating with Syria, the SDF is distancing itself from the potential alliance that Israel had hoped for. This integration could also open the possibility for protection from further attacks and incursions by Turkey, which is building diplomatic relations with the Syrian government. The could also be a step towards pushing Turkey out of the occupied territories.
However, what the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army means in practice remains to be seen. The inclusion of women's units in the Syrian armed forces looks like a shift in the principles of the Islamist government, which finds itself in a situation where it has no choice. Will this contribute to changing the situation of women in Syria? It is not certain, and for sure it won’t happen immediately. What does the inclusion of the SDF’s Anti-Terror Units in the Syrian army mean, with the comment that they will participate in operations throughout Syria? Will they and other SDF forces be able to stop attacks such as the recent massacre against Druze people, or does this only imply the fight against ISIS? This is also unclear. The most clear thing we can see at the moment is the desire of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration for peace and conflict resolution without further blows to the long-suffering peoples. Only time will tell how correct these steps are.
We are continuing our work in the region. As before, we base our approach on critical solidarity and do not allow despair or idealisation to cloud our view of the revolution. At the same time, we ourselves are part of this revolution. We will continue to organize and write about the situation in north-eastern Syria and developments in the Middle East, and we urge you to be mindful of your sources of information. In a situation of uncertainty, it is very easy to spread rumours that play into the hands of various interested parties, thereby harming the revolution.
Revolutionary greetings 🖤
We are continuing our work in the region. As before, we base our approach on critical solidarity and do not allow despair or idealisation to cloud our view of the revolution. At the same time, we ourselves are part of this revolution. We will continue to organize and write about the situation in north-eastern Syria and developments in the Middle East, and we urge you to be mindful of your sources of information. In a situation of uncertainty, it is very easy to spread rumours that play into the hands of various interested parties, thereby harming the revolution.
Revolutionary greetings 🖤
❤8
Weekly Highlights 20.10.25 - 26.10.25
PKK withdraws all fighters from Turkey
The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) announced on Sunday the complete withdrawal of its fighters from Turkish territory, describing this decision a pivotal step toward advancing the ongoing peace process with Ankara into a "second phase."
During a press conference at Mount Qandil, attended by 25 PKK members and senior commanders, the revolutionary party declared, “These monumental steps taken by the Kurdish side, under the guidance of Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK, have significantly influenced Turkey's political and social landscape, fostering a renewed commitment to peace and democratization,”.
The PKK framed the withdrawal as a means to "address serious threats faced by both Turkey and the Kurdish people, while laying the foundation for a free, democratic, and harmonious existence." They reiterated their dedication to the peace process and called on Ankara to reciprocate with corresponding actions.
Observers suggest that the full withdrawal may open up new diplomatic avenues for both Ankara and the Kurdish movement, though skepticism persists, particularly in light of Turkey's ongoing military operations in northern Iraq and Syria.
Renewed clashes between Syrian army and SDF
On Saturday, October 25, clashes broke out between the Syrian army and fighters from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) along the contact lines on both sides of the Euphrates River. The SDF, which attempted to infiltrate a Syrian army position, later claimed that their actions were a response to an attack by unidentified armed groups. Shortly after the fighting began, SDF forces withdrew to their original positions, with no casualties reported.
Minor clashes have continued to occur over the past week at various points along the contact lines between the Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces and the SDF: on Wednesday, armed groups linked to the interim government launched a suicide drone strike on the town of Deir Hafer.
These incidents arise amidst the ongoing integration of SDF into the New Syrian Army.
Syrian transitional government targeting non-integrated foreign fighters
On October 21, the General Security Service (GSS) attempted to raid a compound controlled by the French foreign fighter group "Fiqrat al Ghuraba" and Caucasian fighters near the Turkish border in Harem, Idlib Province. The day after the raids, a group of Uzbek foreign fighters was sent to Fiqrat al Ghuraba’s compound to provide reinforcements. On October 23, the GSS and the foreign fighter groups agreed to a ceasefire.
In the last months, the GSS has carried raids on foreign fighter groups that promote Salafi-jihadist ideologies and have not integrated into the MoD. For instance, in August 2025, the GSS arrested two Uzbek foreign fighters. These fighters had previously served as private military contractors training Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) special forces and participated in the offensive that ousted Assad in December 2024.
Fiqrat al Ghuraba has previously criticized the Syrian transitional government's collaboration with U.S. forces in operations aimed at Salafi-jihadist groups.
Since June 2025, the Syrian government has integrated many loyal jihadist foreign fighters into the Syrian MoD. This integration aligns with a U.S. strategy that permitted the Syrian transitional government to incorporate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army, aiming to deter these fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups.
Rising ISIS threat amid US pullout
The Islamic State (ISIS) has been exploiting the diminished U.S. military presence and the political instability following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in late 2024. Data from the SDF shows a marked increase in ISIS attacks in 2025, as the group has acquired significant quantities of weapons from former Syrian army depots, thereby strengthening their combat capabilities.
PKK withdraws all fighters from Turkey
The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) announced on Sunday the complete withdrawal of its fighters from Turkish territory, describing this decision a pivotal step toward advancing the ongoing peace process with Ankara into a "second phase."
During a press conference at Mount Qandil, attended by 25 PKK members and senior commanders, the revolutionary party declared, “These monumental steps taken by the Kurdish side, under the guidance of Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK, have significantly influenced Turkey's political and social landscape, fostering a renewed commitment to peace and democratization,”.
The PKK framed the withdrawal as a means to "address serious threats faced by both Turkey and the Kurdish people, while laying the foundation for a free, democratic, and harmonious existence." They reiterated their dedication to the peace process and called on Ankara to reciprocate with corresponding actions.
Observers suggest that the full withdrawal may open up new diplomatic avenues for both Ankara and the Kurdish movement, though skepticism persists, particularly in light of Turkey's ongoing military operations in northern Iraq and Syria.
Renewed clashes between Syrian army and SDF
On Saturday, October 25, clashes broke out between the Syrian army and fighters from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) along the contact lines on both sides of the Euphrates River. The SDF, which attempted to infiltrate a Syrian army position, later claimed that their actions were a response to an attack by unidentified armed groups. Shortly after the fighting began, SDF forces withdrew to their original positions, with no casualties reported.
Minor clashes have continued to occur over the past week at various points along the contact lines between the Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces and the SDF: on Wednesday, armed groups linked to the interim government launched a suicide drone strike on the town of Deir Hafer.
These incidents arise amidst the ongoing integration of SDF into the New Syrian Army.
Syrian transitional government targeting non-integrated foreign fighters
On October 21, the General Security Service (GSS) attempted to raid a compound controlled by the French foreign fighter group "Fiqrat al Ghuraba" and Caucasian fighters near the Turkish border in Harem, Idlib Province. The day after the raids, a group of Uzbek foreign fighters was sent to Fiqrat al Ghuraba’s compound to provide reinforcements. On October 23, the GSS and the foreign fighter groups agreed to a ceasefire.
In the last months, the GSS has carried raids on foreign fighter groups that promote Salafi-jihadist ideologies and have not integrated into the MoD. For instance, in August 2025, the GSS arrested two Uzbek foreign fighters. These fighters had previously served as private military contractors training Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) special forces and participated in the offensive that ousted Assad in December 2024.
Fiqrat al Ghuraba has previously criticized the Syrian transitional government's collaboration with U.S. forces in operations aimed at Salafi-jihadist groups.
Since June 2025, the Syrian government has integrated many loyal jihadist foreign fighters into the Syrian MoD. This integration aligns with a U.S. strategy that permitted the Syrian transitional government to incorporate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army, aiming to deter these fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups.
Rising ISIS threat amid US pullout
The Islamic State (ISIS) has been exploiting the diminished U.S. military presence and the political instability following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in late 2024. Data from the SDF shows a marked increase in ISIS attacks in 2025, as the group has acquired significant quantities of weapons from former Syrian army depots, thereby strengthening their combat capabilities.
SDF commander Goran Tal Tamr remarked that the U.S. withdrawal acts as “an inspiration for ISIS,” highlighting that the group’s activities have escalated amidst rising concerns among civilians about security.
Turkey's support to the Syrian Ministry of Defense
On October 21, Turkish officials announced that they will supply the Syrian MoD with advanced military equipment in the coming weeks, including armored vehicles, drones, artillery, and air defense systems. The Syrian MoD plans to deploy this Turkish equipment in northern Syria allegedly to mitigate potential conflict with Israel.
Historically, Turkish and Turkish-backed forces have committed atrocities against the Kurdish minority in northern Syria, including acts of ethnic cleansing and other forms of violence. It is likely that Turkey’s increasing influence within the armed forces and other security services will impact negatively the integration of the SDF in the new syrian army.
Turkey's support to the Syrian Ministry of Defense
On October 21, Turkish officials announced that they will supply the Syrian MoD with advanced military equipment in the coming weeks, including armored vehicles, drones, artillery, and air defense systems. The Syrian MoD plans to deploy this Turkish equipment in northern Syria allegedly to mitigate potential conflict with Israel.
Historically, Turkish and Turkish-backed forces have committed atrocities against the Kurdish minority in northern Syria, including acts of ethnic cleansing and other forms of violence. It is likely that Turkey’s increasing influence within the armed forces and other security services will impact negatively the integration of the SDF in the new syrian army.
Evaluation
The new phase of withdrawing PKK fighters from Turkey is the next step in the new strategy of the Apoist movement in the process of ‘Peace and Democratic Society.’ The direction taken at the beginning of this year is continuing. We cannot call this a surprise. According to the ‘Manifesto of Peace and Democratic Society,’ the Kurd's struggle for recognition of their existence as a people has succeeded, and it is time to take the next step — the struggle for freedom. This refers not only to the freedom of the Kurdish people, but to universal freedom, because A. Öcalan and Apoist movement understand that the freedom of only one group of people in a limited territory is not a solution to the problem. The process of disarming the PKK and democratically integrating the regions of Kurdistan is, according to the manifesto, the path to this universal freedom, which, as Öcalan put it, cannot be achieved at gunpoint. The PKK has indeed achieved its stated goal, and the Marxist-Leninist party form no longer fits the new paradigm and is only a hindrance to bringing the structures into line with the ideology.
What does this mean for North-East Syria? Disarmament does not apply to the SDF, and armed defense continues. The region is still under threat from several sides, and autonomy must be defended. Despite hopes for further peace processes, the Apoist movement does not deny the need for armed self-defense, so the revolutionary project of Rojava will not be left defenseless. The SDF maintains its positions on the ground, and talk of disarming the forces has provoked a fairly unequivocal reaction in NE Syria, because Turkey has not yet taken any steps towards a peaceful resolution of this military conflict, and the situation in Syria remains unstable.
We are at a very important point: the fifty-year history of the PKK is coming to an end. This shows us that revolution and revolutionary movements are not something that can take only one form. But despite all these changes and flexibility in the choice of methods, the revolutionary movement here does not lose its direction and values. Freedom and equality are still the main guiding principles of the struggle.
Revolutionary greetings 🖤
The new phase of withdrawing PKK fighters from Turkey is the next step in the new strategy of the Apoist movement in the process of ‘Peace and Democratic Society.’ The direction taken at the beginning of this year is continuing. We cannot call this a surprise. According to the ‘Manifesto of Peace and Democratic Society,’ the Kurd's struggle for recognition of their existence as a people has succeeded, and it is time to take the next step — the struggle for freedom. This refers not only to the freedom of the Kurdish people, but to universal freedom, because A. Öcalan and Apoist movement understand that the freedom of only one group of people in a limited territory is not a solution to the problem. The process of disarming the PKK and democratically integrating the regions of Kurdistan is, according to the manifesto, the path to this universal freedom, which, as Öcalan put it, cannot be achieved at gunpoint. The PKK has indeed achieved its stated goal, and the Marxist-Leninist party form no longer fits the new paradigm and is only a hindrance to bringing the structures into line with the ideology.
What does this mean for North-East Syria? Disarmament does not apply to the SDF, and armed defense continues. The region is still under threat from several sides, and autonomy must be defended. Despite hopes for further peace processes, the Apoist movement does not deny the need for armed self-defense, so the revolutionary project of Rojava will not be left defenseless. The SDF maintains its positions on the ground, and talk of disarming the forces has provoked a fairly unequivocal reaction in NE Syria, because Turkey has not yet taken any steps towards a peaceful resolution of this military conflict, and the situation in Syria remains unstable.
We are at a very important point: the fifty-year history of the PKK is coming to an end. This shows us that revolution and revolutionary movements are not something that can take only one form. But despite all these changes and flexibility in the choice of methods, the revolutionary movement here does not lose its direction and values. Freedom and equality are still the main guiding principles of the struggle.
Revolutionary greetings 🖤
❤6
Weekly Highlights 27.10.25 - 02.11.25
SDF - MoD clashes in Deir ez Zor
On October 25, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) engaged the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) forces with small arms and mortars across the Euphrates River. This engagement followed reports of an SDF attempt to infiltrate MoD positions. In response, the MoD reinforced its positions, while the SDF deployed a reconnaissance drone over the area.
Additionally, SDF forces in Abu Hamam engaged MoD positions across the Euphrates after receiving rocket-propelled grenade fire from MoD positions on the same day. The SDF officially acknowledged these clashes, stating that no casualties occurred.
These clashes come amid positive steps made in the negociations between the SDF and the Syrian Transitional Government: on October 20, a delegation from the transitional government’s Ministry of Interior visited Tabqa to discuss the security situation in Aleppo with SDF officials. During this visit, the SDF released several prisoners held by the transitional government as a gesture aimed at building trust between the two sides. Thomas Barrack also recently made positive evaluations regarding recent meetings he held with Mazlum Abdi.
Arab tribe mobilize against the SDF
On October 27, in Deir ez Zor Province, an SDF patrol shot and killed a member of the Bakara Tribe after the tribesman allegedly tried to overtake the patrol in his car. In retaliation, Bakara tribespeople attacked the SDF headquarters, injuring two SDF members and one civilian. The SDF issued an apology on October 28, describing the incident as an accident, and arrested the involved members.
Until December 2024, the Assad regime's dominance in Syria deterred Arab tribes in Deir ez Zor Province from opposing the SDF, as aligning with the Assad regime was seen as a worse option than SDF politics. However, the ascent of Al-Sharaa to power have made tribal mobilization a more pressing issue, as tribes now view the politics of the Syrian transitional Government as viable alternatives to the SDF.
Israel and Syria made new steps toward reaching a security agreement
An Israeli official announced that negotiations with the Syrian transitional government are ongoing and near completion. The agreement will resemble the 1974 disengagement accord but will include minor adjustments, such as the establishment of joint US-Israeli-Syrian outposts along the border.
The official assured that Israel does not support separatist movements within Syria. In response to recent U.S. concerns about the situation in Suweida Governorate, the official clarified that Israel has no connections to Druze leader Hikmat al-Hajri or other local figures. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has supplied arms and paid salaries for Druze militias in Suweida Province since July in an effort to unite the militias against the Syrian transitional government. It is today unclear whether it continues to do so.
Furthermore, the Israeli official stated that the proposal for a humanitarian corridor to Suweida is not being considered anymore. Israel’s previous insistence on establishing a humanitarian corridor between Israel and Suweida contradicted various request from the Syrian government and led to the collapse of negotiations in September 2025.
Public trials for the perpetuators of the Alawite massacres
The Syrian Justice Minister announced on October 29 that the Justice Ministry will soon conduct public trials for individuals involved in the massacres committed on the Syrian coast in March 2025. The Syrian transitional government has arrested 298 individuals involved in the massacres. Some MoD fighters accused of atrocities have also been arrested, however these arrests have not been publicly disclosed.
These upcoming trials will permit to the Syrian Transitional Government to display a theatre of judicial independence and procedural transparency. Jolani has, on multiple occasions, strategically abandoned former HTS fighters to advance his political agenda.
SDF - MoD clashes in Deir ez Zor
On October 25, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) engaged the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) forces with small arms and mortars across the Euphrates River. This engagement followed reports of an SDF attempt to infiltrate MoD positions. In response, the MoD reinforced its positions, while the SDF deployed a reconnaissance drone over the area.
Additionally, SDF forces in Abu Hamam engaged MoD positions across the Euphrates after receiving rocket-propelled grenade fire from MoD positions on the same day. The SDF officially acknowledged these clashes, stating that no casualties occurred.
These clashes come amid positive steps made in the negociations between the SDF and the Syrian Transitional Government: on October 20, a delegation from the transitional government’s Ministry of Interior visited Tabqa to discuss the security situation in Aleppo with SDF officials. During this visit, the SDF released several prisoners held by the transitional government as a gesture aimed at building trust between the two sides. Thomas Barrack also recently made positive evaluations regarding recent meetings he held with Mazlum Abdi.
Arab tribe mobilize against the SDF
On October 27, in Deir ez Zor Province, an SDF patrol shot and killed a member of the Bakara Tribe after the tribesman allegedly tried to overtake the patrol in his car. In retaliation, Bakara tribespeople attacked the SDF headquarters, injuring two SDF members and one civilian. The SDF issued an apology on October 28, describing the incident as an accident, and arrested the involved members.
Until December 2024, the Assad regime's dominance in Syria deterred Arab tribes in Deir ez Zor Province from opposing the SDF, as aligning with the Assad regime was seen as a worse option than SDF politics. However, the ascent of Al-Sharaa to power have made tribal mobilization a more pressing issue, as tribes now view the politics of the Syrian transitional Government as viable alternatives to the SDF.
Israel and Syria made new steps toward reaching a security agreement
An Israeli official announced that negotiations with the Syrian transitional government are ongoing and near completion. The agreement will resemble the 1974 disengagement accord but will include minor adjustments, such as the establishment of joint US-Israeli-Syrian outposts along the border.
The official assured that Israel does not support separatist movements within Syria. In response to recent U.S. concerns about the situation in Suweida Governorate, the official clarified that Israel has no connections to Druze leader Hikmat al-Hajri or other local figures. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has supplied arms and paid salaries for Druze militias in Suweida Province since July in an effort to unite the militias against the Syrian transitional government. It is today unclear whether it continues to do so.
Furthermore, the Israeli official stated that the proposal for a humanitarian corridor to Suweida is not being considered anymore. Israel’s previous insistence on establishing a humanitarian corridor between Israel and Suweida contradicted various request from the Syrian government and led to the collapse of negotiations in September 2025.
Public trials for the perpetuators of the Alawite massacres
The Syrian Justice Minister announced on October 29 that the Justice Ministry will soon conduct public trials for individuals involved in the massacres committed on the Syrian coast in March 2025. The Syrian transitional government has arrested 298 individuals involved in the massacres. Some MoD fighters accused of atrocities have also been arrested, however these arrests have not been publicly disclosed.
These upcoming trials will permit to the Syrian Transitional Government to display a theatre of judicial independence and procedural transparency. Jolani has, on multiple occasions, strategically abandoned former HTS fighters to advance his political agenda.
❤4
Undoubtedly, condemning 300 of his fighters will not pose a significant obstacle if it enhances the image of the "new Syrian leader" that Western media is eager to construct.
Continuous developments:
- IDF maintain their activities in Quneitra and Daraa, triggering protests in surrounding villages.
- SDF, backed by the coalition, captured five individuals belonging to ISIS cells during a joint security operation in Deir ez-Zor. Similar anti-ISIS operations are currently ongoing in Raqqa.
- Anti-government protest continue in Suweida governorate.
Continuous developments:
- IDF maintain their activities in Quneitra and Daraa, triggering protests in surrounding villages.
- SDF, backed by the coalition, captured five individuals belonging to ISIS cells during a joint security operation in Deir ez-Zor. Similar anti-ISIS operations are currently ongoing in Raqqa.
- Anti-government protest continue in Suweida governorate.
❤4
Evaluation
November 1st is the International Day of Solidarity with Kobane. The battle for Kobane is one of the most important episodes in the history of north-eastern Syria, which remains in people's hearts as a great victory that drove ISIS out of the region and advanced the revolution. This year, the defense of the Tishreen Dam became a similarly symbolic event. The slogan ‘No pasaran!’ became a reality and a victory cry.
Such events bring a lot of inspiration and unity. Seeing this struggle, participating in it, immersing oneself in the history and spirit of the people, one can feel the real power of the popular revolution: it is not in every part of the world that people can find such political self-awareness and understanding of their own agency. And it is at moments like these that it becomes especially clear what we are fighting for.
Last winter brought many changes, new opportunities and dangers. Without the instability that followed the fall of the regime, there would have been no Turkish attack on Tishreen, no withdrawal of Assad's army from the SDF territories, and many other things that we have written about throughout this year. From the outset, the new government of Jolani has been trying to play up the image of ‘soft Islamism,’ presenting it to the West as an alternative for the Middle East that fits in with European standards. Jolani himself continues to pursue the course he set from the start of obtaining opportunities to expand and maintain power in exchange for his former colleagues in the Al-Nusra Front, who have become inconvenient and too radical. Recall that the HTS campaign began with the extradition of some militants in Idlib to the United States. The same can be seen today in the show trials of militants who participated in the massacre in Latakia, which are, in essence, a parody of justice.
This picture is well complemented by ongoing Jolani's attempts to create a political party. The Syrian government now needs not only to maintain the military junta's power, but also to acquire a solid political foundation if it wants to remain at the helm of the state for a longer time. With the support of Western countries, which it is working hard to obtain, this does not seem impossible.
However, north-eastern Syria is an obstacle to the development of such a scenario. The existence of such an alternative within the country, where people can be politically conscious and are familiar with a non-state system. The provocations taking place in the Deir ez-Zor and Tishreen areas require great caution on the part of the SDF, because any wrong move now could be used as a reason to escalate the conflict.
In the coming weeks and months, we still face serious challenges. The slogan ‘No pasaran!’ expresses the ideological line of self-defense and points to the battles that might have to be fought. Be as it may, there is a wealth of experience in revolution and defense, and not only here. Throughout Syria, the legacy of hundreds of thousands who rose up against the previous regime is still alive, and it will certainly play a role in the new Syria that is taking shape before our very eyes.
Revolutionary greetings 🖤
November 1st is the International Day of Solidarity with Kobane. The battle for Kobane is one of the most important episodes in the history of north-eastern Syria, which remains in people's hearts as a great victory that drove ISIS out of the region and advanced the revolution. This year, the defense of the Tishreen Dam became a similarly symbolic event. The slogan ‘No pasaran!’ became a reality and a victory cry.
Such events bring a lot of inspiration and unity. Seeing this struggle, participating in it, immersing oneself in the history and spirit of the people, one can feel the real power of the popular revolution: it is not in every part of the world that people can find such political self-awareness and understanding of their own agency. And it is at moments like these that it becomes especially clear what we are fighting for.
Last winter brought many changes, new opportunities and dangers. Without the instability that followed the fall of the regime, there would have been no Turkish attack on Tishreen, no withdrawal of Assad's army from the SDF territories, and many other things that we have written about throughout this year. From the outset, the new government of Jolani has been trying to play up the image of ‘soft Islamism,’ presenting it to the West as an alternative for the Middle East that fits in with European standards. Jolani himself continues to pursue the course he set from the start of obtaining opportunities to expand and maintain power in exchange for his former colleagues in the Al-Nusra Front, who have become inconvenient and too radical. Recall that the HTS campaign began with the extradition of some militants in Idlib to the United States. The same can be seen today in the show trials of militants who participated in the massacre in Latakia, which are, in essence, a parody of justice.
This picture is well complemented by ongoing Jolani's attempts to create a political party. The Syrian government now needs not only to maintain the military junta's power, but also to acquire a solid political foundation if it wants to remain at the helm of the state for a longer time. With the support of Western countries, which it is working hard to obtain, this does not seem impossible.
However, north-eastern Syria is an obstacle to the development of such a scenario. The existence of such an alternative within the country, where people can be politically conscious and are familiar with a non-state system. The provocations taking place in the Deir ez-Zor and Tishreen areas require great caution on the part of the SDF, because any wrong move now could be used as a reason to escalate the conflict.
In the coming weeks and months, we still face serious challenges. The slogan ‘No pasaran!’ expresses the ideological line of self-defense and points to the battles that might have to be fought. Be as it may, there is a wealth of experience in revolution and defense, and not only here. Throughout Syria, the legacy of hundreds of thousands who rose up against the previous regime is still alive, and it will certainly play a role in the new Syria that is taking shape before our very eyes.
Revolutionary greetings 🖤
❤4
Weekly Highlights 03.11.25 - 09.11.25
Syrian transitional government to join the anti-ISIS Coalition
The Syrian transitional government is poised to join the Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State (ISIS) during Al-Sharaa's anticipated visit to Washington. This development would formalize 13 years of intelligence collaboration between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the US in combating ISIS and al-Qaeda networks in northern Syria.
Currently, the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the DAANES structures into the New Syrian Army and broader Syrian state framework is at a standstill. However, Syria's potential entry into the coalition could bolster cooperation between the SDF and the New Syrian Army in the efforts against ISIS in the region.
US plan to deploy air force in Damascus
The United States is planning to establish a military presence at an undisclosed airbase in Damascus. On November 5 two Western officials and a Syrian defense official, affirmed that this military presence would allow the U.S. to monitor the potential agreement between Israel and Syria. This airbase is expected to be part of a demilitarized zone outlined in the agreement.
According to two Syrian military sources, US forces might utilize the base for logistical support, surveillance, refueling, and humanitarian missions, while Syria would maintain full sovereignty over the facility.
Until now, the Syrian Foreign Ministry denied these informations.
UN remove Al-Sharaa from terrorism lists
On November 6, the UN Security Council approved a US-backed resolution removing Al-Sharaa and Syria’s Interior Minister from the ISIS and al-Qaeda sanctions list. All members of the United Nations Security Council, with the exception of the People's Republic of China (PRC), voted in favor of a motion. The PRC's UN Ambassador urged the Syrian transitional government to take additional measures against "terrorism," specifically mentioning the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). This reference likely refers to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).
PRC officials have consistently expressed concern regarding the Syrian transitional government's decision to appoint Uyghurs associated with TIP to high-ranking positions in the Syrian army. The Syrian transitional government has rebranded TIP as the 84th Division within the new Syrian army.
Despite the PRC's concerns regarding the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), Chinese companies have continued to engage with the new Syrian government. On October 21, Syrian Economy Minister Mohammad announced that the transitional government is in the process of securing five to six investment projects with the PRC, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.
Continuous development:
The Turkish state pursues its policies of demographic change and preventing the return of the local population by building colonial structures in the Afrin region. The construction of new residences called “Toros Housing Site” began on October 5 in the Afrin Canton.
The Democratic Autonomous Administration of Cizire Canton in Northern and Eastern Syria organized the 1st Communes Conference of Jazira Canton. This conference takes place in the context of the DAANES efforts to revive the commune system in NES.
Syrian transitional government to join the anti-ISIS Coalition
The Syrian transitional government is poised to join the Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State (ISIS) during Al-Sharaa's anticipated visit to Washington. This development would formalize 13 years of intelligence collaboration between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the US in combating ISIS and al-Qaeda networks in northern Syria.
Currently, the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the DAANES structures into the New Syrian Army and broader Syrian state framework is at a standstill. However, Syria's potential entry into the coalition could bolster cooperation between the SDF and the New Syrian Army in the efforts against ISIS in the region.
US plan to deploy air force in Damascus
The United States is planning to establish a military presence at an undisclosed airbase in Damascus. On November 5 two Western officials and a Syrian defense official, affirmed that this military presence would allow the U.S. to monitor the potential agreement between Israel and Syria. This airbase is expected to be part of a demilitarized zone outlined in the agreement.
According to two Syrian military sources, US forces might utilize the base for logistical support, surveillance, refueling, and humanitarian missions, while Syria would maintain full sovereignty over the facility.
Until now, the Syrian Foreign Ministry denied these informations.
UN remove Al-Sharaa from terrorism lists
On November 6, the UN Security Council approved a US-backed resolution removing Al-Sharaa and Syria’s Interior Minister from the ISIS and al-Qaeda sanctions list. All members of the United Nations Security Council, with the exception of the People's Republic of China (PRC), voted in favor of a motion. The PRC's UN Ambassador urged the Syrian transitional government to take additional measures against "terrorism," specifically mentioning the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). This reference likely refers to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).
PRC officials have consistently expressed concern regarding the Syrian transitional government's decision to appoint Uyghurs associated with TIP to high-ranking positions in the Syrian army. The Syrian transitional government has rebranded TIP as the 84th Division within the new Syrian army.
Despite the PRC's concerns regarding the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), Chinese companies have continued to engage with the new Syrian government. On October 21, Syrian Economy Minister Mohammad announced that the transitional government is in the process of securing five to six investment projects with the PRC, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.
Continuous development:
The Turkish state pursues its policies of demographic change and preventing the return of the local population by building colonial structures in the Afrin region. The construction of new residences called “Toros Housing Site” began on October 5 in the Afrin Canton.
The Democratic Autonomous Administration of Cizire Canton in Northern and Eastern Syria organized the 1st Communes Conference of Jazira Canton. This conference takes place in the context of the DAANES efforts to revive the commune system in NES.
This week we will not publish any evaluation, however, we still want to recommend you an analysis from crimethinc treating of the dissolution of PKK.
It was published in July. Since then, some events took place that might question some of the opinions shared in this article. However, this publication remains very relevant in its analysis and we encourage you to read it.
https://crimethinc.com/2025/07/13/making-sense-of-the-pkks-self-dissolution-what-does-it-mean-for-the-middle-east
Revolutionary greetings 🖤
It was published in July. Since then, some events took place that might question some of the opinions shared in this article. However, this publication remains very relevant in its analysis and we encourage you to read it.
https://crimethinc.com/2025/07/13/making-sense-of-the-pkks-self-dissolution-what-does-it-mean-for-the-middle-east
Revolutionary greetings 🖤
CrimethInc.
Making Sense of the PKK's Self-Dissolution
It is not just the fate of an armed group at stake, but of a political project that has redefined the parameters of struggle throughout the Middle East.
Weekly Highlights 10.11.25 - 16.11.25
Syrian Ministry of Interior counter-ISIS operation
On November 8, the Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) began a nationwide “preemptive” operation aimed at dismantling Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) logistics and leadership networks. The MoI spokesperson reported that the counter-ISIS operation was launched in response to intelligence suggesting ISIS's intent to reactivate its networks throughout Syria on the “eve of Syria joining the international coalition.” He cautioned that ISIS is likely to leverage Syria’s entry into the coalition as an opportunity to enhance its youth recruitment efforts and anticipates an uptick in ISIS activities post-integration.
These declarations make echo to recent information regarding two ISIS assassination attempts on Al-Sharaa.
Syria joins Global Coalition against ISIS
Al-Sharaa and the Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with Trump, and other US officials on November 10. The US State, Commerce, and Treasury departments announced shortly after the meeting that they suspended the Caesar Act for another six months.
Trump and Shara also discussed Syria’s ongoing negotiations with Israel and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The US, Syrian, and Turkish foreign ministers also met following Al-Sharaa’s meeting with Trump to discuss the integration of the SDF into the ranks of the new Syrian army and the implementation of the March 10 agreement.
On the same day, Syria signed a declaration to join the Global Coalition Against the ISIS. It is a declaration of “political cooperation” that does not yet include military components. The exact terms of Syria’s role in the coalition are still up for discussion.
Assadist cell supported by Iran
On November 12, the Syrian General Security Service (GSS) dismantled an Assadist insurgent cell in Tartous Province.
The MoI reported that the insurgent cell was led by a Shia cleric who had previously cooperated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The reported activities and recruitment efforts of this cell suggest it may have garnered some local support. Indeed, the delayed detection of the group by the MoI suggests local inhabitants did not immediately report the existence of this insurgent network and might support, at least in principle, its activities.
The MoI asserted that the leader of the insurgent cell has been affiliated with the IRGC in Syria for over four decades. While local accounts claim he was not directly linked to the IRGC or involved in combat operations, he seems to have received support from the IRGC and adopted its ideological framework.
Alawite leader calls for Alawites to establish an “independent region”
The Men of Light (Saraya al Jawad), an Alawite insurgent organization, emerged in reaction to the coastal massacres of March 2025, which specifically targeted the Alawite population.
The leader of this organization recently asserted that the militia’s primary aim is to “confront” the regime of Al Shara, emphasizing that Alawites “cannot coexist” with entities responsible for orchestrating massacres against their community. Furthermore, the leader proclaimed that, should the Syrian transitional government fail to withdraw from the coastal region, the Alawite community possesses the legitimate right to establish “an independent region” to safeguard their existence.
The Men of Light retains limited support within Syria at this time. The Syrian transitional government maintains a strong political and security presence throughout the Syrian coastal region and is unlikely to withdraw from any government-controlled territory without an extremely significant threat to government forces or a change in government policy.
Continuous developments:
- A local official with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) survived an assassination attempt on Saturday evening in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.
Syrian Ministry of Interior counter-ISIS operation
On November 8, the Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) began a nationwide “preemptive” operation aimed at dismantling Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) logistics and leadership networks. The MoI spokesperson reported that the counter-ISIS operation was launched in response to intelligence suggesting ISIS's intent to reactivate its networks throughout Syria on the “eve of Syria joining the international coalition.” He cautioned that ISIS is likely to leverage Syria’s entry into the coalition as an opportunity to enhance its youth recruitment efforts and anticipates an uptick in ISIS activities post-integration.
These declarations make echo to recent information regarding two ISIS assassination attempts on Al-Sharaa.
Syria joins Global Coalition against ISIS
Al-Sharaa and the Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with Trump, and other US officials on November 10. The US State, Commerce, and Treasury departments announced shortly after the meeting that they suspended the Caesar Act for another six months.
Trump and Shara also discussed Syria’s ongoing negotiations with Israel and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The US, Syrian, and Turkish foreign ministers also met following Al-Sharaa’s meeting with Trump to discuss the integration of the SDF into the ranks of the new Syrian army and the implementation of the March 10 agreement.
On the same day, Syria signed a declaration to join the Global Coalition Against the ISIS. It is a declaration of “political cooperation” that does not yet include military components. The exact terms of Syria’s role in the coalition are still up for discussion.
Assadist cell supported by Iran
On November 12, the Syrian General Security Service (GSS) dismantled an Assadist insurgent cell in Tartous Province.
The MoI reported that the insurgent cell was led by a Shia cleric who had previously cooperated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The reported activities and recruitment efforts of this cell suggest it may have garnered some local support. Indeed, the delayed detection of the group by the MoI suggests local inhabitants did not immediately report the existence of this insurgent network and might support, at least in principle, its activities.
The MoI asserted that the leader of the insurgent cell has been affiliated with the IRGC in Syria for over four decades. While local accounts claim he was not directly linked to the IRGC or involved in combat operations, he seems to have received support from the IRGC and adopted its ideological framework.
Alawite leader calls for Alawites to establish an “independent region”
The Men of Light (Saraya al Jawad), an Alawite insurgent organization, emerged in reaction to the coastal massacres of March 2025, which specifically targeted the Alawite population.
The leader of this organization recently asserted that the militia’s primary aim is to “confront” the regime of Al Shara, emphasizing that Alawites “cannot coexist” with entities responsible for orchestrating massacres against their community. Furthermore, the leader proclaimed that, should the Syrian transitional government fail to withdraw from the coastal region, the Alawite community possesses the legitimate right to establish “an independent region” to safeguard their existence.
The Men of Light retains limited support within Syria at this time. The Syrian transitional government maintains a strong political and security presence throughout the Syrian coastal region and is unlikely to withdraw from any government-controlled territory without an extremely significant threat to government forces or a change in government policy.
Continuous developments:
- A local official with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) survived an assassination attempt on Saturday evening in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.
- On Sunday, Druze armed groups responded to heavy gunfire from forces of the Syrian transitional government in the countryside of Suweyda.
- Electricity bills have increased by at least sixty times in Damascus. People living the city and its surroundings, who are already struggling with low incomes and long power cuts reacted by organizing protests.
- Electricity bills have increased by at least sixty times in Damascus. People living the city and its surroundings, who are already struggling with low incomes and long power cuts reacted by organizing protests.
Evaluation
Syria is joining the coalition, which since the active war with ISIS has included some of the world's hegemonic forces: the United States and a number of European countries led by France. We see this as another step by Jolani towards creating a strong political foundation to remain in power. We have already written that the new Syrian government has begun work in the political sphere, creating a political party. They understand well that the military junta's lifespan is not long and that they need to become competitive in this field and gain the support of the population, not just former or current jihadists. The extent to which this is successful can be seen in the reaction of the Syrian people to the increase in electricity tariffs.
Economic issues are critically important here. The economic situation in Syria, including the north-eastern autonomous region, is not improving significantly even after the easing of sanctions. Poverty is one of the most serious problems, and the new government is exacerbating the situation by increasing taxes and tariffs. How successful it will be in securing the support that Jolani so desperately needs in such a situation is a very big question.
For almost a year after the seizure of power, the Syrian people have been protesting against various aspects of the new regime. The consequences of such expressions of dissent often end in massacres, as was the case in Latakia and Suwayda. Nevertheless, the example of north-eastern Syria is still a possible alternative which, in contrast to the dictatorial but relatively stable regime of Assad and then the jihadist chaos, presents itself as the best solution for the regions.
While advocating for the integrity of the Syrian nation-state, Jolani was unable to implement this vision, and Syria is now divided into four regions, in three of which the new government is not accepted by the majority of the population. Whether this is a sign of subsequent federalisation and the strengthening of autonomy in other areas of Syria is an important question.
Turning specifically to north-eastern Syria, we can say that the Syrian regime is still not engaging in open confrontation. At the moment, there are minor provocations and blockades of logistics routes, i.e. attempts to exert economic pressure. After the fall of the Assad regime, new opportunities certainly opened up, but North-East Syria was not and has not become so dependent on Damascus in this regard. This covert economic blockade is noticeable but does not cause major problems because, after more than a decade of revolution, the region has gained some economic stability and immunity to such changes.
There is very little time left until the end of 2025. These weeks may reveal the results of this turbulent year's diplomacy and hint at possible future events in the coming winter. Stay tuned and follow the developments of the revolution with us.
Revolutionary greetings 🖤
Syria is joining the coalition, which since the active war with ISIS has included some of the world's hegemonic forces: the United States and a number of European countries led by France. We see this as another step by Jolani towards creating a strong political foundation to remain in power. We have already written that the new Syrian government has begun work in the political sphere, creating a political party. They understand well that the military junta's lifespan is not long and that they need to become competitive in this field and gain the support of the population, not just former or current jihadists. The extent to which this is successful can be seen in the reaction of the Syrian people to the increase in electricity tariffs.
Economic issues are critically important here. The economic situation in Syria, including the north-eastern autonomous region, is not improving significantly even after the easing of sanctions. Poverty is one of the most serious problems, and the new government is exacerbating the situation by increasing taxes and tariffs. How successful it will be in securing the support that Jolani so desperately needs in such a situation is a very big question.
For almost a year after the seizure of power, the Syrian people have been protesting against various aspects of the new regime. The consequences of such expressions of dissent often end in massacres, as was the case in Latakia and Suwayda. Nevertheless, the example of north-eastern Syria is still a possible alternative which, in contrast to the dictatorial but relatively stable regime of Assad and then the jihadist chaos, presents itself as the best solution for the regions.
While advocating for the integrity of the Syrian nation-state, Jolani was unable to implement this vision, and Syria is now divided into four regions, in three of which the new government is not accepted by the majority of the population. Whether this is a sign of subsequent federalisation and the strengthening of autonomy in other areas of Syria is an important question.
Turning specifically to north-eastern Syria, we can say that the Syrian regime is still not engaging in open confrontation. At the moment, there are minor provocations and blockades of logistics routes, i.e. attempts to exert economic pressure. After the fall of the Assad regime, new opportunities certainly opened up, but North-East Syria was not and has not become so dependent on Damascus in this regard. This covert economic blockade is noticeable but does not cause major problems because, after more than a decade of revolution, the region has gained some economic stability and immunity to such changes.
There is very little time left until the end of 2025. These weeks may reveal the results of this turbulent year's diplomacy and hint at possible future events in the coming winter. Stay tuned and follow the developments of the revolution with us.
Revolutionary greetings 🖤
❤2
Weekly Highlights 17.11.25 - 23.11.25
SDF and Syrian government forces clashes in Raqqa Province
On November 20, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) clashed against Syrian government forces near Madan in southern Raqqa Province, accusing the Syrian government of collaborating with fighters affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). The SDF briefly seized control of several army positions before the Syrian army managed to reclaim the area. Two combatants from the 66th Division were reported killed during the clashes.
In a statement on November 19, the SDF suggested that the attack was prompted by the presence of foreign fighters linked to ISIS within government positions along the frontlines separating government and SDF forces. The SDF released footage purportedly obtained from a government reconnaissance drone, showing a fighter in military fatigues adorned with a patch of the shahada in white text on a black background.
These accusations emerge amidst ongoing discussions between the United States and Syria regarding Syria’s potential entry into the Global Coalition against ISIS.
Israel-Syria relations and agreements
On November 18, a Russian-Turkish military delegation conducted a tour at the former Russian positions in Syria. This tour is linked to a Russian initiative aimed at reintroducing Russian military police into southern Syria. This deployment is intended to serve as a buffer between the Israeli occupied Syrian territory and the Syrian forces.
This proposal comes amid negociations between Russia and Syria regarding their economic and military collaboration. Syria foreign ministry stated recently that Syria will not allow Russians to stay at their bases unless their presence “serves Syria’s interests.”
On November 15, Netanyahu engaged in discussions with Putin regarding "strategies to enhance stability in Syria". Historically, Israel did not oppose Russia’s presence in Syria under the former regime, during which Israeli-Russian military coordination reached its peak.
Despite U.S. efforts to facilitate negotiations between Syria and Israel, tensions remain elevated. Notably, last week, Israeli warplanes violated Syrian airspace, and Netanyahu visited positions in the Golan Heights occupied by the Israel Occupation Forces (IOF). This visit was condemned by the Syrian affair ministry.
Al-Sharaa metting with an Arab tribal sheikh
The Sheikh of the SDF-affiliated Shammar tribe engaged in discussions with Al-Sharaa regarding the significant role of Arab tribes in the Syrian political landscape. They reaffirmed the Shammar tribe's endorsement of the government alongside the SDF's integration framework agreement. Jarba's son is the commander of the Sanadid Forces, a militia within the SDF of approximately 3,000 Arab tribal fighters.
The SDF and Sanadid Forces organized the Sheikh's diplomatic visit to Damascus. While he expresses general support for the government, he has moderated his stance by refuting the government's assertions that the SDF aims for secession from Syria. He has also advocated for the formulation of a new constitution on the basis that the existing one fails to represent the entirety of the Syrian people, aligning with the SDF's position.
Middle-East Peace and Security forum
On November 18, Mazloum Abdi, Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council, Masoud Barzani, former President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, joined the Middle-East Peace and Security forum (MEPS). They engaged in critical discussions aimed at strengthening collaboration between different actors in Kurdistan. The forum was also joined by the Former Turkish Prime Minister.
Ilham Ahmed underscored the necessity of evolving attitudes towards the rights of all peoples in Syria, calling for mutual respect among diverse ethnic and political identities. Mazloum Abdi drew attention to recent developments regarding Abdullah Öcalan, indicating that the ongoing processes at İmralı, where Öcalan is incarcerated, present a significant opportunity for peace and reconciliation.
SDF and Syrian government forces clashes in Raqqa Province
On November 20, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) clashed against Syrian government forces near Madan in southern Raqqa Province, accusing the Syrian government of collaborating with fighters affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). The SDF briefly seized control of several army positions before the Syrian army managed to reclaim the area. Two combatants from the 66th Division were reported killed during the clashes.
In a statement on November 19, the SDF suggested that the attack was prompted by the presence of foreign fighters linked to ISIS within government positions along the frontlines separating government and SDF forces. The SDF released footage purportedly obtained from a government reconnaissance drone, showing a fighter in military fatigues adorned with a patch of the shahada in white text on a black background.
These accusations emerge amidst ongoing discussions between the United States and Syria regarding Syria’s potential entry into the Global Coalition against ISIS.
Israel-Syria relations and agreements
On November 18, a Russian-Turkish military delegation conducted a tour at the former Russian positions in Syria. This tour is linked to a Russian initiative aimed at reintroducing Russian military police into southern Syria. This deployment is intended to serve as a buffer between the Israeli occupied Syrian territory and the Syrian forces.
This proposal comes amid negociations between Russia and Syria regarding their economic and military collaboration. Syria foreign ministry stated recently that Syria will not allow Russians to stay at their bases unless their presence “serves Syria’s interests.”
On November 15, Netanyahu engaged in discussions with Putin regarding "strategies to enhance stability in Syria". Historically, Israel did not oppose Russia’s presence in Syria under the former regime, during which Israeli-Russian military coordination reached its peak.
Despite U.S. efforts to facilitate negotiations between Syria and Israel, tensions remain elevated. Notably, last week, Israeli warplanes violated Syrian airspace, and Netanyahu visited positions in the Golan Heights occupied by the Israel Occupation Forces (IOF). This visit was condemned by the Syrian affair ministry.
Al-Sharaa metting with an Arab tribal sheikh
The Sheikh of the SDF-affiliated Shammar tribe engaged in discussions with Al-Sharaa regarding the significant role of Arab tribes in the Syrian political landscape. They reaffirmed the Shammar tribe's endorsement of the government alongside the SDF's integration framework agreement. Jarba's son is the commander of the Sanadid Forces, a militia within the SDF of approximately 3,000 Arab tribal fighters.
The SDF and Sanadid Forces organized the Sheikh's diplomatic visit to Damascus. While he expresses general support for the government, he has moderated his stance by refuting the government's assertions that the SDF aims for secession from Syria. He has also advocated for the formulation of a new constitution on the basis that the existing one fails to represent the entirety of the Syrian people, aligning with the SDF's position.
Middle-East Peace and Security forum
On November 18, Mazloum Abdi, Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council, Masoud Barzani, former President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, joined the Middle-East Peace and Security forum (MEPS). They engaged in critical discussions aimed at strengthening collaboration between different actors in Kurdistan. The forum was also joined by the Former Turkish Prime Minister.
Ilham Ahmed underscored the necessity of evolving attitudes towards the rights of all peoples in Syria, calling for mutual respect among diverse ethnic and political identities. Mazloum Abdi drew attention to recent developments regarding Abdullah Öcalan, indicating that the ongoing processes at İmralı, where Öcalan is incarcerated, present a significant opportunity for peace and reconciliation.
The forum ultimately functioned as a venue to advance the broader Kurdish political agenda, highlighting the imperative for unity among various factions and a coordinated approach to securing political representation in Syria.
Continuous development:
- In Idlib dozens of teachers gathered outside the Idlib Education Directorate, holding banners calling for the dismissal of the Minister of Education and accusing him of “deliberately neglecting” the deteriorating state of education.
- In Suwayda Governorate, a group of women activists launched on Saturday a new women-led political movement to support “the cause of abducted women and document the violations” committed in the Jabal al-Arab region.
- The Syrian government launched judicial proceedings against 14 defendants involved in the Alawite massacres. The defendants face charges including sedition, sectarian incitement, and premeditated murder of civilians. 563 suspects have been referred to the judiciary.
Continuous development:
- In Idlib dozens of teachers gathered outside the Idlib Education Directorate, holding banners calling for the dismissal of the Minister of Education and accusing him of “deliberately neglecting” the deteriorating state of education.
- In Suwayda Governorate, a group of women activists launched on Saturday a new women-led political movement to support “the cause of abducted women and document the violations” committed in the Jabal al-Arab region.
- The Syrian government launched judicial proceedings against 14 defendants involved in the Alawite massacres. The defendants face charges including sedition, sectarian incitement, and premeditated murder of civilians. 563 suspects have been referred to the judiciary.
Evaluation
One of the drone operators fighting for the Syrian government was recorded with an ISIS patch on his plate carrier. SDF released the statement pointing out the danger of involving those fighters in government forces, shedding light on the legitimization of jihadist fighters by the state military aparatus. The credibility and veracity of these claims are contested by some US media, who argue that some fighters who are not connected to ISIS also sometimes wear the black and white patch.
While we don't see much point in debating those media, we would like to share perspective on the history of disinformation politics led by the US. Historically, the american imperialist state has demonstrated its capacity to fabricate "truth" from thin air to oppose revolutionary movements around the world.
In "Understanding Power," Noam Chomsky discusses the example of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, detailing the extensive campaign led by US entities to discredit the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Mainstream media outlets propagated misleading information about the FSLN’s governance, questioned the political rights of opposition groups and the existence of press freedoms, even denied that legitimate elections had occurred. The guerillas defending Nicaragua against US proxies - the Contras - were branded "Extremists Out of Control" and accused of committing atrocities.
This strategic disinformation was aimed at justifying the US-backed Contras’ so-called "war for democracy" portraying them as defenders against a supposed communist threat.
Of course, none of those allegations were true; the states of Latin America described by the american press at the time as "democratic", states like El Salvador and
Guatemala, were in fact authoritarian regimes backed by the US to suppress popular revolutionary movements. As Chomsky explained in his book: "In El Salvador and Guatemala, the governments are run by the military for the benefit of the local oligarchies - the landowners, rich businessmen, and rising professionals - and those people are tied up with the United States, so therefore those countries are 'democracies.' It doesn't matter if they blow up the independent press, kill off the political opposition, slaughter tens of thousands of people, and never run anything remotely like a free election, all of that is totally irrelevant. They're 'democracies,' because the right people are running them; if the right people aren't running them, then they're not 'democracies.'"
US politics may have evolved and changed since the times of the Sandinistas, but the essence of their strategy remains the same: elevating an authoritarian ruler while creating a narrative that positions him as a "champion of democracy." The many civilians massacred by Jolani's forces in Latakia and Suweida, the number of New Syrian Army fighters who cut their teeth in jihadist groups including ISIS, and the consequences of the Syrian Transitional Government's policies on the Syrian people are inconsequential. The only thing holding significance here is the alignment of the Syrian government with US interests; only then will the facade of "democracy" be stamped onto their Islamist regime.
It is in this context that the revolution in NES decided to take the path of political struggle, aiming for unity in Syria and calling for an end to the bloodshed. While this proves to be a long and difficult path, it is based on the belief that another reality, free from authoritarian regimes supported by the imperialists powers of the world, is possible. No guarantees offered by those states could ever answer the need of the revolution to defend itself.
Long live the revolution! 🖤
One of the drone operators fighting for the Syrian government was recorded with an ISIS patch on his plate carrier. SDF released the statement pointing out the danger of involving those fighters in government forces, shedding light on the legitimization of jihadist fighters by the state military aparatus. The credibility and veracity of these claims are contested by some US media, who argue that some fighters who are not connected to ISIS also sometimes wear the black and white patch.
While we don't see much point in debating those media, we would like to share perspective on the history of disinformation politics led by the US. Historically, the american imperialist state has demonstrated its capacity to fabricate "truth" from thin air to oppose revolutionary movements around the world.
In "Understanding Power," Noam Chomsky discusses the example of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, detailing the extensive campaign led by US entities to discredit the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Mainstream media outlets propagated misleading information about the FSLN’s governance, questioned the political rights of opposition groups and the existence of press freedoms, even denied that legitimate elections had occurred. The guerillas defending Nicaragua against US proxies - the Contras - were branded "Extremists Out of Control" and accused of committing atrocities.
This strategic disinformation was aimed at justifying the US-backed Contras’ so-called "war for democracy" portraying them as defenders against a supposed communist threat.
Of course, none of those allegations were true; the states of Latin America described by the american press at the time as "democratic", states like El Salvador and
Guatemala, were in fact authoritarian regimes backed by the US to suppress popular revolutionary movements. As Chomsky explained in his book: "In El Salvador and Guatemala, the governments are run by the military for the benefit of the local oligarchies - the landowners, rich businessmen, and rising professionals - and those people are tied up with the United States, so therefore those countries are 'democracies.' It doesn't matter if they blow up the independent press, kill off the political opposition, slaughter tens of thousands of people, and never run anything remotely like a free election, all of that is totally irrelevant. They're 'democracies,' because the right people are running them; if the right people aren't running them, then they're not 'democracies.'"
US politics may have evolved and changed since the times of the Sandinistas, but the essence of their strategy remains the same: elevating an authoritarian ruler while creating a narrative that positions him as a "champion of democracy." The many civilians massacred by Jolani's forces in Latakia and Suweida, the number of New Syrian Army fighters who cut their teeth in jihadist groups including ISIS, and the consequences of the Syrian Transitional Government's policies on the Syrian people are inconsequential. The only thing holding significance here is the alignment of the Syrian government with US interests; only then will the facade of "democracy" be stamped onto their Islamist regime.
It is in this context that the revolution in NES decided to take the path of political struggle, aiming for unity in Syria and calling for an end to the bloodshed. While this proves to be a long and difficult path, it is based on the belief that another reality, free from authoritarian regimes supported by the imperialists powers of the world, is possible. No guarantees offered by those states could ever answer the need of the revolution to defend itself.
Long live the revolution! 🖤
👏5
Weekly Highlights 24.11.25 - 30.11.25
Demonstrations in Syria’s coastal areas Alawite cities
On Tuesday, demonstrations erupted in Syria’s coastal region, primarily inhabited by the Alawite community. These protests were catalyzed by a call from Ghazal Ghazal, the spiritual leader of the Supreme Alawite Council in Syria, who urged citizens to advocate for "federalism and political decentralization, an end to ethnic cleansing, killing, kidnapping, and captivity, as well as the liberation of prisoners from detention facilities."
Coordinated demonstrations unfolded in cities and towns including Jableh, Tartus, Baniyas, and surrounding regions. Security forces intervened in several locations to disperse the gatherings, resulting in clashes with protestors.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) issued a statement warning that civilians and peaceful demonstrators are experiencing "direct targeting,".
It asserted that assaults on protesters advocating for their legitimate rights, coupled with the deployment of armed factions represent “systematic practices aimed at undermining civil peace and fueling discord among Syrians.”
On Wednesday, the residents of the city of Suwayda organized a solidarity stands in support of the protests. Suweidawi activists affirmed that the gathering comes as “a continuation of the movement that has been ongoing for more than two years.”
Raising tensions between Alawite community and sunni bedouin tribe in Homs
On November 23, unidentified assailants murdered a Sunni Bedouin couple from the Bani Khaled tribe in the western outskirts of Homs City. These assailants inscribed sectarian slogans in the victims' blood on the home's walls. One of these innoscriptions included “Ya Hussein,” a phrase associated with Shia communities and utilized by Alawites as well.
In retaliation for the murders, members of the tribe of the victims targeted homes in the predominantly Alawite Muhajreen neighborhood. The General Security Service (GSS) established a cordon, attempting to inhibit the outbreak of violence. The Bani Khaled tribesmen breached the GSS cordon and conducted assaults on both Alawite and Sunni residences. The GSS reasserted control only after the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) deployed additional personnel to the area.
Following the events, the GSS instituted a temporary curfew over Homs City. The Homs Health Directorate reported 18 injuries in Homs City on November 23 but did not confirm any fatalities.
There has been a notable escalation in sectarian violence targeting Alawite communities in Western Homs City: four Alawite civilians have been killed in sectarian-motivated assaults between October 25 and November 22. In May 2025, unidentified masked gunmen have specifically focused on Alawites in Western Homs City, executing a series of sectarian attacks since the onset of 2025.
IOF operation in Beit Jinn
On November 28, the Israel Occupation Forces (IOF) bombed the village of Beit Jinn, located at the south of Damascus, near Quneitra region. The bombing followed a ground operation aiming at apprehending some members of al Jamaa al Islamiyya, a faction that has a history of military engagement with IOF in southern Lebanon. During the course of the detainment operation, Israeli forces encountered resistance. Syrian media indicated that the operation resulted in the deaths of 13 villagers and injuries to 20 others, with six injured Israeli soldiers.
Following the events, the Syrian Foreign Minister condemned the ongoing Israeli military operations in Syria, asserting that such activities jeopardize regional stability and security.
The Israeli Defense Minister stated that the nation is currently “not on track” toward achieving peace with Syria. He elaborated on the presence of various armed factions, including the Houthis, operating in southern Syria, signaling potential preparations for a ground offensive into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
Demonstrations in Syria’s coastal areas Alawite cities
On Tuesday, demonstrations erupted in Syria’s coastal region, primarily inhabited by the Alawite community. These protests were catalyzed by a call from Ghazal Ghazal, the spiritual leader of the Supreme Alawite Council in Syria, who urged citizens to advocate for "federalism and political decentralization, an end to ethnic cleansing, killing, kidnapping, and captivity, as well as the liberation of prisoners from detention facilities."
Coordinated demonstrations unfolded in cities and towns including Jableh, Tartus, Baniyas, and surrounding regions. Security forces intervened in several locations to disperse the gatherings, resulting in clashes with protestors.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) issued a statement warning that civilians and peaceful demonstrators are experiencing "direct targeting,".
It asserted that assaults on protesters advocating for their legitimate rights, coupled with the deployment of armed factions represent “systematic practices aimed at undermining civil peace and fueling discord among Syrians.”
On Wednesday, the residents of the city of Suwayda organized a solidarity stands in support of the protests. Suweidawi activists affirmed that the gathering comes as “a continuation of the movement that has been ongoing for more than two years.”
Raising tensions between Alawite community and sunni bedouin tribe in Homs
On November 23, unidentified assailants murdered a Sunni Bedouin couple from the Bani Khaled tribe in the western outskirts of Homs City. These assailants inscribed sectarian slogans in the victims' blood on the home's walls. One of these innoscriptions included “Ya Hussein,” a phrase associated with Shia communities and utilized by Alawites as well.
In retaliation for the murders, members of the tribe of the victims targeted homes in the predominantly Alawite Muhajreen neighborhood. The General Security Service (GSS) established a cordon, attempting to inhibit the outbreak of violence. The Bani Khaled tribesmen breached the GSS cordon and conducted assaults on both Alawite and Sunni residences. The GSS reasserted control only after the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) deployed additional personnel to the area.
Following the events, the GSS instituted a temporary curfew over Homs City. The Homs Health Directorate reported 18 injuries in Homs City on November 23 but did not confirm any fatalities.
There has been a notable escalation in sectarian violence targeting Alawite communities in Western Homs City: four Alawite civilians have been killed in sectarian-motivated assaults between October 25 and November 22. In May 2025, unidentified masked gunmen have specifically focused on Alawites in Western Homs City, executing a series of sectarian attacks since the onset of 2025.
IOF operation in Beit Jinn
On November 28, the Israel Occupation Forces (IOF) bombed the village of Beit Jinn, located at the south of Damascus, near Quneitra region. The bombing followed a ground operation aiming at apprehending some members of al Jamaa al Islamiyya, a faction that has a history of military engagement with IOF in southern Lebanon. During the course of the detainment operation, Israeli forces encountered resistance. Syrian media indicated that the operation resulted in the deaths of 13 villagers and injuries to 20 others, with six injured Israeli soldiers.
Following the events, the Syrian Foreign Minister condemned the ongoing Israeli military operations in Syria, asserting that such activities jeopardize regional stability and security.
The Israeli Defense Minister stated that the nation is currently “not on track” toward achieving peace with Syria. He elaborated on the presence of various armed factions, including the Houthis, operating in southern Syria, signaling potential preparations for a ground offensive into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
❤2
Syria - PRC
On November 17, Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister met for the first time with People's Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Affairs Minister in Beijing.
Minister Shaibani affirmed Syria's commitment to preventing any entity from utilizing Syrian territory as a base for activities that could compromise PRC interests. In response, Minister Wang indicated that Beijing is considering the involvement in the economic reconstruction of Syria. He also referenced the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an anti-PRC Uyghur militant group.
The formal integration of Uyghur militants into the ranks of the new Syrian army poses concerns for the PRC. Many of these militants have aspirations of returning to PRC armed with combat experience and networks, aiming to launch an insurgency against the PRC.
Historically, the PRC has cooperated closely with the Assad regime on counterterrorism initiatives targeting the ETIM. It is likely that PRC policy towards the new Syrian government will condition economic involvement in Syria’s reconstruction on the continuation of counterterrorism cooperation with Syria, specifically targeting Uyghur militants operating within the region.
Following the meeting, a diplomatic Syrian source told that the Syrian Transitional Government “intends to hand over 400 Uyghur fighters to China based on a Chinese request and in several batches.” This information was denied by the Syrian government.
Continuous development:
- Clashes erupted in Suwayda as government forces report casualties. The “National Guard” in Suweida claimed that the government forces had violated the ceasefire in the western countryside of the city.
- The Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS) announced on Saturday night that it is following “with deep concern” recent celebrations called on by Al-Sharaa, warning that the rhetoric expressed at these events “took on racist and sectarian dimensions.”
On November 17, Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister met for the first time with People's Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Affairs Minister in Beijing.
Minister Shaibani affirmed Syria's commitment to preventing any entity from utilizing Syrian territory as a base for activities that could compromise PRC interests. In response, Minister Wang indicated that Beijing is considering the involvement in the economic reconstruction of Syria. He also referenced the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an anti-PRC Uyghur militant group.
The formal integration of Uyghur militants into the ranks of the new Syrian army poses concerns for the PRC. Many of these militants have aspirations of returning to PRC armed with combat experience and networks, aiming to launch an insurgency against the PRC.
Historically, the PRC has cooperated closely with the Assad regime on counterterrorism initiatives targeting the ETIM. It is likely that PRC policy towards the new Syrian government will condition economic involvement in Syria’s reconstruction on the continuation of counterterrorism cooperation with Syria, specifically targeting Uyghur militants operating within the region.
Following the meeting, a diplomatic Syrian source told that the Syrian Transitional Government “intends to hand over 400 Uyghur fighters to China based on a Chinese request and in several batches.” This information was denied by the Syrian government.
Continuous development:
- Clashes erupted in Suwayda as government forces report casualties. The “National Guard” in Suweida claimed that the government forces had violated the ceasefire in the western countryside of the city.
- The Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS) announced on Saturday night that it is following “with deep concern” recent celebrations called on by Al-Sharaa, warning that the rhetoric expressed at these events “took on racist and sectarian dimensions.”
❤1
Evaluation
The 10 March deadline for the ceasefire is drawing ever closer, but the stalled negotiations do not inspire confidence that the tensions between the New Syrian Government and the Autonomous Administration of the Syrian Democratic Forces will be resolved through diplomatic means. The people are protesting, the DAANES consequentially rejects the idea of a unified Arab Syria proposed by Jolani, and the government itself is not ready for the ideas of federalisation and coexistence of peoples and cultures on the basis of equality and women's liberation.
The hegemonic force’s strategy for peaceful resolution of the ‘Kurdish problem’ is clearly ineffective in Syria. The peace talks that began in early 2025 may have seemed naive and untrustworthy, but they gave the SDF enough time to analyse the situation and plan their steps, and they significantly reduced Jolani's ability to act. The Syrian government has been backed into a corner: it must behave appropriately in order not to lose the recognition of the world's leading powers. The global neoliberal system dictates its own rules, according to which open support for radical jihadism is unacceptable, which significantly limits Jolani's options, leaving him with only minor armed provocations against the SDF and vague statements. Meanwhile these peoples in Syria who currently don’t have the tools for independent self-defense, face brutal attacks of government fighters. Ongoing lack of autonomy and self-defense for Druze and Alawite peoples leads to their systematic murder.
Against this backdrop, the northwest appears to be a much more stable region of Syria than any other. Of course, the situation here is also diverse, but in general, the Autonomous Administration and other self-governing bodies manage to ensure conditions for the continuation of revolutionary changes, despite constant military tension, threats of invasion from Turkey, the Syrian government and ISIS, and economic difficulties.
And, of course, we cannot fail to mention an important date this week — 27 November, the day the PKK was founded. All year long, history has been unfolding before our eyes: the dissolution of the party that made the revolution in North-East Syria possible, the adjustment of Öcalan's paradigm, the guerrillas' exit from the mountains of North Kurdistan. Here we would like to note how the ability to critically assess reality and change can help in the realisation of a revolutionary project. The history of the PKK is long and has its dark pages, but as anarchists, we cannot help but respect this ability to acknowledge mistakes, to shift from the Marxist-Leninist paradigm towards libertarian socialism and democratic confederalism, and to understand the party as a tool for achieving revolutionary change, rather than an end in itself.
On this day, celebrations were held throughout north-eastern Syria. For the people here, the PKK is not just an organization, it is a symbol of liberation and unity among peoples. With the dissolution of the PKK, the banner of freedom is finally passing from the party that became a symbol into the hands of a huge number of revolutionaries in this region and around the world.
Revolutionary greetings! 🖤
The 10 March deadline for the ceasefire is drawing ever closer, but the stalled negotiations do not inspire confidence that the tensions between the New Syrian Government and the Autonomous Administration of the Syrian Democratic Forces will be resolved through diplomatic means. The people are protesting, the DAANES consequentially rejects the idea of a unified Arab Syria proposed by Jolani, and the government itself is not ready for the ideas of federalisation and coexistence of peoples and cultures on the basis of equality and women's liberation.
The hegemonic force’s strategy for peaceful resolution of the ‘Kurdish problem’ is clearly ineffective in Syria. The peace talks that began in early 2025 may have seemed naive and untrustworthy, but they gave the SDF enough time to analyse the situation and plan their steps, and they significantly reduced Jolani's ability to act. The Syrian government has been backed into a corner: it must behave appropriately in order not to lose the recognition of the world's leading powers. The global neoliberal system dictates its own rules, according to which open support for radical jihadism is unacceptable, which significantly limits Jolani's options, leaving him with only minor armed provocations against the SDF and vague statements. Meanwhile these peoples in Syria who currently don’t have the tools for independent self-defense, face brutal attacks of government fighters. Ongoing lack of autonomy and self-defense for Druze and Alawite peoples leads to their systematic murder.
Against this backdrop, the northwest appears to be a much more stable region of Syria than any other. Of course, the situation here is also diverse, but in general, the Autonomous Administration and other self-governing bodies manage to ensure conditions for the continuation of revolutionary changes, despite constant military tension, threats of invasion from Turkey, the Syrian government and ISIS, and economic difficulties.
And, of course, we cannot fail to mention an important date this week — 27 November, the day the PKK was founded. All year long, history has been unfolding before our eyes: the dissolution of the party that made the revolution in North-East Syria possible, the adjustment of Öcalan's paradigm, the guerrillas' exit from the mountains of North Kurdistan. Here we would like to note how the ability to critically assess reality and change can help in the realisation of a revolutionary project. The history of the PKK is long and has its dark pages, but as anarchists, we cannot help but respect this ability to acknowledge mistakes, to shift from the Marxist-Leninist paradigm towards libertarian socialism and democratic confederalism, and to understand the party as a tool for achieving revolutionary change, rather than an end in itself.
On this day, celebrations were held throughout north-eastern Syria. For the people here, the PKK is not just an organization, it is a symbol of liberation and unity among peoples. With the dissolution of the PKK, the banner of freedom is finally passing from the party that became a symbol into the hands of a huge number of revolutionaries in this region and around the world.
Revolutionary greetings! 🖤
❤3