Weekly Highlights 01.12.25 - 07.12.25
Abdullah Ocala proposal for SDF integration
On November 24, Abdullah Ocalan proposed a plan for the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to Turkish parliament members engaged in the PKK disarmament dialogue. This plan stipulates that the SDF should join the Syrian military while retaining its own internal security apparatus.
This announcement represents the first call from Ocalan for the SDF to assimilate into the Syrian military structure while preserving its internal security forces. In February 2025, Ocalan asserted that “all [PKK] groups must lay [down] their arms,” a statement interpreted by Turkish officials as a directive for the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian transitional government under the MoD.
SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi asserted that it “applies solely to the PKK [and is not] applicable to our situation in Syria.” Ocalan’s newly articulated vision aligns more closely with Abdi’s advocacy for a decentralized Syrian state, allowing the SDF to maintain local security governance in northeastern Syria.
AKP push for SDF to hand over strategical assets
On December 2, an AKP spokeperson indicated that Turkey may reassess its classification of the SDF as a “terrorist organization,” at the condition that SDF hands over critical resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as part of its reintegration into the Syrian state.
The spokesperson also stated that the SDF would effectively “cease to be a threat to Turkey and a terrorist organization” if it submits control of strategic assets—including airports, border crossings, and oil fields—to the Syrian government.
This transfer of pivotal resources and infrastructure is a strategic maneuver to undermine the SDF's influence in NES, as it would restrict it's access to the Turkish border and curtail its revenue streams from oil operations. Both Turkey and the Syrian government have asserted that the SDF must fully integrate into the Syrian state by year’s end. A potential shift in Turkey’s threat assessment could imply that Turkey may be anticipating the SDF's adherence to the March 10 agreement.
Suweida National Guard carries out political arrests, killings and torture of prominent Druze figures
On November 28, the Suwayda National Guard executed a series of arrests and killings targeting notable Druze figures within Suweida Province. The Druze militia coalition apprehended ten individuals, accusing them of organizing a “conspiracy” in cooperation with the Syrian transitional government. Among those arrested were several influential figures of the Druze community.
On November 29, members of the Suweida National Guard recorded acts of torture against Sheikh Matni. His corpse, displaying evident signs of torture, was delivered to the entrance of Suweida City Hospital on December 2. Sheikh Matni had played a pivotal role in establishing the Suweida Military Council in February 2025, a Druze militia that confronted transitional government forces amid the intercommunal violence of July 2025. Matni maintained a close relationship with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri; however, tensions arose following Matni's opposition to Hijri’s initiative to form the Suweida National Guard. Pro-government sources claim that Matni was arrested for advocating a negotiated settlement with the Syrian transitional government.
Abdullah Ocala proposal for SDF integration
On November 24, Abdullah Ocalan proposed a plan for the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to Turkish parliament members engaged in the PKK disarmament dialogue. This plan stipulates that the SDF should join the Syrian military while retaining its own internal security apparatus.
This announcement represents the first call from Ocalan for the SDF to assimilate into the Syrian military structure while preserving its internal security forces. In February 2025, Ocalan asserted that “all [PKK] groups must lay [down] their arms,” a statement interpreted by Turkish officials as a directive for the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian transitional government under the MoD.
SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi asserted that it “applies solely to the PKK [and is not] applicable to our situation in Syria.” Ocalan’s newly articulated vision aligns more closely with Abdi’s advocacy for a decentralized Syrian state, allowing the SDF to maintain local security governance in northeastern Syria.
AKP push for SDF to hand over strategical assets
On December 2, an AKP spokeperson indicated that Turkey may reassess its classification of the SDF as a “terrorist organization,” at the condition that SDF hands over critical resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as part of its reintegration into the Syrian state.
The spokesperson also stated that the SDF would effectively “cease to be a threat to Turkey and a terrorist organization” if it submits control of strategic assets—including airports, border crossings, and oil fields—to the Syrian government.
This transfer of pivotal resources and infrastructure is a strategic maneuver to undermine the SDF's influence in NES, as it would restrict it's access to the Turkish border and curtail its revenue streams from oil operations. Both Turkey and the Syrian government have asserted that the SDF must fully integrate into the Syrian state by year’s end. A potential shift in Turkey’s threat assessment could imply that Turkey may be anticipating the SDF's adherence to the March 10 agreement.
Suweida National Guard carries out political arrests, killings and torture of prominent Druze figures
On November 28, the Suwayda National Guard executed a series of arrests and killings targeting notable Druze figures within Suweida Province. The Druze militia coalition apprehended ten individuals, accusing them of organizing a “conspiracy” in cooperation with the Syrian transitional government. Among those arrested were several influential figures of the Druze community.
On November 29, members of the Suweida National Guard recorded acts of torture against Sheikh Matni. His corpse, displaying evident signs of torture, was delivered to the entrance of Suweida City Hospital on December 2. Sheikh Matni had played a pivotal role in establishing the Suweida Military Council in February 2025, a Druze militia that confronted transitional government forces amid the intercommunal violence of July 2025. Matni maintained a close relationship with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri; however, tensions arose following Matni's opposition to Hijri’s initiative to form the Suweida National Guard. Pro-government sources claim that Matni was arrested for advocating a negotiated settlement with the Syrian transitional government.
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One year after the fall of Bashar Al-Assad
December 8 will mark one year since the fall of the Assad regime. Many celebrations have already taken place in Syria. On December 6, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) issued a decree forbidding celebrations on the 7th and 8th of the month. The decree stipulated that the decision was made for security reasons, citing the recent rise in terrorist attacks.
While it is true that the recent decision of the Syrian transitional government to join the anti-ISIS coalition has bolstered Islamist group activities, it is likely that the AANES's decision to forbid celebrations for the first anniversary of the fall of Assad is motivated by a desire to maintain public order. The deadline for the negotiations regarding AANES and SDF integration into the Syrian state is approaching. In these times of tension, the AANES might be attempting to avoid protests that would oppose its governance in Northeast Syria, thereby impacting its capacity to defend its right to autonomy.
Continuous developments:
- Former senior Assad regime officials are funding and equipping clandestine networks in Syria to conduct insurgent activity against the Syrian transitional government. Many of the fighters organized by those senior Assad regime officials are "ghost soldiers," lacking genuine loyalty and primarily seeking financial support.
- On December 3, the Syrian General Security Service (GSS) confiscated multiple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and various munitions from an ISIS safe house located near Damascus. This operation is part of ongoing counter-ISIS efforts of the syrian government, which have dismantled several ISIS IED manufacturing sites in the region.
- On November 27 and 28, ISIS claimed responsibility for three attacks within Syrian government-controlled territory. This marks the group's first acknowledgment of attacks in this region since May 2025, likely answering to Syria's recent decision to join the Global Coalition Against ISIS.
December 8 will mark one year since the fall of the Assad regime. Many celebrations have already taken place in Syria. On December 6, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) issued a decree forbidding celebrations on the 7th and 8th of the month. The decree stipulated that the decision was made for security reasons, citing the recent rise in terrorist attacks.
While it is true that the recent decision of the Syrian transitional government to join the anti-ISIS coalition has bolstered Islamist group activities, it is likely that the AANES's decision to forbid celebrations for the first anniversary of the fall of Assad is motivated by a desire to maintain public order. The deadline for the negotiations regarding AANES and SDF integration into the Syrian state is approaching. In these times of tension, the AANES might be attempting to avoid protests that would oppose its governance in Northeast Syria, thereby impacting its capacity to defend its right to autonomy.
Continuous developments:
- Former senior Assad regime officials are funding and equipping clandestine networks in Syria to conduct insurgent activity against the Syrian transitional government. Many of the fighters organized by those senior Assad regime officials are "ghost soldiers," lacking genuine loyalty and primarily seeking financial support.
- On December 3, the Syrian General Security Service (GSS) confiscated multiple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and various munitions from an ISIS safe house located near Damascus. This operation is part of ongoing counter-ISIS efforts of the syrian government, which have dismantled several ISIS IED manufacturing sites in the region.
- On November 27 and 28, ISIS claimed responsibility for three attacks within Syrian government-controlled territory. This marks the group's first acknowledgment of attacks in this region since May 2025, likely answering to Syria's recent decision to join the Global Coalition Against ISIS.
A year after Assad
For a year now, we have been publishing regular reports on the situation in Syria and our assessment of it. Even when you are in the region, it is often difficult to untangle the web of events unfolding there — a year ago, we called it 4D chess. And that is still how it feels today: Syria is the object of interest for many countries of various stripes, each of which is trying to grab its piece of influence, taking advantage of the turbulent situation caused by the fall of Assad's dictatorial regime.
The balance of power in the region shifted rapidly, with Russia and Iran's influence virtually disappearing immediately after Damascus was captured by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militants. Now that Syria is ruled by former Al-Nusra militants led by Jolani, the United States has become much more involved in all matters of the state. This is particularly evident when it comes to negotiations: America has taken on the role of ‘facilitator’ in the dialogue between Damascus and north-eastern Syria. Turkey was initially at the center of events, sponsoring the march on Damascus and, taking advantage of the opportunity, directing SNA attacks on the autonomous region.
Syria under Jolani has already suffered enormous losses. Thousands of civilians killed in massacres involving government forces, first on the coast in Latakia and then in the south in Suwayda, were not victims of circumstances, but of the consistent policy of fundamentalists. The new regime did not keep us waiting; it showed its true colors at the very beginning of its formation, but stubbornly continues to publicly adhere to the image of ‘moderate Islam’ that sells well in Western countries.
For north-eastern Syria and the Kurdish liberation movement, this year was historic in its own way. The main event was the dissolution of the PKK, which was accompanied by the withdrawal of guerrillas from the mountains of Bakur. The disarmament ceremony — literally the destruction of weapons — evoked many emotions. It became a symbol of the conclusion of an entire era of revolutionary struggle, not only for Kurdistan but for the whole world. After the announcement of the dissolution, we took a break from publishing analyses and focused directly on the events in order to better understand the situation and avoid jumping to conclusions. This turned out to be for the best: we had the opportunity to study the ideological and strategic aspects of this decision in greater depth and to truly understand the position of the Kurdish liberation movement on these issues, rather than simply broadcasting our assumptions.
Another important topic this year was the negotiations with the new Syrian government and the so-called integration of the SDF into the state's armed forces. Nobody fully understands how this will work in practice, but the strategic component of this decision is clear. The democratic integration that the Apoist movement talks about is one of the programmatic steps proposed by Abdullah Öcalan in his ‘Manifesto for Peace and Democratic Society.’ In this sense, the SDF is quite consistently following the path it has set out. Such integration does not imply assimilation — autonomy remains autonomy, revolution remains revolution — but it can also provide more opportunities to spread the ideas of democratic confederalism beyond the borders of north-east Syria, and the region itself can overcome the blockade under which it has been since the beginning of the revolution. This is also ideologically consistent for the Apoists: a revolution cannot be built in isolation, freedom on a separate piece of land is not freedom. Everyone must be free.
For a year now, we have been publishing regular reports on the situation in Syria and our assessment of it. Even when you are in the region, it is often difficult to untangle the web of events unfolding there — a year ago, we called it 4D chess. And that is still how it feels today: Syria is the object of interest for many countries of various stripes, each of which is trying to grab its piece of influence, taking advantage of the turbulent situation caused by the fall of Assad's dictatorial regime.
The balance of power in the region shifted rapidly, with Russia and Iran's influence virtually disappearing immediately after Damascus was captured by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militants. Now that Syria is ruled by former Al-Nusra militants led by Jolani, the United States has become much more involved in all matters of the state. This is particularly evident when it comes to negotiations: America has taken on the role of ‘facilitator’ in the dialogue between Damascus and north-eastern Syria. Turkey was initially at the center of events, sponsoring the march on Damascus and, taking advantage of the opportunity, directing SNA attacks on the autonomous region.
Syria under Jolani has already suffered enormous losses. Thousands of civilians killed in massacres involving government forces, first on the coast in Latakia and then in the south in Suwayda, were not victims of circumstances, but of the consistent policy of fundamentalists. The new regime did not keep us waiting; it showed its true colors at the very beginning of its formation, but stubbornly continues to publicly adhere to the image of ‘moderate Islam’ that sells well in Western countries.
For north-eastern Syria and the Kurdish liberation movement, this year was historic in its own way. The main event was the dissolution of the PKK, which was accompanied by the withdrawal of guerrillas from the mountains of Bakur. The disarmament ceremony — literally the destruction of weapons — evoked many emotions. It became a symbol of the conclusion of an entire era of revolutionary struggle, not only for Kurdistan but for the whole world. After the announcement of the dissolution, we took a break from publishing analyses and focused directly on the events in order to better understand the situation and avoid jumping to conclusions. This turned out to be for the best: we had the opportunity to study the ideological and strategic aspects of this decision in greater depth and to truly understand the position of the Kurdish liberation movement on these issues, rather than simply broadcasting our assumptions.
Another important topic this year was the negotiations with the new Syrian government and the so-called integration of the SDF into the state's armed forces. Nobody fully understands how this will work in practice, but the strategic component of this decision is clear. The democratic integration that the Apoist movement talks about is one of the programmatic steps proposed by Abdullah Öcalan in his ‘Manifesto for Peace and Democratic Society.’ In this sense, the SDF is quite consistently following the path it has set out. Such integration does not imply assimilation — autonomy remains autonomy, revolution remains revolution — but it can also provide more opportunities to spread the ideas of democratic confederalism beyond the borders of north-east Syria, and the region itself can overcome the blockade under which it has been since the beginning of the revolution. This is also ideologically consistent for the Apoists: a revolution cannot be built in isolation, freedom on a separate piece of land is not freedom. Everyone must be free.
For now, it does not appear that the agreements reached on 10 March will end with a return to the previous level of military tension, but people here are prepared for any developments. One thing is clear: sooner or later, war will break out again in this region if no other solutions for the coexistence of peoples and states are found. Democratic autonomy has an answer to these questions. Only time will tell how interested the states will be in resolving problems in a way that is goes against state logic.
We are still writing about events in Syria from the ground. For us, this is not only an interesting experiment, a slice of history that can help people outside these territories to better understand what is happening and see events from a different perspective. For us it is a struggle full of contradictions and problems. On every step of this path we face many questions and doubts. Revolution is never perfect. Nevertheless, we decided to be part of it and accept all its risks, challenges and consequences. Thank you for staying with us!
Warmest revolutionary greetings! 🖤
We are still writing about events in Syria from the ground. For us, this is not only an interesting experiment, a slice of history that can help people outside these territories to better understand what is happening and see events from a different perspective. For us it is a struggle full of contradictions and problems. On every step of this path we face many questions and doubts. Revolution is never perfect. Nevertheless, we decided to be part of it and accept all its risks, challenges and consequences. Thank you for staying with us!
Warmest revolutionary greetings! 🖤
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Weekly Highlights 08.12.25 - 14.12.25
Syrian government integration proposal
The Syrian government submitted a “revised” integration proposal to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 6. It is likely that Turkey dictated the terms of this proposal. As of now, the Syrian government has not commented on the specifics of the proposal.
In October 2025, the Syrian government and the SDF reached a “verbal” and “preliminary” agreement to incorporate the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) through various distinct formations, including at least three divisions and several independent brigades. The December 6 proposal lacks several or all details included in the earlier October agreement.
Turkey's insistence that SDF fighters integrate into the MoD as individuals and its demand for a “single command structure” indicate a clear rejection of integrating SDF divisions as cohesive units. Considering its strong opposition to key aspects of the October agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF, it is likely that Turkey played a role in the modifications to the Syrian government’s revised proposal.
On December 8, the General Command of SDF said that it has not received any plan, proposal or official message from Damascus regarding negotiations over the future of its forces.
Turkish Army Ground Forces Commander hold discussions with Syrian defense officials
It is very likely that the meeting addressed efforts to bolster Syrian-Turkish defense collaboration under the military cooperation agreement signed in August 2025.
The timing of this meeting is particularly significant, as the Turkish government continues to articulate political justifications for a potential joint military operation with Syria against SDF. On December 12, same day of the meeting, a spokesperson for the Turkish Defense Ministry reiterated that the SDF must integrate into the Syrian army on an “individual basis” rather than as cohesive units.
Coordination between Turkish and Syrian ground forces will be essential for any preparations leading to a possible joint offensive or Turkish operations within Syrian territory.
Turkish military deployments to NES
On December 7, Turkish military reinforcements were dispatched to Afrin and Manbij in Aleppo Province. Additionally, a Turkish convoy, comprising 20 heavy and medium vehicles, entered the occupied region of Serekaniye.
On December 12, the Turkish Defense Ministry refuted claims that the footage showing Turkish units deploying to Syrian positions indicated preparations for an impending military operation. The ministry described the troop movements depicted in the footage as “routine rotations.”
An SDF spokeperson shared on December 11 that the SDF has not detected any signs of Turkish “readiness for a major military operation” along the frontlines with either the Syrian government or Turkish forces.
The Turkish military previously deployed significant military assets to Kuweires Airbase in Aleppo Province, on September 28. Given Turkey’s established positions and air superiority over the SDF, the Turkish military could potentially launch offensive operations against the SDF from occupied areas of Syria.
Attack on US patrol
On December 13, an ambush resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers and one American translator, while three other US personnel were injured. The ambush occurred during a key leader engagement in the region of Homs, aimed at supporting ongoing counter-ISIS operations in the region.
Syria’s Interior Ministry reported that the assailant was a member of the Syrian security forces who was on the verge of dismissal due to his extremist views.
Donald Trump characterized the attack as a direct assault by ISIS on U.S. forces in a "dangerous area not fully controlled by the Syrian transitional government," vowing “very serious retaliation.”
Syrian government integration proposal
The Syrian government submitted a “revised” integration proposal to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 6. It is likely that Turkey dictated the terms of this proposal. As of now, the Syrian government has not commented on the specifics of the proposal.
In October 2025, the Syrian government and the SDF reached a “verbal” and “preliminary” agreement to incorporate the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) through various distinct formations, including at least three divisions and several independent brigades. The December 6 proposal lacks several or all details included in the earlier October agreement.
Turkey's insistence that SDF fighters integrate into the MoD as individuals and its demand for a “single command structure” indicate a clear rejection of integrating SDF divisions as cohesive units. Considering its strong opposition to key aspects of the October agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF, it is likely that Turkey played a role in the modifications to the Syrian government’s revised proposal.
On December 8, the General Command of SDF said that it has not received any plan, proposal or official message from Damascus regarding negotiations over the future of its forces.
Turkish Army Ground Forces Commander hold discussions with Syrian defense officials
It is very likely that the meeting addressed efforts to bolster Syrian-Turkish defense collaboration under the military cooperation agreement signed in August 2025.
The timing of this meeting is particularly significant, as the Turkish government continues to articulate political justifications for a potential joint military operation with Syria against SDF. On December 12, same day of the meeting, a spokesperson for the Turkish Defense Ministry reiterated that the SDF must integrate into the Syrian army on an “individual basis” rather than as cohesive units.
Coordination between Turkish and Syrian ground forces will be essential for any preparations leading to a possible joint offensive or Turkish operations within Syrian territory.
Turkish military deployments to NES
On December 7, Turkish military reinforcements were dispatched to Afrin and Manbij in Aleppo Province. Additionally, a Turkish convoy, comprising 20 heavy and medium vehicles, entered the occupied region of Serekaniye.
On December 12, the Turkish Defense Ministry refuted claims that the footage showing Turkish units deploying to Syrian positions indicated preparations for an impending military operation. The ministry described the troop movements depicted in the footage as “routine rotations.”
An SDF spokeperson shared on December 11 that the SDF has not detected any signs of Turkish “readiness for a major military operation” along the frontlines with either the Syrian government or Turkish forces.
The Turkish military previously deployed significant military assets to Kuweires Airbase in Aleppo Province, on September 28. Given Turkey’s established positions and air superiority over the SDF, the Turkish military could potentially launch offensive operations against the SDF from occupied areas of Syria.
Attack on US patrol
On December 13, an ambush resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers and one American translator, while three other US personnel were injured. The ambush occurred during a key leader engagement in the region of Homs, aimed at supporting ongoing counter-ISIS operations in the region.
Syria’s Interior Ministry reported that the assailant was a member of the Syrian security forces who was on the verge of dismissal due to his extremist views.
Donald Trump characterized the attack as a direct assault by ISIS on U.S. forces in a "dangerous area not fully controlled by the Syrian transitional government," vowing “very serious retaliation.”
Syrian transitional government stopped importing oil from Kurdish-controlled fields
On December 8, an official from the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) announced that the Syrian transitional government has ceased importing oil from Kurdish-controlled fields. SDF have been supplying oil to the Syrian government since February 2025.
While the reasons behind the Syrian government's halt in oil imports from the northeast remain unclear, it may indicate that the Syrian government anticipates the imminent transfer of oil fields and their revenues from the SDF as part of an integration agreement. Both the Syrian and Turkish governments have asserted that the SDF must transfer control of all oil fields to the Syrian government by the end of the year.
Continuous developments:
- SDF condemned the "dangerous incitement" from armed groups affiliated with the MoD after public celebrations erupted in various Syrian cities to commemorate the fall of the Baath regime. They emphasized that these incidents are not isolated incidents but rather part of a "systematic" effort to incite hatred, reignite divisive rhetoric, and jeopardize civil peace.
- Data from human rights organizations and various media indicate that violence against women has taken on a systematic character over the past year. Since 8 December 2024, a total of 650 women, including 29 children, have lost their lives due to various causes such as remnants of war, armed attacks, sectarian assaults, domestic violence and broader societal violence. The highest number of cases were recorded in regions that remain under the control of the Syrian transitional government.
- During demonstrations commemorating the first anniversary of the fall of the Assad regime, dozens of residents in the southern city of Suweida gathered to claim their “right to self-determination.”
On December 8, an official from the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) announced that the Syrian transitional government has ceased importing oil from Kurdish-controlled fields. SDF have been supplying oil to the Syrian government since February 2025.
While the reasons behind the Syrian government's halt in oil imports from the northeast remain unclear, it may indicate that the Syrian government anticipates the imminent transfer of oil fields and their revenues from the SDF as part of an integration agreement. Both the Syrian and Turkish governments have asserted that the SDF must transfer control of all oil fields to the Syrian government by the end of the year.
Continuous developments:
- SDF condemned the "dangerous incitement" from armed groups affiliated with the MoD after public celebrations erupted in various Syrian cities to commemorate the fall of the Baath regime. They emphasized that these incidents are not isolated incidents but rather part of a "systematic" effort to incite hatred, reignite divisive rhetoric, and jeopardize civil peace.
- Data from human rights organizations and various media indicate that violence against women has taken on a systematic character over the past year. Since 8 December 2024, a total of 650 women, including 29 children, have lost their lives due to various causes such as remnants of war, armed attacks, sectarian assaults, domestic violence and broader societal violence. The highest number of cases were recorded in regions that remain under the control of the Syrian transitional government.
- During demonstrations commemorating the first anniversary of the fall of the Assad regime, dozens of residents in the southern city of Suweida gathered to claim their “right to self-determination.”
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Evaluation
This week saw many developments surrounding the SDF and important events in Syria itself. At present, the movements of Turkish troops and the forces of the Ministry of Defence of the interim government have ceased, but this is no time to relax.
We have been closely monitoring the situation surrounding the anniversary celebrations of the fall of the regime. Large public celebrations were prohibited in the autonomous region of North-East Syria, which seemed a reasonable decision in the context of what is happening in the country: such gatherings would have been a convenient place for supporters of the Jolani regime and followers of ISIS and the SNA to carry out mass killings and provocations. Celebrating the anniversary of their triumph, the jihadists of the new Syrian army actively distributed videos with threats against SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and promises of a march on Hasakah (a city in the Jazira canton). At the moment, there are no radical changes on the front lines, and these provocations are more a reflection of the general narrative prevailing within the Jolani armed forces.
Against this backdrop, Damascus is setting new conditions for the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army. Previously, negotiations had reached a dead end, but now the interim government is proposing new rules that do not take into account the reality of the peoples of north-eastern Syria. This shows its unwillingness to seek a peaceful resolution to the situation. Autonomy remains a problem for Syria's fundamentalist government, which is aiming for a unified nation state and is prepared to eliminate dissenters. But north-eastern Syria is ready and able to defend itself, and this is stopping Jolani from military escalation, even with Turkey's support. The movements on the region's borders were an attempt to exert pressure in the negotiations and test the reaction.
The most significant news for understanding the international narrative is the bombing of three US citizens by a fighter of the new Syrian army. The US authorities claimed the suicide bomber was a former ISIS member. This time, the state's interests included good diplomatic relations with the interim government, so a Ministry of Defense soldier became ‘too radical an Islamist, who was just about to be kicked out of the military.’ We have repeatedly highlighted the hypocrisy of Western states on issues related to regions that are ‘problematic’ for the West, such as the Middle East, and this time the public once again witnessed American diplomats' outcry about ‘bloody jihadists killing our boys,’ while ignoring an important fact: the Syrian state is now ruled by these very same ‘bloody jihadists.’
Eleven thousand revolutionaries gave their lives during the Rojava Revolution. These people fell fighting for freedom, including in battles against ISIS. No country, no government talks about them as much as they talk about the three American citizens who served America's colonial project in Syria. This brings us back to the question of the value of human life: the interests of the ‘first world’ and the lives of its privileged citizens have historically been built on oppression and death within and beyond empires.
On that note, we will end our report for today. Still observing the situation, your comrades in North-East Syria.
Revolutionary greetings! 🖤
This week saw many developments surrounding the SDF and important events in Syria itself. At present, the movements of Turkish troops and the forces of the Ministry of Defence of the interim government have ceased, but this is no time to relax.
We have been closely monitoring the situation surrounding the anniversary celebrations of the fall of the regime. Large public celebrations were prohibited in the autonomous region of North-East Syria, which seemed a reasonable decision in the context of what is happening in the country: such gatherings would have been a convenient place for supporters of the Jolani regime and followers of ISIS and the SNA to carry out mass killings and provocations. Celebrating the anniversary of their triumph, the jihadists of the new Syrian army actively distributed videos with threats against SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and promises of a march on Hasakah (a city in the Jazira canton). At the moment, there are no radical changes on the front lines, and these provocations are more a reflection of the general narrative prevailing within the Jolani armed forces.
Against this backdrop, Damascus is setting new conditions for the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army. Previously, negotiations had reached a dead end, but now the interim government is proposing new rules that do not take into account the reality of the peoples of north-eastern Syria. This shows its unwillingness to seek a peaceful resolution to the situation. Autonomy remains a problem for Syria's fundamentalist government, which is aiming for a unified nation state and is prepared to eliminate dissenters. But north-eastern Syria is ready and able to defend itself, and this is stopping Jolani from military escalation, even with Turkey's support. The movements on the region's borders were an attempt to exert pressure in the negotiations and test the reaction.
The most significant news for understanding the international narrative is the bombing of three US citizens by a fighter of the new Syrian army. The US authorities claimed the suicide bomber was a former ISIS member. This time, the state's interests included good diplomatic relations with the interim government, so a Ministry of Defense soldier became ‘too radical an Islamist, who was just about to be kicked out of the military.’ We have repeatedly highlighted the hypocrisy of Western states on issues related to regions that are ‘problematic’ for the West, such as the Middle East, and this time the public once again witnessed American diplomats' outcry about ‘bloody jihadists killing our boys,’ while ignoring an important fact: the Syrian state is now ruled by these very same ‘bloody jihadists.’
Eleven thousand revolutionaries gave their lives during the Rojava Revolution. These people fell fighting for freedom, including in battles against ISIS. No country, no government talks about them as much as they talk about the three American citizens who served America's colonial project in Syria. This brings us back to the question of the value of human life: the interests of the ‘first world’ and the lives of its privileged citizens have historically been built on oppression and death within and beyond empires.
On that note, we will end our report for today. Still observing the situation, your comrades in North-East Syria.
Revolutionary greetings! 🖤
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Weekly Highlights 15.12.25 - 21.12.25
US reaction to jihadist attack
Following the killing of two U.S. soldiers and a civilian interpreter, the US air-force targeted 70 ISIS-affiliated sites in Syria on december 19. The US Defense Secretary stated that the objective of the operation is to dismantle ISIS fighters, infrastructure, and weaponry. Additionally, the US army andj their local partner forces conducted 10 operations in Syria and Iraq, resulting in the killing or detention of 23 Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) operatives. US fighter jets, attack helicopters, and rocket artillery engaged multiple suspected ISIS locations throughout central Syria. Instances of airstrikes and explosions were reported in the desert areas of Homs, eastern Raqqa, and western Deir ez-Zor provinces.
In addition, Donald Trump has declared on December 16 that Syria entered the expanded US travel ban list, citing concerns related to security, screening, and information sharing. As a result of this decision, Syrian citizens are prohibited from entering the United States, along with nationals from other countries and holders of travel documents issued by the Palestinian Authority.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) expressed their support for the airstrikes. They referred to these actions as a crucial move to undermine ISIS efforts to reorganize and launch new attacks.
New integration proposal
The Syrian government submitted a 13-point proposal aimed at integrating the SDF. According to reports, this proposal involves reorganizing the SDF into three divisions within the Syrian army, deploying additional government forces to northeastern Syria, and placing the SDF under the authority of the Ministry of Defense (MoD).
An SDF delegation will soon be sent to travel to Damascus to discuss several outstanding issues related to military integration, including the status of YPJ units, specific SDF commanders within the MoD, and the internal security forces of the SDF.
Additionally, reports indicated that the Syrian government and SDF agreed to finalize negotiations concerning the military and security dimensions of the March 10 agreement this year. However, discussions on unresolved political issues, such as decentralization and constitutional matters, will be postponed until next year.
Potential change of Turkish position
Turkey may have softened its stance on some elements of the negociations regarding the integration of SDF in the new Syrian army after Thomas Barrack met with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan on December 16. Fidan had previously demanded that the SDF integrate into the Syrian army as individuals instead of as divisions. Following the Barrack meeting, Fidan reversed his position, stating on December 17 that Turkey would not pursue military action against the SDF and expressed optimism about the integration negotiations.
This new position comes inline with a recent declaration of Mazloum Abdi. The SDF commander declared on December 13 that “neighboring countries” are not “as hostile as before” toward the SDF and that the “SDF’s presence” is no longer an “excuse for war.”
Continuous developments:
- The United Kingdom sanctioned two Syrian army commanders and three Turkish-backed armed factions on December 19 for committing human rights abuses during the Syrian coastal massacres in early March. All of these entities are currently integrated into the Syrian army.
-Transitional Government forces launched an attack on the town of Majdal in the Suweida province countryside using drones and mortars, leading to injuries for two individuals. The Suweida National Defense Forces Command stated that it would respond decisively to any ceasefire violations and attempts to enter the region.
- Transitional Government forces have increased checkpoints and patrols around the Aleppo neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh. The passage of fuel and basic needs into the neighborhoods is not allowed anymore.
US reaction to jihadist attack
Following the killing of two U.S. soldiers and a civilian interpreter, the US air-force targeted 70 ISIS-affiliated sites in Syria on december 19. The US Defense Secretary stated that the objective of the operation is to dismantle ISIS fighters, infrastructure, and weaponry. Additionally, the US army andj their local partner forces conducted 10 operations in Syria and Iraq, resulting in the killing or detention of 23 Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) operatives. US fighter jets, attack helicopters, and rocket artillery engaged multiple suspected ISIS locations throughout central Syria. Instances of airstrikes and explosions were reported in the desert areas of Homs, eastern Raqqa, and western Deir ez-Zor provinces.
In addition, Donald Trump has declared on December 16 that Syria entered the expanded US travel ban list, citing concerns related to security, screening, and information sharing. As a result of this decision, Syrian citizens are prohibited from entering the United States, along with nationals from other countries and holders of travel documents issued by the Palestinian Authority.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) expressed their support for the airstrikes. They referred to these actions as a crucial move to undermine ISIS efforts to reorganize and launch new attacks.
New integration proposal
The Syrian government submitted a 13-point proposal aimed at integrating the SDF. According to reports, this proposal involves reorganizing the SDF into three divisions within the Syrian army, deploying additional government forces to northeastern Syria, and placing the SDF under the authority of the Ministry of Defense (MoD).
An SDF delegation will soon be sent to travel to Damascus to discuss several outstanding issues related to military integration, including the status of YPJ units, specific SDF commanders within the MoD, and the internal security forces of the SDF.
Additionally, reports indicated that the Syrian government and SDF agreed to finalize negotiations concerning the military and security dimensions of the March 10 agreement this year. However, discussions on unresolved political issues, such as decentralization and constitutional matters, will be postponed until next year.
Potential change of Turkish position
Turkey may have softened its stance on some elements of the negociations regarding the integration of SDF in the new Syrian army after Thomas Barrack met with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan on December 16. Fidan had previously demanded that the SDF integrate into the Syrian army as individuals instead of as divisions. Following the Barrack meeting, Fidan reversed his position, stating on December 17 that Turkey would not pursue military action against the SDF and expressed optimism about the integration negotiations.
This new position comes inline with a recent declaration of Mazloum Abdi. The SDF commander declared on December 13 that “neighboring countries” are not “as hostile as before” toward the SDF and that the “SDF’s presence” is no longer an “excuse for war.”
Continuous developments:
- The United Kingdom sanctioned two Syrian army commanders and three Turkish-backed armed factions on December 19 for committing human rights abuses during the Syrian coastal massacres in early March. All of these entities are currently integrated into the Syrian army.
-Transitional Government forces launched an attack on the town of Majdal in the Suweida province countryside using drones and mortars, leading to injuries for two individuals. The Suweida National Defense Forces Command stated that it would respond decisively to any ceasefire violations and attempts to enter the region.
- Transitional Government forces have increased checkpoints and patrols around the Aleppo neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh. The passage of fuel and basic needs into the neighborhoods is not allowed anymore.
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Evaluation
This week, we want to highlight an interview with Rohilat Afrin, the General Commander of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). In this conversation, she comes back on the history of her structure and shares her perspectives regarding the ongoing negociation between Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian Transitional Government.
"Today, we [the YPJ] aren’t even fully integrated into the SDF. Of course, when there is a general interest, if this land is under attack, we will work together to serve our people. But otherwise, we have our own command, our own centers, our own institutions, and we organize and educate ourselves within them. In this way, we protect our autonomy. The ones who make decisions and institutional changes in our forces are the Women’s Command. SDF General Command can’t change this. General Mazlum might be the General Commander of the SDF, but he can’t force me to do anything. He can’t make a change in our women’s forces or send me to a different position. Who can do that? The Women’s Command. This means that we protect our autonomy and freedom. Everyone has to know this."
As underlined in this interview, the women of YPJ are engaged in their struggle for autonomy for more than a decade. It is based on this experience that they today, with a confident voice, defend a strong revolutionary stance... a voice that should not be ignored. We encourage all of you to read this interview accessible on the website of the Kurdish Peace Institute: https://www.kurdishpeace.org/
Revolutionary greetings! 🖤
This week, we want to highlight an interview with Rohilat Afrin, the General Commander of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). In this conversation, she comes back on the history of her structure and shares her perspectives regarding the ongoing negociation between Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian Transitional Government.
"Today, we [the YPJ] aren’t even fully integrated into the SDF. Of course, when there is a general interest, if this land is under attack, we will work together to serve our people. But otherwise, we have our own command, our own centers, our own institutions, and we organize and educate ourselves within them. In this way, we protect our autonomy. The ones who make decisions and institutional changes in our forces are the Women’s Command. SDF General Command can’t change this. General Mazlum might be the General Commander of the SDF, but he can’t force me to do anything. He can’t make a change in our women’s forces or send me to a different position. Who can do that? The Women’s Command. This means that we protect our autonomy and freedom. Everyone has to know this."
As underlined in this interview, the women of YPJ are engaged in their struggle for autonomy for more than a decade. It is based on this experience that they today, with a confident voice, defend a strong revolutionary stance... a voice that should not be ignored. We encourage all of you to read this interview accessible on the website of the Kurdish Peace Institute: https://www.kurdishpeace.org/
Revolutionary greetings! 🖤
Kurdish Peace Institute
The Kurdish Peace Institute works to advance awareness of the Kurdish people and their aspirations across the region in which they live.
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Weekly Highlights 22.12.25 - 28.12.25
Fighting between Syrian government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces in Aleppo City
Clashes erupted on December 22 between the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the internal security forces of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud, with both sides using heavy weaponry. Following this, government forces shelled the neighborhoods, resulting in the death of one woman and injuring at least 17 civilians. After hours of fighting, both sides reached an agreement for a ceasefire and a temporary truce. On December 24, the internal security forces of the AANES reported a new violation of the ceasefire by factions linked to the Syrian transitional government.
The SDF and the Syrian government have not yet fully implemented the April 1 agreement.
In the current period of heightened tensions, regional actors opposed to the negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian government may exploit these limited security escalations to advance their own agendas and impose new realities.
Turkish and Syrian officials met in Damascus
Senior officials from Turkey and Syria convened in Damascus on December 22, likely to discuss the SDF's reaction to the recent government integration proposal. The meeting included Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara, Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani, Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, and intelligence chief Hussein Salama, alongside a Turkish delegation comprising Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin.
After the meeting, Shaibani announced in a press conference with Fidan that the Syrian government is currently reviewing the SDF's response to the integration proposal. This arrangement would come with reduced command authority for the SDF and the deployment of other Syrian army units in SDF-controlled areas.
Attack on an Alawite Mosque in Homs City
Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, an ISIS-aligned Salafi-jihadi group, has claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Alawite mosque in an Alawite neighborhood of Homs City on December 26. This attack aimed to reignite the Sunni-Alawite sectarian strife that has recently occurred in Homs. The murder of a Sunni Bedouin couple in November 2025 ignited isolated clashes in Western Homs after the killer scrawled sectarian slogans in the couple’s blood on their home’s walls. This incident underscored the fragile state of Sunni-Alawite relations in Homs.
Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah seeks to establish an Islamic State in Syria that excludes Alawites, Druze, Christians, Kurds, and Shia. On December 16, the group carried out a prior IED attack on an Alawite mosque in Homs, resulting in at least eight deaths and 21 injuries. Following this, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah claimed that the latest attack was conducted "in cooperation" with an undisclosed Salafi-jihadi group. The group had previously threatened a “major” attack on December 16. In their December 26 communications regarding the latest attack, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah exaggerated the casualty figures, denied any intention to target Sunnis, and expressed a commitment to escalate attacks against minorities to incite fear.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) strongly condemned the bombing on Friday, describing the attack as a grave crime against civilians and social peace.
Continuous developments:
- An Israeli official stated, “The Israeli support for the Druze in southern Syria is carefully calculated, and Israel has no interest in establishing a Druze state there.” The official added that “arms shipments were sent to help the Druze when it was necessary,” stressing that Israel remains “committed to the security of minorities” but does not intend to deploy special forces alongside Druze groups or engage in organizing proxy militias.
- Jordanian authorities announced that the Jordanian Armed Forces are confronting groups involved in smuggling weapons and drugs along the country’s northern border with Syria.
Fighting between Syrian government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces in Aleppo City
Clashes erupted on December 22 between the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the internal security forces of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud, with both sides using heavy weaponry. Following this, government forces shelled the neighborhoods, resulting in the death of one woman and injuring at least 17 civilians. After hours of fighting, both sides reached an agreement for a ceasefire and a temporary truce. On December 24, the internal security forces of the AANES reported a new violation of the ceasefire by factions linked to the Syrian transitional government.
The SDF and the Syrian government have not yet fully implemented the April 1 agreement.
In the current period of heightened tensions, regional actors opposed to the negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian government may exploit these limited security escalations to advance their own agendas and impose new realities.
Turkish and Syrian officials met in Damascus
Senior officials from Turkey and Syria convened in Damascus on December 22, likely to discuss the SDF's reaction to the recent government integration proposal. The meeting included Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara, Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani, Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, and intelligence chief Hussein Salama, alongside a Turkish delegation comprising Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin.
After the meeting, Shaibani announced in a press conference with Fidan that the Syrian government is currently reviewing the SDF's response to the integration proposal. This arrangement would come with reduced command authority for the SDF and the deployment of other Syrian army units in SDF-controlled areas.
Attack on an Alawite Mosque in Homs City
Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, an ISIS-aligned Salafi-jihadi group, has claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Alawite mosque in an Alawite neighborhood of Homs City on December 26. This attack aimed to reignite the Sunni-Alawite sectarian strife that has recently occurred in Homs. The murder of a Sunni Bedouin couple in November 2025 ignited isolated clashes in Western Homs after the killer scrawled sectarian slogans in the couple’s blood on their home’s walls. This incident underscored the fragile state of Sunni-Alawite relations in Homs.
Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah seeks to establish an Islamic State in Syria that excludes Alawites, Druze, Christians, Kurds, and Shia. On December 16, the group carried out a prior IED attack on an Alawite mosque in Homs, resulting in at least eight deaths and 21 injuries. Following this, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah claimed that the latest attack was conducted "in cooperation" with an undisclosed Salafi-jihadi group. The group had previously threatened a “major” attack on December 16. In their December 26 communications regarding the latest attack, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah exaggerated the casualty figures, denied any intention to target Sunnis, and expressed a commitment to escalate attacks against minorities to incite fear.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) strongly condemned the bombing on Friday, describing the attack as a grave crime against civilians and social peace.
Continuous developments:
- An Israeli official stated, “The Israeli support for the Druze in southern Syria is carefully calculated, and Israel has no interest in establishing a Druze state there.” The official added that “arms shipments were sent to help the Druze when it was necessary,” stressing that Israel remains “committed to the security of minorities” but does not intend to deploy special forces alongside Druze groups or engage in organizing proxy militias.
- Jordanian authorities announced that the Jordanian Armed Forces are confronting groups involved in smuggling weapons and drugs along the country’s northern border with Syria.
- A video circulated on social media on Wednesday showing students at a secondary school in the western Daraa countryside undergoing weapons training, which has sparked widespread concern among activists and educators, reigniting debate over the militarization of educational institutions in southern Syria.
Evaluations
We’ve arrived to the last week of 2025. During last several months there have been tensions in the media, connected to the deadline of the March agreements. But as the deadline nears, the clearer it becomes that escalation of the armed conflict is not in Damascus’ interests right now. Negotiations continue and according to the plan the decision on SDF integration as an autonomous force is to be taken before January 2026. Further political steps between NES and Damascus won’t be rushed.
Whatever the diplomatic developments, the reality is still far from the coexistence of self-governed autonomy and the state, suggested by the Kurdish liberation movement. Yet again this week, Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo were attacked. Clashes between interim government forces and Kurdish self-defense units in Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods take place regularly, and this time the attacks coincided with a Turkish delegation visit in Damascus. The Jolani government consistently uses armed attacks as pressure for diplomatic talks: we already saw that when the new proposal for SDF integration was made and the tensions on borders with the NES that followed.
Northeast Syria is one of key elements in talks between Jolani and Turkey. Realizing that his diplomacy with the Western hegemonic states won’t benefit from the escalation of armed conflict with the SDF, he doesn’t risk starting war without gaining the support of strong allies. For example, Turkey.
We want to conclude our final evaluation in 2025 on a positive note. Revolution in conditions of permanent war is really hard. But we have to remember what has been achieved even in such harsh conditions. People realizing their place in the world, in history, women realizing their own importance and possibilities, understanding how systems of oppression work, realizing themselves as actors who can change the world around them. In the midst of constant war and everyday struggle for existence in difficult economic and ecologic conditions, people managed to grow political self-determination and build a strong society. Communes, victories of women’s liberation, education, people’s self-defense — only a part of all the achievements of these 13 years. We are happy to be part of that process.
And we still stay on the ground and follow the events. In the situation of absolute instability, the only thing to rely on might be that very instability. We continue to analyze the developments and keep you updated.
Revolutionary frosty greetings from snow-covered NE Syria! 🖤
We’ve arrived to the last week of 2025. During last several months there have been tensions in the media, connected to the deadline of the March agreements. But as the deadline nears, the clearer it becomes that escalation of the armed conflict is not in Damascus’ interests right now. Negotiations continue and according to the plan the decision on SDF integration as an autonomous force is to be taken before January 2026. Further political steps between NES and Damascus won’t be rushed.
Whatever the diplomatic developments, the reality is still far from the coexistence of self-governed autonomy and the state, suggested by the Kurdish liberation movement. Yet again this week, Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo were attacked. Clashes between interim government forces and Kurdish self-defense units in Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods take place regularly, and this time the attacks coincided with a Turkish delegation visit in Damascus. The Jolani government consistently uses armed attacks as pressure for diplomatic talks: we already saw that when the new proposal for SDF integration was made and the tensions on borders with the NES that followed.
Northeast Syria is one of key elements in talks between Jolani and Turkey. Realizing that his diplomacy with the Western hegemonic states won’t benefit from the escalation of armed conflict with the SDF, he doesn’t risk starting war without gaining the support of strong allies. For example, Turkey.
We want to conclude our final evaluation in 2025 on a positive note. Revolution in conditions of permanent war is really hard. But we have to remember what has been achieved even in such harsh conditions. People realizing their place in the world, in history, women realizing their own importance and possibilities, understanding how systems of oppression work, realizing themselves as actors who can change the world around them. In the midst of constant war and everyday struggle for existence in difficult economic and ecologic conditions, people managed to grow political self-determination and build a strong society. Communes, victories of women’s liberation, education, people’s self-defense — only a part of all the achievements of these 13 years. We are happy to be part of that process.
And we still stay on the ground and follow the events. In the situation of absolute instability, the only thing to rely on might be that very instability. We continue to analyze the developments and keep you updated.
Revolutionary frosty greetings from snow-covered NE Syria! 🖤
❤🔥4
Weekly Highlights 29.12.25 - 04.01.26
📌 Clashes during Alawite civilian protests
On December 28, anti-government Alawite fighters launched attacks on government security forces in coastal Syria during an Alawite demonstration. The protest was organized as a response to an attack by the Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah on an Alawite mosque in Homs City. The demonstration demanded federal governance, enhanced state protection for Alawites, an end to sectarian violence, and the release of former detainees arrested after the Assad regime's collapse in December 2024. The situation escalated when pro-government counter-protestors and government forces intervened. Amid the chaos, anti-government Alawite fighters, hidden among the protesters, opened fire and threw grenades on General Security Service (GSS) forces resulting in one dead and two wounded in the ranks of the GSS. In response, the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) deployed armored units and military police to Latakia and Tartous.
The attackers may have been Alawite insurgents deliberately attempting to provoke a government response. Militants from both the Men of Light (Saraya al Jawad, an Assadist insurgent group) and the Coastal Shield Brigade (which also has significant ties to the Assad regime) attacked security forces during civilian protests in Latakia City.
The presence of Assadist slogans at the demonstrations, along with the nature of the attacks, suggests a degree of support among some protesters for these Alawite insurgent factions and could indicate a nascent support for an insurgent movement aligned with Assadist ideals. The immediate threat posed of these Assadist groups to the Syrian government is currently low, given their limited scale, effectiveness, and organizational structure. However, if given the necessary time and space to recruit and organize, these networks could expand significantly.
📌 Abdullah Ocalan statement on the March 10 agreement
In a statement released on December 30, Abdullah Öcalan claimed that the agreement aims to establish a “democratic political model.” He emphasized that this model would facilitate “democratic integration” into the “central structure,” referring to the SDF's potential integration within the broader Syrian state.
An Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) official interpreted the term “democratic integration” to mean the continuation of the current “administrative and cognitive situation” in northern and eastern Syria. This interpretation aligns with the vision of a federalized Syria defended by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
📌 Meeting between AANES and Syrian government representatives
Mazloum Abdi was expected to travel to Damascus on December 29 to discuss or finalize this military integration agreement; however, his visit was postponed due to “logistical and technical arrangements.” The postponement of Mazloum Abdi's visit coincides with clashes that erupted in Aleppo between the Asayish and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces. In a statement, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), emphasized on December 31 that implementing the March 10 Agreement with the Syrian government is a “political priority,” advocating for the drafting of a new constitution that incorporates federalism, a demand the SDF has consistently maintained since the agreement's signing.
The AANES negotiating team spokerperson indicated on December 30 that AANES and representatives from the Syrian government may meet in the next two weeks to discuss the integration of SDF into the Syrian state.
🔵 Continuous developments:
- On December 24 and 25, the Jordanian military carried out airstrikes targeting Captagon production sites, arms caches, and smuggler positions in Suweida Province. The Jordanian military also struck seven sites belonging to the Suweida National Guard’s control. The Suweida National Guard denied that Jordanian airstrikes hit its facilities and accused Bedouins of conducting the cross-border Captagon smuggling.
📌 Clashes during Alawite civilian protests
On December 28, anti-government Alawite fighters launched attacks on government security forces in coastal Syria during an Alawite demonstration. The protest was organized as a response to an attack by the Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah on an Alawite mosque in Homs City. The demonstration demanded federal governance, enhanced state protection for Alawites, an end to sectarian violence, and the release of former detainees arrested after the Assad regime's collapse in December 2024. The situation escalated when pro-government counter-protestors and government forces intervened. Amid the chaos, anti-government Alawite fighters, hidden among the protesters, opened fire and threw grenades on General Security Service (GSS) forces resulting in one dead and two wounded in the ranks of the GSS. In response, the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) deployed armored units and military police to Latakia and Tartous.
The attackers may have been Alawite insurgents deliberately attempting to provoke a government response. Militants from both the Men of Light (Saraya al Jawad, an Assadist insurgent group) and the Coastal Shield Brigade (which also has significant ties to the Assad regime) attacked security forces during civilian protests in Latakia City.
The presence of Assadist slogans at the demonstrations, along with the nature of the attacks, suggests a degree of support among some protesters for these Alawite insurgent factions and could indicate a nascent support for an insurgent movement aligned with Assadist ideals. The immediate threat posed of these Assadist groups to the Syrian government is currently low, given their limited scale, effectiveness, and organizational structure. However, if given the necessary time and space to recruit and organize, these networks could expand significantly.
📌 Abdullah Ocalan statement on the March 10 agreement
In a statement released on December 30, Abdullah Öcalan claimed that the agreement aims to establish a “democratic political model.” He emphasized that this model would facilitate “democratic integration” into the “central structure,” referring to the SDF's potential integration within the broader Syrian state.
An Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) official interpreted the term “democratic integration” to mean the continuation of the current “administrative and cognitive situation” in northern and eastern Syria. This interpretation aligns with the vision of a federalized Syria defended by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
📌 Meeting between AANES and Syrian government representatives
Mazloum Abdi was expected to travel to Damascus on December 29 to discuss or finalize this military integration agreement; however, his visit was postponed due to “logistical and technical arrangements.” The postponement of Mazloum Abdi's visit coincides with clashes that erupted in Aleppo between the Asayish and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces. In a statement, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), emphasized on December 31 that implementing the March 10 Agreement with the Syrian government is a “political priority,” advocating for the drafting of a new constitution that incorporates federalism, a demand the SDF has consistently maintained since the agreement's signing.
The AANES negotiating team spokerperson indicated on December 30 that AANES and representatives from the Syrian government may meet in the next two weeks to discuss the integration of SDF into the Syrian state.
🔵 Continuous developments:
- On December 24 and 25, the Jordanian military carried out airstrikes targeting Captagon production sites, arms caches, and smuggler positions in Suweida Province. The Jordanian military also struck seven sites belonging to the Suweida National Guard’s control. The Suweida National Guard denied that Jordanian airstrikes hit its facilities and accused Bedouins of conducting the cross-border Captagon smuggling.
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- On December 30, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that US and partner forces have killed at least seven ISIS fighters and captured about 18 others during operations in Syria between December 20 and 29.
- On December 31, Syrian security forces prevented a suicide vest attack that sought to target New Year’s celebrations in Aleppo City. The attacker likely intended to target the nearby Armenian Church of Forty Martyrs.
- On December 31, Syrian security forces prevented a suicide vest attack that sought to target New Year’s celebrations in Aleppo City. The attacker likely intended to target the nearby Armenian Church of Forty Martyrs.
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💬 Evaluations
This week we will touch upon the broader context, since nothing happens in a vacuum. As the global events influence the local situations, revolutionary shifts don’t happen without leaving a trace and influence on the people and the world. That is also why we are here, doing what we are doing.
This time we want to talk about events in Iran. Iran is an important actor in the geopolitics of the Middle East. Its influence also had a strong impact on Syria during the Assad rule. Smuggling and other transportation routes were passing through Syria, supplying Hezbollah. After the fall of the Assad regime, Iran was pushed out of Syria and has generally lost its previous power in the region. The damage sustained during the Israeli attacks in June 2025 became another factor that affected the situation of Islamic Republic.
Protests have been regularly flaring up in Iran. The 2022 protests under leading slogan «Woman, Life, Freedom» are famous globally. Just like back then, the protests spread all over the country. People’s discontent spread due to economic factors — inflation, growing prices and poverty, but eventually arrived at calling to take down the regime. Protesters clash with the police in the streets, there are killed and injured.
During Israel-Iran escalation in 2025, an interesting detail to notice were the statements of Netanyahu and Trump on the intentional destabilization of Iran with the goal of regime change. It is a pretty standard approach of the USA towards “inconvenient” governments in the regions of their interests: clearing the path for more co-operative politicians, as it was in Afghanistan. During the most recent escalation of Israel-Iran war there were rumors spreading that there already exists a tentative “democratic” ruling figure, backed and prepared by the USA. Although this information wasn’t confirmed, we can well imagine that it can be true, considering USA methods in other instances (e.g. the recent kidnapping of the Venezuelan president). In this context, Trump’s declared intention to come to the aid of Iranian protesters if Iran will “cruelly kill peaceful demonstrators, as they do,” becomes more understandable.
Iranian Kurdistan, Rojhilat, is one of Iran’s rebellious regions. Their attempts to declare autonomy have not been successful for decades, but the guerrilla struggle in the territory of Iran continues. PJAK (Party of Free Life of Kurdistan) supported the protesters and again condemned the current regime.
Kurdish liberation movement is fighting for freedom not only in Syria or Turkey. News from Rojhilat take the headlines somewhat less frequently, but the situation in Iran is especially hard for the liberation struggle. PJAK forces include a female armed wing, which is especially important in the context if a dictatorship which executes “moral policing” over the population and, as usual, harms the most vulnerable groups, including women.
Instability in Tehran could be a beneficial circumstance for the Kurdish region and could weaken imperialist alliances of the Russia — Iran — China axis. Nevertheless, a puppet government installed by the USA, Israel or whoever else won’t address the Kurdish question in Iran. Furthermore, addressing the Kurdish question in a neoliberal imperialist framework can’t be a true solution for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Middle East. Democratic confederalism, already being implemented in NES by PYD and advocated by PJAK in Rojhilat, offers a much more promising option to bring peace.
This week we will touch upon the broader context, since nothing happens in a vacuum. As the global events influence the local situations, revolutionary shifts don’t happen without leaving a trace and influence on the people and the world. That is also why we are here, doing what we are doing.
This time we want to talk about events in Iran. Iran is an important actor in the geopolitics of the Middle East. Its influence also had a strong impact on Syria during the Assad rule. Smuggling and other transportation routes were passing through Syria, supplying Hezbollah. After the fall of the Assad regime, Iran was pushed out of Syria and has generally lost its previous power in the region. The damage sustained during the Israeli attacks in June 2025 became another factor that affected the situation of Islamic Republic.
Protests have been regularly flaring up in Iran. The 2022 protests under leading slogan «Woman, Life, Freedom» are famous globally. Just like back then, the protests spread all over the country. People’s discontent spread due to economic factors — inflation, growing prices and poverty, but eventually arrived at calling to take down the regime. Protesters clash with the police in the streets, there are killed and injured.
During Israel-Iran escalation in 2025, an interesting detail to notice were the statements of Netanyahu and Trump on the intentional destabilization of Iran with the goal of regime change. It is a pretty standard approach of the USA towards “inconvenient” governments in the regions of their interests: clearing the path for more co-operative politicians, as it was in Afghanistan. During the most recent escalation of Israel-Iran war there were rumors spreading that there already exists a tentative “democratic” ruling figure, backed and prepared by the USA. Although this information wasn’t confirmed, we can well imagine that it can be true, considering USA methods in other instances (e.g. the recent kidnapping of the Venezuelan president). In this context, Trump’s declared intention to come to the aid of Iranian protesters if Iran will “cruelly kill peaceful demonstrators, as they do,” becomes more understandable.
Iranian Kurdistan, Rojhilat, is one of Iran’s rebellious regions. Their attempts to declare autonomy have not been successful for decades, but the guerrilla struggle in the territory of Iran continues. PJAK (Party of Free Life of Kurdistan) supported the protesters and again condemned the current regime.
Kurdish liberation movement is fighting for freedom not only in Syria or Turkey. News from Rojhilat take the headlines somewhat less frequently, but the situation in Iran is especially hard for the liberation struggle. PJAK forces include a female armed wing, which is especially important in the context if a dictatorship which executes “moral policing” over the population and, as usual, harms the most vulnerable groups, including women.
Instability in Tehran could be a beneficial circumstance for the Kurdish region and could weaken imperialist alliances of the Russia — Iran — China axis. Nevertheless, a puppet government installed by the USA, Israel or whoever else won’t address the Kurdish question in Iran. Furthermore, addressing the Kurdish question in a neoliberal imperialist framework can’t be a true solution for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Middle East. Democratic confederalism, already being implemented in NES by PYD and advocated by PJAK in Rojhilat, offers a much more promising option to bring peace.
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❗ Due to ongoing resistance against brutal attack on Kurdish neighborhoods Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah in Aleppo, we will start posting more frequently outside of our usual weekly format and share perspectives from on the ground as much as possible.
Long live resistance of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah!
Long live resistance of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah!
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List of the main acronyms for those in the chat who've joined recently:
HTS: Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, that now hold the Interim Government
SDF: Syrian Democratic Forces, military coalition of defense forces in NES
SNA: Syrian National Army, Islamist Turkish proxy forces
FSA: Free Syrian Army, old name that was used as an umbrella for opposition groups against Assad
SSG: Syrian Salvation Government, political front of HTS
SIG: Syrian Interim Government: political front of SNA and Turkey. Also known as STG, Syrian Transitional Government
MoD: Ministry of Defense of the Damascus government
DAANES: Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, political body in cooperation with SDF
IOF: Israeli Occupation Forces
KRG: Kurdish Regional government of north Iraq
KDP/PDK: Kurdish Democratic Party, governing party in KRG, linked to Barzani clan.
YNK/PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, opposition party in KRG, linked to Talabani clan
PYD: Partiya Yekitiya Democratic - Democratic Union Party, leading political party of DAANES
ENKS: Kurdish national union party, a party in Rojava that is closely connected to KRG and Turkey
KNK: Kurdistan National Congress, a political coalition and organization of parties and civil society from Kurdistan and Kurdish diaspora
FM: Foreign Minister
HTS: Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, that now hold the Interim Government
SDF: Syrian Democratic Forces, military coalition of defense forces in NES
SNA: Syrian National Army, Islamist Turkish proxy forces
FSA: Free Syrian Army, old name that was used as an umbrella for opposition groups against Assad
SSG: Syrian Salvation Government, political front of HTS
SIG: Syrian Interim Government: political front of SNA and Turkey. Also known as STG, Syrian Transitional Government
MoD: Ministry of Defense of the Damascus government
DAANES: Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, political body in cooperation with SDF
IOF: Israeli Occupation Forces
KRG: Kurdish Regional government of north Iraq
KDP/PDK: Kurdish Democratic Party, governing party in KRG, linked to Barzani clan.
YNK/PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, opposition party in KRG, linked to Talabani clan
PYD: Partiya Yekitiya Democratic - Democratic Union Party, leading political party of DAANES
ENKS: Kurdish national union party, a party in Rojava that is closely connected to KRG and Turkey
KNK: Kurdistan National Congress, a political coalition and organization of parties and civil society from Kurdistan and Kurdish diaspora
FM: Foreign Minister
Anarchist report from NES pinned «List of the main acronyms for those in the chat who've joined recently: HTS: Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, that now hold the Interim Government SDF: Syrian Democratic Forces, military coalition of defense forces in NES SNA: Syrian National Army, Islamist Turkish…»